1000-1200 HP: long range fighter vs. interceptor?

[Shortround6]

But in as escort role, you have burned off most of that fuel so the weight difference in minimal.

That rather depends on how far you want to go doesn't It? A Merlin powered P-51 with 184 US gallons of fuel had a combat radius of 150 miles following the later USAAC standard flight plan. Filling the rear tank got it up to 375 miles.
Using 184 internal and 150 external go you 460 miles radius. You want to escort bombers to the low countries and north west France then yes, you will have burned off enough fuel to match the the 'interceptors' in weight. Going to the Ruhr of beyond? no, you are carrying more fuel than the interceptors at the point of of interception or you don't get home.

Weight is not everything, the Mustang was much heavier than the Spit, which was itself heavier than the 109. In fact the Mustang and 190 were very similar in weights. Yet despite all that weight the Mustang could hold its own in turning contests with both.

Quite right but you have to factor in not just weight but wing loading and co-efficient of lift

at the angle of attack being used in the turn

and the power to weight ratio ( or more accurately the thrust to drag ratio at the speed and angle of attack being used in the turn). Trying to compare different aircraft to predict what happens to one aircraft when you change the weight introduces a bunch of variables.

By that logic the supreme fighter was the 109, followed by the Spit and the 190 and Mustang following up as also runs. The P-47 being completely useless.

Except we are not using logic in this example are we?

A 109G-6 could weigh 65-6600lbs at altitude after dropping it's tank. A P-47 might weigh 12,500lbs? (if it carryid under wing drop tanks it didn't carry full ammo and it used some fuel for warm up take-off and initial climb before switching to drop tanks as did the 109) so the P-47 weighs about 92% more EXCEPT the gross wing area of the P-47 is 72% bigger. Which does leave the 109 with an advantage but not the one comparing weights would suggest. Now throw in rate of climb at the altitude you are at. The 109 does have an advantage here but it does get smaller as the altitude goes up. As for the Fw 190A, at 25,000ft it's climb is down to about 1500fpm compared to the P-47s 1860fpm or so ( using 56in) which means that while the P-47 might not be able to out turn the 190 for a short period of time the 190 will either loose more speed or be forced to loose altitude to maintain speed than the P-47. At low altitudes this could reverse.

There is some bit Post hoc ergo propter hoc arguments going on here. Along the lines if: "well they didn't do it because they couldn't do it with Spits. Only the P-47s and P-51s had the magical qualities necessary for MR, LR and VLR escort roles", all the extra fuel and so on had no affect on them whatsoever".

I am not sure where you are getting this from. The P-47 and P-51 were NOT magic. The extra fuel did have an effect on them. However the P-51 had (with the -3 engine) 1390 hp to get off the late war longer runways and it had 1330hp at 23,000ft to fight with rather than the aprox, 900hp of a Merlin XII engine in a Spitfire II which should help handle the extra weight. Early P-47 clean needed over 3 times the distance to take-off than a clean Spitfire II did. Having an engine that gave 2000hp at 25,000 wasn't "magic", it had to be paid for with weight and bulk, but it did mean that the plane was big enough to hold more internal fuel and to be able to handle drop tanks later when longer runways, better fuel, water injection and better propellers became available.

I've just been reading excellent "The Bombing War' by Richard Overy. he makes the point that the RAF simply did not do "counter force" (a more encompassing description than just escorting). It was not part of their dogma, either night or day. What little they did (and despite the propaganda it was very little), was always after the fact and as a response to terrible losses, really to get the politicians off their back and try and preserve some of morale with the crews, as much as anything else.

So these things were not technical in nature, they were deliberate choices that were made. For the RAF this applies to night fighter support as well, what little they applied was pathetic, as many people (in the RAF itself) said at the time.

Some of the problems were technical in nature. They could be solved but some of the solutions took time. The RAF may have taken longer than it should to institute some changes but you can't have 1944 performance in 1940/41 and blaming the lack of 1944 performance on bad officers does ignore the technical problems.

