Aircraft carrier battle in the Falklands War outcome? (1 Viewer)

gardner95x

Recruit
4
0
Joined
Oct 15, 2025
Hi,

Have recently read "A Carrier at Risk: Argentinean Aircraft Carrier and Anti-Submarine Operations against Royal Navy's Attack Submarines during the Falklands War" and was wondering what the outcome would have been if the pincer attack the Argentine Navy was planning with the ARA 25 De Mayo and the ARA Belgrano went ahead?

If the carrier Skyhawks launch an attack on the British task force whilst they're on the open ocean would it be more risky for them as they'd have to deal with air defences that don't have significant radar blind spots due to the proximity of land and ships that will be manoeuvring wildly?
 
It is very unlikely that it would have come any nearer than it did historically.

From the Argentinian side
They have to accurately locate the RN Task Force, which they failed to do after 2nd April, for some considerable time.
They have not got to be scared off by what happened to Belgrano.
Then they need better weather to be able to launch their strike package. More wind over the deck to give the Skyhawks a sufficient bomb load (4 x 500lb bombs) to make the mission worthwhile (The mission as originally planned was expected to deliver just two bomb hits, hopefully one on each carrier).
The real danger weapons for the RN weren't the Skyhawks. It was the 20 x MM38 Exocets carried by the corvette Drummond, Guerrico and Granville and the two Type 42. But they had to get close to launch them (range was 22 nautical miles) and have the targeting data (back to locating the RN again).
And they need the RN Task Force not to withdraw to the east.

Having missed the opportunity to attack the RN TF on 2nd April, by the third they couldn't find it despite launching a number of Tracker sorties from 25th De Mayo. Having lost the Belgrano and a severe chunk of national prestige, they couldn't afford a repeat by losing the carrier. So it was ordered back to coastal waters.

For the RN
On the evening of 2nd May a Sea Harrier was sent at low level in the direction of where the RN thought the 25th De Mayo might be. When it popped up to use its radar for a search it was lit up by Argentinian fire control radars and sensibly withdrew. Woodward, having already moved the TF eastward between 1st and 2nd May, then took the TF East further out of range and the Argentinians then didn't know where it was with sufficient accuracy. For the British, the carriers were key to the whole campaign. Woodward would have done everything in his power to avoid a carrier v carrier clash.

Both the Argentinian groups coming down from the north have to get past the Royal Navy SSN. Splendid tracked one group from the third of May and believed the carrier group would come South to join them. Then he got sent off on a wild goose chase based on erroneous information from London. Her captain came very close to completely ignoring those orders until he received a very direct instruction.

The two forces came as close as about 200 miles on the evening of 2nd April.

Ultimately the problem for both sides was determining accurately where the enemy was.
 
It is very unlikely that it would have come any nearer than it did historically.

From the Argentinian side
They have to accurately locate the RN Task Force, which they failed to do after 2nd April, for some considerable time.
They have not got to be scared off by what happened to Belgrano.
Then they need better weather to be able to launch their strike package. More wind over the deck to give the Skyhawks a sufficient bomb load (4 x 500lb bombs) to make the mission worthwhile (The mission as originally planned was expected to deliver just two bomb hits, hopefully one on each carrier).
The real danger weapons for the RN weren't the Skyhawks. It was the 20 x MM38 Exocets carried by the corvette Drummond, Guerrico and Granville and the two Type 42. But they had to get close to launch them (range was 22 nautical miles) and have the targeting data (back to locating the RN again).
And they need the RN Task Force not to withdraw to the east.

Having missed the opportunity to attack the RN TF on 2nd April, by the third they couldn't find it despite launching a number of Tracker sorties from 25th De Mayo. Having lost the Belgrano and a severe chunk of national prestige, they couldn't afford a repeat by losing the carrier. So it was ordered back to coastal waters.

For the RN
On the evening of 2nd May a Sea Harrier was sent at low level in the direction of where the RN thought the 25th De Mayo might be. When it popped up to use its radar for a search it was lit up by Argentinian fire control radars and sensibly withdrew. Woodward, having already moved the TF eastward between 1st and 2nd May, then took the TF East further out of range and the Argentinians then didn't know where it was with sufficient accuracy. For the British, the carriers were key to the whole campaign. Woodward would have done everything in his power to avoid a carrier v carrier clash.

Both the Argentinian groups coming down from the north have to get past the Royal Navy SSN. Splendid tracked one group from the third of May and believed the carrier group would come South to join them. Then he got sent off on a wild goose chase based on erroneous information from London. Her captain came very close to completely ignoring those orders until he received a very direct instruction.

