What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (5 Viewers)

[FLYBOYJ]

Ok...so, if the 8th AF wasn't responsible for high attrition to the Luftwaffe, then what was?

Non-combat accidents to include weather and pilot error?

 

[wuzak]

"Myth F. 8th AF aircraft shot down a large fraction of all Luftwaffe fighters lost in combat. About 20,000 German fighters were lost in combat in 1944, the peak year of the air war. Eighth AF fighters and bombers
were credited with downing some 4000 of these, or about 20%. The Luftwaffe lost most of their fighters while performing their primary role — close air support of the German Army."
The Luftwaffe had largely withdrawn from France before the 8th AF showed up. A case in point was the effort made by the Luftwaffe at Dieppe. Despite having fighter aircraft that were superior in performance to the Spitfire Vs that formed the bulk of the fighters they were facing, the Luftwaffe made almost no impression on the invading force. Jabos did sink the small destroyer Berkley.

"Close air support of the German Army" - in other words, on the Eastern Front?

While it is true that the bulk of the Luftwaffe forces had left France in 1942, mostly for the Eastern Front, they did return in greater numbers as the USAAF campaign increased in the latter half of 1943 and into 1944.

Though the bulk of the air forces defending the west were inside Germany. Out of the reach of early escort fighters - the Spitfire and P-47.

 

[GrauGeist]

Non-combat accidents to include weather and pilot error?

Ohhh right!
I forgot about the Bf109's landing gear!

 

[SaparotRob]

Gremlins.

 

[Peter Gunn]

View attachment 647692

I think the Obvious Ass Kicking for the Germans was the arrival of the Red Army in Berlin. You didn't need to incinerate Hamburg for the Germans to know they damn sure lost.

The Japanese also, from what I've read, were more influenced toward surrender by the rapid destruction of their remaining land army in Manchuria by the Soviets in the final two weeks of the war than they were by the fire bombing or even the atomic bombs.

The US and British may not have been too gentle but were the 'good cop' compared to the Soviets and Stalin.

I realize this is a late reply, been consulting with doctors about biopsies etc, no fun.

Doesn't matter if Red Army or U.S. Army or British Army, as long as the German people got the message. As for Hamburg... I have no comment, any nation that gasses and incinerates millions of it's own (and other nations) people gets very little sympathy

As far as Japan goes, yeah, I've read the ideas that the Japanese weren't worried about the Americans it was the Russians that really won the war. Perhaps the Japanese government was concerned about the losses in Manchuria but I doubt the average Japanese civilian, which is who we are talking about here would agree. I think they VERY much were influenced by the U.S.A.A.F. bombing campaign.

Sorry for the poor quality, that ain't cordwood stacked up, if you think for a moment that the fire bombing campaign and the atomic attacks had nothing to do with the Japanese surrender I should be interested to hear your views on what did. Also, don't take this as a combative stance from me, far from it, just debate in a friendly way.

 

[Peter Gunn]

The last part about 'almost welcoming to the occupying army' didn't often apply to USAF brats. My experience as an Air Force brat in Tokyo was that conduct (polite show of respect) versus thought (contempt for foreign American Devil) was prevalent. I was a Gai-Jin then and deep down no Japanese person feels inferior to another race. At least we don't top the hit parade of China and Korea. Gratitude and Thank You were transformed into to various forms of expression of obligation or owed debt - which translated to neutral (mild obligation) to resentment for your thoughtfulness. If gifts are exchanged your Japanese host will always try to 'give more' in concert with the framework of obligation. I recognize that 70+ years is plenty of time to weed out the 'old' and 'bring in the new'. (like US).

You'll get no argument from me, simply going on what I've read over the years and as I say, I have just finished Toll's "Twilight of the Gods" and his last chapters were devoted to the Japanese reaction to the occupation in the immediate aftermath of WWII, late 1945 and into 1946.

I have had dealings on both a professional and casual level with Japanese firms/civilians, I can echo P pbehn has said further up thread, making you feel welcome is more important than however they may actually feel toward you. Just my two cents, which is easily discounted, I'm no expert after all.

 

[drgondog]

Just a series of notes.

Running the USAAF heavies versus Luftwaffe Fighters the air to air kill ratios were about 2 fighter to 3 bombers in 1943, 1 to 2 in early 1944 after a Luftwaffe upgunning, shown by the holes in the returning bombers, probably worse for the bombers as 1944 went on. The 20mm versus the 0.5 inch was something of a match given the size of the fighter and bomber and number of hits to shoot each down.