 

[tomo pauk]

Getting back to the original subject with 1100-1200hp there isn't enough power for carrying fuel, armament and keeping good performance. Look again at the spitfire MK II data. Lets assume that they can stick even an extra 30 IMP gallons inside the plane (getting rid of the pesky fixed tank) and rig a 30-45 imp gallon drop tank. The drop tank takes care of forming up and climbing to altitude ( some of these planes could burn 25-35 gallons just getting to 30,000ft). Now you have used some internal fuel for warming up and take-off but you are at combat altitude with over 100 imp gallons of fuel or 30-40 more than an "interceptor" would have. While 5-6% more weight has a negligible effect on speed it does have a fair effect on climb, ceiling, and ability to turn.
Ability to turn is not simply how tight the turn radius is but how how fast speed bleeds off in the turn and how tight or at what rate the plane can turn and maintain altitude, not have to dive to maintain speed. Some of these early fighters can only maintain speed in a hard (4-6 "G") turn by loosing several thousand feet of altitude per minute.

The 'LR Spitfire II' (or any other LR fighter) will be, assuming it's escorting the bombers, at ~20000 ft. The defender need to climb up in order to fight. That gives the LR fighter the advantage in height. Another disadvantage the defender faces is the target priority - are you going to hit the bombers (the escorts will get you) or you will try to tackle the escorts (the bombers do the damage to your bases/factories/towns etc).
Further disadvantage is the inability of defenders to concentrate in one area of interest. An attacker that has 1000 fighters can choose where to attack and concentrate the forces accordingly; the defender must spread (as wisely as possible, but still) it's 1000 of fighters in the areas most likely to be attacked. Result - the defender can throw in maybe 1/3 to 1/2 of it's fighters against the attacker. Historically, the 10 and 12 Group were ill able to help out the 11 Group during the BoB, but lack of range for Bf-109 made it impossible for the LW to capitalize on that. Against Germany, the fighters based in one part of it (or other parts of the W. Europe) were unable to deal much of the help to the fighters based in other part of the country once P-51B arrived and used that to it's advantage.
We can also note that radar coverage and professional C&C system were more of an exception than a rule in the 1st half of war. Even with some radads available, the, on the paper far superior Spit Vs needed much time, effort and sacrifice to stop bomb raids on Darwin, escorted by Zeroes.
Those advantages, the LR fighter provides, should overweight a tad a lower RoC.

Good performance includes climb and altitude as well as speed. One source gives a late model Japanese KI 61 (two type Ho-5 cannon and two H-103mg) as needing 7 minutes to climb to 16,400ft while a MK II Spitfire can get to 20,000ft in the same time. The Spitfire has nearly 5,000ft more service ceiling. While nobody fights at or near the service ceiling it means that the operational and combat ceilings are probably in the Spitfires favor by 3-4,000ft.

The version with 2 HMGs and 2 LMGs have had the ceiling of 11000m (35500 ft) on 2950 kg loaded weight. The version with 4 HMGs have had the ceiling of 10000 m (32260 ft) on 3130 kg; Spit II was at 37000 ft (on 2800 kg). The Ki-61 variant with cannons weighted 3470, and was, at 580 km/h. some 10 km/h slower than lighter versions.
Same 4 HMG variant was to climb to 16400 ft in 5min 30 sec, vs. Spit II 5 min to climb to 15000 ft. The
So we come to another thing - defender needs good punch (it must kill bombers, not just fighter), while the attacker can do with lighter armament. Ie. the extra weight it must carry due to fuel added is well canceled out by the less guns ammo it must carry. The P-51B vs Fw-190A-7/A-8 and 3 cannon Bf-109s come to mind; the Ki-61 will still be a threat with MGs only. It was also faster than Spit II, ~355 mph vs 360-366 mph.

 

[Shortround6]

Please remember, it is not just the initial climb to altitude. The rate of climb affects the turning ability of the fighter at altitude. The fighter with the lower rate of climb WILL NOT be able to turn as long or as hard without loosing either speed or altitude or both. This is different than just turn radius or how many "G"s. Most early fighters were doing good if they could pull 3 "G"s at their best altitude and turn speed WITHOUT loosing speed and/or altitude. And the 3 "G" turn was under 250mph.

once again see;

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/spit109turn.gif

The Spitfire I can pull 3 Gs at 225mph at a 1200ft radius and maintain altitude at 12,000ft and do a 360 in 23 seconds. It can tighten the turn to 6 "G"S and a 690ft radius and do the turn in about 19 seconds but speed is down to about 160mph. IF you want to pull a 4 G turn at 300mph and the same 23 seconds to complete the 360 at a 1600ft radius you have to point the nose down about 10 degrees. that is to say loose about 50 ft of altitude for every 300ft of forward travel or be dropping 4400 feet per minute.