The two forces came as close as about 200 miles on the evening of 2nd April.

Ultimately the problem for both sides was determining accurately where the enemy was.
Ah okay thanks for replying, so I guess the Royal Navy would spot the corvettes before they could get close enough?

I guess the carrier would of been sank if it became enough of a threat?

Would the Skyhawks be swiftly dealt with?
 
Ah okay thanks for replying, so I guess the Royal Navy would spot the corvettes before they could get close enough?

I guess the carrier would of been sank if it became enough of a threat?
That was the plan with the SSN Rules of Engagement being altered on a number of occasions to permit that. In the final version so long as 25th De Mayo was outside Argentinian territorial waters (i.e.further than 12 miles from the Argentinian coast) it was fair game. But there was one complication. The RoE stipulated a positive visual ID before firing any torpedo. And that was where the problems start. First it had to be found and tracked. Splendid had a problem in the few says after 2nd May. She obtained a sonar contact that was thought to be the carrier group. On visual inspection turned out to be a tanker!
Would the Skyhawks be swiftly dealt with?
Of course that was the plan. First the Skyhawks had to evade the Sea Harrier Combat Air Patrol. Then the forward deployed Type 42 screen with their a Sea Dart missiles (which the Argentinians knew all about through having their own Type 42). And then the missile sytems on the ships of the main TF itself including Sea Dart on Invincible and Sea Wolf on the the two Type 22 frigates present, plus everything else from GPMG up.

Of course in war nothing is ever guaranteed. As the saying goes, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. And that applies equally to both sides.

Sea Dart had a mixed performance in the Falklands War. 8 aircraft confirmed downed for 26 missiles fired.

On the other hand the Argentinians expectation was that from the intended strike force of just 6 Skyhawks (25th De Mayo carried 8, with one retained for CAP and one with a buddy refuelling pack in case any survivor required a top up), only 4 would reach the TF and only 2 Skyhawks would survive to return to the carrier. All to achieve an expected two hits with 500lb bombs. And to achieve that the carrier had to get within 150 miles of the TF.

Edit:- It should be noted that when the UK extended the area in which Argentinian warships could expect to be sunk without warning up to Argentinian territorial waters, they were informed of that through the appropriate diplomatic channels. So there could be no doubt about what was likely to happen if they ventured out. Can't remember the exact dates just now but it was in the first few days of May.
 
Last edited:
<<< They [Argentina] have not got to be scared off by what happened to Belgrano. >>>

The idea that Argentina should have "overcome fear and attacked anyway" is unrealistic. After Belgrano, the Argentine Navy recognized that RN submarines had total undersea dominance. The carrier was too vulnerable, ASW was inadequate, and the risk of losing more major combatants was unacceptable. This wasn't cowardice — it was rational naval strategy.

Navies don't "overcome fear" after losing a major combatant. This isn't about courage. It's about operational reality.

When Belgrano was sunk: Argentina lost 323 sailors, they lost their only cruiser, they lost half of their planned pincer attack, they lost confidence in their ASW capability, they realized RN submarines were far more capable than expected.

This wasn't "fear" in a psychological sense. It was strategic paralysis caused by a sudden recognition of vulnerability.

Argentina had destroyers — including two modern Type 42s and several older U.S. destroyers. But after Belgrano was sunk, the entire surface fleet (destroyers, carrier, escorts) withdrew to port and never again attempted offensive operations. The destroyers existed, but they were effectively neutralized by British submarine superiority -- and the British demonstration of willingness to use it even outside the exclusion zone.
 
Last edited:
That was the plan with the SSN Rules of Engagement being altered on a number of occasions to permit that. In the final version so long as 25th De Mayo was outside Argentinian territorial waters (i.e.further than 12 miles from the Argentinian coast) it was fair game. But there was one complication. The RoE stipulated a positive visual ID before firing any torpedo. And that was where the problems start. First it had to be found and tracked. Splendid had a problem in the few says after 2nd May. She obtained a sonar contact that was thought to be the carrier group. On visual inspection turned out to be a tanker!

Of course that was the plan. First the Skyhawks had to evade the Sea Harrier Combat Air Patrol. Then the forward deployed Type 42 screen with their a Sea Dart missiles (which the Argentinians knew all about through having their own Type 42). And then the missile sytems on the ships of the main TF itself including Sea Dart on Invincible and Sea Wolf on the the two Type 22 frigates present, plus everything else from GPMG up.

