Was Operation Pedestal a greater Axis air attack than any faced by the USN in 1942?

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Perhaps you can give an example where accepted AA kill claims were running at 6 or 7 to 1 vs actual AA kills?

I would say that AAA claims, and also those of defensive gunners on bombers, tended to be very high. I don't see how it matters in any way, and I don't think the officers were foolish enough to assume that victory claims were 100% accurate. The only reason I can think of for you to post this and keep going on about it would possibly you are grasping at straws to make the FAA look more impressive by comparison? I really don't know about FAA victory claim to actual enemy losses ratios, but I have crunched the numbers on RAF, Luftwaffe and Italian air force claims and 200-300% overclaiming was routine.

If you are really passionate about this issue, I'd say start another thread. I really don't think it has any relevance to this one.

The F4F-4 air to air kill claims are not really out of line with other AF or actual kills, but the SBD kill claims should be raising some eyebrows. However it's the combined totals of the AA kill claims and aerial kill claims that is really out of whack.

It's clear from the operational histories I've already posted that the SBD pilots did in fact shoot down quite a few IJN aircraft. And at the same time, I'm sure they overclaimed.

This is Lundstrom's summation of just the first IJN strike:

and the 2nd strike:


so that's 21 of the 29 aircraft stated in the table.

So what? It looks like the Japanese took a lot of losses to me. What is your point?

 

[RCAFson]

I don't think anyone was calling for Hurricanes or Sea Hurricanes anywhere in the Pacific

At the risk of repeating myself:

...Another aspect of
the attack that proved inadequate was fighter escort. To Fletcher the folding wing F4F-4s
represented no improvement over the fixed-wing F4F-3s, except more F4F-4s could be
carried. He echoed the call of Halsey and others of the urgent necessity'' for detachable fuel
tanks to increase their effective attack radius beyond 175 miles. Spruance and Browning
rated the Grumman Wildcat "greatly inferior'' in comparison with the nimble Japanese
Zero. On 20 June Nimitz relayed their fears to King, noting the "extreme and apparently
increased superiority performance of 0 fighters'' was mitigated only by the vulnerability
of Japanese planes and the superior tactics of the U.S. Navy fighter pilots. "Overall results
have been bad and will be serious and potentially decisive with improvement that must
be expected in enemy tactics.'' Remarkably he called for army Curtiss P-4OF Warhawk
fighters to replace navy F4F Wildcats and Brewster F2A Buffaloes in all marine fighting
squadrons defending forward bases and even asked that the P-4OF "or comparable type"
be tested for carrier suitability; In the meantime the F4F-4s must be lightened, and their
ammunition supply increased even should that require reverting to four guns in place ofsix.
The swift introduction ofthe Vought F4U-1 Corsair fighter was an"absolute priority.'' Thus
after Midway the top fleet commanders experienced a serious crisis of confidence over the
effectiveness of the basic U.S. carrier fighter, a worry that would soon influence Fletcher's
most controversial command decision...
Lundstrom, Black Shoe carrier Admiral, p.200


what "comparable type" aircraft were available in mid 1942, that would be suitable for carrier operation? The SH1B had already proven itself by this time and Hawker was just finishing work on the SH2A/B/C with the same engine as the P40F...

 

[RCAFson]

So what? It looks like the Japanese took a lot of losses to me. What is your point?

You stated: "Many of the IJN planes that ditched actually didn't make it to anywhere near their carriers."

I replied with quotes from Lundstrom in reply to your statement, above.

"This is Lundstrom's summation of just the first IJN strike:

and the 2nd strike:


so that's 21 of the 29 aircraft stated in the table." (with the actual quotes deleted)

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Heck, they couldn't even get P-40Fs (mostly) Although The navy wanted to try some.

P-40F 41-13701 was transferred to Anacostia Naval AIr station on June 6th 1942 for comparative trials with the F4F-4.
CinCPAC on June 21st 1942 wanted P-40s for all high importance outlying bases for Marine squadrons if the P-40 could be modified for with carrier operations.

They did have P-40Fs based in the Solomons. They were in short supply and high demand as Ehlers noted, but the Corsairs would be there in enough numbers soon, and the P-38s were already trickling in.

 

[PAT303]

This included 49% of B5N crews killed, 39% of D3A crews killed, and 20% of A6M killed.

