1935-45: alternative British bombers

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It was probably beneficial for Beaufighter that Beaufort was over-designed for a bomber? On the other hand, Bristol does not have to turn the bomber base into a heavy fighter.
Nite that A-W making a 4 engined bomber means they don't do Whitley, and very likely not the Ensign, so there is a lot of workload & resources saved both for design shop and for tooling up for production. Strangling Botha in the crib (cruel the man I am) also frees resources to do something else.


Beaufighter didn't do much of the work until the real BoB ended (per Wikipedia: On 25 October 1940, the first confirmed Beaufighter kill, a Dornier Do 17, occurred.[10] ). The next possible time for Germans to make the actual major threat to the UK by bombing is due by Spring of 1941, unless Germans do a stupid strategic mistake or two...
Between the radar-outfitted Defiant (historically in second half of 1941), those without radrars (yes, not ideal), Blenheim with Merlins or he historical type, earlier Mosquito, and clean-sheet 'Beaufighter' there is a lot of night fighting material to help out with the historical Beaufighter out of picture.

Aircraft size of Gloster twin (that was size of Me 210) would've been great for night fighting.
 
From another thread.


The segmented bomb bay restricted the size of the bombs and type of bombs that could be carried.

Supermarine 316

Many of the 1939 bombers used a similar layout. 20 bombs in individual bomb cells in the wing.
The total load was high but the flexibility to carry larger bombs was lacking.

Without a change in basic RAF thinking in a number of areas, bomb size/type/construction being just one of them, large increases in RAF bomber effectiveness is just not happening regardless of the speed/range of the bombers.

A lot could have been done with the basic Blenheim IF more specialized versions had been adopted and IF RAF policies (what missions were actually important aside from bombing the enemy homeland) were changed. Not that the Blenheim was a war winner but it would have been a starting point with better maritime patrol planes and weapons starting in 1937 or so.
Better Army co-operation/support aircraft adopted earlier. Other avenues?
 

There is the 'p!mp my Blenheim' thread here Later Blenheims increased the tare weight by more than 25% vs. Mk.I, while max t-o weight went up by around 40%, so there was a lot of potential in the design. Unfortunately, apart from engines now using the 100 oct fuel, the engines were firm in the late 1930s land - that's got to change 1st.

BTW - I'd say to Supermarine to forget their bomber - saves a lot right there.

Better Army co-operation/support aircraft adopted earlier. Other avenues?
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The whole Army co-op 'aviation' deserves the thread of it's own. One airframe for artillery spotting, transport and lugging bombs is not the way to go.
 
The economic lure of multipurpose aircraft is rather strong in the Thirties. I wonder if a slight change in the retention of Great War personalities in both the RAF and FAA may have provided greater impetus for better single purpose aircraft, capable of additional roles. The rise of ground attack aircraft and tactics late in the war was insufficient in time and impact to force ground and air commanders to stress these roles between wars.
 
Regarding longer runways in the UK: one of the reason that the British rail loading gauge is so constrained relative to the Russian/Soviet[1] (it may predate the USSR) and Continental loading gauges is that British law made eminent domain more difficult than in the countries in Europe.
 

Speed was the main factor driving the RAF towards larger bombers in the late 1930s.

Whilst it is true that Bomber Command was reluctant to give up arming bombers, the 'Ideal Bomber' paper recommended that a high speed unarmed bomber should not be developed, that was not the end of the matter. Following the Bombing Committee's discussion of the 'Ideal Bomber' Ludlow-Hewitt continued to promote his concept of a 'speed bomber'. Initial proposals were still essentially for a heavily armed medium bomber, but by August 1939 he was writing to the Air Ministry proposing an aircraft of some 30,000 lb with a speed 40-70 mph faster than the Stirling or B.1/39 (Ideal Bomber.

This we would think should give something to work with, rooted in reality

At an ACAS/DGRD liaison meeting in August 1939 the DGRD (Tedder at the time) suggested that aircraft firms without sufficient design work (because some specifications had not been issued) should be given design studies on

"Projects which would follow up aspects of design of general interest...
(a) a relatively small high speed bomber.
(b) aircraft directed to attaining the highest possible speed.
(c) aircraft designed for jet propulsion."

This is a reasonable starting point for alternative British bombers.

