Would any level of realistic reinforcements at Malaya have deterred Japan? (1 Viewer)

[Thumpalumpacus]

If the Americans do not join in the war at all the Japanese "win" big. If the Americans join in several months later with the Philippine bases undamaged and alert taking the Philippines so going be much harder and the Americans (in theory) can do much more damage to the Japanese supply lines. Japan has just tipped over to the losing side. To get the "win" they to do even better in sea battles and air battles than they did historically. Early carrier battles have to go to Japanese.

I don't know. That depends on whether or not we still have MacArthur's and Sutherland's mismanagement. It also depends on whether the Filipino Scouts can be expanded, better-trained, and furnished more and better equipment.

I mean, you make good points, but it requires the joint leadership in the islands to take advantage of the opportunity. Was MacA the kind of leader to make hay while the sun shines? Or does he maintain his unwarranted assumption of inherent American superiority?

 

[Zmauky]

The idea of Japan "skipping" the Philippines has always been intriguing to me.

I don't think American entry into the war was ever in question (Roosevelt, at least by his actions, pushed America into the war - for example, the expansion of the zones in the Atlantic and the laws on arms trade to the belligerents).

The only question is at what point Roosevelt can sell the war to the Americans. It is possible that this would be the moment of the Japanese invasion of the DEI and the UK colonies, but I think it would be later - direct defense of (foreign) colonies is not something that would pass Congress at that time
Roosevelt would push Japanese to mistake (as he did) or probably (invent) an attack on some military ship in the Philippines or that Japanese possessed weapons of mass destruction or working on atomic bombs.

But sarcasm aside, this would allow the Japanese to win ( or try to ) their decisive battle as they had planned in their war plans.

So, the gradual hitting of the American fleet with planes, submarines and the final grand confrontation in Philippine waters.
The result?
Who knows - the question is whether without Pearl Harbor the real effectiveness of anti-ship aviation or long- lance torpedoes would have been known, or whether the overly complicated Japanese naval plans would have failed, or...

 

[ThomasP]

First, a couple of bits of info.

From what I have read, there is a serious misunderstanding of MacArthur re his leadership in the Philippines. Misunderstanding #1 is that it was his fault that he failed to build-up and train a native Philippine force. The truth is that he wanted to, and he tried to (beginning in 1938 in a serious effort) and requested personnel and material to help in doing so. But the US higher-ups refused to authorize any significant buildup. This is recorded in the official case history of War Plan Orange.

The refusal to allow the build-up is understandable to a degree for a few reasons.

Reason 1. It should be remembered that the Moro Rebellion only ended (mostly) in 1913. However, the Philippine peoples were not a homogenous group, what with tribal and religious differences, plus there was still a lot of resentment and bad feeling against the US for bad behavior during the invasion and afterward. The higher-ups in Washington and the State Department refused to seriously arm the Philippines at first - for fears of triggering a restart of the Moro rebellion or a new form of rebellion. It was only in mid-1941(?) that the US government officially gave permission for a significant increase in power and started sending material to help with the training. MacArthur had started training as best he could in late-1938, and as per historical note (accurately) MacArthur wanted to stay and lead the Philippine army/guerrilla forces. The US higher-ups ordered MacArthur to leave. Per the fears of the US higher-ups, after the Japanese invasion there were a fair number (possibly as many as 20,000) of Philippine natives that joined the Japanese, acting as police, garrison troops, and supply adjuncts, with some even joining the Japanese Army, although there were not many accepted due to distrust by the Japanese. It should be noted, however, that many more natives joined the guerrilla forces during the course of the war - perhaps as many as 200,000 or more.

Reason 2. The US State Department and the US Navy had concluded in c.1936-38 that it would not be possible (in a practical sense) to hold the Philippines against a concerted effort by the Japanese - primarily due to the distances involved. It was therefore decided not to try, since any significant reinforcements would "only lead to greater loss of men and material". The USN and US Army had concluded the same about Singapore when the British approached them regarding a joint base, as well as other possible bases for the USN in the PTO. It should be noted here that War Plan Orange was focused on a war between the US and Japan, without participation of the UK or other Commonwealth nations.

The US higher-ups did not inform MacArthur of their decision regarding no serious attempt being made to hold the Philippines as the rule - until very shortly before the war began. The failure to inform MacArthur of their decision is recorded in the official case history of War Plan Orange.

