How good a plane was the P-40, really?

[Mike Wenger]

My brother Mark and I argued (in a friendly manner) about the virtues of the Curtiss P-40 for many years. It all started with the movie "God is My Copilot," which aired quite a number of times over the 1950s and 60s on WRAL-TV here in Raleigh, NC. This was, without question, one of our favorite war movies on WRAL's late-late shows... usually on Friday or Saturday nights. I remember that we wrote to the television station requesting that they air the movie and, by George, several weeks or so later we cracked open our TV Guide and found that the station had scheduled what was likely a 16mm print of the movie to be run.

As preteens (and teens), Mark and I were very much into plastic models. We had purchased Aurora kits of the P-40 (Mark) and F4F Wildcat (myself). We also both had read Great American Fighter Pilots of World War II by Robert Loomis... and thus the good-natured debate ensued regarding the relative greatness of these two aircraft.

 

[Barrett]

Some say that the main advantage the P-40 had in the later war years was the good connections which the Curtiss Corp had with the Congress

Nailed it.
C-W was Connected, which is why the 40 was produced almost to the end of 1944.
The same C-W that continued selling SB2Cs when the navy was beaching them in favor of more fighters amid the kamikaze crisis.

 

[EwenS]

Nailed it.
C-W was Connected, which is why the 40 was produced almost to the end of 1944.
The same C-W that continued selling SB2Cs when the navy was beaching them in favor of more fighters amid the kamikaze crisis.

The same USN which in summer 1945 was intending, had WW2 gone on, to increase the SB2C complement on the Essex and Midways.

Midway air group was to be 50% SB2C & 50% F4U.

 

[GrauGeist]

Nailed it.
C-W was Connected, which is why the 40 was produced almost to the end of 1944.
The same C-W that continued selling SB2Cs when the navy was beaching them in favor of more fighters amid the kamikaze crisis.

Not even close.

The "Son Of a Bitch, Second Class" was used extensively by the USN, even taking part in the sinking of the IJN Musashi and IJN Yamato.
They were also instrumental in supporting invasion forces at Iwo Jima, Okinawa, the Ryukus and other key battles.

Additionally, they were valuable in SAR missions, so no, the SB2C was not "beached", as you put it.

 

[Greg Boeser]

That's Son of a Beach, 2nd Class, thank you!

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The SB2C carried on as the frontline USN strike a/c for a couple of years after the war ended, iirc. Curtiss-Wright followed Brewster into oblivion as an airframe designer/builder not long after. If they were paying off Congress, they clearly didn't pay enough, because the aircraft division went tits-up by 1960 or so, without having sold a major contract after the SB2C.

 

[GrauGeist]

The SB2C carried on as the frontline USN strike a/c for a couple of years after the war ended, iirc. Curtiss-Wright followed Brewster into oblivion as an airframe designer/builder not long after. If they were paying off Congress, they clearly didn't pay enough, because the aircraft division went tits-up by 1960 or so, without having sold a major contract after the SB2C.

CW is still in business, though they are more involved with naval assets than aerospace.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

CW is still in business, though they are more involved with naval assets than aerospace.

Right, which is why I specified "airframe designer/builder" in the post you quoted. I know they still do smaller parts stuff. They don't, however, design and build airplanes any more, which was my point.

 

[ThomasP]

During the war, Curtiss-Wright's engine manufacturing branch became a focus for a corruption investigation involving C-R employees and USAAF personnel. The investigation mainly revolved around QC failures and cover-ups re their engines produced at the Lockland plant, but also ended up uncovering a wider institutional corruption within Curtiss-Wright and war profiteering in many of C-R's other contracts.

Although the scandal did not directly cause the shut down of the airframe manufacturing portion of the company, after the war the scandal was remembered by congress and the Air Force in its dealings with Curtiss-Wright.

 

[GrauGeist]

Right, which is why I specified "airframe designer/builder" in the post you quoted. I know they still do smaller parts stuff. They don't, however, design and build airplanes any more, which was my point.

Gotcha, although they did try post-war, to submit types and still has a hand in the current aerospace industry with aircraft components.

From what I gather, Curtiss screwed themselves by not working more with clean sheet designs, but instead, spent far too much money and time trying to upgrade existing designs.

With the advent of the Jet age, CW was too far behind to play catch-up.

As an aside, I can't think of any other aircraft company that spawned so many variations of a single type (Model 75), save for Messerschmitt and their Bf109.

 

[swampyankee]

Gotcha, although they did try post-war, to submit types and still has a hand in the current aerospace industry with aircraft components.

From what I gather, Curtiss screwed themselves by not working more with clean sheet designs, but instead, spent far too much money and time trying to upgrade existing designs.

With the advent of the Jet age, CW was too far behind to play catch-up.

As an aside, I can't think of any other aircraft company that spawned so many variations of a single type (Model 75), save for Messerschmitt and their Bf109.

One of the problems with C-W's management was that it was not particularly interested in maintaining the company's technical competence. As a result, they weren't able to maintain the sort of design staff needed to produce first-rate aircraft and modern engines. R&D costs serious money, and that cuts down dividends. While C-W left both engine and airframe design and manufacture, it was always able to pay dividends, so the stockholders were kept happy and the executives kept getting their performance bonuses.