Of course in war nothing is ever guaranteed. As the saying goes, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. And that applies equally to both sides.

Sea Dart had a mixed performance in the Falklands War. 8 aircraft confirmed downed for 26 missiles fired.

On the other hand the Argentinians expectation was that from the intended strike force of just 6 Skyhawks (25th De Mayo carried 8, with one retained for CAP and one with a buddy refuelling pack in case any survivor required a top up), only 4 would reach the TF and only 2 Skyhawks would survive to return to the carrier. All to achieve an expected two hits with 500lb bombs. And to achieve that the carrier had to get within 150 miles of the TF.

Edit:- It should be noted that when the UK extended the area in which Argentinian warships could expect to be sunk without warning up to Argentinian territorial waters, they were informed of that through the appropriate diplomatic channels. So there could be no doubt about what was likely to happen if they ventured out. Can't remember the exact dates just now but it was in the first few days of May.
Ah okay was sensible to withdraw after Belgrano was sunk.

Do you think if the Brits possessed the capability and recklessness to attack Argentina proper, the Argentine Air Force likely would not have tasked as many airframes to strike the fleet and may be not achieve the same level of success?

Say if the Brits had a carrier like Ark Royal with trackers and Phantoms? They'd be to intercept the A4s sooner?
 
Last edited:
When Belgrano was sunk: Argentina lost 323 sailors, they lost their only cruiser
Interestingly, HMS Conqueror sank the U.S.-built cruiser ARA General Belgrano in 1982, while thirty-eight years earlier, USS Sealion sank the British-built battlecruiser IJN Kongō in November 1944. In both cases, a submarine sank a major warship built by the other's shipyards. Had 25 De Mayo remained at sea, we would have seen a noteworthy occurrence of a British submarine sinking a British-built aircraft carrier.
 
Ah okay was sensible to withdraw after Belgrano was sunk.

Do you think if the Brits possessed the capability and recklessness to attack Argentina proper, the Argentine Air Force likely would not have tasked as many airframes to strike the fleet and may be not achieve the same level of success?

Say if the Brits had a carrier like Ark Royal with trackers and Phantoms? They'd be to intercept the A4s sooner?
Its a personal view but I seriously doubt that the Ark Royal would be a serious threat to the Argentine mainland, the risks would be huge and the potential gain at best very limited.

Probably the best they could have done was a one off strike using the Buccaneer, buddy refuelled by other Buccaneer aircraft to stay away as far as possible from the coast. This would have acted as a warning politically as the potential physical damage is far too limited.
 
Its a personal view but I seriously doubt that the Ark Royal would be a serious threat to the Argentine mainland, the risks would be huge and the potential gain at best very limited. Probably the best they could have done was a one off strike using the Buccaneer, buddy refuelled by other Buccaneer aircraft to stay away as far as possible from the coast. This would have acted as a warning politically as the potential physical damage is far too limited.
If Ark Royal had survived to serve in the Falkland's, would her Buccaneers have antiship missiles? The FAA didn't have air launched Exocets, and we're still years away from fielding the BAe Sea Eagle. Would Buccaneer antiship strikes be relying upon the same 1,000 lb Mk.17 general-purpose bombs as the Argentine Skyhawks? Perhaps the FAA fuses would be optimized for low altitude strikes, resulting in fewer unexploded bomb hits.

Is this the method for conventional bomb strikes as well?


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pco0F2f6Ezg

I expect the Argentines procured regular fuses for their Mk.17 bombs. Not that the Skyhawks didn't have good success with their unguided bombs, sinking HMS Coventry and RFA Sir Galahad, fatally damaging RFA Sir Tristram, and damaging HMS Argonaut, HMS Broadsword, HMS Glasgow, RFA Sir Bedivere, HMS Antelope, and HMS Brilliant.
 
Last edited:
There was an article in the May 2026 edition of the magazine "Britain at War" by the author Chris Gibson that may be of interest in this context. While researching something else at the National Archives he came across an"appreciation" (an outline study rather than a fully worked out detailed plan), for a Black Buck style mission to send a pair of Buccaneers from Ascension Island to strike the Argentine fleet, and hopefully the 25th De Mayo, in Argentine territorial waters.

Weapon loads would have been:-
1. A pair of TV Guided AJ 37B missiles with their associated datalink pod; AND
2. 4 x 1,000lb bombs in the bomb bay.
The aircraft would also have carried an AN/ALQ-101 jamming pod. Also discussed in the paper was the possibility of using an Martel AS 37 engineless and warheadless training round as an ESM system to detect ships radars that could not be detected by the Buccaneers normal Wide Band Homer and RWR. Apparently that package could be programmed for that purpose.