Reason 3. The US did not want to antagonize Japan in the 1930s. The US had a voting majority that was isolationist, still in or recovering from the Great Depression, and the US military was relatively small, The only exception was the USN which was large relative to most nations of the world. The US Army in late-1939 was at around 200,000 personnel (including the Air Corps) - at that time the Japanese Army was more than 10x the size of the US Army. It was only the huge influx of capital from the UK and France that allowed the start of the US massive build-up. (This is sometimes argued as untrue, but regardless of whether the growth could mechanically have happened without the influx of European wealth, it would not have been acceptable otherwise due to the political/economic climate.) Additionally, as of about 1927-38 it still appeared (to the US) that Japan was winning in China, which was scary to say the least.

re

1st. Does the US enter the war at all or late or under certain conditions?
Did the Japanese player/s know what would trigger US participation? Leaving the US in control of the Philippines with 25-30 subs (Japanese had no idea how poorly the US subs would actually perform in the actual war) and the buildup of USAAC forces in the Philippines in late 1941 and early 1942. Some of the A-24s that fought in New Guinea were actually on-board ships on Dec 7th heading for the Philippines. I believe there were some A-20s also in transit. US was flying B-17s across the Pacific to the Philippines.
Keeping the US out of things makes for interesting scenarios, but were any 1/2 way scenarios considered? Japanese attack Philippines (clearing supply routes and gaining staging areas for attacks on the DEI) but waiting to deal with the American fleet later? Much stronger attacks in the Philippines and South East Asia in Dec 1941?
America waits 1 or 2 months to join in if the Japanese don't invade the Philippines? Not enough time for land forces to arrive except for materials already in transit.

We (the war gamers) could only operate based on the historical political climate and on what has been declassified/learned about the behavior of the higher-ups behind the scenes. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt etal did not feel that they could start a war with Japan without serious provocation, or against Germany either. If Japan had not attacked historically, Germany would probably not have declared war on the US anytime soon, and the US might very well have stayed out of the war, or have been a Johnny-come-lately as in WWI. Since we (the war gamers) were only concerned with the Japan-DEI-Commonwealth war (France already being out of the war) we decided that if the US did not enter war with Japan before the end of 1942 then it would not matter relative to what the Commonwealth could have done prior to or at the beginning of the war in the Pacific.

re

2. Does not invading the Philippines free up enough materials and transport to enable a wide scale Australian invasion, even in the spring of 1942?
Invasion of Australian cities has to be done almost individually. Successful overland marches were going to be very hard. Granted Australia had little in the way of defense but even attacking a port is going to require taking dock space very quickly?

The Australians had begun building up their forces already, but only had about 80,000(?) personnel in their Army as of the end of 1939. (Sorry, but I do not remember off hand what their strength was as of December 1941.) In our most successful scenarios, Japan only occupied Darwin and a few of the cities on the east coast of Australia, but they destroyed or crippled pretty much all of the significant harbor facilities at the other ports on the east coast down to Melbourne over a period of about 4-5 months. This was possible because of the withdrawal fo about 150.000 troops from China and redeploying them in other areas of operations, plus without the need to attack the US forces in the Pacific a lot of Japanese troops, ships (including transports), and aircraft were freed up. We gave the Australian forces the advantage of significantly higher morale than the other troops the Japanese encountered at the start of the war, due to fighting for home country and such. But half of whatever the fully trained ground forces Australia had in December 1941 were over seas, either in the MTO, Middle East, or in transit. Of the ground forces at home, more than half did not yet even have full uniform and basic gear. RAAC had 8(?) light tanks and 6(?) cruiser tanks.The RAAF strength at home was about 200(?) effective combat aircraft at the end of 1941. The RAN was small (2x heavy cruisers, 3x light cruisers, plus DDs and such?) and any ships that stayed to fight were sunk almost immediately. (ABDA never formed in our scenarios, and the surviving RAN ships pulled back to ports in the Indian Ocean.) Once the RAAF was destroyed or retreated to the west coast there was very little the ground forces could do relative to offense, and the only fighting devolved into guerrilla warfare around the occupied coastal cities. Japanese supply lines were untouchable by the guerrillas since all supplies were transported by sea. All the Japanese occupying forces were required to do was continue to deny the Australians and Commonwealth forces use of the ports and such and prevent supply along the north-east and eastern coasts. The RAAF did eventually get a foot hold in the western areas of Australia but was unable to have any serious effect before the end of the scenario because of the distances and difficulty in supplying airbases in the middle of the Australian desert. When we assumed the US did not enter the war by the end of 1942 the Japanese navy was able to deny the RN access to the west coast ports, as the RAF and RN were still tied down in the ETO and MTO.

Something to keep in mind is that historically the US/UK/Australian/NZ ground forces faced less than 10% of the total Japanese ground forces at any point in time during the war, and since the fighting was mostly defeat in detail, it was effectively significantly less in any real sense.

Pre 7 December 1941, in the historical timeline the Japanese Army disposition was China (60%), Manchukuo (25%), Japan (10%), Indochina (3%), Korea (2%), PTO (0%).

re

2. . . . I am not sure if the Japanese ever got near the expected spoils out of China that they hoped but aside from oil I don't know (willing to find out) what spoils the Japanese actually got from Burma, the DEI, the Philippines or what they could have gotten from northern Australia?

There was another thread where I posted the reasons for Japan invading the various countries that they went after historically, and below is a repost of countries and their assets. The following are the resources that were known at the time (other than the ranking in size of the reserves) and were already being exploited (for the most part), or in the process of planning to be exploited, by the various controlling governments. The resources listed under Manchukuo and Korea for example were already being exploited to one degree or another by Japan, those under DEI were already being exploited by the Netherlands, etc.

re Japan's reasons for invading the countries they did.

