Aircraft carrier battle in the Falklands War outcome? (3 Viewers)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

First I must thank you for the detailed posting which I totally agree with.

As an aside I was on the Ark Royal for a few days in 1975 for Sea Experience and even then she was clapped out. The running joke was that the RN would vote as one to get rid of the Ark Royal and get the Invincible Class (then referred to as a through deck cruiser) and the Harrier. I can only guess what she was like in 1979.

It was an exciting time for the RN. A number of new ship designs were coming on stream, equipped with leading edge weapons, Sea Wolf, Sea Dart, Ikara, all of which were at least as good if not better than anything else at sea anywhere.

At the time I was in the FAA being trained as an Articifer, the Lynx was approaching service, the Sea King was still being introduced and as mentioned we were more than keen to get the Sea Harrier so they were happy days.
Cool!
 
Four 1,000 pound bomb hits would be a very bad day for any RN ship there.
IF they can deposit 4 x 1,000lb bombs on a single ship in the first place and at what cost? Look at the estimated success rate anticipated for the Buccaneer attacks I posted before.

Remember that in the planned attack on the RN Task Force the Argentinian Navy A-4 Skyhawks on 2nd May 1982, that was never carried out, there were to be 6 A-4Q Skyhawks launched each with 4 x 500lb bombs. Their own expectation was that they would achieve just 4 hits, hopefully putting both carriers out of action, with 2 aircraft being lost on the way in and just 2 aircraft returning to land on the 25th De Mayo.
 
In the planned attack on the RN Task Force, the Argentinian expectation was that they would achieve just 4 hits, hopefully putting both carriers out of action, with 2 aircraft being lost on the way in and just 2 aircraft returning to land on the 25th De Mayo.
This makes me wonder who had the best Colossus/Majestic ship (including catapult/arrestor gear) and CAG in 1982. In addition to 25 de Mayo's A-4Q Skyhawk, S-2E Tracker, we have INS Vikrant (Hawker Sea Hawk, Breguet Alizé) and HMAS Melbourne (A-4G Skyhawk, S-2E/G Tracker). Interestingly, Brazil's carrier, Minas Gerais never operated fighter aircraft operationally during her active career.

How does the Sea Hawk compared to the Skyhawk? Presumably the latter would wipe the floor with the Sea Hawk. While the Skyhawk entered service only three years after the Sea Hawk, they're of different generations.
 
How does the Sea Hawk compared to the Skyhawk? Presumably the latter would wipe the floor with the Sea Hawk. While the Skyhawk entered service only three years after the Sea Hawk, they're of different generations.
Vastly different generations.
The Seahawk first flew in 1947. Taking nearly six years to get into service in 1953. Skyhawk first flew in 1954 and Douglas got the plane into service in 1956.
Sea Hawk was stuck using the Nene engine and never got the Tay/J-48 engines of higher power. Skyhawk started using the Wright J-65 (Bristol Saphire off shoot) and changed to the P&W J-52.
Now throw in the changes in electrics or electronic refits over several decades.
The two may be closer in air to air than it might appear, but a lot depends on the engines in A-4. Seahawk may be firmly rooted in the mid 1950s as far as air ground goes.
Air to Air may also depend on refits and which Sidewinders a particular version carried and when.
 
This makes me wonder who had the best Colossus/Majestic ship (including catapult/arrestor gear) and CAG in 1982. In addition to 25 de Mayo's A-4Q Skyhawk, S-2E Tracker, we have INS Vikrant (Hawker Sea Hawk, Breguet Alizé) and HMAS Melbourne (A-4G Skyhawk, S-2E/G Tracker). Interestingly, Brazil's carrier, Minas Gerais never operated fighter aircraft operationally during her active career.

How does the Sea Hawk compared to the Skyhawk? Presumably the latter would wipe the floor with the Sea Hawk. While the Skyhawk entered service only three years after the Sea Hawk, they're of different generations.
The RAN had been seeking to replace Melbourne for some time by the early 1980s, with a variety of options considered. Melbourne's operational career came to an end in late 1981 and a planned refit was cancelled.

The July 1981 UK Defence White Paper meant that Invincible was to be surplus to RN requirements and negotiations to sell her to Australia at a knock down price were begun. The Australian Govt announced the decision to acquire her in Feb 1982. With the Falklands war, that sale was put on hold and then cancelled in July 1982.

In June 1982 Melbourne was placed in Reserve and her air group disbanded in July. The Skyhawks and Trackers went to second line duties. Then in March 1983 a new Australian Govt decided she would not be replaced.
 