Not sure where you draw data/information regarding LW 'upgunning' emrging in early 1944. Examples include Bf 109G-6 introducing MW-50 methanol-water injection at the end of 1942. It also brought the 2x15mm to replace the 7.82 MG-17s. In early 1943, the 20mm Gondola equipped Bf 109G6/R6 were introduced in defense of Reich equipped Gruppen. The Fw 190A3/A5 were already equipped with 4x20mm plus 2xMG17 in 1942. 1943 brought installation of Mk 108 for both (c/l for Bf109 and wing mounted for FW 190. When the 30mm Mk 108 and Mk 103 (faster/greater MV- pod mounted) entered the fight, the effective damage was far greater than 20mm. When comparing LW actual loss records to 8th AF claims, LW losses reported were overstated as much as 10:1.

The biggest mystery would be source of air to air ratio of LW fighters vs USAAF heavies. US intelligence sources grossly overstated number of LW fighters destroyed in combat in 1942/43 and 44.

In April 1943 the commander of the 306th Bomb Group, Colonel Putnam, wrote a report, problems with aircraft identification, the speeds involved meant only around 10% of gunners who could have fired during the crucial 2 to 3 seconds of a fighter attack did in fact do so. Then there was the problem of the standard of US gunner accuracy, fighter pilots apparently needed 5% hits on the target to pass.

Simply the US formation gunnery was like a flak barrage, it brought down some fighters, damaged a lot more and deterred some. The damage was very useful given the Luftwaffe tended to be short of spare parts.

US definition of length was based on the metric system and so was different to Britain, add all sorts of other standards like screw threads and sizes that were different in Britain and the US. Even aviation terminology. Drawings standards were different too, over and above the variation between companies.

US standard for drawings was decimal - still is. True that for manufacturing reasons, standard tolerence definitions varied depending upon production requirements. I.E. Much tighter tolrances required for crankshafts than a tension fitting designed to connect longeons between fuselage and empennage.

A key limitation of putting bombs on targets in daylight was the smoke and dust kicked up from the intial strikes. You need to space out the formations, keep them as small and low as possible, but that makes the defences more effective. The rise of electronics, the use of target markers, incendiaries, bigger bombs and staying over the target longer meant at the end of 1944 the night raids on oil installations were being considered more damaging on average.

So, lack of formation integrity, lead crew training, and AFE installation slaved to Norden bombsight which kept pilot from taking evasive action during bomb run) were not greater limitations on bombng accuracy? If the lead wing is 'on target' before any visibilty deficiency is created by bomb stikes - the mission will be sucessful.

These factors were constant until corrected. Smoke covered targets were episodic. According to The follow on Strategic Studies, the biggest single factor reducing efficiency for attacks on oil/energy installations was bomb selection. The 8th AF erred by not increasing bomb size to at least 2000 pounders.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

As far as Japan goes, yeah, I've read the ideas that the Japanese weren't worried about the Americans it was the Russians that really won the war. Perhaps the Japanese government was concerned about the losses in Manchuria but I doubt the average Japanese civilian, which is who we are talking about here would agree. I think they VERY much were influenced by the U.S.A.A.F. bombing campaign.

Sorry for the poor quality, that ain't cordwood stacked up, if you think for a moment that the fire bombing campaign and the atomic attacks had nothing to do with the Japanese surrender I should be interested to hear your views on what did. Also, don't take this as a combative stance from me, far from it, just debate in a friendly way.

I think depending which leader to speak to, some Japanese leaders may have worried more about the Soviets than the atomic bombings or fire bombings but there is no doubt the civilian population knew they were defeated although they were still willing to fight on.

 

[drgondog]

It should be noted that the Canadian built B. XXs and B. 25s used by the LNSF (in addition to B.XVIs) used single stage Merlins. Bomber Command did not consider 60 Series Merlins to be essential for missions over Germany. Obviously the faster, higher flying XVIs would be better, but war is nothing if not a series of compromises.

BC did not apply resources to commit to long range day attacks using the Mosquito.The considerations were a.) intercept at high altitude hard to plot and execute and b.) low evel, long range attacks under constant threat of 20mm flak. The latter weapon responsible for most 8th and 9th AF FC losses.

 

[drgondog]

The attrition of the Luftwaffe was a long drawn out affair for which the 8th AF get a a disproportionate share of the credit. Frank W. Heilenday sums it up in a Rand paper entitled "Daylight Raids by the Eighth Air Force : Lingering Myths From World War II"
" Eighth Air Force has a special interest for the author since he was chief of Operations Analysis at Headquarters (HQ) 8th AF. He later was chief of Applied Research with the parent Strategic Sir Command (SAC) and served a total of 29 years in SAC."
"Myth F. 8th AF aircraft shot down a large fraction of all Luftwaffe fighters lost in combat. About 20,000 German fighters were lost in combat in 1944, the peak year of the air war. Eighth AF fighters and bombers

Fact - 8th (and 9th FC) shot down a large fraction of LW Day Fighter total losses between late 1943 through EOW. Day Fighter strength was required to contest Allied deployment of TAC and FC CAS behind beach heads, individual attacks utilizing overcast against troop ships to interdict key reinforcements of beach heads - and stall second and third waves of support in time for extremely bad weather over Normandy to disrupt logistics

were credited with downing some 4000 of these, or about 20%. The Luftwaffe lost most of their fighters while performing their primary role — close air support of the German Army."