__Korea:
Tungsten (4th? largest reserve in the world)
Molybdenum
Iron
Nickel
Magnesium
Zinc
Copper
Lead
Coal (anthracite, the highest grade)
Gold, Silver, etc

__Manchukuo:
Iron
Aluminum
Magnesium
Copper
Zinc
Lead
Oil (shale oil)
Coal
Gold, Silver, etc

__China:
Iron
Aluminum
Mercury
Molybdenum
Tungsten
Nickel
Tin
Zinc
Coal
Oil
Gold, Silver, etc

__Dutch East Indies
Nickel (largest reserve in the world)
Oil
Rubber

__Philippines:
Nickel
Cobalt
Chrome
Copper
Oil
Gold, Silver, etc

__Malaysia:
Iron
Aluminum
Copper
Oil
Rubber
Tin (largest? reserve in world)

__Vietnam:
Aluminum
Coal
Rubber
Gold, Copper

__Thailand:
Oil
Coal
Tin

Burma:
Oil

In our scenarios, the Japanese were not after strategic materials in Australia - the attacks and limited occupation were only to deny the UK and Commonwealth supporting bases, infrastructure, and material.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

First, a couple of bits of info.

From what I have read, there is a serious misunderstanding of MacArthur re his leadership in the Philippines. Misunderstanding #1 is that it was his fault that he failed to build-up and train a native Philippine force. The truth is that he wanted to, and he tried to (beginning in 1938 in a serious effort) and requested personnel and material to help in doing so. But the US higher-ups refused to authorize any significant buildup. This is recorded in the official case history of War Plan Orange.

The refusal to allow the build-up is understandable to a degree for a few reasons.

I don't blame MacA for the lack of manpower or resources. But his decision to forgo previous defense arrangements and try to make a stand at the landing beaches meant that when his forces were pushed back -- and it should have been obvious that they would be -- they would then be bereft of much of their supply caches.

 

[EwenS]

I don't believe that the idea of the US staying out if a Japanese attack was only on British and Dutch interests holds water. To quote Boyd p306 when discussing a Memo sent to FDR on 5th Nov 1941 under joint signature if Adm Stark (Chief of Naval Operations) and Gen Marshall (US Army Chief of Staff) with my emphasis:-

"The memorandum concluded that the ABC-1 principles remained sound. Germany was the primary enemy, and war with Japan must not risk the Atlantic. War should, therefore, be avoided while completing reinforcements, and the United States should respond only to an attack on its own territories, or those of Britain and the Netherlands."

Boyd provides a reference to the Memo as Exhibit 16, Joint Committee on Investigation of Pearl Harbor, Vol 14, p1061.

At the time both Britain and the US were working on reinforcement plans that would see substantial naval (for Britain) and air / ground (for the US) being in place by March / April 1942. Those plans were not well co-ordinated however. As Boyd puts it on p308

"Overall, therefore, there is a respectable argument that by late autumn 1941, the associated powers were groping, albeit in a rather haphazard and disconnected way, towards a joint military strategy that had genuine prospects of containing Japan by mid-1942. However, for the strategy to work, much would have to go right. It required sustained commitment to provide the promised forces and, above all, it needed time, which, as the Allies were about to discover, they did not have."

On the other side of the table Boyd notes that at the Japanese Imperial Conference on 5th Nov at which the Japanese decided on war, the Chief of the Army General Staff identified 4 arguments against delay:-
1. Japan could not match US war production especially air power
2. US defences in the Philippines would make rapid progress
3. Defence co-operation between the US, Britain, the NEI and Russia would increase, especially their combined power in the southern region and
4. Russia might intervene in the north in the Spring (It was a myth about all those "Siberian" divisions being sent West in late 1941).

So the Japanese clearly saw war with the US as inevitable and it was better to act sooner rather than later.

 

[ThomasP]

Possibly, maybe even probably, but there were lots of memos sent over the years leading upto WWII. Some said carriers are nice but we really need more battleships. Some said lets attack now. Some said we won't be able to get us starting the war past congress. Some said the American people won't accept a war over another country's interests when 50% of our own people are in poverty. Some said we {US] should let the UK sink or swim on its own, then make a deal with Japan and we can split up the spoils. Some said it is irresponsible to embargo Japan since it will likely lead to war. Some said lets embargo Japan so Japan will have to start the war or become our butt toy, and we can play the injured party if they decide they don't want to be our butt toy. Some said we need to destroy Japan as a military power and get them out of China so we can get back to exploiting China ourselves. (I am paraphrasing to a degree, but there were actual memos sent back and forth that had pretty much the exact meaning as the words I use above.)

