USAC and USAAF Logistic Support during WW2

[Big Jake]

When surveying the vast discussions/forums/sites dealing with the USAC and USAAF during WW2, the vast majority deal with pilots, aircraft and operations. When it comes to logistics, as far as I know, not much is available.
I have just read "Eighth Air Force Depot Maintenance & Logistics Leadership in World War II" by David A. Loska (Air Power History, Vol. 66, No. 3 (FALL 2019), pp. 29-45) and felt as if a window to an unknown (to me ) field has opened up. How many of you knew that the average heavy bomber spent a total of only 204 days in the ETO? Of these, only 19 days were on operational missions! For 96 days it was operational but not engaged in operations, 21 days were spent in non-operational training and 68 days in repair and maintenance, 12 of which were in modifications. That's an amazing statistics.
Or that when first arrived in the UK, it took 4 months (!) to modify a P-47 and bring it to the necessary operational standard. 4 months!
At the end, nothing can be accomplished without logistics. So, that is why I'm trying and locate and read/research any information about the logistics side of the USAC and USAAF during WW2, in Europe and the Pacific and would appreciate any leads/suggestions/pointers etc. for locating available material. Thanks.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

No one reference devoted to all USAAF logistics.

Numbered USAF Historical Studies Plenty of reports on specific subjects.

The US Army Official Histories have a number of books devoted to supply, plus there are the Transport and Quartermaster Corps histories, mostly concentrating on the ground forces but including the air force. Titles like

Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943
Global Logistics and Strategy 1943-1945
Strategic Planning for Coalition warfare 1941-1942
Strategic Planning for Coalition warfare 1943-1944

The Quartermaster Corps,
Organization, Supply and Service Volume I
Organization, Supply and Service Volume II
Operations in the War Against Japan
Operations in the War Against Germany

The Transport Corps,
Responsibilities, Organization and Operations
Movements, Training and Supply Operations Overseas.

The medical histories actually have plenty of air content, the medical evacuation flights and the trans Atlantic routes, short shelf life products like plasma to theatre, casualties returning. In the first 3 months of 1945 air evacuations from Europe overloaded reception facilities at New York, requiring diversions of aircraft to other US cities.

The US military had a lot to learn about efficient use of merchant ship capacity, being able to load ships "full and down", plus packaging and labelling, compounded by the shortage of shipping. Add giving timely notification to the receiving end of what cargo was coming in what ships, if you like the supply for the supply system.

Also there were the non US supply sources, the USAAF in England sourced 49% of its supplies from British sources until July 1943, plus obtained other British supplies through the Quartermaster system. In the period June 1942 to June 1944 the British supplied to US forces in England 63% of Quartermaster, 58% of engineer, 49% of medical, 25% of Chemical Warfare, 22% of signal corps and 21% of Air Force supplies, some 6.8 million measurement tons of supplies January 1942 to June 1944.

 

[ThomasP]

Try this

 

[pbehn]

Or that when first arrived in the UK, it took 4 months (!) to modify a P-47 and bring it to the necessary operational standard. 4 months!

I dont think 4 months was unusual or at least not extreme. It took about 3 months for the Mustang Mk I when they first arrived. With the P-47 they were arriving at a faster rate and at least some needed changes specified after they were made to do with plumbing for external tanks, there was also a carry on with radios at the start. The poor P-39 ole never really did make it into service in UK.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

 

[pbehn]

Great video, reminds me of unpacking pipes in Scotland. Imagine the mountain of wood and wrapping they have after assembling the 1000th plane.

 

[EwenS]

Of course many more aircraft were shipped from the USA partially disassembled and covered in protective coatings, as deck cargo on merchantmen and carriers. See p412 of this

The Army Air Forces in World War II Volume VI: Men and Planes: Chapter 12

www.ibiblio.org

This may be of interest

The Army Air Forces in World War II Volume VI: Men and Planes: Chapter 11

 

[drgondog]

There were many factors affecting elapsed times between arrival and operations in, for example, the ETO. The organizations under Materiel Command, particularly Wright Field as well as Air Serice Command that did not serve the AAF well in 1942 and 1943. In particular Wright Field was terrible with respect to testing for operational suitability. The P-47C and early Ds are a very good illustration of repeated production 'mistakes' such as designs that sent the fighters with issues in wiring harnesses and radios that simply weren't working or not suitable for combat operations. The issues with the high altitude engine, intercooler and oil cooler in extreme cold should have been caught if a true and thorough testing philosophy existed in MC. Flight Testing and Operational Suitability Testing was wrested from Wright Field and sent to Eglin only after the issues in ETO could not be overlooked.

