1000-1200 HP: long range fighter vs. interceptor?

[stona]

Not really, it depends on the risks they were willing to take. How close to get the carriers flying them off to Malta or how many crated aircraft on freighters they were willing to loose. 8 crated planes on each of 6 freighters gets you 24 delivered Spitfires even if 50% of the freighters were sunk. Granted you have to assemble the aircraft rather than just refuel them in order to use them.

First which carriers? Those that could launch Spitfires equipped with ferry tanks were few, far between or sunk. The freighters were carrying other essential supplies to sustain Malta and these would have to be removed to make room for a handful of aeroplanes, dribs and drabs. I doubt that you could fit a crated Spitfire in one of the submarines which did such sterling service in the supply of Malta
The people at the time had to fight the war, not just the Mediterranean campaign, with the limited resources available. Hindsight is a luxury they did not have.

Any Spitfire sent to Malta or anywhere else is one less available for ADGB, Fighter Command's primary responsibility and the reason for its existence. Again people are using hindsight. It was not clear at the time that the Germans might not attempt some kind of renewed assault, aerial or otherwise, on the UK in 1941.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

From "The Spitfire Story" by Alfred Price.

..............................MK II Spit..............MK II with 40gal tank climb rates.

Altitude-2,000ft...........2,925fpm......................2240fpm
...........5,000ft...........2,925fpm......................2240fpm
.........10,000ft...........2,995fpm......................2,240fpm
.........15,000ft...........2,770fpm......................1,990fpm
.........20,000ft...........2,175fpm......................1,420fpm
.........25,000ft...........1,600fpm......................1,050fpm
.........30,000ft.............995fpm.........................545fpm

Granted the shape of this 'conformal' tank on the port wing was not as good as the ones in the pictures in previous post but the speed loss was 24mph at 15,000ft and 31mph at 20,000ft. Fully loaded weight was 6172lbs for the 'clean' plane and 6,513lbs for the one with the tank. Plane with the tank also had all metal ailerons. Putting the fuel in internal tanks would have restored much of the speed and improved the climb some.

50 MK IIA Spitfires were fitted with the 40imp gallon wing tank and issued to Nos 66,118 and 152 Squadrons. The version did not find favor in the operational squadrons due to the loss in performance.

Time from 20,000ft to 30,000ft for the 'clean' plane was 6m 42s, time for the plane with tank was 10m 30s. even if you can shave 2 minutes off of that by using internal tanks it is still a big difference.

 

[tomo pauk]

What kind of assault against the UK would've Germans attempted in second half of 1941? How were the Hurricanes transported at the Mediterranean in those 6 months?

 

[Shortround6]

The people at the time had to fight the war, not just the Mediterranean campaign, with the limited resources available. Hindsight is a luxury they did not have.

Any Spitfire sent to Malta or anywhere else is one less available for ADGB, Fighter Command's primary responsibility and the reason for its existence. Again people are using hindsight. It was not clear at the time that the Germans might not attempt some kind of renewed assault, aerial or otherwise, on the UK in 1941.

Tomo asked if there was a technical reason. I don't believe there was. Where tactical (or strategic) considerations fall on the spectrum between technical and political may be different. British may have tried to push closer to Malta with carriers and lost both the carriers and the Spitfires, nothing was guaranteed. A better fighter defense might have meant fewer ships bombed/sunk close to Malta or in harbor leading to more supplies for Malta, it all gets very, very iffy.

British did seem to think that ALL other theaters could be handled by aircraft that they would NOT use defending Britain which seems to show a certain arrogance or disregard of opponents capability.

 

[stona]

What kind of assault against the UK would've Germans attempted in second half of 1941? How were the Hurricanes transported at the Mediterranean in those 6 months?

The Germans couldn't launch a serious assault on Britain in 1941, as we now know with the benefit of hindsight.

The first flight of 12 Hurricanes to Malta was on 2nd August 1940, guided by two Skuas. All fourteen aircraft took of from the ageing carrier HMS Argus, which, I have already explained, had a flight deck too short for launching Spitfires with ferry tanks.

The second "club run" was on 15th November, again Argus launched 12 Hurricanes but several were lost due to miscalculations in range/altitude and weather.

