A 'different' strategy for the early SE Asian campaign?

[Shortround6]

From Wiki: 41st Infantry Division (United States) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Take it for what you think it is worth;

"Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 41st Infantry Division was deployed to defend the coastline of Washington and Oregon against a possible Japanese landing.[2]:17 The 218th Field Artillery was at sea en route to the Philippines; it was turned back to San Francisco and eventually rejoined the division"

"In February 1942, the 41st Infantry Division was alerted for overseas movement. It handed over its coastal defence responsibilities to the 3rd Infantry Division and concentrated at Fort Lewis. First to depart was the 162nd Infantry, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and 41st Reconnaissance Troop, which entrained later that month for Fort Dix. This group departed the Brooklyn Navy Yard on 3 March 1942 and sailed for the Pacific via the Panama Canal, reaching Melbourne on 9 April. They were among the first U.S. military units to be engaged in offensive ground combat operations."

"A second group consisting of Division Headquarters, the 163rd Infantry, 41st Signal Company, 116th Engineer Battalion, 167th Field Artillery Battalion, 116th Medical Battalion, and 116th Quartermaster Battalion embarked from San Francisco on 19 March in a convoy that included the liner RMS Queen Elizabeth. This convoy reached Australia before the first, on 6 April. Because Melbourne could not accommodate the Queen Elizabeth, it unloaded at Sydney and the troops and cargo were moved to Melbourne by rail and smaller Dutch ships."

"That month the remainder of the division, including the 186th Infantry and 146th, 205th and 218th Field Artillery battalions entrained at Fort Lewis for San Francisco, from whence they sailed for Australia, arriving on 13 May. As each contingent arrived it moved to a camp near Seymour, Victoria, where training was conducted at the nearby Australian Army base at Puckapunyal"

"The division had arrived in Australia with a reputation as "the top ranking National Guard division and one of the three top divisions in the whole Army",[2]:6 a reason for its early shipment.[4] However, the 41st Infantry Division had never conducted manoeuvres with live ammunition and many men had not even fired their own weapons."

"A training inspection found: The body of instruction is identical with that given in the U.S. The manner of execution showed little comprehension of the realities of warfare. Regimental, battalion and junior commands think that they are doing a good job. In spite of the vigorous representations of the division commander and his staff, coupled with a substantial number of changes of command, unit commanders are convinced that they are preparing their units for war. This for the simple reason that they apparently have only the vaguest conception of the realities of combat"

"Major General Robert L. Eichelberger, whose I Corps headquarters arrived in Rockhampton in August, ordered the division to commence training in jungle warfare.[5]:39 Each infantry battalion in turn was sent down to Toorbul, Queensland for training in amphibious warfare by the Australian Army"

 

[parsifal]

There are two basic probles with sending US ground troops and air formations into the pacific. Each relate to separate issues, but theyr all add up to a common problem.

US army formations were simply not up to the task of fighting in jungles, and most of the solomon islands are heavy jungle and mountain terrain. When the 41st was finally committed to battle in November 1942, it fell apart almost immediately.

Sending untrained, or semitrained troops into the jungle is suicide, and a profligate waste of supply, and supply is the number one issue in jungle warfare.

Further, there was not a single US formation, other the Phillipine Scouts trained for warfare in the Jungle in 1941, and most of 1942.

The Australian army immediately started training units for jungle warfare, and already had some jungle accutomed militia units in PNG at about brigade strength in early 1942. The Japanese had about 3 divisional equivalents in the pacific and a further uncommitted Army (a Corps equivalent in the IJA) either sitting in Palau waiting in Okinawa, or as part of the strategic reserves. There were 12 divs beyand that waiting in ports in China and the far north if anything went wrong with the main assaults. They were not committed, because they were not needed, and in the pacific, the supply lines were so long and amount of shipping so limited, that the japanese knew they would be a liability if they committed them unneccessarily. Japan was also a bit concerned about Russian intentions, and until that became clearer, no major movement of troops out of the China TO was favoured, unless absolutely necessary.