Reading these battle reports it's little wonder the Japanese lost, all you hear about is how good the IJN aircraft were with their extreme range and fantastic maneuverability but when you loose this percentage of your forces on one strike your on a road to nowhere.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

At the risk of repeating myself:

...Another aspect of
the attack that proved inadequate was fighter escort. To Fletcher the folding wing F4F-4s
represented no improvement over the fixed-wing F4F-3s, except more F4F-4s could be
carried. He echoed the call of Halsey and others of the urgent necessity'' for detachable fuel
tanks to increase their effective attack radius beyond 175 miles. Spruance and Browning
rated the Grumman Wildcat "greatly inferior'' in comparison with the nimble Japanese
Zero. On 20 June Nimitz relayed their fears to King, noting the "extreme and apparently
increased superiority performance of 0 fighters'' was mitigated only by the vulnerability
of Japanese planes and the superior tactics of the U.S. Navy fighter pilots. "Overall results
have been bad and will be serious and potentially decisive with improvement that must
be expected in enemy tactics.'' Remarkably he called for army Curtiss P-4OF Warhawk
fighters to replace navy F4F Wildcats and Brewster F2A Buffaloes in all marine fighting
squadrons defending forward bases and even asked that the P-4OF "or comparable type"
be tested for carrier suitability; In the meantime the F4F-4s must be lightened, and their
ammunition supply increased even should that require reverting to four guns in place ofsix.
The swift introduction ofthe Vought F4U-1 Corsair fighter was an"absolute priority.'' Thus
after Midway the top fleet commanders experienced a serious crisis of confidence over the
effectiveness of the basic U.S. carrier fighter, a worry that would soon influence Fletcher's
most controversial command decision...
Lundstrom, Black Shoe carrier Admiral, p.200


what "comparable type" aircraft were available in mid 1942, that would be suitable for carrier operation? The SH1B had already proven itself by this time and Hawker was just finishing work on the SH2A/B/C with the same engine as the P40F...

You think P-40F is comparable to a Sea Hurricane? It then becomes a mystery why they benched the Hurricane (no 'Sea') for front line fighter duties in the MTO already by the time of Pedestal.

I also doubt that Spruance, Nimitz or King would want Hurricanes when they were shot down in droves over Singapore and Ceylon and were doing so dismally in Burma.

In fact, I'm going to go out on a limb and say that there was nobody in the world who thought a Hurricane was the equivalent of a P-40F in 1942.

P-40F had the same engine as a Hurricane II, but it was 50-70 mph faster than a Tropicalized Hurricane (depending on which P-40F test you want to go by). The P-40F was In Demand in 1942. Hurricane of any kind was not, it was just something they had.

"Comparable type" to a P-40F would be the Spitfire V, and the Seafire would be flying from carriers very shortly by 1943. The Marines would get F4Us starting in Feb 1943 and the Army already had P-40s (including P-40Fs) and P-38s in Theater, as well as some P-39s which soon went the way of the Hurricane. As we know the Corsair was far superior as a carrier aircraft to either the Sea Hurricane or the (much better but still troubled) Seafire.

The 175 nm strike radius of an F4F would not be improved by an aircraft with half the range. Fortunately for the USN, they did in fact work out external fuel tanks for the F4F, adding an extra 116 gallons of fuel.

 

[SaparotRob]

I explained one of the consequences in my post. Another consequence is that USN AA capability was greatly overrated. The number of SBD kill claims is also of note and there's a thread here currently discussing SBD kill claims.

If the RN ship's AA and FAA aircraft were overclaiming at the same rate as the USN, then the Allies might have concluded that the Luftwaffe had been blown from the sky over PEDESTAL.

What SR6 said.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Reading these battle reports it's little wonder the Japanese lost, all you hear about is how good the IJN aircraft were with their extreme range and fantastic maneuverability but when you loose this percentage of your forces on one strike your on a road to nowhere.

Well it's a bit of a chicken / egg thing, as we are debating the relative merits of carrier aircraft, and it has already been pointed out in here recently that the US was a bit ahead of the curve on the effectiveness of their AAA. F4F was clearly superior to the Sea Hurricane in many respects, USN pilot training and in particular gunnery training were extremely good.

Aircraft losses in combat (as opposed to, because their carrier sunk) clearly went up sharply for the Japanese in Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. This is probably related to more fighters and more AAA.

At Santa Cruz the USN had four of their new "Atlanta Class" CLAA cruisers. These had 8 dual 5" gun mounts plus many lighter guns.

The other thing I would note about the IJN aircraft -

Their fighters took a heavy toll of USN aircraft in air combats, and
Their strike aircraft, particularly the D3A, were extremely lethal in sinking ships.

I will total up the number of attacking planes vs. actual hits, but in Pedestal (and many other Mediterranean battles) you can see cases where 20 or 30 German or Italian strike aircraft, unmolested by any Combat Air Patrol and facing relatively light AAA, still failed to get any hits. I don't think that would have happened with an equivalent number of D3A, B5N or even G4Ms.

We can also see that the D3A was every bit as lethal against British ships as they were against US ships (D3A at Ceylon, G3M at Singapore etc.). Once those "Vals" were in the sky in particular it was a good idea to find your life vest. I think the Japanese also benefited by the fact that unlike the USN, their torpedoes worked and worked very well, making their relatively unimpressive B5N still pretty lethal ship killers, and the same for the G3M and G4M. These weren't as dangerous as a D3A but they were getting hits more often than a Ju 88 or a SM.79.