Once we cut off the oil (along with the UK and the Netherlands) there was no real question (in any rational person's mind) that Japan would go to war with someone, the recommendation as to trigger date being defined by the minimum amount of oil stocks needed to accomplish as much as considered feasible by the IJN. Once the US intercepted the specific communications between the various Japanese state department agencies there was no question in the minds of the US higher-ups that Japan would be starting a war with the US. We issued a war warning 10(?) days before the Japanese attacked because we knew the attack was imminent - we just did not know exactly where the first attack(s) would come.

But part of the scenario here is: If Japan had not attacked the US - would Roosevelt have been able get Congress to declare war on Japan? Would the American people have supported a war with Japan? If either of the above is answered no then what would Japan have been able to do? And what could have been done on the part of the Commonwealth to deter or minimize Japan's efforts.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

But part of the scenario here is: If Japan had not attacked the US - would Roosevelt have been able get Congress to declare war on Japan? Would the American people have supported a war with Japan? If either of the above is answered no then what would Japan have been able to do? And what could have been done on the part of the Commonwealth to deter or minimize Japan's efforts.

[Emphasis added -- Thump]

Not just a part, but the crucial part of the scenario. A big driver for the (admittedly waning) isolationist movement was the idea that Americans had died for European interests in 1917-18 and that we should not do that again. Going to war to defend European colonies which many Americans found distasteful, if not obnoxious, anyway was going to be a very hard sell.

 

[Shortround6]

[Emphasis added -- Thump]

Not just a part, but the crucial part of the scenario. A big driver for the (admittedly waning) isolationist movement was the idea that Americans had died for European interests in 1917-18 and that we should not do that again. Going to war to defend European colonies which many Americans found distasteful, if not obnoxious, anyway was going to be a very hard sell.

For some reason (biased reporting?) the Americans seemed to view China and the Far East bit differently than Europe.
That or some of America (business) viewed China as a good market for American goods and a good source for cheap low tech items and view the Japanese as interlopers moving in on the American sphere of influence.
Maybe the US "movers and shakers" thought that keeping the Japanese out of the rest of Asia would be cheaper and easier than doing much in Europe.
US had made moves against Japan in 1938 Like not writing loans for Japanese businesses or trade. This was followed in 1939 by ending the 1911 commercial treaty agreement and then a progressive tightening of sanctions/embargos extending to the ban on selling scrap steel to Japan. The Oil embargo was the last step.
But most Americans did not view this as "war" if they were not involved in trade with Japan or the Far East. Of course the bombing of the USS Panay in Dec 1937 did not win the Japanese any friends. US Isolationism may have been a bit different in regards to Japan. Not enough to have Americans clamoring for war but until Pearl Harbor some Americans might have thought a Japanese-American war would have been short and low-cost favoring America. Racial bias against Asians.

As I mentioned earlier, the US had been leaning on the British, Dutch and the French (before June of 1940) to go along with the US "embargos". US might have refused to help the European countries if Japan had left the US (including Philippines) alone but that might have been viewed as stabbing them in the back.
Leaving the Philippines alone with the US forces there after the US had been the leader of the embargos was probably not going to be OK with the Japanese military. Trusting the US not to attack Japanese supply convoys after the US had spent 3-4 years trying to strangle Japanese trade/ resource supply was probably not going to happen regardless of what the US "man in the street" thought.

 

[swampyankee]

There seems to be some idea that FDR's China policy was massively different from his predecessors. It wasn't; it's that Japan's China policy had been changing since the expansionist and rightward turn of the Japanese government. Ships like the USS Panay had been in China for decades, under administrations both Democrat and Republican. No US administration would tolerate Japan's expansionism in China. Hoover -- whose origins were Quaker -- may have been more circumspect. FDR's Republican opponents would not have been. They may say so, in hindsight, but, again, US interests in China did not begin in 1933. Until 1937, the war between China and Japan didn't expand outside of Manchuria, which had been sort of recognized as "Japan's" by the international community. It didn't start to expand out of there until FDR's second term.

Trying to get back on track.....

The key is what could the UK and Commonwealth realistically do. Considering that the Japanese were not, as some at the time thought, technologically deficient with second rate training, they were competent, largely reasonably well-led, and the techological equals, overall, with the UK and Commonwealth. If you start when the Japanese are seriously threatening, which happens after the fall of France, it's too late: the British Army has just lost a lot of equipment, which has to be replaced. The UK was facing an actual existential threat from Germany (when the UK didn't fold, the German treatment of civilians would be fairly typical, i.e., if somebody looks askance at a German officer, they round up and murder a few dozen random civilians). They had remarkably little to send.

Probably the one thing of most value would be to send a few T-class submarines if they could be supported in the area. Give them a simple order: go hunt for ships over there; if it's Japanese, sink it. Transports are the first priority, then carriers, but don't wait for a carrier or a battleship; sink any ship that you can be reasonably sure is Japanese. When on the surface, use whatever you have in terms of RDF to find IJN ships, if you can, but don't take unnecessary risks.