What actually happened was that by coincidence or otherwise, about one month after the meeting, Captain Geoffrey de Havilland wrote to Freeman proposing a high speed bomber requiring little or no defensive armament. As AMDP Freeman would have been aware of the Liaison Meeting decision to investigate such a type. The eventual result was the Mosquito* but there is no reason that someone else might not have proposed something different.

* What de Havilland proposed was an aircraft, if equipped with Sabre engines, which would achieve 405 mph at 20,000 feet, cruise at 320 mph, have a range of 1,500 miles and carry 4,000 lb of bombs with a crew of three and a couple of defensive guns. This may have been pie in the sky, but it shows the sort of numbers that some believed possible on the eve of war.

For our non British/Commonwealth friends: ACAS, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. DGRD, Director-General Research and Development. AMDP, Air Member for Development and Production.
 
Thanks for not making me ask.
 

Another reason was cost. It could take up to a million pounds sterling (mid 19thC money) per mile to buy up the property for a new railway through a city. It was why London and Glasgow were the first cities to have underground railways, no matter how expensive tunneling was it was still cheaper than an overground railway.
 
stona said:
Following the Bombing Committee's discussion of the 'Ideal Bomber' Ludlow-Hewitt continued to promote his concept of a 'speed bomber'.
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Yes, Ludlow-Hewitt was responding to George Volkert of Handley Page's paper regarding a high speed unarmed bomber concept and notably said at the time "it is not an unarmed bomber that we require, but a Speed Bomber." R.N. Liptrot was also in favour of the idea too, providing the helpful suggestion that such a thing could be faster than a Spitfire. Its main detractor was Sholto Douglas, who as we know insisted that de Havilland's DH.98 was to to be fitted with a rear gun turret, which, thankfully didn't happen, again due to Freeman's intervention. Simultaneously as de Havilland got his lot into gear following writing to Freeman in September 1939, Blackburn was beginning work on its high speed bomber project, the B.28, which despite countering the speed bomber idea to Ludlow-Hewitt who wrote again about it just before the outbreak of war, Sholto-Douglas issued a request to Blackburn for it. It was an unarmed bomber, but could also be employed as a reconnaissance machine and a heavy cannon armed fighter powered by Griffon engines.

That this machine was authorised flies in the face of the lack of interest by the air staff - it seems chiefs on one hand were happy to discuss and comment favourably on Volkert's paper and eventually offer Blackburn a contract for such an aircraft, but on the other hand were willing to criticise de Havilland for his proposal. Most vocal against it was Sholto-Douglas, but the others, including Liptrot thought de Havilland were overstating their figures. I suspect that Blackburn got permission to work on its aircraft because from the outset it was advertised as a multi-role aircraft, incorporating an armed fighter and recon roles, tasks that the Mossie eventually did at any rate, whereas the DH.98 was being promoted as an unarmed bomber made from non-strategic materials.

Interestingly, de Havilland and Blackburn were offered contracts in 1940, permission to proceed with the DH.98 came in March and the B.28 in July, although it was eventually cancelled. DH.s specified bomber production only as B.1/40 and Blackburn's as B.3/40 specified a "Light Reconnaissance Bomber" "...primarily to be suitable for duties of long distance high and low altitude reconnaissance by day and bombing by day and night."
 


Well, 1935 to 1945 covers going from biplanes to jets so there was quite a bit of change in ten years and quite a bit of overlap.

For the Blenheim the MK IV started as a maritime recon plane but they changed the requirement (bigger crew, etc) and that lead to the Beaufort. They built the MK IVs as regular bombers.

Had the RAF taken the maritime patrol job more seriously they could have built a batch of Blenheim IV aircraft with Mercury XI or XII engines which were "medium" supercharged and offered 830hp for take-off on 87 octane fuel instead of 735hp and at critical altitude of 6,000ft offered 890hp, also on 87 octane fuel. The need for an engine with critical altitude of 14,000ft for maritime patrol (or ground support) seems a bit suspect.
A version could have also been set up for ground support/low level attack using the same engine/s. One or more machine guns in each wing for strafing. A bit of cockpit armor.
Perhaps under wing racks for light bombs (with smaller outboard in wing fuel tanks?), nothing earth shaking but something to get the ball rolling so better tactics could have been worked out before May of 1940?
Blenheims were made in at least 3 factories in England (Bristol. Avro and Roots. others???) so one might think that improvements (like the Beaufort type wing and better landing gear) could have been worked into one or more production lines without too much loss in production?

Having the British decide earlier that bigger than 500lbs bombs would be needed and/or better bombs than the British GP series would be needed?