The Japanese aircraft did ultimately suffer from high rates of attrition of course as we well know. The crew deaths were partly due to features of the aircraft and partly because the IJN (unlike the Royal Navy or USN) had almost no policies for rescuing downed aircrew. They sometimes sent ships or submarines to collect survivors, but almost as an afterthought. This was due to their mindset. (by contrast US had fleets of PBYs and OS2Us and many other planes, plus submarines and PT boats out looking for their valuable aircrew right after every fight, and the British did the equivalent generally speaking).

The Japanese Navy aircraft and their tactics were suited to a kind of lightning warfare, rapid tactical victory which could come at a heavy cost. This is what won them their victory at Peal Harbor and their conquests of Singapore, Malaysia, Java, and the Philippines.

What the US and Australians did was more or less fight them to a draw from the second quarter of 1942, on the ground at Guadalcanal and New Guinea, in the Air at New Guinea and Darwin and Guadalcanal, and out at sea out at Midway and all around the Solomons. At great cost. This turned the battle from "lightning war" to attrition, which eventually doomed the Japanese.

But I don't think it is wise to sell them short. Considering they were basically in the Middle Ages in the 1870s, they were certainly a force to contend with in 1942.

 

[Shortround6]

The Marines would get F4Us starting in Feb 1943 and the Army already had P-40s (including P-40Fs) and P-38s in Theater,

The P-40Fs started to show up in Dec of 1942 and first reached Guadalcanal in Jan 1943.

About 88 were sent to the Pacific and they were scattered from Hawaii to New Caledonia.

Fortunately for the USN, they did in fact work out external fuel tanks for the F4F, adding an extra 116 gallons of fuel.

Not sure when they showed up but in the evaluation test in June of 1942 the Navy admired the 52 gallon tank on the P-40F. The 50 (?) gallon tanks for the F4F-4 were under test, but not operational at this time. You can find photos of Wildcats with drop tanks but they are not as common as you might think. And be careful of what you are looking at. Some of the ones on Guadalcanal carried one tank, there is a photo of one F4F with a belly tank followed by one wing one wing tank. P-38 in the same photo for timing.
There are several photos of FM-2s with two tanks.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The standard external tank for the F4F was the 58 gallon tank, carried either in pairs or just one at a time. These were tested in mid 1942 and were in use by the time of these October battles at Guadalcanal. There was also a smaller 42 gallon tank carried beneath the center.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I believe the drop tanks used for the P-40F (originally 52 gallon and later 75 gallon) were particularly successful and were later passed around all over and used with many different types of Allied aircraft including P-51s and I think some RAF types though I'm not sure. The Japanese were also very early adopters of an external fuel tank, carrying an 85 gallon drop tank on the A6M which greatly increased their range, and was a major boon to their success.

 

[Shortround6]

The standard external tank for the F4F was the 58 gallon tank, carried either in pairs or just one at a time. These were tested in mid 1942 and were in use by the time of these October battles at Guadalcanal. There was also a smaller 42 gallon tank carried beneath the center.

The 50 gal was from a book on Curtiss fighters so certainly not definitive. But we are back to timing again. And perhaps field performance.

That center drop tank is a bit scary looking.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think there was interest in an 'interceptor' especially around the time when the Kamikazes started up, that's when they started putting F4Us on the carriers and I think Seafires were considered good for this too.

IIRC, CinCPAC requested examining the proposition of a navalized P-40 in 1942. Few in the USN were happy with the F4F.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Fletcher was withdrawn as part of a general change of command because he and Ghormley and some others weren't perceived as sufficiently willing to risk destruction of the USN fleet especially in surface actions and had left the marines in a lurch at Guadalcanal.

King certainly had a distaste for Fletcher's caution about his carriers which played into Fletcher's removal. But King hadn't lost two carriers in combat while delivering strategic victories, either, as Fletcher had at CS and Midway.

I think Ghormley's removal was unrelated. By Oct 1942 the admiral was worn out. Nimitz took note of that on his visit that month, that Ghormley looked haggard, and that played into his decision to install Halsey. We all know that physical tiredness/ailments play upon mental acuity. Halsey himself had been replaced a few months before for health reasons, right before Midway.

Put shortly, I think relieving Ghormley was fair, while removing Fletcher was arguably unfair -- and worse, unwise. Fletcher (for being black-shoe) gained a solid grasp of carrier tactics, and was at grips with the enemy, which wasn't the case for King or Ghormley. He also knew he was far out on a branch that could be sawn off behind him, so looking to his logistics was not a bad move. Remember, he'd already done a tour in the SoPac when he had to really work to refuel his ships.