Getting some anti-tank guns to the army in Malaya would certainly help, as would some artillery and support vehicles. But what could be sent? Governments in London did not encourage industrialization in the Commonwealth countries, and actively discouraged it in India, so pretty much everything had to come from factories in the UK, or later US.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

For some reason (biased reporting?) the Americans seemed to view China and the Far East bit differently than Europe.
That or some of America (business) viewed China as a good market for American goods and a good source for cheap low tech items and view the Japanese as interlopers moving in on the American sphere of influence.
Maybe the US "movers and shakers" thought that keeping the Japanese out of the rest of Asia would be cheaper and easier than doing much in Europe.
US had made moves against Japan in 1938 Like not writing loans for Japanese businesses or trade. This was followed in 1939 by ending the 1911 commercial treaty agreement and then a progressive tightening of sanctions/embargos extending to the ban on selling scrap steel to Japan. The Oil embargo was the last step.
But most Americans did not view this as "war" if they were not involved in trade with Japan or the Far East. Of course the bombing of the USS Panay in Dec 1937 did not win the Japanese any friends. US Isolationism may have been a bit different in regards to Japan. Not enough to have Americans clamoring for war but until Pearl Harbor some Americans might have thought a Japanese-American war would have been short and low-cost favoring America. Racial bias against Asians.

As I mentioned earlier, the US had been leaning on the British, Dutch and the French (before June of 1940) to go along with the US "embargos". US might have refused to help the European countries if Japan had left the US (including Philippines) alone but that might have been viewed as stabbing them in the back.
Leaving the Philippines alone with the US forces there after the US had been the leader of the embargos was probably not going to be OK with the Japanese military. Trusting the US not to attack Japanese supply convoys after the US had spent 3-4 years trying to strangle Japanese trade/ resource supply was probably not going to happen regardless of what the US "man in the street" thought.

Agreed, the US position was in large part fed by missionary views of China as being the next big thing in evangelism -- and you're right that business interests probably had a say; after all, we were latecomers to the party, missed out on the opium money, but a developing market is money in the trees waiting to be shaken.

While I've always liked the alt-history idea of Japan not attacking the PI, meaning not assailing PH, I have to admit it's pretty unrealistic in the sense that no nation would want a somewhat-hostile power sitting astride trade-routes they've just picked up precisely because they've attacked your allies. So while I will mention that alt-hist timeline, I understand how unrealistic it is in OTL history.

 

[Shortround6]

I have wondered if the British could not have done better if they had done better in the NA and East Africa in 1940 and 41.

From an equipment standpoint perhaps not enough people were held accountable for the Covenanter fiasco.
Keep making Cruiser MK IVs while figuring out if the MK V (Covenanter) was actually going to work.
Building 300-600 MK IVs in 1940-41 instead of the Covenanters would allow for stronger tank forces in the African campaigns and/or allow for some tanks to be sent to the Far East.

Building a 2pdr MK X EC (El Cheapo) with 60-80 degrees of traverse instead of 360 degrees would allow for both higher production in 1940-41 and a lighter weight gun for jungle use.
Actually order 2pdr HE ammo for both tanks and AT guns. More effective tank formations and fewer losses in Africa and 2pdr HE ammo would work at least well as Japanese 37 HE in Jungle fighting.

Would not deter Japan but might slow them down enough to change the situation.

British needed to a number of the things to save Singapore. Main thing is not to let them get into rifle/machine gun range to begin with.
More aircraft doesn't do a lot of good if the Japanese army can overrun the northern Airfields. Then the JAAF moves forward to the captured bases and repeats the process.

Successful Defense of Malaya requires several things.
A naval presence strong enough to hurt invasion forces or supply runs.
Enough air defense to hinder Japanese recon and enable British recon. Degrade Japanese air attacks.
Strong enough ground defense buy time. Weeks not days.

 

[EwenS]

I'm not sure how you believe building 300-600 more Cruiser Mk.IV in place of Covenanters means more tanks for North Africa or even some for Malaya unless you reduce the expansion of the armoured units in Britain. By mid-1942 there were some 600 Covenanters (of 1,771 built 1939 to 1943) in 3 armoured divisions training in Britain.

9th Armoured Division - formed 1 Dec 1940. Broken up in July 1944 with individual units going to NWE as replacements.
Guards Armoured Divisions - formed June 1941
42nd Armoured Division - formed 1 Nov 1941. Converted from an infantry division. Broken up in late 1943 with some elements converted back to infantry, others supplying trained tank crews to home and overseas, and others becoming trading units.

This comment is worth bearing in mind:-
"It may well be wondered why a vehicle unfit for active service built in such largenumbers? The only reason that can put forward is the same as for continuing to use 2pdrguns, that the tank was ready, being built and interrupting production in favour of animproved design would probably have been disastrous. Other types were freed for use abroadand the vehicle was a stopgap until Sherman and Cromwell came along. Tanks were needed ofany sort, in January 1941 the British Army stated a need for 9930 cruisers, a shortfall of9300! Production of Cruisers was given priority over Infantry tanks the following month,yet as early as May Covenanter was expected to be out of production in 1942, with Matilda,Valentine and Crusader following. The building programme was stepped up to make way forthe A27 series, and apart from hold-ups with 'free issues' of stowage items and a shortageof 2pdrs, production shot ahead, often exceeding forecasts. In August 1941, the lastorders for 196 Covenanters were issued. soon idea of the vehicle's worth can be gleanedfrom other orders placed then, 2637
Crusaders, 2700 Centaurs, 389 Matildas, 1325 Valentines and 1960 Churchills."

