Ok so I promised some data from Ehlers, I'm going to post that finally.
Ehlers' Data
These are some of the data points Ehlers mentions during 1942.
January 1942 -
Axis air forces in Tripolitania 515 aircraft, 300 serviceable.
WDAF 445 aircraft, 280 serviceable.
(his source is a British military press report, subtitled "British forces reach their lowest ebb"
Axis deliver 67,000 tons of supplies, 40,000 tons of fuel by sea, loss rate 9%. Loss rate in Feb is 3%, April is 1%
Rommel notes being very pleased with Luftwaffe support
March 1942
Drummond: "fighter squadrons understrength, tactical superiority of Me 109F was out of all proportion to numbers." Me 109s attacking RAF airfields, WDAF bombers only striking at night (Wellingtons with Albacore spotters). Even when RAF had large numbers of fighters to go after Me 109Fs, their superior performance, heavy armanent [!], and backing by Italian fighters gave them unprecedented freedom of action."
Dawson demands more Kittyhawks, noting only 28 were en-route. "Hurricane obsolete as air superiority fighter, transitioning to 'hurribomber'"
335 Kittyhawks arriving from April-June, 65 Merlin powered P-40F arriving in May and June. Tedder demands more Kittyhawks "gravest concern."
April 1942
60 RAF squadrons flying US made aircraft. 60,000 workers pulled from industrial jobs in the UK and trained to be mechanics of US types.
May 1942
First Spitfires arrive WDAF
Germans have 160 fighters and 250 bombers in Sicily (vs Malta)
Gazala Offensive
RAF squadrons "down to 7 or 8 aircraft" due to attrition. Lost 50 out of 250 aircraft 27-31 May. Coningham changes tactics for Kittyhawks to deploy at higher altitudes. First Spitfire PR squadrons. Tedder: Shortage of Kittyhawks.
June 1942
SAS destroys 11 Axis aircraft 12-13 June
"Coningham released fighters to high altitude duty to maximize success" Saved Free French units. "Merci pour la R.A.F. / Merci pour le sport."
WDAF 615 sorties on 26 June. 34 B-24 strikes vs Benghazi 21-30 June. USAAF launches 120 B-24 missions, 45 B-17 missions.
2 RAF Air Liason officers with each USAAF unit.
Friction between Luftwaffe air and ground. Luftwaffe heavy losses 3-10 June.
Heavy Axis troop and vehicle losses covering 8th Army collapse at Bir Hacheim.
21st Panzer division history: "Continual attacks at quarter-hour intervals by bombers and low-flying aircraft."
Germans using Stukas and Italian fighter-bombers for tactical air support, Ju 88 for 'operational'
Gambut airfield captured by Rommel.
Axis supply convoys in June lost 23% supplies, 17% fuel (35% total shipping tonnage)
July 1942
First El Alamein
SAS destroys 66 aircraft July 26
Major WDAF changes (seemingly under Coningham with Tedder's approval)
Tedder: "Spitfires enormous asset". RAF radar. 560 aircraft. 15.3 aircraft per sqn at start, 16.9 by 6 July.
Kesselring: "Luftwaffe units no longer a match for the RAF". vs. Allied artillery: "stuka too vulnerable, Ju 88 too inaccurate" Insufficient fighters.
19th Division attacked 'hourly', Italian Littoro division halted by air attacks. German artillery unit went from 60 vehicles in June to 20 by end of July.
WDAF Air raid Gazala destroys 30 Me 109s. Night bombings hitting Axis supplies.
USAF: 27 x Hudson, 80 x Kittyhawks (P-40F), 57 x B-25s, 35 x B-24s. USAAF 35% of light bombers, 70% of heavies.
At the end of 1st El Alamein - WDAF 780 operational aircraft, Luftwaffe 126 (Italian aircraft not indicated here)
Axis supply convoys in July lost 6% of supplies and fuel
August 1942
Alam Haifa offensive
Allied air strikes (Malta and 201 Group) sink 60,000 out of 137,000 tons of Axis shipping. 443 tons of ammo available to Axis, 350 tons sunk.
