The B-26 was a fine airplane but it had several characteristics that made it a more demanding aircraft to fly than a B-25 (or A-26 or A-20).
Simply stated, the B-26 had significantly higher wing loading which translated to a.) higher stall speed requiring higher approach and landing speed, b.) greater speed and longer runways to take off and land.
New pilots coming from Advanced training might have received time in a B-25, but more likely in a C-45 which is a far more docile and forgiving twin engine aircraft than a B-26. Experienced pilots in a B-25 would have no trouble if they listened to instructions and understood the differences in approach speed and landing differences. The higher stall speed was a killer and almost forced cancellation circa B-26C. Doolittle saved the program for Martin.
My father loved it, almost went to war with it before sneaking out for Fighters based on his legs being too short for rudder pedals. That said he performed as B-26 IP for 355th FG fighter pilots at Steeple Morden who were interested in learning to fly it.
FWIIW, the B-25s that Pappy Gunn modified universally had a forward CG issue after he stuffed everything up front so, allegedly the SWPA B-25s were no safer than a B-26 relative to airfield management.
I am aware of the traits ala wing-loading and stall speed of the early B-26, but I'm just noting it doesn't seem to be reflected in the operational history (at least in New Guinea, I believe some were also being used in Alaska...?) as far as the number of accidents in Claringbould's books, which cover the entire year of 1942. The B-26 units had a lot of accidents but so did the P-39s, P-40s, P-38s, B-25s, A-20s, B-17s, B-24s, Beauforts, Beaufighters etc. etc.
I wonder if part of the issue was that traits of the B-26 were being blamed for what seem like universal problems. The Allies (Americans and Australians both) had many more accidents and mishaps operating in New Guinea than the Japanese did, at least twice as many maybe three times. The conditions were horrible, and may have been a little worse for the Allies due to a larger number of aircraft and quickly built airfields and hastily prepared bases etc., but some of it must come down to training and maintenance.
All of the Allied aircraft operating in New Guinea seemed to have a high accident and mishap rate, and the Allies were also prone to navigation problems resulting in flying into mountains or out to sea never to be heard from again. The truth is a lot of the Allied units were rushed into the breach so fast that they did not have sufficient training especially (though to varying degrees) on the specific types of aircraft they were using. They also lacked for things like charts, local knowledge of the topography and many lethal quirks of the local environment etc. Early on they had extremely primitive maintenance facilities and were open repairing aircraft in the open air amid swarms of mosquitoes, daily thunderstorms etc., and while ill with malaria and a slew of other tropical diseases, sleeping in muddy tents without mosquito nets and so on. I think this contributed to the high rate of engines seizing, landing gear failing to deploy and the many other mechanical problems, which in turn often contributed to wrecks.
One of the reasons, IMO, to carefully read through these sometimes rather tedious detailed operational histories is to learn where the many tropes and propaganda slogans we all read about for decades and the true reality separate somewhat. I'm seeing a lot of that in this series but I'll address some of my observations (for what little that is worth) at the end after I finish going through Vol 6.