US-manufactured 20mm cannons being badly unreliable had a lot to do with that.
I'd argue it was even the primary reason.
Tony Williams has a excellent write up on some of what when wrong with the US 20mm programme.
Chinn in The Machine Gun also devotes a considerable amount of space to the problems (see page 577-582 and 588-590)
What's staggering is that the US ended up producing nearly 135,000 20mm cannon but only supplied 34,500 to the AAF and Navy. Another 44,000 were provided as 'international aid'. And 55,000 ended up in storage, never to see the light of day.
I think one of the other reason for the failure to adopt the 20mm was that there was always the idea that something better was just on the horizon.
In the years leading up to WW2 and during the conflict, the US did an immense amount of mucking about with designs for very heavy machine guns and light/medium cannon. Apart from the Hispano and various derivative designs, there were multiple other light cannon designs in 15mm/0.60 caliber, 20mm, 23mm and 25mm. And a bunch of .90 calibre projects. And the 37mm that ended up in the P-39/P-63 and very early production P-38s.
During WW2, the US was looking for something with a REALLY high velocity to stick on their aircraft. Someone had worked out that for deflection shooting that if you cut the flight time by 1/3rd then the chance of a hit went up by 400% for the average pilot. So, they proceeded to do all sorts of experimental things, mostly based around a .60 caliber round moving at somewhere north of 3500 feet per minute.