If Weimar Republic succeeds, is Britain unprepared to face Japan?

[Admiral Beez]

If with continued US assistance, and German and Allied acceptance the Young Plan, the Weimar Republic lasts through the Great Depression and beyond, will reduced rearmament in Britain leave the Empire unprepared to face Japan in 1941? There's still Mussolini's Italy to deal with in North Africa and Ethiopia, and the civil war in Spain, so Britain won't totally neglect its military, but the huge re-armament programs of 1936-1940 will assuredly be impacted, as will Churchill's chances of becoming PM.

In 1919 the British government enacted the ten year rule, "a guideline, that the armed forces should draft their estimates on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years. In 1928 Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, successfully urged the Cabinet to make the rule self-perpetuating. There were very large cuts in defence spending as a result of this rule, with defence spending going down from £766 million in 1919–20, to £189 million in 1921–22, to £102 million in 1932. The Ten Year Rule was abandoned by the Cabinet on 23 March 1932, but this decision was countered with: this must not be taken to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial and economic situation."

Japan may not appear to be a big threat until its successful invasion of China from 1937 onwards, so Tokyo's aspirations may not drive British re-armament. Though as they watch IJN expansion; Australia, NZ, Malaya, Burma and India may be crying out for defences. An expansionist Japan will need to consider facing off against an undistracted if less well armed Britain, France and Netherlands.

 

[EwenS]

I think it depends on which service you are looking at, and you may get different results for each.

The RN & USN were very much focused on Japan in the 1930s. Japan announced its withdrawal from the Treaty system in Dec 1934 to take effect from 31 Dec 1936. There was hope that they might announce compliance with the new 1936 London Treaty limits (35,000 tons, 14" guns for battleship) by 1 April 1937, failing which the gun limit would revert to 16". That didn't happen and by mid-1937 it was expected that they would build a new class of battleship of tonnage greater than 35,000 tons which would outclass virtually everything the RN & USN had in service. That led to a new agreement on a 45,000 ton / 16" limit.

So it was clear to the US & Britain that their fleets would have to be renewed to compete.

If you look at many of the British ships designed from the early 1930s, they are not a response to what was happening in Europe, but to what Japan was doing. For example Mogamis triggered the Towns, Fubukis the Tribals with more guns and the need for greater torpedo armament in the J/K class.

It was only from late 1935 following the Abyssinian Crisis and then particularly after Munich in 1938 that the naval focus moved to Europe with the likes of the Hunt class being designed.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If you look at many of the British ships designed from the early 1930s, they are not a response to what was happening in Europe, but to what Japan was doing. For example Mogamis triggered the Towns, Fubukis the Tribals with more guns and the need for greater torpedo armament in the J/K class.

If Japan remained the focus in the mid-late 1930s, I wonder what sort of aircraft carriers and carrier aircraft we would have seen the RN, AM and FAA field. HMS Ark Royal was reportedly designed with Japan in mind, but when she entered service in early 1939, her CAG was clearly not optimized to deal with the A5M or B5N then in IJNS service or the Aichi D3A then in development (see prototype image - first flown a year earlier in Jan 1938). Without the threat of the Kriegsmarine or Nazi Germany driving both military expenditures and conscription, I suggest we'd see some rationalization of the RN, with, for example the five Revenge class, at best going into the reserve fleet. What do you think the RN would look like up to 1941 without German-driven re-armament?

I think the British army's manpower size and equipment inventory and development will take the biggest hit, which is worrisome as by the early 1940s in addition to Japan risks, Stalin will be looking to expand towards an unprepared eastern Europe and an especially weakened Germany, as the Treaty of Versailles limited the German army to 100,000 men, conscription was forbidden, the Navy was limited to vessels under 10,000 tons, submarines are forbidden, as was an air force.

 

[Admiral Beez]

In my first post above, we see that UK defence spending had dropped from £766 million in 1920 to to £102 million in 1932. Using an inflation calculator to approximate 2024, this is equal to a drop from £60 billion to about £8 billion. In 2023, the UK defence budget was £53 billion. So, we can just imagine the shock to the system if Britain today dropped defence spending to £8 billion, equal to Greece's defence budget. Of course it's not apples to apples, as the development, procurement and operating costs of ships, planes, tanks, other systems, plus payroll have dramatically changed, but still, the cuts from 1920 to 1932 must have had sweeping impacts.