RAF aircraft with ASV radar - better torpedoes. Axis supply convoys lost 25% supplies and 41% fuel. 1 Aug to 5 Sept 61 Axis ships sunk (243,000 tons), 18 (73,000 tons) out of commission
Night attacks in ground war. Albacore spotters for Wellingtons. Germans lack searchlights and radar (one Freya radar at El Daba)
Rommel "vast numbers of vehicles burning in the desert"
Once large Axis MV reach port "the RAF faced a profusion of smaller west-to-east sea convoys and land convoys." Attacked by Hudsons with ASV and torpedoes
Sept 1942
Axis supply convoys lost 20% of supply and fuel
Air superiority key because "until the skies were relatively safe, Hurricanes faced heavy losses."
901 British vs 171 Luftwaffe serviceable (Italians not indicated). German POWs: "Flucht-Psychose" - 'flight psychosis' due to raids.
British ground division: Nine "tentacles" with nine radios, 3 sets in control HQ, 2 liaison to division HQ, + 2 FASL
Oct 1942
Second El Alamein
"Several major" Axis supply convoys destroyed. Heavy bomber raids against Tripoli, Benghazi and Tobruk, requiring ships offload at different harbors.
Five large fuel tankers sunk in one week. Only one road for truck transport - 'under unceasing air attack'
Rommel: "Air raid after Air raid after Air raid" burning vehicles choked the battlefield.
"Air raids put all of von Thoma's artillery out of action". German army "lost mobility."
27 Oct - 3 Nov 4,244 tons of fuel allocated, 893 tons arrived.
Bf 109G in Theater. "Only the 78 Spitfires and the perennially understrength Kittyhawk units could contest the air."
B-24s, A-20s, B-26s, B-25s and 50 Wellingtons in
205 group at the time of El Alamein. 205 group flying 540 sorties a day.
Wellingtons drop 125 tons in night attacks, later 200 tons per night.
General Georg Stumme killed by strafing attack during the "Defense of Outpost Snipe" which I'm going to do a deep dive in a followup post
21st Pz counterattack stopped by RAF, 6 pounder, and tanks (RAF 352 tons of bombs)
Operation Supercharge, Germans hit 34 raids vs. "Hill 28"
9 x intact Bf 109G captured by Allied ground forces.
Sortie rates dropped as Axis army retreated out of range. Montgommery 'cautious'
Ehlers' Conclusions
Chapter 8 is titled "Axis High Tide" February - July 1942
Chapter 9 is titled "The Tide turns" - July - October 1942
That is pretty close to the main premise of what I was arguing earlier in this thread. But I promise you I hadn't seen this book.
Ehlers notes that the Germans could have done much more against RAF basis - such as 205 Group bases that were preying on the German shipping, or attacked Suez.
(I am not so sure they could do the longer range strikes but I'll come back to that. But at some points Allied maritime strike aircraft bases were within range of Bf 109s and MC 202s)
Says Germans only had an intermittent campaign against Allied tactical air bases.
Notes that Bf 109 was not good in the escort role and had limited range.
Strategic goal at 1st El Alamein included oil fields. Ehlers says Germans were thinking about breaking through and shutting down Suez but didn't coordinate their strategy well enough.
RAF covered (made possible) 8th Army escape and survive first half 1942.
US heavy bombers "packed a punch out of proportion to their numbers" by mid 1942.
Importance of the Kittyhawks and Spitfires for air superiority. Hurricanes already incapable in this role by March 1942.
Change in tactics with Kittyhawks in June - July 1942 (Ehlers only mentions flying at higher altitude, I'll have a bit more on that).
Importance of Wellingtons in night attacks, and Albacores as night time markers with flares. They also had Halifax in Theater.
Major significance of better British torpedoes appearing (I think) in mid 1942.
East to West coastal transport in small vessels was of major importance.