Last edited:
IF they can deposit 4 x 1,000lb bombs on a single ship in the first place and at what cost? Look at the estimated success rate anticipated for the Buccaneer attacks I posted before.
.........
Remember that in the planned attack on the RN Task Force the Argentinian Navy A-4 Skyhawks on 2nd May 1982, that was never carried out, there were to be 6 A-4Q Skyhawks launched each with 4 x 500lb bombs. Their own expectation was that they would achieve just 4 hits, hopefully putting both carriers out of action, with 2 aircraft being lost on the way in and just 2 aircraft returning to land on the 25th De Mayo.
Fog of war and all that. Low probability but still could happen.
 
Fog of war and all that. Low probability but still could happen.
The fog of war would have needed to have become very thick indeed. I would rate the probability as next to zero given the historical position.

Firstly the only aircraft the Argentinians had that was capable of carrying more than a single 1,000lb bomb from the mainland to the Falklands was the venerable Canberra. They only flew a very limited number of anti-shipping operations up to 1st May when one of their number was shot down. After that their main activity was night bombing land targets, mostly from higher altitudes with 1,000lb bombs.

As far as the Daggers were concerned their usual bomb load was 2 x 250kg ExAl bombs with either conventional (BR) or parachute retarded (BRP) tails. From 12th May the Daggers based at Rio Grande, but not their other bases, began to fly operations with the option of a single 1,000lb bomb of British origin. Looking through their operational history with that latter weapon at the missions that actually found a target to attack, they achieved the following:-

21st May - 3 aircraft attacked Argonaut & Broadsword no hits, one aircraft lost.
21st May - 3 aircraft attacked Antrim one hit failed to explode
21st May - 4 aircraft attacked Ardent & Brilliant. 2 hits on Ardent that failed to explode. 1 aircraft lost
24th May - 4 aircraft attacked transports in Ajax Bay. 3 bombs dropped and one hangup. 1 hit on Sir Lancelot which failed to explode.

Turning to the Skyhawks, the Navy A-4Q only dropped US manufactured 500lb Mk 82 bombs with ordinary or parachute retarded tails. Max load was four bombs.

The Air Force A-4B and A-4C usual load was 3 x 250kg bombs with the option after 11th May 1982 of a single 1,000lb bomb. The following attacks were made with 1,000lb bombs:-

12th May - Glasgow was hit by a single 1,000lb bomb delivered by an A-4B Skyhawk. 4 aircraft attacked. 2 bombs dropped. 2 aircraft shot down by Sea Wolf on Brilliant and another crashed in sea taking avoiding action. Bad luck on part of Glasgow saw her Sea Dart system fail at the critical time and her 4.5in gun fail after 8 rounds.
21st May - 5 x A-4B attacked the frigate Argonaut. 2 hits on Argonaut that didn't explode. She was very lucky as one came to rest in her forward Seacat magazine, knocking the warheads off several missiles in the process.
23rd May - 4 A-4B attacked Broadsword & Antelope. 2 hits on Antelope that did not explode. 1 aircraft lost and two others badly damaged.
24th May - 5 A-4B attacked transports in Ajax Bay, hitting RFAs Sir Galahad (failed to explode), Bedivere (glancing blow) and Sir Lancelot (failed to explode but see above under Dagger)


I could go on but time is pressing. Coventry was sunk by 3 x 500lb bombs delivered by a Skyhawk. At Bluff Cove, Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram were hit by US pattern Mk 82 500lb bombs. Similarly other ships were hit and damaged by 500lb bombs.

An awful lot has to go right for the Argentinians (weather, aircraft not going u/s, finding more targets, more aircraft bombing successfully etc ) and a lot more has to go wrong for the RN (more weapons failures etc) before any RN vessel is going to be able to be hit by 4 x 1,000lb bombs as you claim as possible.
 
The fog of war would have needed to have become very thick indeed. I would rate the probability as next to zero given the historical position.
Bismarck, Hood, Prince of Wales.

Golden bullet syndrome. Probability as next to zero.
 
To me, the more interesting "what if" regards the Argentinian fuze debacle. Apparently they had several different types and arming times, and obviously insufficient practice. I've read several accounts of the limitations, but none that convincingly explain the crippling dud rate.
 
To me, the more interesting "what if" regards the Argentinian fuze debacle. Apparently they had several different types and arming times, and obviously insufficient practice. I've read several accounts of the limitations, but none that convincingly explain the crippling dud rate.

A top grade and well led and trained ARA Fleet, with all its kit in order, appropriate for the task (including anti-ship fuses), and well-armed (including more Exocets) would have been interesting.

Start with the carrier 25 de Mayo able to operate Exocet-armed Super Étendards, A-4Qs, as well as a credible ASW force of S-2E Trackers and S-61D Sea Kings. Put the Sea Dart-armed Type 42 destroyers Hércules and ARA Santísima Trinidad (with their Sea Lynx Mk.23 ASW helicopters) alongside for air defence, plus the three French-built A69-class corvettes (ARA Drummond, Guerrico and Granville) and the ex-US Navy FRAM destroyers (ARA Bouchard, Piedrabuena and Seguí), all equipped with sonar and ASW weapons, as additional escorts for the carrier. HMS Spartan, Splendid and Conqueror will have to work hard to get through this ASW screen. Beyond the CBG escorts, with both Type 209s in top shape, the submarines San Luis and Salta could be loitering off the Falklands shore line, where SSKs do their best work.