 

[yulzari]

Churchill will be remembered not for advocating rearmament but as an architect of the Ten Year Rule.

 

[Shortround6]

Japan was seen as a major threat from WW I on.
What Britain was prepared to do about Japan varied.

Japan had become the 3rd largest navy in world after June 21st 1919 with the scuttling of the German High Seas fleet. That was a fact. Japan had little or no war debt unlike France or Italy to hinder rebuilding. Japan had very aggressive building program. The 8-8 program/s building strategy was aimed at the US but British could not depend on the US to defend British interests in the far east in the 1920s and the British fleet building plans had to take that into account.
The Washington treaty was the first attempt to scale back the building programs and Japan did not like the fact they were being pushed back to 2nd rate status with the French and Italians.

Japan was always the focus for the RN. Just look at the numbers. The Anglo German naval treaty of 1935 was supposed to limit the Germans to 35% of the RN. The Japanese were limited to 60%, the same as the French and the Italians. Germany never completed the amount of tonnage they were allowed under the Treaty. If the British maintained the 5 : 3 ratio over the Japanese they had just enough to match the Japanese and Germans combined without the Americans if France matched Italy.

The British sought to control the Japanese through the treaties but maintaining a superiority over the Japanese was always the main goal. When the Japanese pulled out of the treaties in the mid 30s it was game on, at least to the goals of the RN, what the treasury would allow was another thing. Germany was a side line. Two Bismarks and two Scharnhorst's ???? Pffft.
British was not planning on stopping with the KGVs if/when the Germans built more/larger Bismarcks the British were planning on building Lions, 6 of them. Not to really counter the Germans but to counter the unknown Japanese BBs. British were planning on 11 modern BBs and perhaps more to follow in the mid/late 40s. Whatever the Germans could build could be handled by left overs that the British would not need to handle the Japanese.

Such was the plan, which went down the drain when France didn't fold, it disintegrated like a well soaked paper bag. Leaving the British to face not a 3 + 1.6 combination against their 5., but 3 + 3 + 1.6 combination with Italy joining in.

German navy was always a side show. Japan was always the most important opponent (after the US). Italy was something of a wild card. They tried to build up the treaty limits and came close, they also starved the army and to some extent the Air Force to do it. Their ability to sustain building programs or expand them beyond treaty capabilities was rather suspect, Their steel industry was perhaps a bit over 25% that of Japan? Steel production is not ship building but if you don't have steel it doesn't matter how many slips you have.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Japan was seen as a major threat from WW I on.

Excellent points. So, given your info re. countering Japan, the ten year rule lasting until at least its historical end in 1932, and the British government's parsimonious views on defence spending, what do you see the RN, RAF and HM's Army at home and overseas looking like by 1941? And back to the original question, without the German-focused re-armament and mobilization of 1936-40, will Britain be prepared to deal with Japan in 1941?

I would hope in view of British neglect, for example the long delays on the Singapore naval base, that the Australians would expedite or expand their own re-armament.

 

[yulzari]

Japan was seen as a major threat from WW I on.
What Britain was prepared to do about Japan varied.

It shows Singapore in its intended light as a fleet base for a campaign against the Japanese navy. The OTL Japanese response was not to match the Royal Navy at sea but to take the base from inland leaving the Royal Navy an ocean further away. This is not a new tactic. Possibly one of the most indirect ones but not a new concept. Plymouth and other naval ports in Britain were ringed by huge and expensive fortifications in the latter part of the 19th century to guard against just this sort of tactic, although the planned threat was one of landings far nearer than a whole country away, but the principle stands.

It would be interesting, but beyond my naval knowledge, to explore what the Royal Navy and Japanese navy would have done with a working Singapore naval base with a suitable fleet on station and reinforced. It is my view that the major contribution of the German navy was to be a fleet in being with commercial raiding submarines to tie up the Royal Navy line of battle vessels when they had to cover the loss of the French navy to deal with the Mediterranean and southern approaches. By the time the Japanese pounced the Royal Navy was covering the entire Atlantic from Greenland to Antarctica, the whole of the the Indian Ocean from Iran to Australia, not mention the South Pacific so deployments could take weeks to carry out.