The weapons that would actually be delivered would depend on the weather in the area. If it was good and in daylight a TV Martel would be delivered by each aircraft from 10-12 nautical miles, to disrupt or inhibit flight deck operations. If a repeat attack was required the second Martels would be fired.

If the weather was poor for TV Martel, which couldn't be used at night, but a visual attack was possible, then a lay down or shallow dive attack with the 4 x 1,000lb bombs would be made. If a visual attack was not possible, or the attack was at night, then the bombs would be delivered by toss / loft technique using the Blue Parrot radar and associated Buccaneer bombing system.

Odds of success? 76% for a single Martel hit. 60-70% for a 1,000lb bomb hit in a laydown / dive attack. 15-30% for a toss bomb attack.

All this depended on:
1. Tanker support
2. Nimrod MR.2 support to detect the Argentine ships and provide a cover for the attack;
3. Exploiting a gap in Argentinian radar cover at 1,000ft in the area of the planned attack; and above all
3. Surprise, and Argentinian defences that were not alerted.

After the attack the two Buccaneers would escape across Argentina, climb over the Andes to land at either Santiago or Concepcion in Chile.

Many details had to be worked out, including the endurance of the Buccaneers, not in terms of fuel, but in terms of other consumables like oil & LOX. At that time 8hrs in the air was considered the maximum, although subsequently Buccaneers stretched that to 9hrs, which still wouldn't have been enough.

IIRC, AS 37 Martel ARM was rejected for Black Buck sorties as it couldn't take the cold soak of high altitude long range flights. Hence the use of Shrike for the strikes on Argentinian radars in the Falklands.

Another of the interesting but exceptionally risky operations considered during that particular war.
 
If Ark Royal had survived to serve in the Falkland's, would her Buccaneers have antiship missiles? The FAA didn't have air launched Exocets, and we're still years away from fielding the BAe Sea Eagle. Would Buccaneer antiship strikes be relying upon the same 1,000 lb Mk.17 general-purpose bombs as the Argentine Skyhawks? Perhaps the FAA fuses would be optimized for low altitude strikes, resulting in fewer unexploded bomb hits.

Is this the method for conventional bomb strikes as well?


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pco0F2f6Ezg

I expect the Argentines procured regular fuses for their Mk.17 bombs. Not that the Skyhawks didn't have good success with their unguided bombs, sinking HMS Coventry and RFA Sir Galahad, fatally damaging RFA Sir Tristram, and damaging HMS Argonaut, HMS Broadsword, HMS Glasgow, RFA Sir Bedivere, HMS Antelope, and HMS Brilliant.

Argentina was the first overseas customer for the air launched AM39 Exocet.

By 1982 British attention was turning to the US Harpoon. The sub-launched Sub-Harpoon was first deployed operationally when the SSN Courageous sailed for the Falklands on 12 May 1982. The air-launched version was integrated onto Nimrod MR.2 shortly after the war (IIRC work on that project actually began during the war) and was fitted to new surface ships starting with the Batch 3 Type 22 frigates ordered in the aftermath of the war.

Sea Eagle development had begun in the mid-1970s with production beginning in 1982 followed by test firings through to 1984 and service entry in 1985 on the Buccaneer and Sea Harrier FRS.1. Sea Eagle was faster, longer ranged and carried a heavier warhead than Harpoon.

The Argentinians also used 500lb bombs. As to the exact Mark of 1,000lb bomb in use by the Argentinians, see this discussion over on Britmodeller that includes contributions from those "in the know".

Not all the ships were hit by Skyhawks. Daggers also had successes. Brilliant was only strafed not bombed by a Dagger with its 30mm DEFA cannon. Argonaut, before being bombed by Skyhawks, was strafed and rocketed by an Aermacchi MB.339.
 
The Buccaneer crews had plenty of practice training with TV Martel in the anti-shipping role in the 1970s & 1980s.
Did the Phantoms also have any anti-shipping capability? As for their fighter role, would their lack of a cannon pod be a detriment to air-air combat with Argentine Mirages? Perhaps not, as out of the 20 Sea Harrier victories, 18 were achieved with AIM-9L Sidewinders and only two involved cannon fire (IA-58 Pucará and C-130 Hercules). After the Phantoms were transferred from the FAA to the RAF they received cannon pods, so perhaps these could have been rushed from US-stocks while Ark Royal was enroute.