CAS by LW was a non-factor at Normandy or the entire invasion campaign through EOW. See above.

The Luftwaffe had largely withdrawn from France before the 8th AF showed up. A case in point was the effort made by the Luftwaffe at Dieppe. Despite having fighter aircraft that were superior in performance to the Spitfire Vs that formed the bulk of the fighters they were facing, the Luftwaffe made almost no impression on the invading force. Jabos did sink the small destroyer Berkley. On the other hand, the Luftwaffe bombers were more than decimated, losing 25 bombers, more than 17% of sorties.(source Eagle in Flames by E. R. Hooton)
The RAF flew 2,640 sorties (including 120 by the USAAF) vs 945 by the Luftwaffe. To put that in perspective the RAF and USAAF flew somewhere around 14,000 sorties on D Day. It is difficult to imagine even a thousand more fighters making a difference.
The record of the Luftwaffe in stopping anything Was extremely poor. They never stopped the invasion of Italy, the invasion of Sicily, the invasion of North Africa. They never stopped the evacuation of Dunkirk, they never stopped the evacuation of Crete, At Crete they had absolute air supremacy yet still could stop it.

The record at Dieppe is that combined LW/Wermacht interdiction at Dunkirk defeated the Allied command objectives. A very small LW/Italian force created havoc at Sicily and Salerno - ditto Anzio. Did not turn the Allies away but in the case of Normandy, time was not in Allied favor when very larg reserves were available in days - and poentially more successful at daylight mobility if Wermacht had significant air cover.

Hindsight, IMO, doe not contradict the opinions of LW stakeholders such as Schmid, Galland, and Goering to the effect that 8th and 9th AF attrition of Day Fighter capability by end of May 1944.

Hindsight also does not dispel the alarm that SHAEF experienced in January 1944 when Allied intelligence reported growth of LW day fighter strength due to influx from Ost and Sud.

Although LW had retreated (to conserve resources from attrition by RAF and 8th/9th AF) save LuftFlotte 3, significant reinforcement from JG3 and JG 27 and other units were performed to bases within ange of Normandy on 7 and 8 June.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think depending which leader to speak to, some Japanese leaders may have worried more about the Soviets than the atomic bombings or fire bombings but there is no doubt the civilian population knew they were defeated although they were still willing to fight on.

The Japanese had been trying to send out peace feelers to America via the USSR after the Potsdam declaration in Jul 45; they wanted the assurance that the Emperor would be allowed to retain the throne, which America would not give.

It's true that the Japanese leadership was violently anti-communist and greatly feared any occupation by Soviet troops, but they weren't worried about the Home Islands being invaded by USSR at the time of surrender so much as they were forestalling the impending American invasion and removal of Hirohito, by conditional surrender if necessary. The Soviets ending the Neutrality Pact ended the last Japanese hope for avoiding unconditional surrender.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The Japanese had been trying to send out peace feelers to America via the USSR after the Potsdam declaration in Jul 45; they wanted the assurance that the Emperor would be allowed to retain the throne, which America would not give.

"Some Japanese" In Jablonski's old book "Wings of Fire" he documents how the military was divided on this. Prime minister Suzuki suggested one last massive battle "to save face" prior to surrender. He was almost assassinated over his surrender proposals

It's true that the Japanese leadership was violently anti-communist and greatly feared any occupation by Soviet troops, but they weren't worried about the Home Islands being invaded by USSR at the time of surrender so much as they were forestalling the impending American invasion and removal of Hirohito, by conditional surrender if necessary. The Soviets ending the Neutrality Pact ended the last Japanese hope for avoiding unconditional surrender.

I think all the above was on their minds - no Navy, a huge enemy fleet parked offshore, B-29s firebombing cities at will, the Atomic Bombs and Soviets in Manchuria. Take your pick!

 

[GrauGeist]

The Emperor's cabinet was also convinced that inflicting unsustainable losses on the Allies would force the Allies to negotiate a conditional Japanese surrender during the last year of the war.

They clearly thought wrong.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The Emperor's cabinet was also convinced that inflicting unsustainable losses on the Allies would force the Allies to negotiate a conditional Japanese surrender during the last year of the war.