A further what if would be not abandoning the Anglo-Japanese naval links in favour of Anglo-American ones. As an allied nation what might be a British response if the Dutch continued to supply oil to Japan and the US navy threatened naval actions to stop them?

The latter two paragraphs are just idle musings.

 

[Shortround6]

Excellent points. So, given your info re. countering Japan, the ten year rule lasting until at least its historical end in 1932, and the British government's parsimonious views on defence spending, what do you see the RN, RAF and HM's Army at home and overseas looking like by 1941? And back to the original question, without the German-focused re-armament and mobilization of 1936-40, will Britain be prepared to deal with Japan in 1941?

I would hope in view of British neglect, for example the long delays on the Singapore naval base, that the Australians would expedite or expand their own re-armament.

Like a lot of these long term "what if's" there was no real one thing that triggered everything to happen.
The British had a plan for the Far East and to deal with Japan even near the end of WW I. It is what naval staffs do, try to plan for the next war against the most likely and powerful opponent. If you plan for the 2nd or 3rd opponent and then have to fight No 1 you just wasted all your money because you lost despite what you spent.

Now for the British (and the world) not all of the 1920s were good times. It went up and down and depended on the location and this was before 1929 and that problem.
What the RN wanted to do and what they could afford to do varied a great deal. British were trying to pay off the WW I debt. The Shipyards in the north of Britain never got the amount of peace time orders to come close to the war building. The Bad times in the 1920s may have out numbered the good times even before 1929. Britain was near broke.
The pause in war spending gave them a break and also a break for many nations in Europe. The British started work on Singapore in 1930 (?) which is well before the Germans start to become more than a few articles in the papers. Naval programs take years, lots of years. The British rebuilding of the QEs was spread out over years not only to spread the cost out but to minimize the number of ships in rebuild/repair process at one time. Rebuilding 5 ships out of 15 in one year is cutting things a bit too fine.

Now with the Japanese being the biggest bully on the block for a lot of the 1930s the British were going to do something. Maybe not as much as they did to counter Germany but Japanese spread through China was not a secret. Again look at fleet deployments and plans as shown in other threads. In 1939-40-41 Britain either stripped Singapore or stopped any major improvements while resources went to Europe and NA. Without Germany things would have been much better. One question is if it would have been enough? Another question is if the Japanese would have challenged the British if they weren't busy dealing with Germany and Italy?

As far as Australia doing more? You need to find out what the population of Australia was, how much money they had, the extent of the industry in Australia and so on.
This gets complicated in that it was almost always cheaper to import manufactured goods to start with (locomotives, ship engines, steel and such) to start with rather than build your own. When the cross over to being cheaper comes (when you have actually paid for the shops/factories) to actually make your own gets a little variable.
For somethings, like ships, paying for the slips/docks to build things like even light cruisers gets expensive as once the initial ships are built the facilities may sit idle for quite a while waiting for new orders. And the bigger the guns you want to build things get real expensive real quick and the repeat orders get a lot further apart.

Australia did an amazing job in both wars and paid a large cost. But Australia also has some things like geography working against it as far as domestic production goes. Where do you put war production? Where do you even put Naval bases? How many?

 

[Admiral Beez]

It shows Singapore in its intended light as a fleet base for a campaign against the Japanese navy. The OTL Japanese response was not to match the Royal Navy at sea but to take the base from inland

With FIC firmly in France's hands and Thailand contained the Japanese route inland to Singapore is cut off, which was a foundational assumption of the Singapore strategy. Instead we may see Britain, France (and ROC-friendly Weimar Germany) giving further material support to the Republic of China, giving the IJA further trouble.

Without their occupation of FIC, Japan is miles away from an overland route to Malaya and Singapore.



I wonder about fascist Italy's relations with Japan. The Italian navy has their Indian Ocean and Red Sea bases, both of which could prove useful to Japan. Not that Mussolini is going to go to war against Britain and France without some allies.

 

[yulzari]

With FIC firmly in France's hands and Thailand contained the Japanese route inland to Singapore is cut off, which was a foundational assumption of the Singapore strategy. Instead we may see Britain, France (and ROC-friendly Weimar Germany) giving further material support to the Republic of China, giving the IJA further trouble.