In early 1941 the Royal Navy was a bit busy conveying 68,000 troops and their equipment to Greece. I keep saying that resources are not limitless and priorities have to be made. It was also giving the Italians a bloody nose at the battle of Cape Matapan.

Nonetheless another 12 Hurricanes were brought to Gibraltar aboard Argus where they transferred to Ark Royal before being flown off to Malta on 3rd April '41. This time they all arrived safely.

On 21st May '41 48 Hurricanes were flown off Ark Royal and Furious all arrived safely

On 6th June a similar operation safely delivered another 35 Hurricanes.

On 14th June another 47 Hurricanes were delivered, this time from Ark Royal and Victorious

This period coincides with the disaster on Crete. The sea route to Malta, was now enfiladed by enemy air bases in Crete and North Africa. Somerville wrote.

"For over twelve months Malta has held out most gallantly against all assaults of the enemy. Until Crete fell we were able to supply Malta from both ends of the Mediterranean, but since then the situation has changed. For the present Malta can only be supplied from the west and this is the task with which we have been entrusted..."

On 5th September 26 Hurricanes were transferred from Furious to Ark Royal by ramp at Gibralter. On the 8th they all flew off successfully to Malta.

On 10th September both carriers successfully launched another batch of Hurricanes to Malta. (not sure exactly how many).

On 11th November 11 Hurricanes were flown of Argus and 26 off Ark Royal to Malta. This would be Ark Royal's last contribution before she was sunk.

It is important to put the deliveries of Hurricanes in context. Nobody on Malta was squealing for Hurricanes in 1941. This is largely because the Luftwaffe was occupied elsewhere. As the winter weather closed in Luftwaffe units became available to Kesselring in the Mediterranean. In early 1942 he prioritised Malta. It was only in the last weeks of 1941 that the full implications of German involvement in the Mediterranean began to be felt. The Luftwaffe steadily increased the intensity of air raids from December 1941. Malta's darkest days from February to August 1942 were upon the island.
It was only now, in early 1942, that the Hurricanes on the island became out classed by the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s and only now that Air Vice-Marshall Lloyd first asks for reinforcement with Spitfires. This is probably the principal reason why no Spitfires had been released for the defence of Malta in 1941.

The first attempt to deliver Spitfires was on 27/28th February 1942. Both Argus and Eagle sailed into danger only to discover that the long range tanks dispatched did not fit the Spitfire. The operation was aborted.
Almost as soon as the AOC Malta asked for Spitfire aircraft an attempt was made to deliver them.

The first batch of 16 Spitfires reached the island on 6th March 1942, launched from an almost identical task force as the earlier failed attempt.

The rest is I think well known.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Many thanks for the overview, Steve.
As for the supposed assault against the Britain - you will note that I've twice mentioned the 'second half of 1941' as a time to deliver Spitfires elsewhere. Without hindsight, the British knew that LW did not have assets to defeat, in same time, the Soviets, the Allied forces in the Med (even with RA assets) and the metropolitan UK defenses.

 

[stona]

As for the supposed assault against the Britain - you will note that I've twice mentioned the 'second half of 1941' as a time to deliver Spitfires elsewhere. Without hindsight, the British knew that LW did not have assets to defeat, in same time, the Soviets, the Allied forces in the Med (even with RA assets) and the metropolitan UK defenses.

Yes but it might have caused some serious damage. There was absolutely no chance that the government, Air Ministry and RAF would leave any chance of Fighter Command being under strength in the UK in 1941. The Battle of Britain ended for the British in September 1940, but that is not the view of the Germans.

It's a moot point because when the RAF's Hurricanes became outclassed in the Mediterranean efforts were made to supply Spitfires. It proved difficult to do, but that is due to the actions of the Germans and a lesser extent the Italians. The intervention of the Germans in Italy's "Mare Nostrum" only began to be seriously felt on Malta at the very end of 1941. Throughout 1941 the Fleet Air Arm's Fulmars and Skuas had done quite well in fleet defence which gives an idea of the level of opposition.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Yes but it might have caused some serious damage. There was absolutely no chance that the government, Air Ministry and RAF would leave any chance of Fighter Command being under strength in the UK in 1941. The Battle of Britain ended for the British in September 1940, but that is not the view of the Germans.