Because feedback regarding issues in ETO for aircraft arriving from US was dismal, Republic and Lockheed and Boeing and Consolidated were slow to design and insert into production the necessary fixes - placing a huge burden on the Base Air Depot to make field changes on the fly and then try to support many non-standard features, even as the factory introduced production changes.

Major issues occurred during the flood of aicraft and crews in 1943 when both would arrive, but lo and behold, the maintenance tools, bomb carriers, fuel lorries, spare parts, Service Groups, etc did not arrive until much later and otherwise capable aircraft sat parked, and absent operational - the crews were woefully unprepared for combat ops at the crucial time in spring of 1943 when Eaker was flying half the sorties per B-17 and B-24 when compared to RAF.

 

[pbehn]

There were many factors affecting elapsed times between arrival and operations in, for example, the ETO. The organizations under Materiel Command, particularly Wright Field as well as Air Serice Command that did not serve the AAF well in 1942 and 1943. In particular Wright Field was terrible with respect to testing for operational suitability. The P-47C and early Ds are a very good illustration of repeated production 'mistakes' such as designs that sent the fighters with issues in wiring harnesses and radios that simply weren't working or not suitable for combat operations. The issues with the high altitude engine, intyercooler and oil cooler in extreme cold should have been caught if a true and thorough testing philosophy existed in MC. Flight Testing and Operational Suitability Testing was wrested from Wright Field and sent to Eglin only after the issues in ETO could not be overlooked.

Because feedback regarding issues in ETO for aircraft arriving from US was dismal, Republic and Lockheed and Boeing and Consolidated were slow to design and insert int production the necessary fixes - placing a huge burden on the Base Air Depot to make field changes on the fly and then try to support many non-standard features, even as the factory introduced production changes.

Major issues occurred during the flood of aicraft and crews in 1943 when both would arrive, but lo and behold, the maintenance tools, bomb carriers, fuel lorries, spare parts, Service Groups, etc did not arrive until much later and otherwise capable aircraft sat parked, and absent operational - the crews were woefully unprepared for combat ops at the crucial time in spring of 1943 when Eaker was fying half the sorties per B-17 and B-24 when compared to RAF,

Easy to be critical in hindsight, they were doing something that had never been done before. When a P-51 started being made in 1943 the airfield it would operate from wasnt actually an airfield at the time, it was a field.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I wonder if IKEA saw this.

 

[drgondog]

Easy to be critical in hindsight, they were doing something that had never been done before. When a P-51 started being made in 1943 the airfield it would operate from wasnt actually an airfield at the time, it was a field.

That specific example was not particularly true - at least by mid 1943 when so many RAF airfields had already transferred to AAF VIII and IX Fighter Commands.

 

[drgondog]

That specific example was not particularly true - at least by mid 1943 when so many RAF airfields had already transferred to AAF VIII and IX Fighter Commands.

To be more specific Boxted, home of Pioneer Mustang Group - the 354th was 8th AF in 1942, operational in spring 1943; Leiston, home of 357th operational Oct 43; RAF Steeple Morden 355th operational AAF 9-43; Keevil, initil 363rd FG, was operational bomber base, was 8th 9-42. Then moved Rivenhall (8th AF 8-42) in lat 1943. 4th FG RAF Debden 8th AF 9-42; 78th FG Goxhill/Duxford 9-42; 353rd FG Metfield operational 8th AF 10-42; 352nd FG Bodney 6-43. 20th FG Kingscliffe allocatd 8th AF 10-42; 55th FG Northampsted allocated 8th AF 8-42.

Offhand I can't recall a single 8th or 9th AF Fighter Base destination that was under construction as late as mid 1943. That said, some were more 'appointed' as far as permanent buildings and revetments.

The Air Service Command failures in 1942 and 1943 that I was babbling about were truly planning and execution errors in streamlined logistis to get aircraft, flight crews, ground crews, operations support tools and equipment delivered to the right place within 30 days of each other - so that cohesive training air and ground could begin for the new bomb, fighter and transport groups. Folowing that basic organizational requirement, were the organization and staffing of the Service Groups and Base Air Depots to perform the massive equipment modifications, major repairs, engine overhauls, etc. needed in 'front' and 'back' office to get and keep the aircraft operational.