Though I have to wonder when faced by a British government that kept HMS Ark Royal in service, along with the defence investments that would entail (including possibly HMS Invincible and SHAR), if Argentina might not have thrown the dice.

If Ark Royal was in service, what about HMS Eagle? I know historically the latter was stripped of components to keep her sister running, but if Eagle was instead maintained in the reserve fleet, what aircraft would she operate? Does the SHAR still exists?
 
Last edited:
Did the Phantoms also have any anti-shipping capability?
FAA Phantom FG-1 was optimised for the air to air role with the AWG-11 radar, Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles. It was not intended for the long range attack role (the RN had the Buccaneer for that) and therefore lacked the more sophisticated navigation and bombing systems fitted to the RAF FGR.2.

So alternative weapon loads were restricted to 500 / 540lb and 1,000lb bombs on the 4 underwing and fuselage centreline pylons, SNEB unguided rocket pods, Lepus flares and possibly BL755 cluster bombs.

The heaviest load I've seen a photo of was 13 x 540lb bombs (triple ejector racks on inboard wing and under fuselage pylons and twin racks on outboard pylons in place of The drop tanks).

The RN never specified the SUU-23A gun pod for the Phantom FG-1, but I wonder if it was even possible to carry it. While the triple ejector rack referred to above was relatively short, the gun pod extended some way aft of the of the pylon itself. Having looked at some Phantom plans, when the nosewheel leg was extended by its full 40in for catapult launch, there would appear to be minimal clearance at the aft end of the pod from the flight deck. That was a feature that was disabled when the aircraft were modified for RAF service. Phantom displayed at Leuchars in the launch position.

1785337760727.png



And from the rear

1785338146760.png





Despite the RAF beginning to receive the FG-1 in 43 squadron in Sept 1969, it was not until Oct 1975 that they began to receive aircraft modified to carry the SUU-23A gun pod. The RAF spec FGR.2 had the capability from the outset. However whether it was fitted or not depended on where squadrons were located. RAF Germany aircraft in the air to air role carried it on a regular basis. Those based in the UK did not, although squadrons held them in case they were required. The centreline fuel tank was a more usual feature on UK based Phantom interceptors than the gun pod.
As for their fighter role, would their lack of a cannon pod be a detriment to air-air combat with Argentine Mirages? Perhaps not, as out of the 20 Sea Harrier victories, 18 were achieved with AIM-9L Sidewinders and only two involved cannon fire (IA-58 Pucará and C-130 Hercules).
Neither exactly represents a recommendation for guns.

The Pucara in question was flown by Major Tomba and was one of a pair on that particular mission. The second aircraft escaped entirely unscathed. On 21st May Tomba encountered Lt Cdr "Sharkey Ward and his two wingmen, one of whom spotted the Argentinian aircraft with the Mk.1 eyeball (Blue Fox radar in the SHAR didn't operate well in a look down situation over land). In total, the wingmen made 3 gun passes and failed to hit the target at all. Ward made two passes, hitting one engine on each pass and on a third pass set the fuselage on fire, at which point the pilot ejected just before the aircraft hit the ground. The speed difference between Pucara and SHAR made it a very difficult target. A Phantom would just not have gone in that low and slow.

The C-130E fell victim to Lt Cdr "Sharkey" Ward on 1 June 1982. His first Sidewinder fell short but his second hit in the right wing causing both engines on that side and the wing between to burst into flames. Fearing that it might survive that he closed to gun range to finish it off. Would it have made the mainland? Who knows.
After the Phantoms were transferred from the FAA to the RAF they received cannon pods, so perhaps these could have been rushed from US-stocks while Ark Royal was enroute.
See above. There was no shortage of gun pods in the RAF.

There were problems with the gun pod. Firstly it slowed the aircraft. Secondly, I've read that, being a podded weapon, there were problems keeping it aligned with the gunsight leading to inaccuracies..

But why you would want to get in close to use a gun fight when you could stand off and use Sparrow missiles and then Sidewinders is beyond me. Remember it was the A4 Skyhawk that the USN used for adversary training as part of the "Top Gun" programme. Nimble little beast.
Though I have to wonder when faced by a British government that kept HMS Ark Royal in service, along with the defence investments that would entail (including possibly HMS Invincible and SHAR), if Argentina might not have thrown the dice.