Later Spitfires with more power and more weight will behave a bit different as will trying this at a different altitude but I hope you get the idea. The better the climb rate the more 'excess' power you have to maintain altitude in a turn.

BTW the Spit MK II got some extra 'stuff' that helped kill it's power advantage over the MK I Spitfire. Like the famous 6mph armor glass windscreen and the seldom noted IFF aerials running from the fuselage to the tips of each tailplane. Fitting out the Ki 61 to British 'standards' might have knocked a few mph of the top speed.

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks for the data.
I was trying to point out that a slight advantage in performance the defender might have will be pitted with advantages intrinsic to the attacker (height advantage; ability to better concentrate always limited assets; the target 'preference' that might either position the escorts right behind defenders or allow the bombers to do their task; dependence on how well the C&C network works, if available at all).
What ever the engine power advantage the Spit II have had over the Spit I, it ceased once the fighters were above, say, 10000 ft. The Merlin III and Merlin XII were capable for same 1030 HP at ~16000 ft. It took Hooker's Merlins to improve Spitfire's performance at medium and high altitudes. Indeed, added extras killed much of the speed RoC vs. Spit I.

 

[Shortround6]

Actually no, the Merlin XII used a slightly higher supercharger ratio. 9.089 instead of the 8.58 in the Merlin MK III. It used pressure water cooling instead of gylcol and since it was intended to use 100 octane from the start was initially rated using 9lbs of boost.
engine could pull 1140hp at 14,750ft at 9lbs boost. With RAM it could pull 8.8-9lbs at 17,550 ft under test and just over 6lbs at 20,000ft. It was rigged to use 12lbs boost with boost override.
The increase was not anywhere near what Hooker got with his changes but there was a difference.

edit. a big change was that the engine was rated at 2850rpm and 9lbs boost while climbing for 30 minutes instead of the 2600rpm and 6 1/4lbs the Merlin III was rated at for 30 min climb.

 

[tomo pauk]

Indeed, you're right.
At those 14750 ft it was making 40 HP more than Merlin III, or some 3.5% more. Combat power was 1280 HP at 10800 at 12 lbs boost, vs. 1300 HP at 9000 HP at 12 lbs for the Merlin III.

 

[Glider]

We can chew over the numbers endlessly but there can be no doubt that over Malta the Hurricanes were totally outclassed by the Me109. When the Spitfires arrived things improved, the pilots were trained to a similar level so its the performance that made the difference. The books Malta the Spitfire yeas and Malta the Hurricane years make this very clear and should be read by anyone with an interest in this battle.

As for range, when the Spit was designed the mantra was that the bomber would always get through, a mantra the RAF WENT TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS TO DISPROVE. As mentioned earlier the spec for the Spit and Hurricane was almost science fiction when written and the emphasis was on its performance as an interceptor, a role the Spitfire was the plane everyone measured their aircraft against. Its worth noting the Japanese considered the Spit to be the ultimate interceptor during the BOB and they had full access to the Me109.

If you are talking range then drop tanks obviously help, but you need more internal fuel. Weight has often been mentioned and its important but only up to a point, if the plane is designed for the weight then the impact is reduced. Had the designers been given a spec for a longer ranged fighter then I am confident that they would have succeeded. The Zero is one approach, the P51 another what is noticeable that these are single engine designs . A twin is almost always going to be at a disadvantage if the opposition can match its speed. The Me110 was a great success in the battles before the BOB as it generally had a speed advantage, in the BOB it didn't. The P38 had the speed advantage over most of the Japanese opposition but wasn't nearly as effective against the Germans whose aircraft were generally faster.

 

[Shortround6]

Something was going on in the 1930s as the Germans had the Bf 110, the French wound up with the Potez 63 series ( and others), The Dutch built the Fokker G1 , The Poles tried to build the PZL P.38 Wilk, and the US toyed long and hard with the Bell Airacuda. The Japanese joined in with the Kawasaki KI 45 Toryu. And perhaps a few I missed.

Kawasaki Ki-45 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Now none of these planes were particularly successful against single engine interceptors but they do show that few, if any, air staffs believed you could build a long range single engine aircraft with the technology of the times (mid to late 30s). It took the cold, bitter truth of actual combat to show that these planes could NOT compete with short range interceptors (much like turret fighters or strapping gun packs under twin engine bombers) and it took either very large single engine fighters or exceptional low drag aircraft with engines that had much better power to weight ratios than late 1930s engines to get single engine escorts to work.