As for ARA General Belgrano, she's of no use on the high seas. Better to operate the cruiser (with exclusively HE shells aboard) within Falkland Sound, moving unpredictably and preferably exploiting shallower water, protected by ARA San Luis and Salta, ready to provide NGFS once the primary British landing sites have been identified. Once she's within range of the British troops (Belgrano's 15 × 6-inch guns could reach roughly 15 miles / 24 km), if necessary the cruiser can beach herself, Canopus-style to serve as a fixed gun platform.
 
Last edited:
A top grade and well led and trained ARA Fleet, with all its kit in order, appropriate for the task (including anti-ship fuses), and well-armed (including more Exocets) would have been interesting.
I'm not aware of any anti-ship fuzes for GP bombs. I believe the standard is a slight function delay on a generic fuze. But in any event, the dud rate implies a training issue (possibly exacerbated by a lack of data on the available weapons).

Lord Craig is often cited with the "Six better fuses and we would have lost" quote. I suspect that's a bit of hyperbole, but "interesting" is apt.
 
A top grade and well led and trained ARA Fleet, with all its kit in order, appropriate for the task (including anti-ship fuses), and well-armed (including more Exocets) would have been interesting.

Start with the carrier 25 de Mayo able to operate Exocet-armed Super Étendards, A-4Qs, as well as a credible ASW force of S-2E Trackers and S-61D Sea Kings. Put the Sea Dart-armed Type 42 destroyers Hércules and ARA Santísima Trinidad (with their Sea Lynx Mk.23 ASW helicopters) alongside for air defence, plus the three French-built A69-class corvettes (ARA Drummond, Guerrico and Granville) and the ex-US Navy FRAM destroyers (ARA Bouchard, Piedrabuena and Seguí), all equipped with sonar and ASW weapons, as additional escorts for the carrier. HMS Spartan, Splendid and Conqueror will have to work hard to get through this ASW screen. Beyond the CBG escorts, with both Type 209s in top shape, the submarines San Luis and Salta could be loitering off the Falklands shore line, where SSKs do their best work.

As for ARA General Belgrano, she's of no use on the high seas. Better to operate the cruiser (with exclusively HE shells aboard) within Falkland Sound, moving unpredictably and preferably exploiting shallower water, protected by ARA San Luis and Salta, ready to provide NGFS once the primary British landing sites have been identified. Once she's within range of the British troops (Belgrano's 15 × 6-inch guns could reach roughly 15 miles / 24 km), if necessary the cruiser can beach herself, Canopus-style to serve as a fixed gun platform.
The British were very aware of the risk should Argentina access more air launched Exocet missiles and moved heaven and earth to ensure that Argentina didn't get access to any. There was a significant behind the scenes operation to stop this happening.

The Sea Dart was at the time arguably the best naval medium / long ranged SAM available anywhere. Not often noted it was also a capable SSM missile as well. The main advantage that the RN had, was that we knew all about it, what its strengths were and of course, its weaknesses.

I believe that the main problem people would have been concerned about was submarines. The FRAM destroyers were old and their weapons and sensors were at least one probably two generations behind the RN. The A69 wasn't designed or equipped for deep sea A/S work. The Argentine navy effectively had no training against a nuclear sub and the RN were again second to none in training and practice.

The only real threat would be the new Type 209 subs from Germany. However in 1977 during a conversation between the British Naval Attache Daniel Leggat and Admiral George Anaya it was admitted that the type 209 could not find an RN nuclear sub. It was common for RN Subs to find and trail the latest Russian subs of all types so the advantage has to be with the RN.

The earliest example I can find of Argentine ships being monitored was on the 15th April when Spartan watched two ships laying minefields but his rules of combat didn't allow him to attack.
On the 21st April the UK knew where the main Argentine naval force was and an order was sent to Splendid to intercept and attack. It was recognised that the force was just outside the 200 mile limit but the opportunity was too good to miss. An important meeting was about to take place with the USA and the order was rescinded. The Captain of the Splendid was gutted as he was only a few hours from the target.

Even more interesting is that on the 29th April the Splendid was able to get within 14,000 yards of both Type 42 frigates and all three of the A69 frigates, but the rules of engagement stopped the captain from attacking. The force split and he followed the A69 frigates for a few days then was ordered to leave them and hunt for the carrier. The Captain ignored four messages and continued to track the A69's hoping that the carrier would appear until finally a personal direct order was sent that left him no room for argument.

From this I take it that any chance of Argentina dealing with the RN nuclear subs to be theoretical, not practical.
 
Last edited:

Users who are viewing this thread

Back