Now unfortunately my originally intented reply was taken by this board's engine, and I don't intend to re-type the whole thing again, so please pardon me for being brief.
For a start you need to research the decisions made on the 7th, 8th and 9th Meetings of the Air Ministry's Oil Co-ordinating Policy Committee on 18th May, 29th June and 10th August 1940, respectively. These can be found in AVIA 10/282 at the Public Records Office, Kew. I believe this source is cited in my original article, which you should not selectively quote to support a thesis which it explictly contradicts.
First, thank you for giving us your references. About a month ago, Glider made an offer that he, being more closely situated to Kew than the rest of us, would try to find that paper, but I haven't heard of him about it ever since, and not sure if he attempted or succeeded in it.
Now, as for your thesis, it seems to be refuting the notion that the use of 100 octane fuel was made available by US.
And I believe I have quoted the part of your work which notes that as of 1939, 16 fighter and 2 Blenheim Squadrons were intended to be supplied with 100 octane fuel. You should also not rely on Glider's 'summaries' of my arguements, as they are not my arguements, but Glider's own arguements presenting my position as strawman arguements.
As for the 18th May meeting, it does seem to have two salient points.
a, The position of the Oil Committee was 'made clear' to Fighter Command, which does sound like, given the circumstantial evidence (see later), that Fighter Command's wishes for 100 octane fuel were not completely fulfilled.
b, It also notes that 100 octane fuel was supplied to 'Squadrons concerned', ie.
selected Squadrons, and not all.
As for the 10th August meeting, it does note that they intended to use 100 octane fuel for all operational aircraft of all Commands; from the actual rate of fuel consumption by type of fuel, it is also clear that this remained a plan and did not materialize.
Ie. In June - August, a monthly avarage of 10 000 tons of 100 octane is used against 26 000 tons of other grades; in September 1940, 14 000 tons of 100 octane is used against 23 000 tons of other grades. In October, its 17 000 tons vs 18 000 tons. In November, its still 15 000 vs 13 000 tons.
Quite clearly, the majority of operational RAF aircraft were using 87 octane during the period, despite the plans made on 10th August.
I don't think we are in disagreement about that RAF fighters which were deployed to Stations that were supplied with 100 octane were taking advantage of the fuel. The dilemma and uncertainty that surrounds the issue is that to what extent 100 octane fuel was used during the Battle by RAF fighters, and not wheter it was used at all or not.
However, if your thesis is that 100 octane was the only kind of fuel used by Fighter Command during the Battle, I must note that at this point, this thesis would lack the sufficient evidence, and is contradicted by contemporary RAF fighter manuals which note both 87 and 100 octane fuel use, German reports that indicate that captured Spitfires and Hurricans were found fuelled with 87 octane fuel, and the generic lack of positive evidence to the positive claim, and also documentary evidence, that will be listed below.
In any case, the relevant file for that letter (PRO AIR 2/2434) should contain the rather interesting observation for some readers, made on 25 August 1938, that the RAF planned to supply 100 octane to all Spitfire and Hurricane bases.
As you noted, the August 1938 was a pre-war plan that was over-ridden by a series of subsequent planning decisions, first the March 1939 decision which revised and limited the number of Squadrons effected to 16 + 2 effective in September 1940, and as you noted, this was brought forward to early 1940. I do not see how its nature was any different than the March 1939 plan that replaced it.
However it remains unclear wheter there were more Squadrons effected than the original 16 + 2. Do you have perhaps information regarding the number of Stations / Squadrons that were
actually supplied with 100 octane fuel?
Now in return I'd like to know what evidence you have which demonstrates that operational squadrons in Fighter Command (and particularly 11 Group) after May 1940 were not using 100 octane fuel routinely. I am particularly interested in learning the source of your statement that -
... it seems that there is evidence in May 1940 decision was made to stop existing conversion on the basis of the uncertainity of the supplies, and that around 1/4 of the Squadrons were supplied with this kind of fuel during most of the Battle.
- as this is appears to be contradicted by the decisions in the sources I have just cited.
Certainly. A couple of years ago an Australian researcher shared his findings about the matter with some of us during a related discussion.
He came across a document, copied to the Australian Military Commission in England in February 1941, by Roll Royce to Lord Beaverbrook outlining past, current and proposed changes to the Merlin; and factors that affect it's performance, when he was researching another subject (Dutch East Indies Fuel levels prior to the Japanese Invasion) at the Australian War Memorial Archives. It was a collection of lose-leaf typed pages, included as an addendum in a report titled Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. He noted that the reason why it was included amongst AWM papers is because the Australian Government at that time was protesting vigoriously about the continued supply of lower grade 87 octane fuel when it too wanted 100 octane for the RAAF. McFarland, Pugh, Hart, Perret, Lumsden and even Churchill have all quoted parts from the report.
He summarized the contents of the addendum as the follows (salient points highlighted by me):
"Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.
By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.
Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.
The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940."
It certainly does seem to be connected to your papers in Kew, in particular the position of the Oil Committee that was 'made clear' to Fighter Command in the SIXTH meeting, in May 1940.