30 Spitfires (against 30 Hurricanes less) would've made quite a difference in the Med in 1941, while 30 Spitfires less (but 30 Hurricanes more) would bee hardly felt as a disadvantage for the RAF FC that already has a 3:1 numerical advantage vs. LW at the West. And, without hindsight, RAF brass knew they have a big numerical advantage vs. LW in second half of 1941. Expecting a 'serious damage' to be dealt by such a force would be too much.

It's a moot point because when the RAF's Hurricanes became outclassed in the Mediterranean efforts were made to supply Spitfires. It proved difficult to do, but that is due to the actions of the Germans and a lesser extent the Italians. The intervention of the Germans in Italy's "Mare Nostrum" only began to be seriously felt on Malta at the very end of 1941. Throughout 1941 the Fleet Air Arm's Fulmars and Skuas had done quite well in fleet defence which gives an idea of the level of opposition.
Cheers
Steve

Well, everything wee post here is a moot point
The Germans intervened in the Med as early as April of 1941, and, as you've posted, with fall of Crete, Malta was enfiladed from all sides as early as mid 1941. Malta was attacked by the LW, based in Sicily, from April 1941.
Further, the RAF, CW and Allied units in the North Africa and Greece/Crete (before those fell) could've find good use for the Spitfires, if only they could get any prior mid/late 1942.

 

[stona]

The pressure wasn't really on the RAF defenders of Malta until late 1941. You have to put this into the perspective of the entire MTO. The Luftwaffe itself had other commitments through 1941 and only ramped up it's attacks on Malta in December. The release of units from the east helped with this.

I don't know whether the AOC Malta would have got Spitfires in 1941 had he asked for them and never will. When he asked he got. Had the first attempt been better organised he would have got them fairly quickly following his request. There are lots of other things that could have been but weren't done. Plans for a sort of Maltese Coastal Command using Blenheims and other types were rejected for example.

All sides fight with limited resources, we can argue about how those resources might be deployed but we can't increase them! We might feel that too many Spitfire squadrons were retained for ADGB, but the powers of the time clearly did not.

Cheers

Steve

 

[OldSkeptic]

30 Spitfires (against 30 Hurricanes less) would've made quite a difference in the Med in 1941, while 30 Spitfires less (but 30 Hurricanes more) would bee hardly felt as a disadvantage for the RAF FC that already has a 3:1 numerical advantage vs. LW at the West. And, without hindsight, RAF brass knew they have a big numerical advantage vs. LW in second half of 1941. Expecting a 'serious damage' to be dealt by such a force would be too much.



Well, everything wee post here is a moot point
The Germans intervened in the Med as early as April of 1941, and, as you've posted, with fall of Crete, Malta was enfiladed from all sides as early as mid 1941. Malta was attacked by the LW, based in Sicily, from April 1941.
Further, the RAF, CW and Allied units in the North Africa and Greece/Crete (before those fell) could've find good use for the Spitfires, if only they could get any prior mid/late 1942.

Correct. In both arenas there were clear operational requirements. The excuses given by FC were endless: Spitfires were too delicate for the conditions, needed for home defence (while the Luftwaffe was fully engaged in Russia and the ME), etc.

The only excuse that was true was that LM was throwing them away by the bucket loads in France, fully backed by Douglas and Portal in their 'leaning towards the enemy' 'strategy'.

Now you have to remember that Malta and North Africa were two of the Allies 'must win' situations (the other was the Battle of the Atlantic). Whoever control Malta controls the Med. And the Allies had to clear the Med to enable shipping to come through the Suez canal thus saving millions of tons of shipping equivalent. No Med, no invasion of France because there would not be enough shipping.

Plus Malta itself payed an essential role in winning North Africa, by hammering German and Italian convoys when it was free from attack itself, as did winning in NA help protect Malta convoys from attack from airbases there. Thus you have to look at them as a single interlinked campaign.

Therefore the reluctance by the RAF to properly equip these theatres defies belief. NA only got some Spits just before the Battle of El Alamein, how many Hurricanes and P-40s did Marseille shoot down again? Shooting fish in a barrel.

