A6M - Germany Japan Technology Exchange Missed Opportunity?

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GrauGeist said:
I know the Soviet Union skirmished with Japan between 1932 and 1939.
The Soviets and Finland also went to war in 1939.

But I had no idea Germany and the Soviet Union went to war in the 1930's...
Click to expand...
Nicely stated. Where else did the I-16 meet the Bf109? What was the upshot of the Finnish USSR war? Armor and SSFT?
 
sotaro said:
By that criteria, what was the Japanese Chinese War?
Click to expand...
The confrontation between Japan and the Soviet Union was a seven year long contest over border issues.
So while it was not *technically* a declared war, it did have occasional clashes involving ground and air elements.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria and China was a "forced occupation" under the auspices of the Japanese's "Greater Asia Co-prosparity Sphere" doctrine.

We would see the Germans conduct the same tactic several years later with their "Lebensraum" edict, where they annexed former German territories (although it was considerably less violent). The second phase of the "Lebensraum", the expansion into Poland and points east, of course, had a much different outcome.
 
GrauGeist said:
I know the Soviet Union skirmished with Japan between 1932 and 1939.
The Soviets and Finland also went to war in 1939.

But I had no idea Germany and the Soviet Union went to war in the 1930's...
Click to expand...

The fellow member probably thinks of the Spanish Civil War, where there was a lot both for Germany and Soviet Union (and Italy) to learn, including the thing of 'pilot is precious'. Soviets seem to be 1st to install armor on their fighters.
 
Japan in the 1930s looked into semi auto rifles but rejected them.

Too expensive and too finicky and too long to make and we are at war in China so need rifles yesterday so nah.

So give them a sturmgewehr and you're going to get the same reply.

I was reading about USN botching radar and fighter controlling because the concept wasn't there and comms wasn't there. So you can have the best radar in the world but if your Admiral doesn't understand it then again it doesn't work.

Give the IJN the best electric U-boats in the world and they would still use them as transports.

I was reading how in war games, IJN couldn't operate fleet subs as they couldn't keep up with the enemy fleet so they were outclassed for recon and trying to get a firing solution was pretty much a big no. But the doctrine didn't change so subs were still used as fleet subs even though thier own war games found this to be of dubious value. Can't argue against stupid.
 
Pretty much agree with everything, especially the IJN wargaming method. Hey, American carriers show up unexpectedly and sink two IJN CV's? Can't have that.

"Umpire! Refloat those two CV's immediately and whatever schmoe is running the American side, get a grip and know your place, you show up when and where we say so... just like it will happen off Midway, got it?"
 
Fleet submarines are an idea that don't work. Subs of that era are too slow.

Too slow to keep up with your fleet and too slow to attack the enemy fleet.

They didn't commerce raid or use ASW at Tsushima and by jiminy the IJN are not doing it now.

A submarine was subservient to decisive battle and not its own ideas.

Any future war was going to be short and victorious so the need for commerce warfare or ASW was unnecessary and a bit of a long burn.

Commerce warfare can take years to bear fruit so the idea was not contemplated and would seem a bit defeatist. Drink the Kool Aid and rinse and repeat.

The idea that American subs would play havoc wasn't contemplated either.

Damn IJN, they ruined the IJN.
 

ASW, being defensive in nature, was likely anathema to IJN's command echelons.
 
Japan, US, UK, Italy (and many others) had agreed to the post-WWI Geneva Convention clause prohibiting unrestricted submarine warfare, Japan partly because they considered it dishonorable/immoral to make war on non-combatants, and incompetent to sink ships that were not supposed to be sunk. The strategy of the Japanese Submarine force was to lie in wait in the areas of known or expected enemy combat and combat support ships for the opportunity to attack (like the UK, Italian, and most other nations) - which is what they did.