Everyone wants to keep Ark Royal in service beyond 1979! I really can't understand why. She was completely worn out. On her last deployment 1978/79 to the western Atlantic her evaporators were not working properly (not for the first time) and water rationing for the crew had to be introduced on several occasions. because fresh water for the boilers and catapults came first. Crew quarters generally belonged to an earlier era compared to then modern ships. A full power trial produced a speed of 29 knots (down from her 31.5 knots when new in 1955). The remaining AEW Gannets were at the end of their lives.
If Ark Royal was in service, what about HMS Eagle? I know historically the latter was stripped of components to keep her sister running, but if Eagle was instead maintained in the reserve fleet, what aircraft would she operate? Does the SHAR still exists?
The position of Eagle was controversial in 1972 just as she was going to Reserve. The Governments position was summed up by the then Defence Secretary Lord Carrington.

"It is always sad when a ship reaches the end of her life., the more so when her passing is felt in some respects to mark the passing of an era. The limitations of a single aircraft carrier are obvious. You must regard HMS Ark Royal as a contribution to NATO naval forces. Her deployment and refits will, as far as possible, be co-ordinated with Britain's allies. After a thorough and careful study the Government came to the conclusion that it was not practicable to run HMS Eagle on after 1972. If I had a lot of money available I would not seek to keep HMS Eagle in commission, but would seek to speed up the entry into service of the new weapons. The arguments against keeping the vessel in reserve are conclusive. Initially, she would need a refit costing between £2 million and £4 million and frequent refits afterwards. Even under the most favourable circumstances, it would take four and a half months to get her out of reserve and made fully operational.

HMS Eagle will be towed to Devonport later this year where certain items of her equipment will be earmatked for Ark Royal. A decision on when she will be disposed of for scrap probably will not be taken before the end of 1973. If circumstances change between now and 1973 the Government could have another look at the matter, but I do not see how they could ever any other decision."

That £2-4 million was simply to ready her for Reserve. It still wouldn't have made her Phantom capable. That would have required more money being spent on a ship that had been laid down 30 years previously, launched 26 years previously and completed 22 years previously. For the Phantom trials they fitted a single arrester wire capable of taking a Phantom and welded steel plates to her deck to withstand the reheat from the Phantom engines. Ark had 4 arrester wires and suitable water cooled jet blast deflectors. Eagle's demise also saw the demise of most of the remaining Sea Vixen fighters save for a handful operated by the FRU / FRADU.

The 1970s were a period of renewal for the RN with the following immediately coming to mind. Type 82, Type 42, Type 21 warships. Exocet, Sea Dart, Ikara missiles etc etc.

Look at the background.
Britain had withdrawn from East of Suez.
We joined the Common Market in 1972 turning away from the Commonwealth and towards Europe
UK was in a financial mess (leading to an IMF bailout in 1976)
Inflation, while down a bit in 1972 was still over 7% and by 1975 would reach 24%
Industrial disputes were endemic. I well remember having to do my school homework by candlelight because of power cuts caused by industrial disputes around 1972. My Mum had to wait nearly a whole year for a new car she had ordered due to the never ending round of disputes at British Leyland in the mid-1970s.

And everyone wants to lavish money keeping old decrepit ships in service, some worse than others.
 
Good points all round. I wonder if there's any thought to the replacement of HMS QE and POW in the 2050-60s?
We can't even decide what is to replace the Type 45 with in the 2030s or a follow on to the Type 31. And you want to know about replacing the QEs in 2050-60.🤣
 
Everyone wants to keep Ark Royal in service beyond 1979! I really can't understand why. She was completely worn out. On her last deployment 1978/79 to the western Atlantic her evaporators were not working properly (not for the first time) and water rationing for the crew had to be introduced on several occasions. because fresh water for the boilers and catapults came first. Crew quarters generally belonged to an earlier era compared to then modern ships. A full power trial produced a speed of 29 knots (down from her 31.5 knots when new in 1955). The remaining AEW Gannets were at the end of their lives.
First I must thank you for the detailed posting which I totally agree with.

As an aside I was on the Ark Royal for a few days in 1975 for Sea Experience and even then she was clapped out. The running joke was that the RN would vote as one to get rid of the Ark Royal and get the Invincible Class (then referred to as a through deck cruiser) and the Harrier. I can only guess what she was like in 1979.

It was an exciting time for the RN. A number of new ship designs were coming on stream, equipped with leading edge weapons, Sea Wolf, Sea Dart, Ikara, all of which were at least as good if not better than anything else at sea anywhere.

At the time I was in the FAA being trained as an Articifer, the Lynx was approaching service, the Sea King was still being introduced and as mentioned we were more than keen to get the Sea Harrier so they were happy days.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back