Without their occupation of FIC, Japan is miles away from an overland route to Malaya and Singapore.

View attachment 768796

I wonder about fascist Italy's relations with Japan. The Italian navy has their Indian Ocean and Red Sea bases, both of which could prove useful to Japan. Not that Mussolini is going to go to war against Britain and France without some allies.

Indeed. This is like the fall of France. Something that altered the whole dynamic of the British war effort and required some strategic risks to be taken in order to prosecute the war and defend Britain against the threat of invasion. Which latter was still valid, if increasingly unlikely, until 1942 when military resources could be diverted to offensive deployments away from home defence. Combined with the reduced threat was the increasing ability of the Home Guard to blunt any incursion on land. The Japanese move on Malaya and Burma took advantage of the risk Britain took to consciously neglect that in favour of prosecuting the war elsewhere.

That had involved fighting a losing campaign in Norway, France and Belgium, meeting a very real threat of invasion at home, clearing the Italians out of East Africa, defeating Iraq and, with the Soviet Union, Iran, fighting a campaign in Greece from Albania to Crete, defeating the French in Syria, holding off the Italians in North Africa with a hostile French North Africa all whilst being bombed (and shelled) at home and a naval war from the North Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.

Take away a land route to Malaya and Burma and the Japanese could have launched a seaborne invasion of Malaya but, with a working Singapore and a reinforced fleet there, it would have to defeat the Royal Navy at sea if only to allow the landed army to be supplied. Unless they can contrive to make war upon the Commonwealth and Netherlands whilst not involving the United States. The objective of the Japanese war was to seize and keep the oil of the Dutch East Indies and Borneo. Everything else was a consequence of that. There would be no purpose on attacking the United States by itself; there was no return even if they drove them away from the deep Pacific.

The availability of French Indo-China to the Japanese allowed the possibility of a war to the Japanese. That was itself was based upon the feeble power of the defeated Armistice French forces. Had the French government continued to carry on the war from North Africa and colonies then they could have transferred enough military resources to keep the Japanese away from Indo-China. Even if they could not keep them way for ever it would trigger a war with Britain and cause Malaya to be reinforced and the Royal Navy to beef up the fleet in Singapore and integrate the Dutch and French fleets into operations again deterring an invasion of Malaya. At a very minimum the French would have British resources allocated for them to move their fleet and troops etc. to beef up Indo-China. Enter local butterflies stage right….

It is a way to trace the Japanese taking the risk of widening their war in China to the whole west and South Pacific, by taking on the Commonwealth, Dutch and American military forces, to the window of opportunity afforded them IOTL by the French Armistice. Controversially one could say that the fall of Singapore was due to the fall of Sedan.

Sedan; the Isle of Thanet of France.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Had the French government continued to carry on the war from North Africa and colonies then they could have transferred enough military resources to keep the Japanese away from Indo-China. Even if they could not keep them way for ever it would trigger a war with Britain and cause Malaya to be reinforced and the Royal Navy to beef up the fleet in Singapore and integrate the Dutch fleet into operations again deterring an invasion of Malaya. At a very minimum the French would have British resources allocated for them to move their fleet and troops etc. to beef up Indo-China. Enter local butterflies stage right….

There's also the Australian government to consider, which was eager for Britain to recognize Manchukuo. Japan was one of Australia's largest trading partners outside of Britain, and there were increasing economic ties between Australia and Japan.

The Manchurian crisis and the genesis of Australian foreign policy | The Strategist

"Even as the Manchurian crisis unfolded and a rift emerged in the interwar global order, Australia continued to explore avenues for economic and diplomatic engagement with Japan. In 1934, Prime Minister Latham led Australia's first diplomatic mission outside of the British Empire—the Australian Eastern Mission. Although Latham visited other East and Southeast Asian nations, Japan was the true focus of his attention."

So, Australia may be demanding Britain not support Washington in an embargo of Japan. Meanwhile, I'm not convinced that without the German occupation, the independently-minded Dutch would acquiesce to any demands from the USA.

