So the idea of 'letting them though' and then hammering them on the way out .....'
Who had that idea? At no point in the quotes I gave for Douglas is there any suggestion of letting the bombers through. The first was written when EVERYONE, with the possible exception of Dowding, assumed that the bomber would always get through.
Dowding had said in a speech in Coventry of all places, on 14th February 1939.
"I am not one to minimise air raid precautions, particularly in the matter of fire services, but I think the politicians have allowed the nation to get altogether the wrong idea about modern air war. I believe the fighter has sixty to four the best of the bomber."
Douglas wrote.
"Our objective is not to prevent enemy bombers reaching their objectives, though it would be nice if we could, but to cause a high casualty rate among enemy bombers, with the result that the attack will dwindle rapidly to bearable proportions."
The second quote, after the BoB when Douglas is frankly stating the obvious.
"The best, if only way of achieving air superiority is to shoot down a large proportion of enemy bombers every time they come over.........I would rather shoot down fifty of the enemy bombers after they had reached their objective than shoot down only ten before they do so."
The "Big Wing" wasn't supposed to intercept the raid on the way out either. It just took too long to assemble. The actual time was still causing acrimony in the 1970s to my certain and personal knowledge. Bader was still accusing 11 Group of ordering the Duxford Wing into the air too late. 11 Group was still accusing Leigh Mallory and 12 Group of failing to cover its airfields.
This became a bone of contention at the time. Park, as you rightly say, was keen to get to raids before they bombed and harass them in and, if possible, out.
On 17th September Leigh Mallory wrote a report to Dowding on his wing patrols. Five had taken place and they claimed 105 aircraft destroyed plus another probably destroyed and eighteen damaged. These claims are simply fantastic and many copied in to the report, including Douglas, Dowding and Park must have know it. Tellingly, on Park's copy, a note reads.
"Did these Wings engage before targets were bombed?"
Leigh Mallory, like Douglas, thought that defence of targets should be left to ground forces and a concentrated fighter attack made on the enemy formation, if necessary after it had bombed.
I have never seen any evidence, apart from one comment by Park, that Fighter Command tasked specific squadrons to specific
elements of a formation. This may well have been Park's intended tactic but is entirely dependant on the local tactical situation and in no small part the reaction of the enemy. The reasons why this could rarely be done in reality I have already mentioned. A look at the types credited to the various Hurricane 'aces' would tend to confirm this. Tietzen (who was lying fourth in Signal Magazine's unofficial league table behind Galland, Molders and Wick) was not the only senior Bf 109 pilot to fall victim to a tired old puffer.
Both Dowding and Park (and others) wrote, said and emphasised that the primary target for
all Fighter Command aircraft was the enemy bombers. They had to keep reiterating this point because in all the scenarios for which Fighting Area and then Fighter Command had exercised before the war the bombers were unescorted.
At a meeting of the Air Fighting Committee on 12th February 1940 Dowding said that he,
"wished to emphasise the point that the primary job of fighters was to shoot down bombers, not to fight other fighters."
It was a point reiterated by both men (Park and Dowding) throughout the summer of 1940.
Again there were some, particularly kicking their heels at 12 Group, who disagreed.
Cheers
Steve