Running a successful aerospace company is hard: spend too much on R&D and the stockholders dump the stock, and the company dies; don't spend enough, and your product doesn't sell and the company dies. Quite a few companies -- Keystone, Great Lakes, WACO, Fairchild -- don't manage that balance.

 

[Simon Thomas]

During the war, Curtiss-Wright's engine manufacturing branch became a focus for a corruption investigation involving C-R employees and USAAF personnel. The investigation mainly revolved around QC failures and cover-ups re their engines produced at the Lockland plant, but also ended up uncovering a wider institutional corruption within Curtiss-Wright and war profiteering in many of C-R's other contracts.

Although the scandal did not directly cause the shut down of the airframe manufacturing portion of the company, after the war the scandal was remembered by congress and the Air Force in its dealings with Curtiss-Wright.

Tom,
I posted this on the AEHS forum, and it bears repeating here:

I found an interesting document at the NASM in Arthur Nutt's personal papers, which are available here:

Slideshow | NASM.1987.0115_ref265

It was interesting to read the Wright versions of events.

On the "Additional Report of the Special Committee investigating the National Defense Program", Arthur Nutt has hand written "This report is designed to support Truman and his desire to be the V.P. of USA. It is wrong and viscous" (Page 8 )

His letter to Doubleday states:

Here is the true at story. An Amy inspector rejected a small gear because when marking the required part number on the gear with acid etch a drop of acid spilled on the gear. The spot was not called for on the drawing.

The gear department foreman took the gear to the Chief Amy Inspector who accepted the gear without question. This same inspector, I was told, was in trouble constantly and as a result was transferred to another plant. As a result this disgruntled inspector went to his Congressman who in turn took the report to Harry S Truman's committee.

I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle...

It's worth hunting around the rest of his papers. There are some interesting things to find. There are quite a number which have been digitized.
Dr. Arthur Nutt Papers | Collection: NASM.1987.0115

 

[BobB]

One of the problems with C-W's management was that it was not particularly interested in maintaining the company's technical competence. As a result, they weren't able to maintain the sort of design staff needed to produce first-rate aircraft and modern engines. R&D costs serious money, and that cuts down dividends. While C-W left both engine and airframe design and manufacture, it was always able to pay dividends, so the stockholders were kept happy and the executives kept getting their performance bonuses.

Running a successful aerospace company is hard: spend too much on R&D and the stockholders dump the stock, and the company dies; don't spend enough, and your product doesn't sell and the company dies. Quite a few companies -- Keystone, Great Lakes, WACO, Fairchild -- don't manage that balance.

Hey, WACO spent money on R & D for a log splitter.

 

[Think Tanker]

Tom,
I posted this on the AEHS forum, and it bears repeating here:

I found an interesting document at the NASM in Arthur Nutt's personal papers, which are available here:

Slideshow | NASM.1987.0115_ref265

It was interesting to read the Wright versions of events.

On the "Additional Report of the Special Committee investigating the National Defense Program", Arthur Nutt has hand written "This report is designed to support Truman and his desire to be the V.P. of USA. It is wrong and viscous" (Page 8 )

His letter to Doubleday states:

Here is the true at story. An Amy inspector rejected a small gear because when marking the required part number on the gear with acid etch a drop of acid spilled on the gear. The spot was not called for on the drawing.

The gear department foreman took the gear to the Chief Amy Inspector who accepted the gear without question. This same inspector, I was told, was in trouble constantly and as a result was transferred to another plant. As a result this disgruntled inspector went to his Congressman who in turn took the report to Harry S Truman's committee.

I suspect the truth lies somewhere in the middle...

It's worth hunting around the rest of his papers. There are some interesting things to find. There are quite a number which have been digitized.
Dr. Arthur Nutt Papers | Collection: NASM.1987.0115

Attaching the images here of Dr. Nutt's response for ease of reference. The committee's report as well as Dr. Nutt's insights paint a very interesting and conflicting picture. It appears, at least, that the origin of the Committee's inquiry is related to the Wright R-2600 engine. Now, while I am aware that the R-2600 had some teething issues circa 1941, I am unaware of any systemic issues reported by the USAAF by 1943. I do recall a fair few developmental hiccups with the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 in 1943, but I would doubt there's a mix-up on the engine and company involved. Perhaps I am wrong on that account, but it's an interesting item of note.

In his response letter, Dr. Nutt noted that the civil action was 'left to die' and never brought to trial, which raises an eyebrow assuming the Truman Committee had credence and the evidence they purported to have. If the fabrication and quality control issues were that systemic, that substantial, and the Army was involved in the capacity inferred, I am skeptical that the Committee's "slap on the wrist" to the Army and finger-wagging at Curtiss-Wright would've been where this story ended. Not to mention that I doubt any resolution to those issues would happen on the time-table which they allegedly occurred.

Though, for what it is worth, I am also thoroughly unconvinced by Dr. Nutt's claim that Truman admitted to the investigation being a publicity stunt to the General Manager at Wright. That strikes me as highly unlikely that if Truman was doing such as a publicity stunt, that he'd hand a verbal smoking gun to an officer of the company accused.

Anyways, wonderful excerpts and I greatly appreciate you sharing these. Lots to chew on. I suspect your conclusion is correct, but I'm left with far more questions now...