But then again it took Roosevelt's personal intervention to get enough VLR B-24s for Atlantic convoy protection.....

 

[stona]

Plus Malta itself payed an essential role in winning North Africa, by hammering German and Italian convoys when it was free from attack itself, ...

As it did in 1941, without Spitfires and after the fall of Crete. Don't forget that it was on 9th October, following actions by "Force K" that Rommel complained to Berlin that his supply line had been cut and that only 8,093 of his promised 60,000 troops had arrived.

The Italians indulged in self delusion. Generale Pricolo, the Regia Aeronautica's, Chief of Staff reported that reconnaissance photos of a British cruiser moored near a dry dock in Malta was proof that it had been hit.
Ciano noted wryly in his diary that this was " equivalent to declaring that a man is probably dead because he has gone to live near the cemetery. Clowns, tragic clowns."
Ciano also presciently wrote "we have no rights to complain if Hitler sends Kesselring as commander in the South."
Some senior officers did loose their commands (Brivonese and Brisciani I can remember for sure).

It was the commitment of German forces against Malta which really started from the beginning of December 1941 which precipitated the crisis in 1942.
You seem to be unable to place events in a chronological order.

Cheers
Steve

 

[OldSkeptic]

Think they were a bit busy in '41 too....

Siege of Malta (World War II) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This made Malta a dangerous threat to Axis logistical concerns. In response, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OLK or Air Force High Command) sent Fliegerkorps X (Flying Corps Ten) to Sicily, which arrived in January 1941, to strike at naval forces in and around Malta, as well as RAF positions on the island to ease the passage of supplies.[44]

The British operation should not have been launched: Ultra had informed the Air Ministry of Fliegerkorps X's presence on Sicily as early as 4 January. They did not pass on the intelligence to the Admiralty, who probably would not have sailed within range of the Ju 87s if they had known.[56] The RAF was in no condition to prevent a major German air attack, with only 16 Hurricanes and a couple of Gladiator aircraft serviceable.[57] On 11 January 1941 10 more Ju 87s were sent to sink Illustrious. They chanced upon the light cruisers HMS Southampton and Gloucester. Hits were scored on both; Southampton was so badly damaged her navy escorts scuttled her. Over the next 12 days the workers at the shipyard in the Grand Harbour repaired the carrier under determined air attack so that she might make Alexandria. On 13 January the Ju 87s, now equipped with SC 1000 bombs failed to achieve a hit. On 14 January, 44 Ju 87s scored a hit on the ill-fated after lift. On 18 January, the Germans switched to attacking the airfields at Hal Far and Luqa in an attempt to win air superiority before returning to Illustrious. On 20 January two near misses breached the hull below the water line and hurled her hull against the wharf. Nevertheless, the engineers won the battle. On 23 January she slipped out of Grand Harbour, and arrived in Alexandria two days later. The carrier later sailed to America where she was kept out of action for a year.[58]
....
The Luftwaffe had failed to sink (Illustrious) the carrier. However, their losses were few—three aircraft on 10 January and four Ju 87s over several weeks—and the Germans had impressed the British with the effectiveness of land-based air power. They withdrew their fleet's heavy units from the central Mediterranean and risked no more than trying to send cruisers through the Sicilian Narrows. Both the British and Italian navies digested their experiences over Taranto and Malta
......
The appearance in February of a staffel (squadron) of Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-7 fighters of 7. Staffel Jagdgeschwader 26 (26th Fighter Wing or JG 26), lead by Oberleutnant Joachim Müncheberg, quickly lead to a sudden and marked rise in RAF losses, as the experienced, confident, tactically astute, better-equipped and -trained German fighter units made their presence felt.[60] The Allied pilots on Malta had little combat experience and their Hawker Hurricanes were well-worn. Over the next four months, few of JG 26's Bf 109s were damaged, let alone shot down.[61][62] In exchange they claimed 42 air victories, twenty of them (including one over Yugoslavia) credited to Müncheberg.[63]
.....
In contrast, the Hurricanes were patched up and cannibalised beyond their expected service life. Their performance, already inferior to the Bf 109E-7, was further reduced as a result. Small numbers of reinforcements arrived; five at the beginning of March, another six on the 18th. However five were lost in-between, costing the RAF five pilots. The life expectancy of RAF pilots was poor.[64]
.....
On 1 March, the Luftwaffe mounted very effective raids. Attacks on the airfields destroyed all the Wellingtons brought in in October. Royal Navy warships and Sunderland flying boats could not use the island for offensive operations. The two main fighter squadrons, No. 261 and 274 Squadrons, were put under severe pressure.[65]
....
German air superiority was taking its toll on the island. There were several raids per day. Over 107 Axis attacks took place in February and 105 in March, with Bf 109 fighters contributing by strafing any signs of movement on the ground.
....
Nevertheless, the Germans held on to air superiority. Hitler ordered Fliegerkorps X to protect Axis shipping, prevent Allied shipping passing through the central Mediterranean, and neutralise Malta altogether as an Allied base. Around 180 German and 300 Italian aircraft would carry out the directive. The Luftwaffe in particular swarmed over the island almost at will. The RAF was barely able to put more than six to eight fighters in the air at one time. Occasionally a dozen would be flown in off British carriers but, being heavily outnumbered, the replacements were soon used up. The Axis were successful in implementing Hitler's directive. By mid-May, the central Mediterranean had been sealed off to Allied shipping, and the DAK was able to send reinforcements to Rommel in North Africa with the loss of only three percent of its supplies, personnel and equipment. From 11 April to 10 May, just 111 Axis raids were carried out. All targeted military installations. Most heavy equipment in Grand Harbour was destroyed; the dry-docks could only be operated by hand. Efficiency of most workshops was down to 50 percent, some down to 25 percent.[74]

