1942 and on: RAF fields 'proper' P-38s - consequences?

[drgondog]

Just asking, but the tumultuous board meeting in early 1942 where the board denied funds to install "them", was the "them" Merlins or Allisons? Thanks in advance.

Merlins - remember that Allisons were already installed.

 

[P-39 Expert]

Right, the P-51 opened with Allisons and I have always wondered why it never got a single stage Merlin before it got the two stage Merlin.

 

[wuzak]

Right, the P-51 opened with Allisons and I have always wondered why it never got a single stage Merlin before it got the two stage Merlin.

Rolls-Royce produced performance estimates for both the Merlin XX and Merlin 61 in the Mustang airframe, but only ended up installing the 61, as far as I am aware.

Rolls-Royce also proposed the Griffon 61 for the Mustang, but that would have required a lot of modifications to the airframe.

(This is not the Rolls-Royce Flying Test Bed, which came later and never flew!)

 

[Shortround6]

Right, the P-51 opened with Allisons and I have always wondered why it never got a single stage Merlin before it got the two stage Merlin.

You have to look at the timing of the orders for aircraft and the timing of the engine production by Packard.
The Original order for Merlins by Packard was for 9000 engines of which the US was to get 1/3.
Packard did not complete the original order for 9000 single stage engines until the end of Feb 1943. At which time a number of prototypes of the Mustang with 2 stage engines are already flying and 2 stage Merlin powered Mustangs have been ordered in large quantities.
The window of opportunity for a single stage Merlin powered Mustang would have had to have been in early 1942 to late 1942.
However the first 620 Mustangs were British, bought and paid for. The next 150 (Mustang IAs ) were paid for by lend lease and they only rolled out the factory starting in July of 1942 which is about the time the idea of mounting a two stage Merlin begin to get around.
The US is using their share of single stage Merlins in the P-40F at this point. July of 1942 sees Packard hit the 800 engines a month production goal. US is getting around 264 Merlins per month ? US also has no money for fighters which leads to the whole A-36 dive bomber funding trick.
For most of the first 1/2 of 1942 NA is making about 80 Mustangs a month while Curtiss is building over 300 a month (using both Allisons and Merlins)

Between money, production schedules and what planes/engines were ordered when, the window for any sort of single stage Merlin Mustang was very short. And if started in the 2nd half of 1942 might well have delayed the two stage engine project.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

You have to look at the timing of the orders for aircraft and the timing of the engine production by Packard.
The Original order for Merlins by Packard was for 9000 engines of which the US was to get 1/3.
Packard did not complete the original order for 9000 single stage engines until the end of Feb 1943. At which time a number of prototypes of the Mustang with 2 stage engines are already flying and 2 stage Merlin powered Mustangs have been ordered in large quantities.
The window of opportunity for a single stage Merlin powered Mustang would have had to have been in early 1942 to late 1942.
However the first 620 Mustangs were British, bought and paid for. The next 150 (Mustang IAs ) were paid for by lend lease and they only rolled out the factory starting in July of 1942 which is about the time the idea of mounting a two stage Merlin begin to get around.
The US is using their share of single stage Merlins in the P-40F at this point. July of 1942 sees Packard hit the 800 engines a month production goal. US is getting around 264 Merlins per month ? US also has no money for fighters which leads to the whole A-36 dive bomber funding trick.
For most of the first 1/2 of 1942 NA is making about 80 Mustangs a month while Curtiss is building over 300 a month (using both Allisons and Merlins)

Between money, production schedules and what planes/engines were ordered when, the window for any sort of single stage Merlin Mustang was very short. And if started in the 2nd half of 1942 might well have delayed the two stage engine project.

I am not in the US at the moment and do not have access to my copy of Rolls Royce and the Merlin, but I believe Rolls Royce was considering installing 20 series Merlins in Mustang airframes. As you note the performance of the 60 series was so superior that the idea was dropped

 

[Kevin J]

I am not in the US at the moment and do not have access to my copy of Rolls Royce and the Merlin, but I believe Rolls Royce was considering installing 20 series Merlins in Mustang airframes. As you note the performance of the 60 series was so superior that the idea was dropped

If you look in wwiiperformance.org in the Hurricane II section you should find a chart of Hurricane II vs Merlin XX powered Mustang, IIRC.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

You don't have access to the documents that I have.

In late 1940 Kindelberger and Ernie Breech escalated the issues of repeated deficient quality of tech support and failure to deliver by Allison - which was jeopardizing the RAF relationship. Kindelberger contacted R-R in March 1941. Kindelberger sought and received details regarding the Merlin XX/Packard 1650-1. He received a voluminous design package from R-R USA in May 1941. The complaints about delivery and service escalated in late 1941 to a tumultuous Board meeting in early 1942. The Board denied funds to enter into an agreement to install them into a NA-83 series airframe.

When the ARMY got in line with proposed Merlin hybrid experiment during the Rolls Royce conversion in May 1942, they basically stuffed the decision down GM throat. GM tried one last time by forcing NAA to study the issues presented by the Allison 2S/auxiliary 2nd stage but it would have forced a complete re-design and major production disruption.