 

[stona]

We can chew over the numbers endlessly but there can be no doubt that over Malta the Hurricanes were totally outclassed by the Me109.

It was outclassed by the Bf 109 F when that arrived, so was the Spitfire I. The "Friedrich" arrived in the MTO in significant numbers in late 1941.

Prior to that the Hurricane could compete with the Bf 109 E over Malta just as well as it had done over England in 1940. There are many tactical reasons why the RAF's Hurricane force was overwhelmed over Malta but simply blaming an aeroplane that had been the mainstay of Fighter Command months earlier and was fighting the same German opponent and mostly inferior Italian opponents just doesn't work.

I have already posted figures showing the comparative performance of the Spitfire and Hurricane in the BoB along with a salient comment by "Laddie" Lucas. I could post another twenty similar opinions from men who actually flew the Hurricane in combat against the Bf 109 E. I'll take their opinions (Townsend, Bader, Kain, Orton, Holden, Mould........I could go on for a while) over any of ours every time.

As for Malta's Spitfires, in January 1942 Cunningham's battle fleet had virtually ceased to exist. He had no carrier, Barham was lost and Valiant and Queen Elizabeth were disabled. It was this situation, described by Cunningham as "depressing in the extreme" which allowed the Italians to run operation M43, a convoy to Tripoli on which Ciano wrote rested "hopes for the resistance in Libya". The naval situation was now desperate for the British.
It is impossible to separate the supply of Malta from the situation in North Africa which had now improved for the Axis. In February 1942, after the failure of convoy MW9, Cunningham made it clear to the Admiralty that the further Auchinleck pulled back his defensive line (and deferred a counter-attack) the more difficult the task of supplying Malta became. At the end of February the Chiefs of Staff informed Cunningham that they could no longer replenish Malta from Gibraltar, though "club runs" would be attempted. I already mentioned that of February 27/28 which was aborted because the wrong ferry tanks for the Spitfires had been sent.

Operation SPOTTER delivered the first 15 Spitfires on 5th March. At the same time Force H fell back to Gibraltar and the Italians were able to vigorously re-supply and reinforce Rommel in North Africa. Between 7th and 18th March they pushed through a series of convoys virtually unmolested.

Convoy MW 10 might give an idea of how wide ranging actions were in support of Malta. You cannot just consider one narrow aspect of the campaign (like re-supply of fighters) out of context. In support of MW 10 were not only Cunningham's war ships, including the recently arrived 5th Destroyer Flotilla, but various submarines. The Long Range Desert Group mounted diversionary raids on the Axis airfields at Martuba and Tmimi. RAF and land based FAA aircraft from Egypt bombed Luftwaffe airfields in an attempt to keep its Ju 88s grounded. The RAF's Naval Co-operation Group, No. 201 provided air cover and reconnaissance ahead of the convoy. This is not the place to tell the story of MW 10, suffice to say that of the 29,500 tons of materiel sent only 4,952 tons were landed on Malta.

A lack of fighters on Malta was NOT the most pressing problem that the British faced in the Mediterranean. It was however becoming one. Through February and March Fliegerkorps II was indeed laying waste to the island, flying more than 4,000 day light sorties and dropping about 7,000 tons of bombs.

The 16 Spitfires delivered by Operation PICKET on 27th March didn't make a great deal of difference. By April 1942 the Axis was deploying more than 500 aircraft against the island.

It was now that Churchill cabled Roosevelt saying (slightly inaccurately) that between 20 and 30 British fighters on Malta were ranged against 600 enemy aircraft. He asked if Roosevelt would be willing to allow USS Wasp to make one of the club runs. Churchill noted that "the response was generous."
This was a green light for Operation CALENDAR.

52 Spitfire Vs of Nos 601 and 603 Squadrons were loaded aboard the US carrier. The Spitfires were prepared aboard USS Wasp when it was found that the ferry tanks were defective and leaked copiously, many of the aircraft's guns did not work, three quarters of the aircraft radios didn't work. Not a good start. It only got worse. Eventually, on 20th April, 48 Spitfires were made airworthy and flew off to Malta. They landed at Ta'Quali where they were almost immediately attacked by 300 Luftwaffe aircraft. Within 72 hours not one single Spitfire was airworthy.