The second issue was supplying these formations. Before any real support could be even sent to Australia, hte Americans had to build up their chain of intermediate fleet bases. They chose three main bases, Fiji, Noumea and New Zealand. They also had subsidiary bases at Pago Pago. Setting up these bases took time and shipping, lots of it. There was simply not enough shipping available to send division sized or larger formations haring across the Pacifc or into frontline areas. The Japanese could have just nothing other than maintain their blockade and a token presence in the area, and watched these poor devils starve.


Remener too that in 1941 the US only controlled about 9million tons of shipping, and more than half of that was already in the Atlantic supporting the allies ther. that leaves about 3 million tons of shipping in the Pacific, of which 2 million tons were needed to supply the bases at Oahu and in Alaska(and feed the population). Half of the remaining 1 million tons was in the Far East, where most of it was either lost or captured. That leaves precious little for the allies to mess around with. Nimitz had a sign posted above his desk for everyone to see on taking the job on, for very good reason, and its worth noting in this discussion....It read something like "Before you suggest anything....Do we have the shipping?????"

The lesson to take home here is that in 1941 through to the middle of 1942, the US was a nation of very limited real military value, but a nation of great potential. Their army needed cadres to expand....every soldier sent to the front was 3 or 4 less soldiers later in the war. Same holds true for the air force. Those 300 P-40s, you could probabaly afford 20 or 30 to be placed in the front line....the rest were needed for training. In every category, excepty their navy the US was totally unprepred for war (and even theren there were gaps, such as ASW). Whats more everybody knew that.....

 

[Shortround6]

I would note that not all shipping is created equal, to turn a freighter into a troop transport you not only need decks and bunks put into the holds but water tanks or a water making system, you need sanitation facilities for hundreds of men( not dozens) hanging one's butt over the leeward rail doesn't cut it. You need refrigeration lockers for food ( 3-4 weeks on C-rations doesn't cut it either) and you need the galley/kitchen spaces to feed the hundreds ( or thousands) of men. the original crew galley won't be near enough. Freighters or freighter designs were converted to troop transports but it wasn't done in a couple days or even weeks. Even turning a liner into a troops ship took some time.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

This isn't an invasion. Prior to late January 1942 merchant ships could carry 41st Infantry division into Rabual harbor and unload at the piers. The same holds true for Ambon and Timor.

There's only one catch - the USN need to get the lead out. They cannot sit immobilized staring sadly at sunken battleships while the Japanese seize strategic territory with a single infantry regiment.

The convoy to Rabaul would still need escorts. IJN subs were abroad and while they (unlike the rest of the world's navies typically preferred to target combatants, that wasn't known and wouldn't have been a certainty in any event.

If we are talking pre-belligerency (pre-December 7, yes probably) but after that no. During December the USN pac fleet was preoccupied with the wake resupply problem once again, a classic case of logistical preeminence in the movement of combatants. Afterward the USN was focused on the carrier raids. That pretty much absorbed the entire stock of combatant-available fuel for the first 4-5 months of the war.

King became quite miffed at Fletcher because he wasn't more aggressive in his moves in the South Pacific during the late winter of 1942, until reinforced by the very able Wilson Brown and the Lex (another black shoe admiral). Brown was too old and his health too poor for extended wartime service to continue. Brown's aborted February 20 attempt to raid Rabaul with the Lex was the proof that Fletcher's concerns were valid. Rabaul fell February 6, 1942, and in the space of about two weeks it had been reinforced with the squadron of Betty's and some fighters but its actual strengh was unknown and Fletcher had found the IJN searches were very effective in ferreting out US movements. "Getting the lead out" was probably a King perspective but Nimitz tended to appreciate more cautious movement of his irreplacable carriers.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Given that RAA Lark Force was already in place at Rabaul, that would appear to be the spot to reinforce with additional P-40 squadrons and some additional attack capablity which was in very short supply at the time. Two squadrons of P-40s at Rabaul should have bolstered its defense vs the Kaga and Akagi significantly although it may simply have invited a PH Type massed CV assault with accompanying occurpying forces. The confrontation in any event would likely have gone to the IJN much as the Midway battle between 20+ F2As and 36 escorting zeros albeit with greater demage done to the IJN aircraft by the additional P-40 defenders. The IJN CV airwing was more likely to attack at altitudes within the P-40s optimal operating envelope which might have offset to some degree the general superiority of the A6M escorts.

