Was the Me210/410 every a good idea?

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While I liked the Bf 110, I never liked the Me 210 or Me 410. They didn't seem to off performance improvement to any great degree and I think they were a waste of effort on Germany's part. The effort could have been put into a strategic bomber, into the He 277, the Me 264, a new fighter of the single engine variety ... ANYTHINHG but the Me 210 / 410.

All nations developed planes that were flops, but Germany seemed to stay with it longer than most. You could argue that the Japanese stayed with the twin engine fighter too long as well, with a wide variety of types of the same general configuration and performance.
 
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The Bf 110 turned out to be one of the LW's most tractable and versatile airframes and actually gave excellent service in almost all the roles it was employed in, most likely beyond what Lusser or Messerschmitt had intended. In the scheme of things it was only natural that they investigate a successor; it's a shame that work couldn't have been done to remodelling the Me 210/410 as a ground attack platform and night fighter from the outset. Like Dave said earlier, to begin with the LW high command were at fault for sticking to the original idea for the Bf 110 in its replacement, especially since that proved beyond the capabilities of the Bf 110, although this is being stated with massive doses of hindsight, which the planners in the RLM didn't have in late 1939/early 1940.
 
I think the Luftwaffe did what they could with what it had, but I don't think what the Luftwaffe had was what it needed. If you think about it the Me110 was an aircraft that the Luftwaffe had on their hands that wasn't successful in the role it was designed for and would of been pretty useless had they not found other uses for it. This is not to say that it was not successful in the new roles that were found for it, but why repeat the initial mistake.
 
pattle said:
I think the Luftwaffe did what they could with what it had, but I don't think what the Luftwaffe had was what it needed.
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This is because it was ordered before the war when the zerstorer concept was still very much at the fore front of German thinking. The RLM still wanted 16 heavy fighter Geschwader by 1942, half of which would be equipped with the Me 210. Even under the then current 3 Staffeln/3 Gruppen to a Geschwader that was a lot of aircraft.
By the time the Me 210/410 actually arrived nobody was sure exactly what to do with it and this is reflected in the endless meetings to discuss it. It was a jack of all trades and master of none. It's best chance probably was as a fast bomber (as someone suggested) but this isn't what was needed in defence of the Reich. By the time the Me 410 appeared the vast majority of German aircraft production was beginning to turn to single engine fighters for this purpose.
Cheers
Steve
 
Yes the main problem with the 210/410 imho isn't the plane, which in its fixed form was decent, but that by the time it went into service (1943) the tactical requirements changed. They simply needed different type of aircraft - perhaps a trio of multirole Ju 88/188 and 109/190 could be an answer for all needs of the LW - high/low altitude fighters, close support aircraft, bombers night fighters.
 
Strategic bomber force would have been a much bigger waste of German resources.


Extract from paper on Ju-88 program.
Blunders like this are the real problem. This mistake probably cost Germany 1,000 Ju-88s.

Strange how a major production event such as this didn't make it into Albert Speer's book.
 
davebender said:
Strange how a major production event such as this didn't make it into Albert Speer's book.
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I don't know about 1,000 Ju 88s but it is a valid point. It is by no means the only instance of muddled planning seriously effecting aircraft production, nor is it the only one which seems to have slipped from Speer's memory.

I think it is fair to say Speer had a very selective memory, particularly when his neck was literally on the line

Cheers

Steve
 
The original pre-war plan called for Henschel to build 80 Ju-88s per month. I've got to assume production was at least that much by 1943. Most likely it was quite a bit higher. If the Henschel factory was idle for the better part of a year due to production plans changing twice I think 1,000 lost aircraft is reasonable.

478 Me-410s were built during 1943 by conversion of existing Me-210s (including partially completed aircraft when Me-210 production was halted).

Historical Me-410 production (new build) began November 1943 with a total of 711 aircraft built. If the Henschel factory had been allowed to produce 100 or so Me-410s per month Germany would have more then twice the historical quantity during 1944.

More data.
http://books.google.com/books?id=6P...v=onepage&q=Production Henschel Ju-88&f=false
According to the above site Henschel (Schonefeld) was supposed to produce 400 Me-410s per month!
 
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davebender said:
If the Henschel factory was idle for the better part of a year due to production plans changing twice I think 1,000 lost aircraft is reasonable.
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It isn't unreasonable but it is very difficult to estimate lost production, that is something that didn't happen. We can ascertain that only so many of such and such was produced. You have to take some of the RLM's production plans with a grain of salt too.
I actually agree with you that many, many thousands of aircraft were not built due to the shambolic way that the aircraft industry was run. The RLM, the Luftwaffe and the manufacturers all bear some responsibility for this.
One can choose just about any aircraft type developed after 1939, and there will be a sorry saga told of its production. The Luftwaffe didn't seem to know what it wanted, the RLM continually moved the goal posts, even after series production had started, and the manufacturers offered performance and production on time scales they could never hope to deliver. Not all are as bad as the Me 210/410 or He 177, but few ran smoothly.
Cheers
Steve
 
No Me 410 was built from existing Me 210 other than during development and soem prototypes. The initial Me 410 were built from stored Me 210 fuselages.
 
I only know what I read and I have read 478 were converted from Me-210s. Unfortunately I didn't save the data source.

What data source are you using?
 
Jan 1941. Decision to build a new 1,000 aircraft engine per month manufacturing complex.
265 million marks. Stage 1. 500 engines per month.
393 million marks. Stage 2. 1,000 engines per month.

25 July 1941. Factory construction begins.
24 Dec 1941. Production of the Jumo 222 cancelled. Instead the new plant is to produce DB603 engines.
End of March 1942. Factory construction completed.

1943. Due to the tooling change (from Jumo222 to DB603) production did not begin until mid 1943. Only 515 engines produced through the end of the year. The factory complex was bombed beginning during August 1943, which certainly did not help matters.



If Henschel had produced 400 Me-410s per month beginning late 1943 they would need the entire output (1,000 DB603 per month) from Ostmark engine plant. Unfortunately that program was screwed up too so DB603 engines were available only in small quantities.

Starting to look like the two 1943 Luftwaffe production planning disasters are actually a single giant fiasco. Perhaps it's no coincidence Hitler and other German leaders began losing faith in Speer's management skills during the final year of WWII.
 
davebender said:
I only know what I read and I have read 478 were converted from Me-210s. Unfortunately I didn't save the data source.

What data source are you using?
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Bundesarchive data, 18 prototypes + 260 A-1 and 200 A-1/U2 were built from stored Me 210 fuselages. Additional 134 A-1 + 6 A-1/U1 + 77 A-1/U2 + 74 A-3 were new-built. All B-series were new-built.
 
Would have it not been simpler to rectify the flight deficiencies of the Me 210 by lengthening its fuselage by use of a "Rumpftonne" like Focke Wulf did it for the Fw 190D and Ta 152.
Thus Focke Wulf was more able to "sell" this simplified solution to the RLM instead of the all new Ta 153.
The changing of tools, rigs etc. for the production of the Me 210 should have been minimal then, does it?
 
14 March 1942. Modified Me-210A. Longer and deeper rear fuselage.
…..Messerschmitt changed the fuselage back to the original size. It had been shortened during development in an effort to lower production cost.

July 1942. Leading edge slots added to wings.
…..Taken together these changes fixed the Me-210 handling problems.


By August 1942 the Me-210C design was good to go. But it appears RLM decided to upgrade the design with more powerful DB603 engines. Then during 1943 RLM realized they didn't have enough DB603 engines so mass production at Henschel was cancelled.
 
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