By early May 1941, the Luftwaffe had flown 1,465 strike, 1,144 fighter and 132 reconnaissance missions for just 44 losses.[78] III./Kampfgeschwader 30 (KG 30) and III./Lehrgeschwader 1 (KG 1) flew sporadic night attacks during April

Only the German Balkan campaign and then the attack on the Soviet Union saved Malta, because there was nothing the RAF was going to do about it.

 

[stona]

Only the German Balkan campaign and then the attack on the Soviet Union saved Malta, because there was nothing the RAF was going to do about it.

Because there was nothing the RAF HAD to do about it. Malta survived 1941 relatively unscathed precisely because the Germans were engaged elsewhere (even Wikipedia got that bit right) and because the Italians were ineffective, particularly in the air.

The Royal Navy was operating in the Mediterranean and causing all sorts of problems for the axis forces in North Africa. It's why Kesselring prioritised Malta when he arrived in NOVEMBER 1941. Ultimately even he chickened out of a German-Italian invasion suspecting that as soon as the Royal Navy appeared the Italian fleet would bolt for its home ports.

I would disagree with the assertion in that Wikipedia article that the Hurricane could not compete with the Bf 109 E (dash number is irrelevant). It contended quite well in 1940. What the Hurricane was clearly outclassed by was the Bf 109 F which arrived later.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Getting back to the original subject with 1100-1200hp there isn't enough power for carrying fuel, armament and keeping good performance. Look again at the spitfire MK II data. Lets assume that they can stick even an extra 30 IMP gallons inside the plane (getting rid of the pesky fixed tank) and rig a 30-45 imp gallon drop tank. The drop tank takes care of forming up and climbing to altitude ( some of these planes could burn 25-35 gallons just getting to 30,000ft). Now you have used some internal fuel for warming up and take-off but you are at combat altitude with over 100 imp gallons of fuel or 30-40 more than an "interceptor" would have. While 5-6% more weight has a negligible effect on speed it does have a fair effect on climb, ceiling, and ability to turn.
Ability to turn is not simply how tight the turn radius is but how how fast speed bleeds off in the turn and how tight or at what rate the plane can turn and maintain altitude, not have to dive to maintain speed. Some of these early fighters can only maintain speed in a hard (4-6 "G") turn by loosing several thousand feet of altitude per minute.

Good performance includes climb and altitude as well as speed. One source gives a late model Japanese KI 61 (two type Ho-5 cannon and two H-103mg) as needing 7 minutes to climb to 16,400ft while a MK II Spitfire can get to 20,000ft in the same time. The Spitfire has nearly 5,000ft more service ceiling. While nobody fights at or near the service ceiling it means that the operational and combat ceilings are probably in the Spitfires favor by 3-4,000ft.

