Would any level of realistic reinforcements at Malaya have deterred Japan? (1 Viewer)

[Shortround6]

The Japanese missed out on the trench warfare of WWI. This might have clued them in on fighting spirit versus machine guns.

But the Japanese had fought the 1904-1905 war against the Russians and a learned a lot things that West did not, or that the Western Nations had to learn for themselves in 1914-16 (they had learned most of the lessons by 1917).
The Western Nations had little to learn from the backwards Russians and the inferior Orientals. 5 months of siege warfare had nothing to teach the Western nations.

 

[Howard Gibson]

But the Japanese had fought the 1904-1905 war against the Russians and a learned a lot things that West did not, or that the Western Nations had to learn for themselves in 1914-16 (they had learned most of the lessons by 1917).
The Western Nations had little to learn from the backwards Russians and the inferior Orientals. 5 months of siege warfare had nothing to teach the Western nations.

Again, Google "human bullets".

 

[swampyankee]

The West was still working on the imperialist era assumption that non-Europeans were inferior and southern Europeans were inferior to northern ones. The Russians barely counted as European. All the Western services underestimated the competence of the Japanese forces.

 

[EwenS]

I came across this video of a presentation at the Library of Congress about the economic warfare waged by the USA from 1937 which might be of interest.

Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor

Was the bombing of Pearl Harbor an unprovoked attack on the United States? According to a new book by Edward S. Miller, the Japanese motivation stemmed from U.S. plans to defeat Japan economically in the years before World War II. Miller discussed his book, "Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S...

www.loc.gov

Based on the book:-

Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor eBook : Miller, Edward S, Miller, Edward S.: Amazon.co.uk: Books

Bankrupting the Enemy: The U.S. Financial Siege of Japan Before Pearl Harbor eBook : Miller, Edward S, Miller, Edward S.: Amazon.co.uk: Books

www.amazon.co.uk

Just another aspect of the lead up to the war in the Pacific. This time economic rather than military.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Are we deterring Japan, or defeating it outright?

My opening idea was to place a small but credible RN, Army and RAF force on Malaya as a deterrence. Or, if not a deterrence entirely, but to force Japan to alter its plans. For example, the nearly unopposed landings at Kota Bharu would need to be reconsidered if RN cruisers, destroyers and submarines, along with RAF strike aircraft and British armour and artillery may be ready to counter.

 

[EwenS]

My opening idea was to place a small but credible RN, Army and RAF force on Malaya as a deterrence. Or, if not a deterrence entirely, but to force Japan to alter its plans. For example, the nearly unopposed landings at Kota Bharu would need to be reconsidered if RN cruisers, destroyers and submarines, along with RAF strike aircraft and British armour and artillery may be ready to counter.

I would hardly call the landings at Kota Bharu "nearly unopposed".

Battle of Kota Bharu - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Soldier's Burden

Soldiers of the First World War and Colonial wars. Their battles, their units, their awards and their suffering.

www.kaiserscross.com

This contains descriptions of how the Japanese saw it.

http://lib.perdana.org.my/PLF/Digital_Content/NLM/Batch4/DVD01/11-11/M940.53095951WRITheJapaneseInvasionOfKelantanIn1941.pdf

 

[swampyankee]

One must wonder how many of the Commonwealth problems in Malaya were due to poor command and control, as was the case with the French Army in August 1940

 

[Admiral Beez]

One must wonder how many of the Commonwealth problems in Malaya were due to poor command and control

Considering the disparity in size between the defending and attacking forces it's a good question. Better placement, construction and defence of fewer airfields might have helped. Even if my proposed 500-600 aircraft are deployed there's no need for the airfield network Malayan Command set up, especially poorly drained, unpacked strips.

 

[Shortround6]

My opening idea was to place a small but credible RN, Army and RAF force on Malaya as a deterrence. Or, if not a deterrence entirely, but to force Japan to alter its plans. For example, the nearly unopposed landings at Kota Bharu would need to be reconsidered if RN cruisers, destroyers and submarines, along with RAF strike aircraft and British armour and artillery may be ready to counter.

Your proposed Naval force was too small and/or weak to be much of a deterrence. Japanese had enough ships to counter 4 C class Cruisers and 10-12 WW I destroyers. with a little redeployment of their own.
A better Army Force is more debatable. A larger force is unlikely. A better equipped force is possible but how much did the Japanese know about the actual state of equipment?
British forces were lacking in all types of artillery for the number of troops they had. An extra 8-16 field guns and several thousand shells able to hit the original beaches might have been enough to stop the original attack. But that is not deterrent. It is actual, after the fact, defense.
Better air would not take much. Again, not deterrence, but better defense. A couple more squadrons of bombers (even Blenhiems) AND 1-2 squadrons of fighters that actually escorted the bombers might have screwed the Japanese up for several days and slowed down their timetable.