Lastly, if Weimar Germany and others can more support the ROC, we may see Japan defeated in the early stages of their invasion of China. If the IJA is forced back to Manchukuo and Korea, the whole justification for Washington's oil embargo is moot. In this case, does Japan expand northwards, Hokushin-ron?

 

[Shortround6]

So, Australia may be demanding Britain not support Washington in an embargo of Japan. Meanwhile, I'm not convinced that without the German occupation, the independently-minded Dutch would acquiesce to any demands from the USA.

Might depend on what year and what else was going on.
By 1938 the Dutch were planning on building 2-3 battlecruisers ( 9 X 11in guns) for Dutch East Indies, but they were not dumb enough to think that that would stop the Japanese by them selves.
The Dutch figured that the Japanese would be busy using their carriers and Battleships against either the British or Americans (or both) and the Japanese could only spare a couple of Cruiser squadrons to attack the DEI.
This plan implies at least a degree of co-operation with the Americans and/or British. Maybe not peacetime joint naval maneuvers but at least a joint general strategy. Which might include joint embargoes.

 

[Admiral Beez]

By 1938 the Dutch were planning on building 2-3 battlecruisers ( 9 X 11in guns) for Dutch East Indies,

Did the Netherlands have the capability to build such ships? If the Weimar Germans are out of the game, would another nation build them? Given the IJN's ineptitude in ASW, the Dutch might be better off focusing on building and fielding in the DEI a greater number of their large submarines rather than playing into Japan's advantages in surface warfare. The DEI air force could also be updated with competitive fighters and bombers, for example a torpedo-capable variant of the Fokker T.IX.

 

[swampyankee]

If with continued US assistance, and German and Allied acceptance the Young Plan, the Weimar Republic lasts through the Great Depression and beyond, will reduced rearmament in Britain leave the Empire unprepared to face Japan in 1941? There's still Mussolini's Italy to deal with in North Africa and Ethiopia, and the civil war in Spain, so Britain won't totally neglect its military, but the huge re-armament programs of 1936-1940 will assuredly be impacted, as will Churchill's chances of becoming PM.

In 1919 the British government enacted the ten year rule, "a guideline, that the armed forces should draft their estimates on the assumption that the British Empire would not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years. In 1928 Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, successfully urged the Cabinet to make the rule self-perpetuating. There were very large cuts in defence spending as a result of this rule, with defence spending going down from £766 million in 1919–20, to £189 million in 1921–22, to £102 million in 1932. The Ten Year Rule was abandoned by the Cabinet on 23 March 1932, but this decision was countered with: this must not be taken to justify an expanding expenditure by the Defence Services without regard to the very serious financial and economic situation."

Japan may not appear to be a big threat until its successful invasion of China from 1937 onwards, so Tokyo's aspirations may not drive British re-armament. Though as they watch IJN expansion; Australia, NZ, Malaya, Burma and India may be crying out for defences. An expansionist Japan will need to consider facing off against an undistracted if less well armed Britain, France and Netherlands.

Complicated question. Neglecting the fact that the German right, which dominated the security services, absolutely despised the very idea of a democratic government, so it would require some very serious (and possibly non-democratic) actions to get internal and external security services to be trustworthy. On the other hand, Stalin did want a red Germany, which is unlikely without the help of the Soviet Army, so Germany did need an effective, loyal army. Under Weimar, it may never have gotten that.

Britain did look at all threats, although Germany, being closest, was the main concern: neither Japan nor Italy were the threat to the UK, vs the Commonwealth/Empire, that was posed by an aggressive Germany (presuming Weimar doesn't indulge in the same sort of revanchism as did the nazis. An aggressive Weimar isn't inconceivable.)

Since the UK's defense policies included threats to its worldwide holdings, I do not think much of its naval policy would change. It would still need to rebuild its fleet, much of which was dated and hard-used. In the Med, Italy under Mussolini was still a threat to the use of that sea as a transport route, and a threat to Suez. While the Italian Army was, generally, not that good, the British could not know that with surety.

How things would play out in Asia and the Pacific is not easy for me to predict. With both France and the Netherlands able to respond to attacks on FIC and the DEI and the UK much more able to respond to threats on its holdings, Japan may have been more circumspect with respect to them, but it would have more forces to use against the US and China. With the Commonwealth out of the war, there is very little way to get supplies to China except through the USSR, possibly via the Trans-Siberian Railway, which would be a skinny pipeline. Thus would tend to annoy Japan, and the USSR may demur for that reason.