 

[davebender]

Not during 1941. A typical Pacific convoy during the fall of 1941 was escorted by a single cruiser and a single ASW vessel.

Convoy 4002 (i.e. Pensacola Convoy).
Pensacola Convoy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
CA Pensacola.
PG-52. U.S.S. Niagara was actually an armed ocean going yacht serving as an ASW vessel.
7 transports / merchant ships.

7 ships doesn't sound like much but these were relatively large ships. USAT Republic displaced 33,530 tons! In addition to speed (about 14 knots) and large cargo capacity they've also got great endurance. Attach one of the Pearl Harbor based USN oilers and the convoy is ready to go. Make a 14 knot dash to Rabaul, refuel from the oiler while cargo is being unloaded and then make a 14 knot dash back to Pearl Harbor. Convoys sailing to Timor, Ambon or the Philippines would probably make a refueling stop at Darwin before a high speed dash through the most dangerous area.

Begin this process 26 July 1941 (i.e. start of Philippine military build up) and it's a cake walk. Prior to war warnings issued during November 1941 you can make a bee line through the central Pacific. Sailing an armed convoy past the Japanese controlled Marshall Islands during August 1941 would also reinforce the U.S. diplomatic stance.

 

[Shortround6]

Not during 1941. A typical Pacific convoy during the fall of 1941 was escorted by a single cruiser and a single ASW vessel.

A convoy is not a task force.

14 or 14.5kts is top speed, not cruising speed. USAT Republic had boilers that were 15-18 years old? Running them full bore for days on end is asking for a break down. Summer of 1941 had her in the Atlantic, again pointing out that there was not a huge surplus of shipping available at a moments notice.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I think we need to be clear about what measures are pre-war and what comes after December 7. Before the war:
1. We have the arrival in Manila of The SS Etolin in 2/10/41 with 24 pilots,
2. the USAT Washington arrives on 5/8/41 with 39 pilots
3. On 5/17/41 a ship arrives carrying 31 P-40B
(at this point we have three squadrons manned to about 29 pilots/18 plane squadron including the 24 pilots already in the PI prior to 1/1/41. There are about 55 P-35 and 31 P-40B aircraft in the PI and about 2 dozen P-26. In other words, there are about 86 relatively modern aircraft of both types to be flown by 87 pilots.
4. On 6/24/41 the USAT President Pierce in company with USAT Republic arrives with 96 rookie pilots.

On 9/29/41 a ship carrying 55 P-40E arrives in Manilla
On 11/20/41 President Coolidge arrives in Manilla carrying 31 P-40 pilots.
On 11/25/41 freighter arrives Manilla carrting 24 P-40Es.

I don't know of any ground forces in these cargos except the Pensacola Convoy. If a convoy is conjured to be sent early with ground troops, that strikes me as ahistoric, and not in accord with the arbitrary proposed changes which are limited to redirection of aviation cargos that are in transit by mid 1941. These cargos are redirected to Australia by virtue of the recognition that building an operational presence in Oz might probably be more important that the attempt to build a "crust defense" in the PI.

were there any voices crying out in the wilderness, "Prepare Australia for the coming storm? It is the Westpac southernmost flank and needs to be reinforced in the event of war which by JUly 24 seems inevitable." Is an prepared Australia more a deteren to IJ aggression than a hastily and semi-prepared PI and yet not nearly so evidently threatening to IJ ambitions?

Reinforcement as considered here includes bolstering the defense of Rabaul. If there are ground forces being deployed prior to December 7, that becomes fair game to be included IMHO.

 

[Shortround6]

You may want to consider several scenarios.