Despite the US agreeing to the clause also, in the expected (hoped for?) war with Japan, their intent was to sink anything Japanese (or that was not clearly identified) that moved in the PTO (civilian or combat) - which is why they developed/produced the types/numbers of submarines they did.

I have mentioned the book 'War Plan Orange' in other threads. It covers this subject as well as pretty much every other subject of the US planning of the coming war with Japan, from the time of the end of WWI to the end of WWII. It includes quite a bit on the Japanese concepts and plans also.
 
Navies are not homogeneous blocks and there is always an allocation of resources based not on operational need but who got Da Juice. Biggest dog at the bowl. So big gun battleship guys or air power so Yamato is not exactly common sense or logical but if your big gun battleship guys want big guns then Yamato it is. And your admirals are now old men who served on battleships or even at Tsushima and they go with what they know.

Doenitz was a u boat man and so it's no surprise he pushed his u boat ideas even when the rest of the Kreigmarine was going for Plan Z.

If you don't have ASW or sub cheerleaders at the top of the pyramid then they will never get the resources or the love they require.
 
Japanese decisive battle was fundamentally a defensive battle like Tsushima. The enemy will come to you and you set the trap.

Problem is with battles like Pearl and Coral Sea and Midway this wasn't decisive battle and Yamamoto threw all naval planning in the bin. So using subs as fleet subs was chucked the moment Arizona went bang. So the IJN didn't follow the strategy which the whole of their naval existence depended and was designed on.

¡Ay Caramba!
 
Both Japan and the Soviet Union signed the 1929 Geneva Convention treatise, but did not ratify it, nullifying their obligation.
Finland was not a signee of the treaty, either.

Japan did sign and ratify the Hague Convention of 1907 as did Russia, but when the Soviets took over in 1917, it became null.
 

One reason that the IJN had a tendency towards stupidity is that they often retired admirals because they were intelligent. The IJN was divided into factions such as the "Fleet" and "Treaty" factions.

In 1934, the Fleet Faction had control and forced the retirement of Vice-Admiral Hori Teikichi Teikichi Hori - Wikipedia, Materials of IJN (Naval Academy class 32). Their reasoning was that Hori was their most effective opponent.

After the events of 26/2/1936, Yonai and the Treaty Faction became influential and Takahashi Sankichi Sankichi Takahashi - Wikipedia, Materials of IJN (Naval Academy class 29) was retired, partly because he was Fleet Faction and partly because he supported aircraft carriers over battleships.

Another retired officer was Vice-Admiral Sato Ichiro Materials of IJN (Naval Academy class 36). Like Hori, he had been top of his year at Etajima (behind an Imperial Prince in Sato's case) and had been top of his Naval College course. I remembered that he had written about the importance of defending Japanese commerce and eventually found a link Japan's Sea Lane Security in one of my posts from 7 years ago 1930's Japanese Navy - What would you have done differently?. Everyone agrees that he was retired for political reasons without agreement on which issue doomed his career.

Sometimes admittedly admirals were retired because of stupidity rather than intelligence. An example was Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa Nobumasa Suetsugu - Wikipedia, who created much of Japan's submarine doctrine despite never serving in a submarine. He accepted a position as a Cabinet Councillor from Prince Konoe and was surprised when Yonai pointed out that he must enter the reserve as a serving officer could not play a political role (Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral, page 132).

On the unrelated subject of self loading rifles, there is a nice video at .
 

The party trick of the German u-boats was being able to dive nearly twice the depth of allied or Japanese submarines. The German u-boats were tough and could survive a depth charging. Their skins were twice as thick. The Germans had other intermeshing technology suc.h as the GHG phased array sonar with its enormous range and precision.

The greatest Japanese gift to the Germans would have been type 22 microwave, radar and radar detector and some other interesting devices for depth keeping.

The small size of the u-boats reflects tye need to operate in the Baltic, the Skagerackert, English Channel etc. Developing larger craft able to operate in the Gulf of Texas/Mexico had to wait.
 
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