 

[Zmauky]

So to summarize... the limited (larger) reinforcements that the UK (to the detriment of the forces in North Africa) could send towards Malaysia would certainly not deter Japan from attacking. Japan's attack on the UK (Malaysia and DEI and French Indochina) was provoked by the US embargo, which put pressure on Japan because it threatened their interests there by continuing to conquer China.

As we read earlier, skipping the attack on the Philippines would not have prevented the US from entering the war.
In fact, for Malaya and DEI and the Philippines, I would say that the die was cast a long time ago and not by Japan.

So the only question is whether Japan could have done better if it had skipped Pearl and let the USA implement its orange war plan. (of course from our positions because we know how (un)important battleships were, how decisive aviation was and how good American torpedoes were at the beginning of the war).

 

[EwenS]

Everyone talks about the Japanese occupation of Indochina as a single event. It wasn't. It was two events separated by nearly a year each with different motives.

1940 - Following the Fall of France, Japan applied pressure on the new French Governor (appointed by the Vichy Govt) with a view to securing the closure of the main supply route to China via the port of Haiphong (near Hanoi in the North). At the same time several weeks of negotiation with Britain resulted in a 3 month closure of the Burma Road starting 18th July. July also saw the imposition of US embargo of war materials and some other strategic materials.

1941 - politically a lot had changed for Japan, Britain & the USA. Japanese pressure on the French Governor secured an agreement for the occupation of the southern part for bases and airfields. That triggered the oil embargo by the 3 Allies.

When it comes to War Plan Orange, the US was in no position to carry it out in the near term in late 1941. It didn't have the logistics support, especially fleet oilers, to carry out an advance across the Pacific, crushing Japanese bases en route or capturing them for their own use.

Reading the first few chapters of this will give an idea of the problems the USN had, and recognised that it had.

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/b/beans-bullets-black-oil.html#service

So I don't see how not striking PH helps the overall Japanese position. It knew it could not compete industrially with the USA. Their conclusion was that they had to deliver a major shock that would force the USA to negotiate some kind of settlement.

Edit:- This may also be of interest.

https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/nhhc/research/publications/publication-508-pdf/contested_logistics_508_050423.pdf

 

[Shortround6]

I'm not sure how you believe building 300-600 more Cruiser Mk.IV in place of Covenanters means more tanks for North Africa or even some for Malaya unless you reduce the expansion of the armoured units in Britain. By mid-1942 there were some 600 Covenanters (of 1,771 built 1939 to 1943) in 3 armoured divisions training in Britain.

If they had kept building the MK IVs at least they would have had the option of sending more tanks to Africa or elsewhere.
With the cooling problems of the Covenanters even in England they did not have that option.
Converting existing production lines over to production lines for the Covenanters and Crusaders meant fewer tanks total during the change-over period.
Perhaps I am overestimating the loss of production (maybe a lot), but it is the only thing I can think of to get more tanks into the mid-east area in late 1940/early 1941.
I am not saying that the MK IVs were more reliable than Crusaders, maybe they were and maybe they weren't, at least early Crusaders but the Covenanters had no hope in the desert, or Greece or far east.
For some reason the 2pdr AT gun had to stay in production instead of the 6pdr in order to make up losses and allow for defense, while at the same time it was a good idea to stop or slow production of the existing cruiser tank while changing production to two different types of cruisers. Both of which turned out to have teething problems.

 

[yulzari]

The decision to maintain production of the 2 Pounder instead of going over to set up and make the 6 Pounder had severe knock on effects that ran on into 1943 but the alternative, in 1940 after the defeat in the Battle of France was to have only a leftover token few anti tank guns at all just as Britain was expecting an invasion there and then. We have perfect hindsight and can see that we would have got away with such a wild risk but it was the correct decision at that time in the light of what we knew at that time.

What was planned was to recognise the coming weakness of the 2 Pounder and had the next tank gun, the 6 Pounder designed and due for mass production. And, as that was already in hand work was beginning on the next generation beyond the 6 Pounder. Eventually that turned out to be the 17 Pounder. Had the planned introductions of these gone ahead then British tanks would have been gunned comparably to German ones as the war progressed but the decision to retain 2 Pounder production was a sound one at the time.

A more serious failure to my mind was not splitting 6 Pounder production, when it actually began, into the OTL 6 Pounder anti tank gun and giving the actual tanks an equivalent of the QF75mm ROF as mounted in the Cromwell. It was, after all, a 6 Pounder in all respects other than a wider bore and rechambered breech. The same performance as the US M3 75mm.

