Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Several hundred additional P-39 and P-40 fighter aircraft were enroute to the Philippines along with a multitude of aircraft support units. They would have been formed into additional fighter groups after arrival.
Australians are perfectly capable of securing their own continent.
If you want to secure the Philippine supply line then you need to secure the Gilbert Islands, Solomon Islands, New Britain, Timor, Ambon and the western tip of New Guinea. Ideally you should also have 1st Marine Division seize Palau during December 1941. All of these places except Palau are free for the taking prior to January 1942. The US Army and USN just need to get the lead out. We had plenty of shipping in the Pacific and Army units such as 41st Infantry division were sitting at San Francisco waiting for the USN to assemble a convoy.
The Australians had next to zero fighter capability in Australia at the start of the Pacific War and for months after. Just because they lacked that doesn't mean the Japanese would have been capable of, or had any intention to, conquer Australia. But the fast growing supply of USAAF fighters in Australia from early '42 were the only Allied fighters around. The Australian Wirraways weren't real fighters and the only two 'Kittyhawk' units stood up in Australia after the war began were actually equipped in part with P-40's from among those shipped there for the USAAF, not all with export Kitthawks. The RAAF had experienced fighter units in the Med/North African theater at the time...but that's where they were, not in Australia. It's a different what if of overall British Empire strategy to have had fewer Empire (Australian or other) forces in the Med and more in the Far East. But IMO the basic British approach of leaving inadequate second string forces in the FE was the correct one, humiliating and perhaps surprising (though shouldn't have been) as the results were. Losing to the Germans in the Mid East would have been a bigger problem.View attachment 204060
Australians are perfectly capable of securing their own continent.
We could move entire army divisions and fighter groups anywhere in the South Pacific escorted by multiple aircraft carriers and the large cruiser fleet based at Pearl Harbor. But we had to get moving as the window of opportunity lasted ony about 4 months.
AS has been pointed out, refuel these fleets how?
Why do the Japanese have to follow their Historical plans if the allies change theirs?
Why can't the Japanese shift an Invasion fleet 600-1000 miles east or west of where it struck Historically?
You want to move US assets 3-7000 miles in the same time. It is 7292 air miles from LA to Manila.
Those "fighter groups" are brand new are they not? and they have to be moved by ship as deck cargo in crates unless you want your carriers to to be out of action while they play aircraft ferry. There are THREE US carriers in the Pacific in early Dec 1941.
If the fighters were based in Oz, they would have flown to their deployment bases as did PPS-17 to Java. They island hopped, with legs up to 530 miles. Of course they had drop tanks to give them a reserve since that's evidently a max effective range for a fully loaded bird without the tank.
11 oilers as of Dec 7th and some of those are WW I left overs with a TOP speed of 12 kts. A few others had a top speed of 10.5 kts and were not fitted for underway replenishment. A few of these were in the Philippines and were lost, Even if you could have gotten them away at 8-9 knts they would have take weeks to get to Hawaii and been near useless for supporting a fast moving task force.
The US simply did not have the Logistics to support this idea in the first few months of 1942.
Most merchant ships have long range. They routinely crossed the Pacific and Indian Oceans without refueling. That was true even during WWI.
This isn't an invasion. Prior to late January 1942 merchant ships could carry 41st Infantry division into Rabual harbor and unload at the piers. The same holds true for Ambon and Timor.
There's only one catch - the USN need to get the lead out. They cannot sit immobilized staring sadly at sunken battleships while the Japanese seize strategic territory with a single infantry regiment.