The combined failures of ASC to expedite complete pre-operational air Groups in a timey fashion, combined with some of the leadership errors in backing some underperforming staff, ultimately cost Eaker the 8th AF command.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Some of the USAAF logistical problems in early 1943 may have been related to a lot of it lying at the bottom of the Atlantic.

 

[pbehn]

To be more specific Boxted, home of Pioneer Mustang Group - the 354th was 8th AF in 1942, operational in spring 1943; Leiston, home of 357th operational Oct 43; RAF Steeple Morden 355th operational AAF 9-43; Keevil, initil 363rd FG, was operational bomber base, was 8th 9-42. Then moved Rivenhall (8th AF 8-42) in lat 1943. 4th FG RAF Debden 8th AF 9-42; 78th FG Goxhill/Duxford 9-42; 353rd FG Metfield operational 8th AF 10-42; 352nd FG Bodney 6-43. 20th FG Kingscliffe allocatd 8th AF 10-42; 55th FG Northampsted allocated 8th AF 8-42.

Offhand I can't recall a single 8th or 9th AF Fighter Base destination that was under construction as late as mid 1943. That said, some were more 'appointed' as far as permanent buildings and revetments.

The Air Service Command failures in 1942 and 1943 that I was babbling about were truly planning and execution errors in streamlined logistis to get aircraft, flight crews, ground crews, operations support tools and equipment delivered to the right place within 30 days of each other - so that cohesive training air and ground could begin for the new bomb, fighter and transport groups. Folowing that basic organizational requirement, were the organization and staffing of the Service Groups and Base Air Depots to perform the massive equipment modifications, major repairs, engine overhauls, etc. needed in 'front' and 'back' office to get and keep the aircraft operational.

The combined failures of ASC to expedite complete pre-operational air Groups in a timey fashion, combined with some of the leadership errors in backing some underperforming staff, ultimately cost Eaker the 8th AF command.

It was Leiston I had in mind, according to Wiki it was assigned to the US and construction started in Sept 1942 finished in Sept 1943 and handed over in October. For some reason this stuck in my mind
"The first aircraft to land on the airfield - while it was still under construction - are believed to have been two Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses which were returning from operations on 30 July 1943. One aircraft nearly hit a contractor's vehicle when coming in to land as some of the runways were still partly obstructed by tree stumps and other materials."

I am sure there were cockups but it was a helluva task they took on.

 

[elbmc1969]

There were many factors affecting elapsed times between arrival and operations in, for example, the ETO. The organizations under Materiel Command, particularly Wright Field as well as Air Serice Command that did not serve the AAF well in 1942 and 1943. In particular Wright Field was terrible with respect to testing for operational suitability. The P-47C and early Ds are a very good illustration of repeated production 'mistakes' such as designs that sent the fighters with issues in wiring harnesses and radios that simply weren't working or not suitable for combat operations. The issues with the high altitude engine, intercooler and oil cooler in extreme cold should have been caught if a true and thorough testing philosophy existed in MC. Flight Testing and Operational Suitability Testing was wrested from Wright Field and sent to Eglin only after the issues in ETO could not be overlooked.

Because feedback regarding issues in ETO for aircraft arriving from US was dismal, Republic and Lockheed and Boeing and Consolidated were slow to design and insert into production the necessary fixes - placing a huge burden on the Base Air Depot to make field changes on the fly and then try to support many non-standard features, even as the factory introduced production changes.

Major issues occurred during the flood of aicraft and crews in 1943 when both would arrive, but lo and behold, the maintenance tools, bomb carriers, fuel lorries, spare parts, Service Groups, etc did not arrive until much later and otherwise capable aircraft sat parked, and absent operational - the crews were woefully unprepared for combat ops at the crucial time in spring of 1943 when Eaker was flying half the sorties per B-17 and B-24 when compared to RAF.

I'm getting the feeling that the criticism of the French Air Force for taking so long to make produced aircraft "bon de guerre" in 1940 is a bit unfair ...

 

[drgondog]

I'm getting the feeling that the criticism of the French Air Force for taking so long to make produced aircraft "bon de guerre" in 1940 is a bit unfair ...

Probably true. The French were far better prepared for war than US. That said,Hitler had an insurmounable barrier to put tracks on the ground or bombs on the cities in the US. Even the Japanese had no hope of ever putting feet on the ground despite a magnificent Navy and Army and Air Force in 1941.

Simply Logistics is control of source, supply chain and destinaton. But the aircraft 'readiness' thangy was far better in hand for Britain and France and Germany and Japan and maybe even Italy at the time.