They clearly thought wrong.

Just got done reading the book "Flyboys" and that was the strategy of General Ushijima on Okinawa

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

"Some Japanese" In Jablonski's old book "Wings of Fire" he documents how the military was divided on this. Prime minister Suzuki suggested one last massive battle "to save face" prior to surrender. He was almost assassinated over his surrender proposals

I think all the above was on their minds - no Navy, a huge enemy fleet parked offshore, B-29s firebombing cities at will, the Atomic Bombs and Soviets in Manchuria. Take your pick!

Indeed, it's a lot more complex that one single reason explains. The same hardheads who wanted the Emperor to remain enthroned also conducted a failed coup when they learnt of his decision to surrender.

 

[GrauGeist]

Just a bit of trivia regarding the planned invasion of Japan:
Nearly half a million Purple Hearts were manufactured for the invasion, which never happened (obviously).

It wasn't until 1999, that the government ordered 9,000 new Purple Hearts to be manufactured to bolster stocks and in 2008, 21,000 more were ordered as stocks again ran low.

This means that between late 1945 and 2008, recipients were receiving Purple Hearts intended for the invasion.

 

[pbehn]

"Some Japanese" In Jablonski's old book "Wings of Fire" he documents how the military was divided on this. Prime minister Suzuki suggested one last massive battle "to save face" prior to surrender. He was almost assassinated over his surrender proposals

I think all the above was on their minds - no Navy, a huge enemy fleet parked offshore, B-29s firebombing cities at will, the Atomic Bombs and Soviets in Manchuria. Take your pick!

The decision was in the hands of a few people, fortunately they werent all like Adolf, who didnt care about anything because he was going to top himself.

 

[drgondog]

The attrition of the Luftwaffe was a long drawn out affair for which the 8th AF get a a disproportionate share of the credit. Frank W. Heilenday sums it up in a Rand paper entitled "Daylight Raids by the Eighth Air Force : Lingering Myths From World War II"
" Eighth Air Force has a special interest for the author since he was chief of Operations Analysis at Headquarters (HQ) 8th AF. He later was chief of Applied Research with the parent Strategic Sir Command (SAC) and served a total of 29 years in SAC."
"Myth F. 8th AF aircraft shot down a large fraction of all Luftwaffe fighters lost in combat. About 20,000 German fighters were lost in combat in 1944, the peak year of the air war. Eighth AF fighters and bombers
were credited with downing some 4000 of these, or about 20%. The Luftwaffe lost most of their fighters while performing their primary role — close air support of the German Army."

Mr. Heilenday forgot to mention the following from 8th AF source data and corroborated by USAF Study 85:
VIIIth FC, not including VIIIBC, were credited (vs Claimed) with 5597 air victory credits - mostly Bf 109 & Fw 190 for 1944.
VIII8th FC, not includig VIII BC, were credited with 3100 ground destruction credits - all types - 1944
I don't have the IXFC victory total credits for pre-June 1944 separated, but IXFC was operating under 8th AF control. Estimate that 600-650 more LW Day Fighter were destroyed in the air during that period with unknow total for ground credits.

Using source data available, regarding 8th AF, to Mr. Heilenday he seems to count poorly. Does anybody know which specific source he used for LW loss data? I have Prien's spreadsheet but it is not broken out in sortable format to pull specific 'opponent' causing the loss. That said, his statement that 8th AF was responsible for 4000/20% is significantly Lower than 6200 air plus 3100 ground applied to '20,000 lost' in one theatre, to One organization (15th and 12th not considered, even though 15th and 8th were controlled bu Spaatz and generally attacked the same German/Czech targets against most of the same eastern based German day fighters.

So, 8th AF 'influence applied against LW Day Fighter strength was closer to 45% in 1944. But aircraft looses alone are not the core impact of 8th (and 15th AF) - it was the loss of irreplacable experienced pilots drawn from Ost and Sud into LuftFlotte Reich,

USAF Study 85

 

[GrauGeist]

I keep seeing Luftflotte Reich numbers being a key point in many recent discussions, but rarely ever Luftflotte 2, which was first (and last) point of contact for Allied bomber operations going into German proper, which was under Luftflotte Reich's control.

 

[wuzak]

Mosquitoes used Merlins with reversed cooling. Not a big deal if you plan ahead but you can't take a Merlin 20 out out of a crate and shove it in a Mosquito airframe.

Was just reading the entry for the Merlin 21 in Lumsden, British Piston Aero Engines and their Aircraft. It seemed to say that the cooling flow was not reversed in teh engine itself, but in the way the engine was plumbed between the header tank, radiator and engine.