Stuka, the most important CAS strike aircraft for the Axis, was neutralized for ground operations by the time of El Alamein.
Finally, Ehlers felt the Germans could have taken Malta and not doing so was a fatal mistake.
Efficiency of CAS was already getting quite good. Ehlers mentions response time in minutes (IIRC half an hour?) but I couldn't find the quote just now when I was making this post. Hopefully I'll find it again later.
My Conclusions
(I know this is the least interesting bit, but I'll carry on anyway)
Allies did not always have numerical superiority. Actual numbers fluctuated a lot as aircraft on both sides were moved around, diverted for convoy fights etc. Notably at some points in early 1942 the Axis actually had numerical advantage.
The losses in Allied fighters inflicted by the Luftwaffe in early 1942 were indeed a serious problem, necessitating a change in tactics, and causing a supply crisis for aircraft.
Limited range of Bf109 and ineffectiveness in fighter escort role was a major problem for the Axis throughout this campaign.
Lack of a better long range strike aircraft was also a major problem. Ju 88 was a good aircraft but it didn't seem to be good enough by the second half of 1942.
Ultimately the Kittyhawk was the solution to air superiority over the Luftwaffe in the Med, at least in 1942.
Heavy bombers - including both B-24s and B-17s
did in fact play a major role, as early as June 1942, and this steadily increased. Surprisingly they even sunk some ships (I assume in harbor but that wasn't clear). The main impact was against ports and then later on, airfields. Ehlers
It was often pointed out that Axis defeat was a foregone conclusion because they were low on fuel. But a quarter to (by the time of 2nd El Alamein)
half of their fuel and supplies lost was due to Allied air power.
The "high altitude" tactics change which Ehlers mentions also coincided with the switch to 'finger four', systematic tactic of turning into enemy attacks from above, improved radios, more reliable guns and some other things which changed the outcomes for the Kittyhawk units quite a bit, starting in mid 1942.
Neutralizing the Stukas was of huge importance. This was in part to a general shift in priorities toward achieving air superiority, which included hitting the Axis airbases.
Surprises
The two biggest surprises for me were the sheer intensity of the tactical bombing (two and three times an hour in some cases) and the fact that it continued 24/7. This in turn brings up the significance of the Wellingtons + Albacores which Ehlers mentions over and over, flying night raids (also about every hour or even more often).
Another surprise was that apparently the US wanted to send almost all their Kittyhawks to the Pacific during the crisis there, but the British pointed out they had already put in this whole logistics system for Kittyhawks and trained thousands of mechanics to fix them, and they did not want to switch to a British type (even though they had a lot of Spitfire V in England). I think there are many reasons for this, but it looks like this is partly why US units in New Guinea and the Solomons got P-39s instead of P-40s. The British needed them more.
A third surprise to me was the very impressive rate of refurbishment and rebuilding of damaged Allied aircraft by the British. This really saved the day because it effectively doubled or even tripled their resupply of planes. I'm not sure if these were quite as good as undamaged ones but it was way better than nothing.
Postscript
A great deal of very interesting stuff happens in Ehlers book after El Alamein, but that's obviously beyond the scope of this thread.
Just as a postscript though, during and after Torch, in a nutshell the Axis adapted somewhat to air attacks vs. their shipping (using ferrys and some other smaller boats to run the blockade at night) and the Americans coming in, mainly the ground commanders, had to relearn the air support lessons. As a result the Luftwaffe had a brief heyday, which coincided with German victories at Kasserine. For a moment the Axis had air superiority again and they used it to good effect. This was the last major use of the Stuka in North Africa.
Eventually Esienhower forced the American ground commanders to go along with the British model, which paid dividends.
Part of the Allied resurgence after Kasserine also involved bringing down a very (to me surprisingly) large number of 8th AF heavy bombers from England. There was a lot of debate about this but basically it was felt that they could do much more harm to the enemy in North Africa and eventually Italy, until 8th AF was really able to do deep raids into Germany and the Allied armies were ready to do D-Day, which they realized was out of reach in 1943.