 

[OldSkeptic]

Because there was nothing the RAF HAD to do about it. Malta survived 1941 relatively unscathed precisely because the Germans were engaged elsewhere (even Wikipedia got that bit right) and because the Italians were ineffective, particularly in the air.


I would disagree with the assertion in that Wikipedia article that the Hurricane could not compete with the Bf 109 E (dash number is irrelevant). It contended quite well in 1940. What the Hurricane was clearly outclassed by was the Bf 109 F which arrived later.

Cheers

Steve

On 1 March, the Luftwaffe mounted very effective raids. Attacks on the airfields destroyed all the Wellingtons brought in in October. Royal Navy warships and Sunderland flying boats could not use the island for offensive operations. The two main fighter squadrons, No. 261 and 274 Squadrons, were put under severe pressure.[65]

From 11 April to 10 May, just 111 Axis raids were carried out. All targeted military installations. Most heavy equipment in Grand Harbour was destroyed; the dry-docks could only be operated by hand. Efficiency of most workshops was down to 50 percent, some down to 25 percent.[74]

Note all in 1941. Just a flesh wound, a big firework display, nobody noticed anything.

As for the 109. In the BoB there was the Spit and they were deliberately tasked with attacking the 109s. Without that, those 'tired old puffers' (as the Luftwaffe called them) would have suffered appalling losses. They were giving away 20-30mph, even in brand new or top condition. If they have been hammered and spares are short then that could be lot more.

 

[OldSkeptic]

Getting back to the original subject with 1100-1200hp there isn't enough power for carrying fuel, armament and keeping good performance. Look again at the spitfire MK II data. Lets assume that they can stick even an extra 30 IMP gallons inside the plane (getting rid of the pesky fixed tank) and rig a 30-45 imp gallon drop tank. The drop tank takes care of forming up and climbing to altitude ( some of these planes could burn 25-35 gallons just getting to 30,000ft). Now you have used some internal fuel for warming up and take-off but you are at combat altitude with over 100 imp gallons of fuel or 30-40 more than an "interceptor" would have. While 5-6% more weight has a negligible effect on speed it does have a fair effect on climb, ceiling, and ability to turn.
Ability to turn is not simply how tight the turn radius is but how how fast speed bleeds off in the turn and how tight or at what rate the plane can turn and maintain altitude, not have to dive to maintain speed. Some of these early fighters can only maintain speed in a hard (4-6 "G") turn by loosing several thousand feet of altitude per minute.

Good performance includes climb and altitude as well as speed. One source gives a late model Japanese KI 61 (two type Ho-5 cannon and two H-103mg) as needing 7 minutes to climb to 16,400ft while a MK II Spitfire can get to 20,000ft in the same time. The Spitfire has nearly 5,000ft more service ceiling. While nobody fights at or near the service ceiling it means that the operational and combat ceilings are probably in the Spitfires favor by 3-4,000ft.

But in as escort role, you have burned off most of that fuel so the weight difference in minimal.
Weight is not everything, the Mustang was much heavier than the Spit, which was itself heavier than the 109. In fact the Mustang and 190 were very similar in weights. Yet despite all that weight the Mustang could hold its own in turning contests with both.

By that logic the supreme fighter was the 109, followed by the Spit and the 190 and Mustang following up as also runs. The P-47 being completely useless.

There is some bit Post hoc ergo propter hoc arguments going on here. Along the lines if: "well they didn't do it because they couldn't do it with Spits. Only the P-47s and P-51s had the magical qualities necessary for MR, LR and VLR escort roles", all the extra fuel and so on had no affect on them whatsoever".

I've just been reading excellent "The Bombing War' by Richard Overy. he makes the point that the RAF simply did not do "counter force" (a more encompassing description than just escorting). It was not part of their dogma, either night or day. What little they did (and despite the propaganda it was very little), was always after the fact and as a response to terrible losses, really to get the politicians off their back and try and preserve some of morale with the crews, as much as anything else.