However, we digress from the OP.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Successful Defense of Malaya requires several things.
A naval presence strong enough to hurt invasion forces or supply runs.
Enough air defense to hinder Japanese recon and enable British recon. Degrade Japanese air attacks.
Strong enough ground defense buy time. Weeks not days.

Better generalship on the west coast of the peninsula would have helped.

 

[yulzari]

The most concrete deterrence would have been seizing Indo China from the French. It would display a determination to resist any Japanese attack on Malaya, avoid any drift towards Japan by the Thais, remove any immediate threat to Burma and force any Japanese attack to be mounted from Formosa. The whole task would have been far more difficult. It buys time to cope with any landing, extends air reconnaissance farther out into the South China Sea and permits more aid to flow to China which increases the attention Japan has to pay to fighting China.

My personal assessment is that, given OTL policies to cut off Japanese oil supplies and the short sighted politics and the 'get 'I'm Kev' planning of the Japanese military, nothing will deter an attempt to seize Burmese and DEI oil no matter what one does. Rationality and long term thinking were entirely absent from Japanese military politics. The whole OTL plan was an immense national strategic 'Banzi' charge across a whole region of the world whilst maintaining a long term war against the most populous nation on earth.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

First, a couple of bits of info.

From what I have read, there is a serious misunderstanding of MacArthur re his leadership in the Philippines. Misunderstanding #1 is that it was his fault that he failed to build-up and train a native Philippine force. The truth is that he wanted to, and he tried to (beginning in 1938 in a serious effort) and requested personnel and material to help in doing so. But the US higher-ups refused to authorize any significant buildup. This is recorded in the official case history of War Plan Orange.

The refusal to allow the build-up is understandable to a degree for a few reasons.

Reason 1. It should be remembered that the Moro Rebellion only ended (mostly) in 1913. However, the Philippine peoples were not a homogenous group, what with tribal and religious differences, plus there was still a lot of resentment and bad feeling against the US for bad behavior during the invasion and afterward. The higher-ups in Washington and the State Department refused to seriously arm the Philippines at first - for fears of triggering a restart of the Moro rebellion or a new form of rebellion. It was only in mid-1941(?) that the US government officially gave permission for a significant increase in power and started sending material to help with the training. MacArthur had started training as best he could in late-1938, and as per historical note (accurately) MacArthur wanted to stay and lead the Philippine army/guerrilla forces. The US higher-ups ordered MacArthur to leave. Per the fears of the US higher-ups, after the Japanese invasion there were a fair number (possibly as many as 20,000) of Philippine natives that joined the Japanese, acting as police, garrison troops, and supply adjuncts, with some even joining the Japanese Army, although there were not many accepted due to distrust by the Japanese. It should be noted, however, that many more natives joined the guerrilla forces during the course of the war - perhaps as many as 200,000 or more.

Reason 2. The US State Department and the US Navy had concluded in c.1936-38 that it would not be possible (in a practical sense) to hold the Philippines against a concerted effort by the Japanese - primarily due to the distances involved. It was therefore decided not to try, since any significant reinforcements would "only lead to greater loss of men and material". The USN and US Army had concluded the same about Singapore when the British approached them regarding a joint base, as well as other possible bases for the USN in the PTO. It should be noted here that War Plan Orange was focused on a war between the US and Japan, without participation of the UK or other Commonwealth nations.

The US higher-ups did not inform MacArthur of their decision regarding no serious attempt being made to hold the Philippines as the rule - until very shortly before the war began. The failure to inform MacArthur of their decision is recorded in the official case history of War Plan Orange.

Reason 3. The US did not want to antagonize Japan in the 1930s. The US had a voting majority that was isolationist, still in or recovering from the Great Depression, and the US military was relatively small, The only exception was the USN which was large relative to most nations of the world. The US Army in late-1939 was at around 200,000 personnel (including the Air Corps) - at that time the Japanese Army was more than 10x the size of the US Army. It was only the huge influx of capital from the UK and France that allowed the start of the US massive build-up. (This is sometimes argued as untrue, but regardless of whether the growth could mechanically have happened without the influx of European wealth, it would not have been acceptable otherwise due to the political/economic climate.) Additionally, as of about 1927-38 it still appeared (to the US) that Japan was winning in China, which was scary to say the least.

re

We (the war gamers) could only operate based on the historical political climate and on what has been declassified/learned about the behavior of the higher-ups behind the scenes. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt etal did not feel that they could start a war with Japan without serious provocation, or against Germany either. If Japan had not attacked historically, Germany would probably not have declared war on the US anytime soon, and the US might very well have stayed out of the war, or have been a Johnny-come-lately as in WWI. Since we (the war gamers) were only concerned with the Japan-DEI-Commonwealth war (France already being out of the war) we decided that if the US did not enter war with Japan before the end of 1942 then it would not matter relative to what the Commonwealth could have done prior to or at the beginning of the war in the Pacific.