The British did not get the 1000lb GP bomb (33% HE content) into production until 1940 (late and small numbers) and the 1000lb MC bomb (medium case 47% HE content) wasn't worked on until 1942 with first real use in 1943.

Having some sort of 1000lb in stock and designing bomb bays to use them might have resulted in somewhat different aircraft for the late 30s and early 40s.
 

The problem with the Beaufighter was not that it didn't do much, it's because it couldn't do much at the time as a night fighter. Its radar sets were unwieldy and suffered numerous faults and the dedicated night fighter variants were not in sufficient numbers in 1940 to offer much assistance. The Mk.II became available in numbers as a night fighter variant in 1941, but it was found that it was such a handful that tyro pilots at OTU and squadron level were pranging them on the ground, or, in common with other night fighter types of the time, busily flying into hills and airfields and getting themselves killed that this contributed to low availability. The Beaufighter was building up in numbers when it was needed, through spring and summer 1941 at the height of the Blitz - in late 1940, although German night activity increased compared to previously, Britain's night fighter force was ill-equipped to do much about it, in terms of training and numbers of machines overall.

Regarding the Defiant, only a very few were fitted with radar and only one radar aided kill is attributed to the use of it. All its other kills were made using the Mk.I eyeball and as whatever we believe regarding the Defiant and its concept, the fact was it was available in numbers so could be used, but it was only a stop gap until the Beaufighter and Mosquito appeared in greater numbers.

Frankly, I wouldn't want to do away with either the Beaufort or the Beaufighter. My option would have been to halt Blenheim production as the airframe was obsolescent and continue of Beaufort and Beaufighter, both of which proved their usefulness time and again - bar the terrible Taurus engines, the Australians had the right idea putting US engines in it - but to do away with these leaves a significant gap in capability of night and heavy fighters and torpedo bombers. I suspect we are underestimating the useage of this aircraft - remember the Beaufort managed to damage the Scharnhorst in a dive bombing attack, torpedo the Gneisenau and Lutzow and put that ship in dry dock for months, not to mention the numbers of enemy merchant shipping the type took out in Rover raids.
 

Bigger bombs do have their appeal, and for the good reasons.
I'd certainly try and have the Blenheim outfitted with engines rated for low level operation for ops above water (patrol, torpedo bombing...), but sending them over Ardenes in 1940 presents the Flak gunners with an even bigger target than it was the Battle.
Wing of the Beaufort was both bigger and much heavier than what Blenheim had, two Mercuries will not cut it anymore. Unless you suggest that we also use the engines, too? Perhaps too much of hassle for a bomber that has a bomb bay for 1000 lb of bombs, in time when Hampden offers a bomb bay for 2x2000 lb bombs, and does it earlier.
 

Please note that nobody is trying to leave RAF speachless with regard to torpedo or 'ordinary' bombing, or night fighting capability. Early start for Mosquito is suggested instead (that can cover a lot just by itself), Hampdens (not just) for torpedo bombing instead of the stillborn Botha, improved Blenheim etc.

BTW - when (if ever?) is the right time and approach for the RAF to start requesting bespoke dive-bombers?
 
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The Beaufort wing wasn't much bigger and it was reportedly both lighter and stronger (made much more use of aluminium alloy instead of steel).
46cm more span and 34 more square ft of area (about 7%)

Blenheim bomb bay is a bit of a puzzle, it could carry two 500lb bombs, one each in the inner bays, or four 250lb bombs, side by side in all four bays.
No 500lb bombs in the outer bays. It could carry light bomb containers in all four bays and those are not small.

Why they never tried two 500lb and two 250lb bombs at the same time I don't know (different ballistics/impact point if dropped at the same time?)
Wing would accept span loading (fuel tanks out board of nacelles) but not concentrated weight in the fuselage and wing roots?

Lets not forget that the Mosquito didn't get four 500lb bombs until the 11th production bomber

The Hampden got a bomb bay of that size part by accident.

The British were working on a 2000lb AP bomb but no GP or MC bombs when the Hampden was designed.
The 2000AP bomb had only a 9% filling and was only 13.5in in diameter while it was 113in long.
The standard 500lb GP bomb was 12.9-13in in diameter and about 69-70in long until they cropped the tail, then it went to about 55 in long.
The 1900lb GP bomb had a 26% filling, was 18.7in diameter and 98in long and was not ordered until sept 1940, well after the Hampden was designed.designe
the 2000lb HC bomb was designed to replace the 1900lb GP bomb, design work starting after production orders for the 1900lb were placed and while it was the same diameter it carried much more explosive and was 162in long with initial parachute tail and 135in long with the later simple tail.


how you designed your bombers depended an awful lot on what type and size bombs you wanted them to carry, simple comparisons of weight can be rather misleading.