So these things were not technical in nature, they were deliberate choices that were made. For the RAF this applies to night fighter support as well, what little they applied was pathetic, as many people (in the RAF itself) said at the time.

Note that the USAAF was also initially dead against escort fighters (or counter force to be more exact) too. In fact Eaker was dead against them full stop. It was Hap Arnold that was the pusher (and had endless fights with Portal, all documented too, very interesting reading).
One of the reasons why Eaker got moved sideways and people like the superb Doolittle were put in (a very unappreciated person, he was the one that created the layered escort and also set them free - within limits of course, the US's Park in my view, a superb air tactician).

Again, as always, Dowding was different. I contend that if he had remained, ideally been CAS, with Park as head of Fighter Command then things would have been very, very different. (at least there would have been no nonsense about Malta and NA, plus there would have been no starving of VLR aircraft for the BoA).

Note Dowding had no issues with improving range whatsoever, in fact it was a priority for him. Correctly reasoning (since he had been responsible for everything that had been done to date, like the Spit, Hurricane, radar, world best C&C and so on) that if you set the requirements then the manufacturers will make it happen and people like Park will create the training and tactics to apply it properly. After all the spec he created for the Spit and Hurricane was science fiction at the time in a RAF ruled by bi-planes.

So, just like today (sadly people never seem to change) a lot of people ended up dying because some prats at the top screws up and have bees in their bonnet about something (like model trains, read RV Jones, my father actually knew him, he was not impressed).

You can pick many (sadly far too many) examples of this in the years since WW2 and right now (think F-35 for example, the Bolton Paul Defiant of its time).
Talking about that pig, Dowding spent huge amounts of time fending off the Air Ministry about that plane. They loved it, wanted heaps of squadrons dedicated to it, he managed to keep the deaths down fortunately.

 

[stona]

As for the 109. In the BoB there was the Spit and they were deliberately tasked with attacking the 109s. Without that, those 'tired old puffers' (as the Luftwaffe called them) would have suffered appalling losses. They were giving away 20-30mph, even in brand new or top condition. If they have been hammered and spares are short then that could be lot more.

Park attempted to engage escorts with Spitfires. This tactic rarely succeeded. Squadrons were tasked to a raid, the composition of which would be unknown until it neared the coast and was seen by the (Royal) Observer Corps, according to state of readiness and geographic position. They were not tasked to a raid depending on which type they were equipped with.

Almost all Luftwaffe fighter pilots claimed to have been shot down by a Spitfire, whereas many had in fact fallen victim to a Hurricane. The most successful squadron to fly in the battle flew Hurricanes. The numbers are out there.

Many eminent and successful Battle of Britain pilots have written that they preferred the Hurricane in 1940 for reasons which belong in another thread.

I am not suggesting that Malta was not targeted during 1941. The supply situation was better until the Germans arrived in force and the Royal Navy was still able to operate from the island. The importance of Malta to the British was not as an airfield but as a naval base.

It was the German reluctance to launch a seaborne assault that led to the attempt to reduce the island, from the air, in 1942. It is hard to over estimate the disdain in which German commanders held their Italian counterparts, rightly or wrongly.
It was to this threat, now largely carried out by much better equipped and determined German forces, that the RAF was reacting when Lloyd asked for Spitfires in early 1942. Unfortunately in January 1942 there was no aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean.

Vice Admiral Ford, one of the true unsung heroes of the Malta campaign realised what was happening in January 1942. He wrote to Cunningham, saying that the enemy was,

"trying to neutralize [sic] Malta's effort and, I hate to say, is gradually doing so.........Malta must be made stiff with modern fighters.......Guns and stores to come in a submarine beforehand.."

He concluded somewhat desperately,

"How I can unload convoys I cannot think."

This, early 1942, was the beginning of Malta's real trials.


As an aside be very wary of Luftwaffe claims. Much better to check allied losses. JG 27 in North Africa is one unit which we know for a fact was making knowingly fraudulent claims. Four of its pilots were busted by their own side doing this. Whilst most pilots on all sides made honest, if "optimistic", claims it would be naïve to imagine that Vogel, Sawallisch, Bendert and Stigler, 4./JG 27's so called "expert schwarm" were the only ones who knowingly inflated their figures.