Likely no A-bomb; the US physics community wasn't strong enough without the Jewish scientists driven out of Europe by the nazis.

 

[Admiral Beez]

In the Med, Italy under Mussolini was still a threat to the use of that sea as a transport route, and a threat to Suez. While the Italian Army was, generally, not that good, the British could not know that with surety.

Without the risk of Weimar Germany's involvement, perhaps Britain and France would risk a war with Italy over North Africa and the Horn over the Abyssinia Crisis. This likely rapid victory would eliminate Mussolini and the Italian threat and prepare the British (and French) militaries to face Japan later.

Given the Japan-focus, what sort of aircraft do we see the Fleet Air Arm fielding by 1941? Hopefully not Fulmars, Skuas, Albacores and Swordfish. With no imminent threat to the home islands, the Air Ministry might have directed Vickers-Supermarine, Hawker-Siddeley, Blackburn and Fairey Aviation to meet different specifications.

And what of Indian independence? In the 1935 Government of India Act the British granted more autonomy to the provinces, but still the Indian people want Britain entirely out. Without the IJA invading Burma and making inroads into India the independence movement appears less capable in the immediate term.

 

[Shortround6]

Did the Netherlands have the capability to build such ships? If the Weimar Germans are out of the game, would another nation build them?

The plan was to build the ships in Dutch shipyards. However the guns, armor and machinery would be provided by German firms.
And now we really get into politics and trade. The Dutch were still working with the Germans up until a few weeks before the Germans invaded Norway. Months after the invasion of Poland. Estimated completion was 1943-44.
Sweden might have been able to supply guns. Italy was trying to export designs and fire control equipment to the Soviet Union in 1939/40.
Politics could make several swings in 3-5 years. What Germany would do in the 1930s might have nothing to do with the Weimar government of the 1920s and hard cash often cut through politics.

Given the IJN's ineptitude in ASW, the Dutch might be better off focusing on building and fielding in the DEI a greater number of their large submarines rather than playing into Japan's advantages in surface warfare.

We are using the retrospectroscope at high rpm here. In the late 30s nobody had any idea of how good or bad the IJN's ASW capability was. Actually nobody's ASW was all that good. Even the British were vastly over rating their own ASW capabilities.
Now the Dutch were actually building some of the most capable submarines in world at the end of the 1930s. They actually had a few boats with working snorkels in 1940.
However geography was against the Dutch in the Far East. The main Fleet base for the Dutch was in Surabaya, eastern Java. There were harbors where refueling was possible but in 1939/40 Surabaya was almost 2500 miles from were the Japanese were operating off of China or their bases in Taiwan. The Japanese were trading in the DEI and the SE Asia but nowhere near the extent of traffic that would come after the take-overs.
The Dutch goal was to prevent the take-over, not hurt the Japanese after the take over. Maybe not a realistic goal, Dutch were also expecting the Philippines to be more of an obstacle than it was.
And until 1941/42 nobody had any idea of how good the Japanese were at surface warfare. And no idea what so ever of the Japanese torpedoes so the idea of 3 battlecruisers standing up to 6-8 10,000 ton cruisers was at least plausible.

Skuas

Skua gets a crap load of flack here.
The Skua was a 1934 airplane that the British managed to delay the program by at least year. The plan was for it enter service in 1937, instead first production aircraft didn't show up until Oct 1938. Production had dropped to single digits by the end of October 1939. They only ordered 190 of them, there were never going to be any more.
Anybody want to compare 1939 Skua to a 1939 SBD? Oh yeah, there weren't any 1939 SBDs, they didn't exist.
Blaming the Skua (or Blackburn) for the Failure to come up with replacements is a bit like blaming Vaught and Vindicator for being obsolete in 1941/42 in the US hadn't managed to come up with the SBD.
The Problem was not with the Skua, the problem was the lack of follow up.
Skuas were out of combat service by the fall of 1941. Mostly because they were worn out or needed overhaul. Which would have happened even if there wasn't a European war.