1. what could be done by shuffling around the historic forces available, as you are describing already.
2. What might have been done with "modest" reinforcements or alterations in detail (not conjuring up complete divisions and hundreds of planes)

to affect an altered deployment strategy.

IS Australia better defended by a concentrated force on Australian soil or by defending the Philippines better and keeping the Japanese there or by spreading out the available resources in penny packets hundreds of miles apart in positions were they can be cut off and isolated.

 

[parsifal]

Just remember as well that prior to December 1941 Australia effectively was not an independant nation insofar as managing its Foreign Policy was concerned, though i concede we had become thoroughly disillusioned with the empty British rhetoric about far eastern defence and the establishment of a coherent defence industry in Australia from 1938-41. Our break with British control of our FP had been granted in 1931 but we had not really excercised our independance until after the fall of Singapore. Australia and her surrounding territorial waters were declared war zones, and Australia was already at war. For the Americans to deploy into Australia they would have had to accept some rather onerous situations, and in a very real sense risked further alienation with the European Axis powers. Its the same reason why US forces did not deploy into the British Isles that prevented them from deploying into any territories of the Commonwealth. that includes Australia, NZ, Fiji, The Gilberts (and most of the other island groups outside the HI) , The Solomons and PNG. deployment to any of these areas and territories was really off limits to the US until after war broke out.

With regard to noumea, a teritory under free french control, the situation was somewhat different. i am unsure of the diplomatic situation, but as a general observation, Us and FF relations were relatively cool generally. This was in contrast to the situation in places like iceland, where the local authorities were quite keen to accept a neutral power (the Us as their new protectors over an active belligerent (the brits). I doubt the New caledonians would have been as pleased to accept the US whilst there was no shooting war in the Pacific. Noumea did rapidly change attitudes after ther DoW but thats a long way from just sailing into Noumea Harbour, unnannounced and not necessarily welcome.

So all this talk of sending half trained US troops here or there, with or without escort, and with no possibility of re-supply is overlooking some fundamental political issues....the US was not at war, and had no treaties with the territories they were supposed to be "invading". Not sure how people are proposing to engineer this without getting the US directly into a shooting war with somebody.

 

[Shortround6]

Good points.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

You may want to consider several scenarios.

1. what could be done by shuffling around the historic forces available, as you are describing already.
2. What might have been done with "modest" reinforcements or alterations in detail (not conjuring up complete divisions and hundreds of planes)

to affect an altered deployment strategy.

IS Australia better defended by a concentrated force on Australian soil or by defending the Philippines better and keeping the Japanese there or by spreading out the available resources in penny packets hundreds of miles apart in positions were they can be cut off and isolated.

Thanks Pars, that's the kind of broader perspective (i.e. Australian) I was hoping you or someone else would provide. Until December 7, it would appear that everyone was pretty much on their own in what became the PTO. In the case of the P-40 movements (there must have been P-39/P-400 as well) some of the units were not "half-trained." and potentially immediately deployable. But where to put them to do the most good?

I am still curious (foreign political considerations aside) whether there might have been a strategy of fighter squadron deployment to certain points that would have stalled the IJ advance and not simply caused them to be defeated in detail (as described by SR above). Looking at the Indonesian archipelgo it appears to be a complex geography providing multiple offensive options that overcome any partifcular defense. The numbers of P-40s were not "conjured" though. That is apparently what was afloat before or just after the PH attack. I was quite surprised at the sheer size of this mass movement of men and materiel on he eve of war. Just ordered "Racing the Sun" which describes that effort in more detail.

 

[buffnut453]

Until December 7, it would appear that everyone was pretty much on their own in what became the PTO.

But not for want of trying. Churchill had been desperately seeking closer cooperation between Commonwealth and American forces to defend against the Japanese threat but to no avail. We are left to speculate what might have happened had US and Commonwealth forces collaborated to mutual defence (eg balancing Force Z with American cruisers, combined US/Australian defensive measures in New Guinea during the fall of 1941 etc).