Take what you wish and leave the rest.

NAAs board or GMs?

 

[drgondog]

NAAs board or GMs?

GM - Ernie Breech was Ch NAA and also a GM Board member. He was the one that called a special meeting of the GM Board, at which Kindelberger made his case based on a multitude of Allison 'Design vs Delivered' issues causing multiple re-works on the production line at NAA, Extremely poor communication from Allison Support/Service group to communicate those changes in advance of delivery, and the general poor performance of the Allison at higher altitudes.

By documented post meeting remarks the meeting was extremely heated and Hal Dupont - CEO of Dupont and GM Board member was dispatched to meet with both NAA exec and design and production execs - and Allison's CEO as well as the GM of the Engine Group.

The latter fact finding mission coincided with the emergence of the XP-51B and just after Rolls-Royce had made successful and spectacular flights. This was also after Allison had a large backlog scheduled for the P-51A and knew that that order was toast if the AAF remained as excited about the potential (realized) of the P-51B and converted the projected remaining contract of P-51A to the P-51B-1-NA. It is alleged that GM appealed via back channel to Lt.Gen William Knudsen, Ch of War Production Board and former GM COB - and were 'coldly' rebuffed.

The ultimate focus of the investigation was 'why didn't Allison have the foresight to pursue R-R 12s/1s and 2s/2s engine development' ?

This was also the timeframe when Arnold was sure enough of the success of the mating of the P-51 and Merlin to be 'politically correct enough' to communicate to Roosevelt that the AAF had decided to purchase 2200 (or 2400 - have to look it up) Mustangs.

Obviously this was the timeframe that the animosity between Allison and NAA reached a peak, that remained in play through the XP-82 and XP-51J.

 

[drgondog]

I am not in the US at the moment and do not have access to my copy of Rolls Royce and the Merlin, but I believe Rolls Royce was considering installing 20 series Merlins in Mustang airframes. As you note the performance of the 60 series was so superior that the idea was dropped

NAA was also considering the 1650-1 as noted in my earlier post, and there were still serious positive reasons to go with the 1650-1, namely in Hp to weight and less engineering effort regarding the increased Aftercooling requirements of the 1650-1 vs the Merlin 61 (and 65 which went into the Mustang I conversions). The other issue is that the first 1650-3's experienced bench test deficiencies that in July 1942 - were not easily solvable - pointing to delays to the XP-51B (XP-78 at that time) first flight and subsequent production run. Those issues remained in October 1942, which did in fact delay the XP-51B and also delivery of the 1650-3 from 'scheduled' from February to 'actual' May 1943.

Shaking out initial production release of the 1650-3 combined with the Packard strike in June/July 1943 was the real root cause for the P-51B not beginning ops about the time the 55th FG started combat ops with P-38H in mid October 1943.

 

[P-39 Expert]

NAA was also considering the 1650-1 as noted in my earlier post, and there were still serious positive reasons to go with the 1650-1, namely in Hp to weight and less engineering effort regarding the increased Aftercooling requirements of the 1650-1 vs the Merlin 61 (and 65 which went into the Mustang I conversions). The other issue is that the first 1650-3's experienced bench test deficiencies that in July 1942 - were not easily solvable - pointing to delays to the XP-51B (XP-78 at that time) first flight and subsequent production run. Those issues remained in October 1942, which did in fact delay the XP-51B and also delivery of the 1650-3 from 'scheduled' from February to 'actual' May 1943.

Shaking out initial production release of the 1650-3 combined with the Packard strike in June/July 1943 was the real root cause for the P-51B not beginning ops about the time the 55th FG started combat ops with P-38H in mid October 1943.

Can you elaborate on the bench test deficiencies in the -3?
A strike in wartime? How did that happen?

 

[fubar57]

The World War II and post-war strike wave - Jeremy Brecher

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The World War II and post-war strike wave - Jeremy Brecher

The Human Machinery of War | eHISTORY
Some strikes are for good reason.
There was huge resentment at the profits made by the captains of industry in the Great War while workers died in the mines and factories

 

[drgondog]

Can you elaborate on the bench test deficiencies in the -3?
A strike in wartime? How did that happen?

The primary issues for the first series of Bench tests at Wright Field were piston/crankshaft failures at 12 pounds/54" boost as well as inadequate carburetion for projected 61".

on June 3, 1943 Packard management promoted three Black works to supervisory positions resulting in an immediate wildcat UAW strike (not sanctioned by UAW) and 25000 walked out. The War Labor Board, supported by UAW ordered them back on the 4th. Most returned but approximately 1500-2000 remained on the picket lines. The On June 6 30 Union organizers were suspended and the strike ended on June 7th.

That said, the strike was estimated to have lost 5-600,000 man hours resulting in a delivery loss of 240 1650-1 and 100 1650-3 engines for June.

 

[fubar57]

​