A second operation, BOWERY, was now needed. USS Wasp returned to pick up another batch of Spitfires. It became apparent that the ferry tank problem was unresolved. An unimpressed Captain Reeves ordered loading to be stopped until the problem was rectified. He also undertook to "carry out such further repairs as were necessary with his own labour." The Americans were clearly unimpressed with British efforts, something which did not go unnoticed. The flag-officer at Glasgow reported that the situation had been "unsatisfactory, and has unfortunately created a very bad impression."

Preparations for the arrival of the Spitfires were better organised. The fast minelayer "Welshman" was chosen to carry ground personnel and spares, including 100 Merlin engines, to the island.
USS Wasp set off with 47 Spitfires and was joined by the repaired HMS Eagle at Gibraltar with 17 undelivered Spitfires still aboard.
On 9th April all the Spitfires flew off to Malta. This time they were dispersed to all three air fields. The ferry pilots were relieved by experienced combat pilots. Within half an hour 61 Spitfires were armed, fuelled and ready for action. When the Luftwaffe arrived to repeat their success of 20th April they got a nasty surprise. The Luftwaffe lost 37 aircraft that day. The tide of the air war over Malta was turned by the arrival of those Spitfires. The fighting of 10th May has been called "The Battle of Malta" and the Axis lost it.

Much credit should go to the Americans and it is seldom given. Reeves and his crew were not just a delivery service. It was largely these Americans who rectified the shameful, shambolic, British embarkation procedure.

The victory in "The Battle of Malta" and the salvation of the island was actually abetted inadvertently by Kesselring. Following the Luftwaffe's success on 20th April he reported that Malta was "neutralised". Hitler promptly cancelled the already moribund plans for Operation HERKULES and sent the troops still ear marked for the invasion to Rommel, ensuring that even the outside chance of an invasion was gone.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Greyman]

Prior to that the Hurricane could compete with the Bf 109 E over Malta just as well as it had done over England in 1940. There are many tactical reasons why the RAF's Hurricane force was overwhelmed over Malta but simply blaming an aeroplane that had been the mainstay of Fighter Command months earlier and was fighting the same German opponent and mostly inferior Italian opponents just doesn't work.

The aircraft were different, however. Over Malta, the Hurricane I was much worse and the Bf 109E only got better.

 

[stona]

The aircraft were different, however. Over Malta, the Hurricane I was much worse and the Bf 109E only got better.

Would you care to clarify.

How had the Bf 109 E "got better"?
The Bf 109 Es committed to the Maltese campaign were essentially the same as those fighting the battle of Britain. Some may have had DB 601 N engines, but given the arguments raging at the RLM about which aircraft should get what engines it would not have been all. Some would have been GM-1 equipped, only relevant above 8,000 metres, but none of this was new in 1941.
The one notable improvement would have been the ability to carry a drop tank on the E-7.

How were the Hurricanes "much worse"?
Hurricane Is but mostly Hurricane IIs were sent to Malta. The Hurricane IIs which were powered by the Merlin XX and were delivered to the RAF from October 1940 could do 342 mph at 17,400 feet, in S gear, just 20mph slower than a Spitfire.

It wasn't the type of aeroplane but the lack that was the problem. Tobruk fell on 22nd January 1941. At that time there was just No. 261 Squadron on Malta (at Hal Far) with a mixture of Hurricanes and Sea Gladiators.
Raids in early 1941 rarely comprised more than 60 Axis aircraft. The failure of the first club run (HMS Argus) left the defences depleted. In desperation 6 Hurricanes were flown from Gazala to Hal Far on 30th January, a considerable feat, led by Flt Lt Charles Wittingham. This was all Longmore could spare. You MUST see the Maltese campaign in the context of the larger conflict in the Mediterranean, it did not take place in isolation.

For example it took until May 1941 before stocks of Hurricanes in the Canal Zone reached more than 100. It was at this period that deliveries of Hurricanes were being made by the club runs I listed a while back. In June a third Hurricane squadron was created at Ta'Qali.
In July 1941, as some contributors here think that Malta needed its Spitfires and the air situation was desperate it became evident that the Luftwaffe was hardly involved in attacks on the island. We know that many units were moved away in preparation for Barbarossa.
Emboldened, far from crying out for Spitfires, LLoyd went on the OFFENSIVE, attacking Italian air bases in Sicily.