re

The Australians had begun building up their forces already, but only had about 80,000(?) personnel in their Army as of the end of 1939. (Sorry, but I do not remember off hand what their strength was as of December 1941.) In our most successful scenarios, Japan only occupied Darwin and a few of the cities on the east coast of Australia, but they destroyed or crippled pretty much all of the significant harbor facilities at the other ports on the east coast down to Melbourne over a period of about 4-5 months. This was possible because of the withdrawal fo about 150.000 troops from China and redeploying them in other areas of operations, plus without the need to attack the US forces in the Pacific a lot of Japanese troops, ships (including transports), and aircraft were freed up. We gave the Australian forces the advantage of significantly higher morale than the other troops the Japanese encountered at the start of the war, due to fighting for home country and such. But half of whatever the fully trained ground forces Australia had in December 1941 were over seas, either in the MTO, Middle East, or in transit. Of the ground forces at home, more than half did not yet even have full uniform and basic gear. RAAC had 8(?) light tanks and 6(?) cruiser tanks.The RAAF strength at home was about 200(?) effective combat aircraft at the end of 1941. The RAN was small (2x heavy cruisers, 3x light cruisers, plus DDs and such?) and any ships that stayed to fight were sunk almost immediately. (ABDA never formed in our scenarios, and the surviving RAN ships pulled back to ports in the Indian Ocean.) Once the RAAF was destroyed or retreated to the west coast there was very little the ground forces could do relative to offense, and the only fighting devolved into guerrilla warfare around the occupied coastal cities. Japanese supply lines were untouchable by the guerrillas since all supplies were transported by sea. All the Japanese occupying forces were required to do was continue to deny the Australians and Commonwealth forces use of the ports and such and prevent supply along the north-east and eastern coasts. The RAAF did eventually get a foot hold in the western areas of Australia but was unable to have any serious effect before the end of the scenario because of the distances and difficulty in supplying airbases in the middle of the Australian desert. When we assumed the US did not enter the war by the end of 1942 the Japanese navy was able to deny the RN access to the west coast ports, as the RAF and RN were still tied down in the ETO and MTO.

Something to keep in mind is that historically the US/UK/Australian/NZ ground forces faced less than 10% of the total Japanese ground forces at any point in time during the war, and since the fighting was mostly defeat in detail, it was effectively significantly less in any real sense.

Pre 7 December 1941, in the historical timeline the Japanese Army disposition was China (60%), Manchukuo (25%), Japan (10%), Indochina (3%), Korea (2%), PTO (0%).

re

There was another thread where I posted the reasons for Japan invading the various countries that they went after historically, and below is a repost of countries and their assets. The following are the resources that were known at the time (other than the ranking in size of the reserves) and were already being exploited (for the most part), or in the process of planning to be exploited, by the various controlling governments. The resources listed under Manchukuo and Korea for example were already being exploited to one degree or another by Japan, those under DEI were already being exploited by the Netherlands, etc.

re Japan's reasons for invading the countries they did.

__Korea:
Tungsten (4th? largest reserve in the world)
Molybdenum
Iron
Nickel
Magnesium
Zinc
Copper
Lead
Coal (anthracite, the highest grade)
Gold, Silver, etc

__Manchukuo:
Iron
Aluminum
Magnesium
Copper
Zinc
Lead
Oil (shale oil)
Coal
Gold, Silver, etc

__China:
Iron
Aluminum
Mercury
Molybdenum
Tungsten
Nickel
Tin
Zinc
Coal
Oil
Gold, Silver, etc

__Dutch East Indies
Nickel (largest reserve in the world)
Oil
Rubber

__Philippines:
Nickel
Cobalt
Chrome
Copper
Oil
Gold, Silver, etc

__Malaysia:
Iron
Aluminum
Copper
Oil
Rubber
Tin (largest? reserve in world)

__Vietnam:
Aluminum
Coal
Rubber
Gold, Copper

__Thailand:
Oil
Coal
Tin

Burma:
Oil

In our scenarios, the Japanese were not after strategic materials in Australia - the attacks and limited occupation were only to deny the UK and Commonwealth supporting bases, infrastructure, and material.

Figure 9 in the attached USSBS report tables where the Japanese got their goods from prewar.

 

[Howard Gibson]

My personal assessment is that, given OTL policies to cut off Japanese oil supplies and the short sighted politics and the 'get 'I'm Kev' planning of the Japanese military, nothing will deter an attempt to seize Burmese and DEI oil no matter what one does. Rationality and long term thinking were entirely absent from Japanese military politics. The whole OTL plan was an immense national strategic 'Banzi' charge across a whole region of the world whilst maintaining a long term war against the most populous nation on earth.

No, no. The Japanese military were not irrational. Like the Germans and the Italians, they had a very high tolerance for risk. They knew damn well that they could not out-last the Americans in a protracted war of attrition. After being thumped at Pearl Harbour, lacking the toughness and fighting spirit of the Japanese, they were supposed to surrender.

The Japanese missed out on the trench warfare of WWI. This might have clued them in on fighting spirit versus machine guns. The again, Google human bullets.