Fletcher risked a lot, including his own career and reputation. I'm not sure he's gotten a fair drag, and I write that as someone who has in the past slagged his taste for refueling at inopportune moments.

Imperfect admiral, to be sure, but in a different class, and fired for different reasons, than Ghormley.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

You stated: "Many of the IJN planes that ditched actually didn't make it to anywhere near their carriers."

I replied with quotes from Lundstrom in reply to your statement, above.

"This is Lundstrom's summation of just the first IJN strike:

and the 2nd strike:


so that's 21 of the 29 aircraft stated in the table." (with the actual quotes deleted)

I still don't get your point. Do you feel that the passage you quoted from Lundstrom refutes the idea that Japanese planes ditched before they got to their carriers? Because it definitely doesn't.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

King certainly had a distaste for Fletcher's caution about his carriers which played into Fletcher's removal. But King hadn't lost two carriers in combat while delivering strategic victories, either, as Fletcher had at CS and Midway.

I think Ghormley's removal was unrelated. By Oct 1942 the admiral was worn out. Nimitz took note of that on his visit that month, that Ghormley looked haggard, and that played into his decision to install Halsey. We all know that physical tiredness/ailments play upon mental acuity. Halsey himself had been replaced a few months before for health reasons, right before Midway.

Put shortly, I think relieving Ghormley was fair, while removing Fletcher was arguably unfair -- and worse, unwise. Fletcher (for being black-shoe) gained a solid grasp of carrier tactics, and was at grips with the enemy, which wasn't the case for King or Ghormley. He also knew he was far out on a branch that could be sawn off behind him, so looking to his logistics was not a bad move. Remember, he'd already done a tour in the SoPac when he had to really work to refuel his ships.

Fletcher risked a lot, including his own career and reputation. I'm not sure he's gotten a fair drag, and I write that as someone who has in the past slagged his taste for refueling at inopportune moments.

Imperfect admiral, to be sure, but in a different class, and fired for different reasons, than Ghormley.

I remember reading a very interesting analysis of WW2 in comparison with our modern military - that US military commanders were routinely 'sacked', replaced or removed from command without necessarily damaging their career. As you note, Halsey himself was replaced and then reinstated. In WW2, officers could be removed, get some time to re-evaluate, maybe serve in a different capacity, or maybe in a different area. This way they helped prevent the congealing of bad policies or entrenched mistakes from bringing on defeat.

The point being made in the article is that now days removal from a post above the rank of O-6 or so was tantamount to destroying a career, so it was rarely done any more (such as during some of our recent wars) even when it really needed to be. They had a much better system previously.

As for Fletcher in particular, I believe his removal was part of a sweeping change which included Ghormley. I don't necessarily think Halsey was a better naval officier or leader - his decisions led to some quite bloody outcomes for the US Navy. But that is what the higher ups wanted at the time - more aggression, more blood and guts. Ultimately I guess it payed off. It may also be possible that the same goals could have been accomplished with fewer casualties via a bit more finesse.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

IIRC, CinCPAC requested examining the proposition of a navalized P-40 in 1942. Few in the USN were happy with the F4F.

I don't think they were delighted with the F4F, and for a fact there was definitely a mini revolt about it. The pilots were pissed to go from the moderately peppy F4F-3 to the slower and heavier F4F-4 (at least until some of the fuel was burned off). But folding wings meant for strategic advantages.

The Wildcat or Martlet was a quite limited design as a carrier fighter, but for engines available in the period, and all the things a naval fighter needed to carry and do, it was the best option available on the Allied side by a wide margin. Do you think a Sea Hurricane would have made a good replacement?

I also think a lot of the consternation died down once the Thach Weave proved to be successful and a few other changes were made (including that external fuel tank) which made life easier.

The Corsair and the Hellcat were the ultimate solution to all the problems, and for the smaller escort carriers, the FM-2.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The 50 gal was from a book on Curtiss fighters so certainly not definitive. But we are back to timing again. And perhaps field performance.
View attachment 708520
That center drop tank is a bit scary looking.

Yeah it does look scary. I especially would not want to land with one of those still on. That's a great photo. Is that 'Cactus'?

I think the twin 58 gallon tanks were preferred, though you do see them often with just one like that, not sure if due to weight or limited availability of the tanks. The FM-2s carry two frequently possibly for either reason.

 

[eagledad]

Gentlemen,

It appears that the Navy did test the F4F-4 against the P-40F. Unfortunately, the attached is all I have.

Eagledad

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Very diplomatically worded! It was 'ahem' a bit faster. As in about 40 mph!

The Wildcat probably did have better high altitude performance though.

And I don't think the P-40 would have made a good carrier fighter though, for many of the same reasons that the Hurricane wasn't, and some others. You really needed a purpose-designed carrier aircraft for that job. The Wildcat fit the role pretty well for the first year and a half of the war.