An action in Malta on 26th July tells a tale.
The Italians sent 6 fast motor boats and Maachi C.200s to attack Grand Harbour. Hurricanes of Nos 126 and 185 Squadrons were tasked to the raid. They destroyed 4 of the motor boats and the gun runs of Flt Lt Peter Lefevre so unnerved the crew of another that it ran up a white flag. 185 Squadron had driven off the Maachis but Plt Off Winton was forced to bale out of his aircraft. He landed in the sea and swam to the nearest Italian motor boat. He found the entire crew dead and so "captured" the vessel. The squadron retained its flag as a memento.

Jump forward to early 1942, when the Luftwaffe was well and truly back in the fray and the situation is very different. Between December 1941 and February 1942, as the pressure mounted No. 126 Squadron destroyed 34 German and Italian aircraft for the loss of 10 Hurricanes. This included some Bf 109 Fs, an aircraft which was clearly superior to the Hurricane. In the second week of March 1942 there were only 30 serviceable Hurricanes on Malta. These were confronting raids not by 40-60 Axis aircraft but hundreds.

The Spitfires that were flown into Malta in March 1942 were the first armed Spitfires to be deployed in the Mediterranean theatre

The defence of Malta did now became a priority and would henceforth be largely undertaken by Spitfires. The contribution of the Hurricane was vital. It was not an obsolete aircraft in 1941, in fact many squadrons were still using Hurricanes well into 1943, some into 1944. When Tedder was appointed Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Air Command on 17th February 1943 he inherited 23 Hurricane squadrons and 34 Spitfire squadrons (including 6 of the USAAF)

In two years of fighting to sustain Malta 333 Hurricanes had been delivered from carriers, 62 had been flown in from bases in Cyrenaica (when they were available) and a further 19 had been delivered as deck cargo on merchant ships. The "poor old Hurricane" is consistently under rated and under appreciated. Without it not just the Battle of Britain might have had a different outcome.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Greyman]

How had the Bf 109 E "got better"?
The Bf 109 Es committed to the Maltese campaign were essentially the same as those fighting the battle of Britain. Some may have had DB 601 N engines, but given the arguments raging at the RLM about which aircraft should get what engines it would not have been all.

How were the Hurricanes "much worse"?
Hurricane Is but mostly Hurricane IIs were sent to Malta. The Hurricane IIs which were powered by the Merlin XX and were delivered to the RAF from October 1940 could do 342 mph at 17,400 feet, in S gear, just 20mph slower than a Spitfire.

I have no figures on the number of DB601N engines in JG26 at that time either.

As I said before, the Hurricanes during this first Luftwaffe period (against the Bf 109E) were well-worn and forced to equip tropical filters. As far as I can tell most of the Hurricanes during this period (Feb - Apr 1941) were Mk.I aircraft. Reading the countless pilot accounts in 'Hurricanes Over Malta' (Brian Cull and Frederick Galea) it's abundantly clear the Hurricane pilots were very, very troubled by the Bf 109.

 

[stona]

Again Malta was prioritised.
On 3rd April 1941 Malta received the first Hurricane IIs (a mixture of IIAs and IIBs) to reach the Mediterranean theatre. Just as later it would receive the first armed Spitfires. Subsequently all Hurricanes delivered to Malta were Mark IIs.
To put this in perspective, it wasn't until July 1941 that even half the squadrons in the Middle East were equipped with Mark IIs, around the time the 300th Hurricane passed through Takoradi..

I would be surprised if the RAF's pilots over Malta were not troubled by the Bf 109 E. It was a very good aeroplane. The fact that it did not significantly out class the Hurricane certainly didn't make it an easy target.
The point is that the Hurricane could and did hold its own against the Bf 109 E throughout 1940 and into 1941.
It is not to be forgotten that at the end of 1940 Hurricane squadrons still out numbered Spitfire squadrons in the UK by about 3:2. At the end of 1940 Hurricane production still exceeded Spitfire production by a similar ratio.

The Bf 109 F, which was a much improved, if under armed fighter was a late comer to the Mediterranean. Despite being in production for many months previously the RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East only became aware of it in significant numbers during Operation CRUSADER in November 1941. The "Friederich" had been deployed first in NW Europe and had subsequently gone East.
It's arrival over Malta really was a problem for the Hurricane and led directly to the pleas from Malta for Spitfires in early 1942.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Greyman]

Roughed out a quick diagram. I know of no test of a tropicalized Hurricane I, so I reduced a standard Hurricane I the same amount as a Hurricane II as an estimate.