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Buff,

You don't happen to have a biography or history you'd recommend that goes into Churchill's efforts to that end. I'd love to know if his eforts were defined actions or more in the form of tentative feelers?

So, the reality appears to be that Australia was left on her own because the Empire was in a fight for its survival in the ETO, but Churchill saw the warclouds on the horizon in the PTO (how could he help but see them?) and tried to recruit the USA to play an more active role in the comonweath's defense. What was the US positon or response to such efforts: "Mac's got it covered in the PI?" and that's as much progress as Churchill's efforts were able to make. Moves that were superficially mutually supportive but fell short of territorial involvment, at least until the balloon went up?

SR6 mentioned the geographically widespread and piecemeal commitment of resources that seems to me not too different from the history. Some resources went to the PI, some were dribbled out to defend Java from staging bases in Oz.

USAAF flight schools evidently graduated 8 classes per year designated by graduation year and a letter A-H corresponding to the date of graduation.
The 5 or so P-40 squadrons consigned to the failed defense of Java were comprised of the best and most senior pilots arriving on the aforementioned ships:
The 17th PPS consisted of pilots from 38-C (the squadron CO) to pilots from class 41E (the latter were pilots mostly collected from the pre-existing 21st and 34th PSs arriving on the Repubic, half of whom had preceded them to the PI in November. The 20th PPS was collected from the same basic pool but included graduates of class 41-F. Similarly for the 3rd PPS except with a larger number of 41-F graduates. The 33rd PPS included many less experienced pilots from classes 41-G and 41-H. The 13th PPS was mainly comprised of 41-G and 41-H graduates, 24 of which were lost when the Langley was sunk or later, due to that event.

 

[buffnut453]

I can strongly recommend the following:

"Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War" by Nicholas Tarling
"Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945" by Christopher Thorne
"Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia 1937-1941" by Peter Lowe
"The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific" by Akira Iriye
"Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor " by Antony Best

Most of these are academic volumes and hence are expensive. However, they are all excellent.

 

[buffnut453]

If I were to prioritize from the above list, I'd start with Lowe and Best - both are excellent.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Thanks very much! I was going to ask you to prioritize but you beat me to it!

 

[buffnut453]

Oh, and Thorne too.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Rabaul is too far East to play any role in preserving a line of comm to the PI.

The Port Moresby or Guadcanal campaign might be an example (albeit geographically removed from the area of most importance (to IJ) in late 41 - early 42.) and where forces would have been required to be committed to establish a defensive bulwark to resist the Japanese tidal wave of expansion across SE Asia. I can't see that scale of operation being mounted within the first couple of months of December 7 regardless of how well stocked Australia might have been in an alternate scenario. Essentially 5 P-40 squadrons were expended to discover that hard fact. Based on geography, it would appear that control of at least 4 airbases would be required to maintain contact with the PI: one path includes 5 bases: from Darwin to Koepang to Makassar to Balikpapan to Tarakan to Del Monte (across Japanese occupied Jolo). Another, requires 4, from Darwin to Koepang to Amboina to Manado to DelMonte. Java and Timor (Koepang) were vulnerable to invasion from North, East, West, and by IJN CV attack from the South. In the end, Koepang and the other intermediate airfields fell in rapid succession to the IJ juggernaut by early March 1942. It doesn't look like there was a geographically defensible option whether Australia was developed earlier or not. Even though Port Moresby and Gaudacanal were held, it was only though a major commitment of troops, aircraft and ships which weren't available until late Spring at the earliest. Guess that's the answer I sought.

 

[renrich]

When you are talking about post December 7 action by the US you have to take into account that FDR had promised and agreed with Churchill that the war against Germany would take precedence over the Japan war. Stalin played a role in these priorities also. Of necessity any offensive actions against Japan would drain strength needed for the defeat of Germany. In retrospect the allies accomplishments in 1942 against Japan, at Coral Sea, Midway, Buna-Port Moresby, Guadalcanal, not to mention Torch were, IMO, amazing.