 

[don4331]

I think you're being too kind to the Weimar:

12 Torpedo boats​

5 of 6 Cruisers​

and the 3 Panzerschiffe (while AGS was launched under Nazis, she was ordered before they took power)​

were all products of the Republic.

They were also working hand in glove with Soviets on air force and army. The reason the Heer and Luftwaffe progressed so fast was all the time spent in USSR working on new ideas.

S Shortround6 : I'm giving you a little bit of hard time over your math: UK - 5, Japan - 3, Italy - 1.75 and Germany - 1.75 (funny, they always say 35% of UK, not equal to France and Italy). 5 (UK) > Japan (3) + Germany (1.75) ; France and Italy theoretically being equal. France dropping out meant 5 (UK) < Japan (3) + Germany (1.75) + Italy (1.75). Not sure where you came up with the additional 3 from. But if the RN could bottle up RM, and Japan held off, then they were more/less equal. And they almost did it.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Skua gets a crap load of flack here.

I'm a fan of the Skua. The first all metal, retractible undercarriage, folding wing monoplane carrier aircraft of any type. The Americans and Japanese would not have a dive bomber of this spec until the SB2C Helldiver and Yokosuka D4Y enter service in 1942, four years after the Skua was introduced. Blackburn was ahead of its time with the Skua. I would have liked to have seen a successor powered by the Hercules. As it was, after the Skua everything from Blackburn was rubbish until their swan song, the superlative Buccaneer.

 

[EwenS]

Given the Japan-focus, what sort of aircraft do we see the Fleet Air Arm fielding by 1941? Hopefully not Fulmars, Skuas, Albacores and Swordfish. With no imminent threat to the home islands, the Air Ministry might have directed Vickers-Supermarine, Hawker-Siddeley, Blackburn and Fairey Aviation to meet different specifications.

I don't see the pattern of RN carrier development changing in those pre-radar days. Like it or not, the route chosen by the RN had a certain logic in a situation that had changed dramatically since 1930 when the Ark Royal design was being drawn up.

The Illustrious class emerged from the conclusion that with increasing aircraft speed the visual warning time of an attack reduced, and therefore the ability of single engined deck launched fighters to intercept in time to prevent an attack reduced their efficacy. With carrier size limited by treaty, they couldn't carry both a decent number of fighters to maintain standing CAP patrols throughout the daylight hours and a decent sized strike group to perform attacks on an enemy fleet to slow it down for the big guns to kill. So reduce the fighters to a number needed for strike escort (which required two seats) and protect the air group under armour while relying in the fleets AA guns for protection. (Even the USN acknowledged this difficulty with its pre-war 18 plane VF units expected to provide both CAP and strike escort, while at the sane time acknowledging that the carrier was very likely to be destroyed by an enemy response).

So the fighter problem doesn't change in that timeframe.

As for the strike component, with limited aircraft numbers on each carrier, and the similarities of RN torpedo bomber and dive bomber attack profiles (discussed on other threads on this site) combining the roles made sense.

The Albacore spec was issued in Feb 1937, and later that year both Blackburn & Fairey were offering private venture monoplane designs. The Spec for the next generation was issued in Jan 1938, by which time some relaxation of aircraft limitations on handling around the flight deck were beginning to be made (But not far enough. More relaxation came in 1939/40 specs). That led to the Barracuda, which if WW2 had not broken out, was expected to enter production in April 1941.

And all this happening at a time when relations between the Admiralty and Air Ministry were, if anything, deteriorating over the question of control of naval aviation. That wasn't settled until late 1937. Air Ministry technical committees on naval aircraft, that were supposed to have RN participation (But which the AM restricted to more junior ranks) met very infrequently so limiting the interchange of information between the two services vital to both sides understanding what was doable in producing the next generation of naval aircraft. Curiously, the committees met more often after Inskip than before it.

So with a little more foresight, better co-operation, it might well have been able to get a monoplane TBR spec issued 12 months earlier with the prospect of having it in service around 1940. If Fairey wasn't building so many Battles at Heaton Chapel, more production space could have been devoted to that type. Or Blackburn having space from not building Bothas. Only one question then remains. Finding a suitably powerful engine in that 1937-1940 timeframe to power it to give it a decent performance, while allowing for the substantial weight growth that kicked in historically come WW2.