Purple - Bf 109E
Green - Hurricane I (temp)
Orange - Hurricane I (trop)

Having a 'worn out' aircraft is quite a nebulous quality, but it can get pretty bad. For example, I have a tests Hurricanes in Squadron service during Battle of Britain, and the difference between the fastest and the slowest at full throttle height was 33 mph.

The tired, old Finnish H75s are another good example. According to their tests an aircraft was 27 mph slower than a brand new Mohawk in British service (very same engine).

It's impossible to really quantify this 'worn' or 'clapped' aspect of the Hurricanes during this period, but it's something that fails to escape constant mention when researching the situation that faced the British pilots.

 

[stona]

You need to do the chart for the Hurricane II which was the type used on Malta from April/May 1941 until the Spitfires arrived a year later.

I would also refer you to comments by the men who flew the type. As Lucas said there wasn't much in it "in actual combat"......his italics.

Charts and performance figures only tell half a story. If the fighter which was the mainstay of Fighter Command for all of 1939, 40 and into 41 had been so badly outclassed by the opposition the RAF would have been in far deeper doo-doo than the historical record, losses, victory percentages and all the other data that I have already posted would indicate. It would beggar belief that the Air Ministry was still producing more Hurricanes than Spitfires in November 1940.

I've nothing more to add here. I would suggest going back through the thread and reading the data I have posted. I would say that facing the Bf 109 E the success and loss rates of the Spitfire and Hurricane from May to November 1940 are most significant. It's one of the few ways we can quantify the performance of aircraft fighting the same battle in Laddie Lucas' "actual combat."
Nobody can refute those.

We are all entitled to opinions but none of us can change the facts!

Cheers

Steve

 

[Greyman]

I was flipping through 'Hurricane Over Malta' and found this telling bit:

Worse was to follow, for they were taken by bus to Takali where they were informed they were to fly the well-worn, battle-weary Hurricane Is left by 261 Squadron. One of the new arrivals, Flight Lieutenant Tom Neil was not impressed with what he saw, and described the Hurricanes as: "A poor crowd of battered Mark Is - no squadron markings, some with Vokes filters, some not. A variety of propellers etc ..." Another reported seeing tailwheel tyres stuffed with straw due to lack of spares, and the inherited Hurricanes were undeniably in a poor state of repair and serviceability.

Pilot Officer John Pain agreed with the comment regarding the condition of the aircraft left behind: "By the time we left, aircraft were being repaired with dope-painted linen or cloth from anywhere, and metal repairs were made with the aid of 'Players' 50s tins. And, of course, cannibalization where practicable.

This was 21 May, 1941, just after the final JG26 over Malta (before finishing their move back to North Africa). As far as I can tell the island was operating about 30 Hurricane Is and were down to 2 Hurricane IIs (from the total of 18 that were sent to the island up to that point).

 

[stona]

3rd April WINCH 12 Hurricane IIs
27th April DUNLOP/SALIENT 24 Hurricane IIs
19th-22nd May SPLICE 48 Hurricane IIs
These were not old or war weary aircraft and I can't tally the recollections above with the actual club runs made. 84 Hurricane IIs were delivered in April and May.
5th-6th June ROCKET 35 Hurricane IIs
14th June TRACER 47 Hurricane IIs
27th June RAILWAY 1 22 Hurricane IIs
30th June RAILWAY 2 35 Hurricane IIs (eventually, this operation did not run smoothly).

Cheers

Steve

 

[Greyman]

The question is what numbers of these stayed in Malta, however.

For example, for 'SPLICE' all 48 Hurricane IIs refueled at Malta and continued on their way to the Middle East.

 

[stona]

Really? Where's that from? I can't check now but that would be a bizarre way of moving aircraft to the Middle East.

Cheers

Steve

 

[RCAFson]

Really? Where's that from? I can't check now but that would be a bizarre way of moving aircraft to the Middle East.

Cheers

Steve

That was pretty common - this was another strategic advantage, commonly overlooked, that Malta provided to the Commonwealth. Hurricanes over Malta,p.295, states that about 390 Hurricanes arrived at Malta via various means but approx 150 of these flew on to North Africa, for a net total of 250 staying in Malta over a ~24 month period.