British went into a near frenzy designing new bombs in the fall of 1940 after being on the receiving end of German bombs with near 50% fillings.
 
I like the CAC Woomera. Too bad it was a year or more too late and failed to be produced. With its twin torpedoes the Woomera would be useful in the Pacific from 1941 onwards, better than Viderbeests anyway.
 
tomo pauk said:
BTW - when (if ever?) is the right time and approach for the RAF to start requesting bespoke dive-bombers?
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Aside from the Skua?

For naval use or for land use?

Germans made quite a reputation for the Stuka on land by attacking armies with poor organic AA defences. They also had had Luftwaffe officers imbedded with the army units in vehicles with radios that could talk directly to the planes. This in addition to extensively training the pilots.

Even If the British do the last the German army had the best AA defences of the time (1939-42?) of any field army. Not as easy pickings as the Polish, French, British and RUssian armies.
Will the RAF invest in officers in ground units to direct aircraft and give them the communications to do so (and the ability to say no to ground commanders who may want an air strike now and not save it for a more important target in an hour or so, hard calls in a fast moving battle).

For naval use the Skua carried about the best anti ship bomb the British had in 1936-39. Not much sense building a bespoke dive-bomber that can carry bigger bombs than a Skua if bigger than 500lb bombs don't exist. The 1500lb load of the Swordfish and Albacore was six 250lb GP bombs. each bomb held about 67 lbs of explosives. While they could certainly mess up the top sides of a large ship they were unlikely to sink a large ship unless very,very lucky. Granted development can take place at the same time but development of the 1000lb bomb doesn't take place soon enough 159 made in all of 1940? if you begin design of the bespoke dive-bomber in 1939 you are unlikely to get it until 1942-43. At which point only the Japanese navy has any real significance. Only two German ships pose any real threat and you are going to need more than 1000lb GP bombs to deal with them.

Germans in 1939-41 had better bombs for attacking variety of targets than the British did.
 

2 x 500lb and 2 x 250lb was a common load out for the Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda, as well.
 
Shortround6 said:
The Beaufort wing wasn't much bigger and it was reportedly both lighter and stronger (made much more use of aluminium alloy instead of steel).
46cm more span and 34 more square ft of area (about 7%)
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Seems like someone reported it partially wrong?
Stronger it certainly was at Beufort, both when looking at tare weight of the whole aircraft, max permissible weight, ability to morph into Beaufighter without much of calamity, and the G load.
Lighter wing - I'd say no. Beaufort weighted - tare weight - between 12760 and 14000 lbs, Blenheim started at 8077 lbs, went to ~ 9250-9800 lbs to Mk.IV, and 10650 lbs on Mk.V (that also had a 3 ft longer nose).
Blenheim was already too big for it's engines, speed went quickly down from respectable 286 mph for the Mk.I to 260-266 for the Mk.IV. Being slower and bigger makes it easier to shot down both for enemy fighters and AAA.

The Hampden got a bomb bay of that size part by accident.
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Specification called that the torpedo is also to be carried, so I'd say it was designed in, rather than it was an accident, even partially.
 

For RAF, their gear is the topic here.
Dive bombers are not only required to do close support of the army. They can attack bridges and roads, railroads and marshaling yards, ports and ships, troops concentration, different vehicles - both soft-skinned and armored - that they meet in the target area. Dedicated forward/embedded officers are nor required for such tasks, even if they are necessary for the tasks of close air support to work well.




A dive bomber that can carry 2-3-4 500lb bombs will carry a 1000 lb bomb far better than a bomber designed to carry just one such bomb. Something like the Italian Ro.57, or a pre-Whirlwind with two Mercuries, or something like the Fw 187 with British engines.
Conversely, we can come out with a much smaller dive bomber to carry a 500 lb bomb. Talk something size of Spitfire, Re.2000, P-36/-40 or Gloster F.5/35. Or, have Hurricane carrying two bombs. Each of those, including the above mentioned twins, is a far more elusive target for enemy fighters and AAA than we can hope for a dive-bomber Blenheim, Battle or Skua.
 
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