Cheers

Steve

 

[OldSkeptic]

Almost all Luftwaffe fighter pilots claimed to have been shot down by a Spitfire, whereas many had in fact fallen victim to a Hurricane. The most successful squadron to fly in the battle flew Hurricanes.

Yes 303 squadron composed of the most experieced pilots around...the Poles.

But the rest, the average, tells another story which Stephen Bungay shows quite clearly.

I am not suggesting that Malta was not targeted during 1941.

It was just a bit smashed, total air supremacy does that to places. It was over for Malta, then it was saved because the Germans went to, first the Balkans, then of course that little battle .. the Soviet Union.

RB Jones had a part to play. The Germans had learned how to jam British radar. He was consulted about this and said "keep doing it and they will believe that the jamming was ineffective". They did and after the war, he got to interview the various players. One of which, forgot his name (get his book) asked him about it , and when he told them what happened looked sheepish ... conned beautifully.

 

[Greyman]

I would disagree with the assertion in that Wikipedia article that the Hurricane could not compete with the Bf 109 E (dash number is irrelevant). It contended quite well in 1940.

Keep in mind that these Hurricanes were well-worn, both in engine and in airframe. It's possible that this can go so far as to render an example's performance unrecognizable compared to a factory-fresh machine.

Also, aircraft had to be tropicalized, and Hurricanes were fitted with that big Volkes filter. This exacerbated the Hurricane-Bf 109 performance gap even further.

RAF units in Africa definitely complained about having to use entirely ball ammunition, it's certainly possible the units in Malta had the same problem.
The armour of your average Luftwaffe aircraft had probably improved since the Battle of Britain as well.

It was over for Malta, then it was saved because the Germans went to, first the Balkans, then of course that little battle .. the Soviet Union.

The line I enjoy is 'while the ANZACs may have lost Crete, in the process they saved Malta', the implication being they made the Germans pay so dearly for Crete that they hadn't the stomach for an airborne invasion of Malta.

 

[stona]

It was just a bit smashed, total air supremacy does that to places. It was over for Malta, then it was saved because the Germans went to, first the Balkans, then of course that little battle .. the Soviet Union.

No. 303 Squadron did have some experienced veterans but by no means all were No. 303 (Kosciuszko) only came into being on 2nd August 1940 and yet was the 4th highest scoring of all RAF squadrons. This is largely due to the longer training and better experience of those pilots. It has little to do with the aircraft they were flying, though in their hands the Hurricane I was clearly up to the job. Many pilots of the Luftwaffe were equally experienced, having fought three campaigns in some cases (Spain, Poland, France).
Of the 967 Luftwaffe aircrew taken as PoWs between 1st July and 31st October 1940 only TWO had been trained since the war began.

655 victories were credited to 30 Squadrons of Hurricanes, at 22.5 per Squadron, while 19 Spitfire Squadrons were credited with 530, at 28 per Squadron. Those are the official figures and do not support your prejudice.

As for losses, between May and November 1940 the RAF lost 753 Hurricanes and 467 Spitfires (PRO AIR 22/262). These figures have been spun many ways and somewhat loosely ("twice as many Hurricanes were lost"). The percentages of total losses are 61.7% and 38.3%. This does not badly reflect the ratio of Hurricane to Spitfire squadrons.

Bungay is not the only or best historian of the battle. I am not going to embark on a public critique of a popular historian here.

Here is what P.B."Laddie" Lucas wrote, representing the views of himself and a certain Douglas Bader.

"Subject to height (which was critical), there was not a lot to choose between the Hurricane I, Spitfire I and the Messerschmitt 109 E in actual combat"

His italics in the original. He concluded.

"Pilot quality counted for much - much more than most would credit."

See "Flying Colours" p.95 Lucas.

Let's accept that the Luftwaffe lost about 1200 aircraft between 10th July and 15th September.
221 of that total were shot down by just 17 pilots.
Most pilots never hit a thing and what aircraft type they were flying made little difference. About 15% of all pilots claimed a "whole aircraft",12% scored two and only 7% four or more.

Making one of the "club runs" to Malta, delivering 20-30 Spitfires and the infrastructure to support them, in 1941, would not have made much difference to the islands defences.

Cheers

Steve