Aircraft Improvements (1 Viewer)

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Just a follow up. It is only within the last decade or so that historians are taking a close look at the German economy under Hitler. The degree to which the Nazi's subordinated military spending to public spending in order to insure a reasonably comfortable standard of living for the populace in the years leading up to and during WWII is shocking. Huge is obviously an elastic term and one might compare Germany's spending in the years leading up to WWII to Russia's spending during the same period. Clearly if Germany had spent money to that degree they certainly would have been able to advance their Jet Turbine programs more easily. They would have been stockpiling or coming up with viable substitutes for scarce materials. While slave labor during the war was a factor of mass production after the successful completion of developments, it had nothing to do with the initial developments before the war.
If whoever was in charge of aircraft procurement had a crystal ball that told them of the importance of Jet engine technology and they convinced the government leadership of such, they would have faced the dilemma of either reallocating public expenditures or would have had to cut other military programs to come up with the monies.
It isnt just in the last 10 years, this was mentioned in The documentary series "The World at War" that I watched in the mid 1970s. While German soldiers were dying of cold in the east, German industry was still making fur coats for the ladies fashion industry. Politically Adolf didnt want the population to suffer the privations of war. "Huge" is elastic and also relative. The capabilities of the LW were huge compared to anything in WW1. However Goring was so good at propaganda he scared the UK and USA into massive action to counter his threat. By 1940 the UK passed Germany in arms production, the USA did shortly after to a much higher peak while I believe Russia passed Germany in about 1942/43 having moved a lot of industry eastwards.
 
If whoever was in charge of aircraft procurement had a crystal ball that told them of the importance of Jet engine technology and they convinced the government leadership of such, they would have faced the dilemma of either reallocating public expenditures or would have had to cut other military programs to come up with the monies.
"reallocating public expenditures" This is a no brainer. Other military programs most certainly been cut as well.
 
If whoever was in charge of aircraft procurement had a crystal ball that told them of the importance of Jet engine technology and they convinced the government leadership of such, they would have faced the dilemma of either reallocating public expenditures or would have had to cut other military programs to come up with the monies.
Maybe I'm missing something.

Germany didn't have the finances for a jet engine program, but they had funding for:
Prototype aircraft
Prototype aircraft with pulsejet engines
Prototype aircraft with rocket engines
Unmanned aircraft development
Prototype guided munitions
Prototype multi-stage rockets
Prototype internal combustion aircraft engines
Prototype submarines
Prototype anti-tank AFVs
Prototype super-heavy tanks
Two aircraft carriers
Prototype carrier aircraft
And so on and so on and so on...

Again, why all the above and no jet program?
 
Maybe I'm missing something.

Germany didn't have the finances for a jet engine program, but they had funding for:
Prototype aircraft
Prototype aircraft with pulsejet engines
Prototype aircraft with rocket engines
Unmanned aircraft development
Prototype guided munitions
Prototype multi-stage rockets
Prototype internal combustion aircraft engines
Prototype submarines
Prototype anti-tank AFVs
Prototype super-heavy tanks
Two aircraft carriers
Prototype carrier aircraft
And so on and so on and so on...

Again, why all the above and no jet program?
Amazing how many are extremely high tech single use items.
 
Indeed. I think the problem with German jets was not that money wasn't available, it was that R&D budgets were pretty scattershot. In my view it was more about priorities than lack of funds. Didn't von Schacht warn that the economy was approaching overheating due to the massive defense expenditures?

ETA: To make my point here clear, had the Germans prioritized jet engine R&D in the late 30s, by 1944 they could have had something more reliable. The funding was clearly available, but being spent on other things.
 
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Hey Akuma,

'The Vampire Economy' was written in 1939, and hence really cannot (I think) be applied in an analysis of why the jet engine was not more thoroughly developed earlier than it was?

re "Just a follow up. It is only within the last decade or so that historians are taking a close look at the German economy under Hitler"

As pbehn points out upthread, this is not the case. I also have encountered information that is the same information continuously for the last 50+ years. The German pre-war and wartime economy has been one of the most thoroughly analyzed subjects in post-WWII history. There are few if any tidbits concerning it (if any) that have been 'recently discovered' or 'found' out, that were not previously 'discovered' or 'found' out.

While I agree that at the time, there was much 'Mirroring' going on, that has not been the case for most of the last 75 years re the historical.

Also, re "A small but important group of Japanese leaders knew that they could not match the wartime economic capabilities of the United States but were equally convinced that Japanese cultural and spiritual superiority would make up for any deficit."

This statement is similar to ones that have been kicked around for the last 75 years. It is also not true. There were a large number of people in the decision making Japanese government and military that understood exactly what the position was re the US economy, and/or that the Japanese "cultural and spiritual superiority would [not] make up for any deficit". Again, as I have had to say in many other threads on the subject of the Japanese people/leadership prior to and during WWII, to believe such things you would have to think they had less brains than a cucumber - and that was not the case. In addition, there are plenty of irrefutable sources (ie official US records such as the intel gathered form the 'Magic' program, post-war US led debriefs of Japanese officialdom, and various Japanese records) that directly contradict any existence of such ignorance.

The decision to go to war with the US can be laid directly at the base of the Japanese perceived need to expand (regardless of the exact reasons) and the perceived need of the US to stop them from expanding (regardless of the exact reasons). The Japanese nation's need to expand was perceived as paramount, and therefor the risk of war with US was deemed preferable to simply fading ignominiously into the background. Right or wrong, this was the Japanese leadership's perception of what was happening/would happen - in one form or another.

The Japanese civilian and military high commands knew that they had little chance of winning against the US in any kind of war, precisely because they understood the US manufacturing capabilities (due to access to natural resources, technology, and the sheer size of the US population). They did not think that they could win through any kind of superiority of the Japanese spirit. They hoped that the US would not be wiling to fight a war where the focus was 7000 miles away, particularly with the attendant costs. They did, however, believe that the US would go to war if Japan attacked. The subsequent war was a 'Hail Mary' attempt to remain an empire on their own terms, as opposed to the terms of a foreign nation.
 
It isnt just in the last 10 years, this was mentioned in The documentary series "The World at War" that I watched in the mid 1970s. While German soldiers were dying of cold in the east, German industry was still making fur coats for the ladies fashion industry. Politically Adolf didnt want the population to suffer the privations of war. "Huge" is elastic and also relative. The capabilities of the LW were huge compared to anything in WW1. However Goring was so good at propaganda he scared the UK and USA into massive action to counter his threat. By 1940 the UK passed Germany in arms production, the USA did shortly after to a much higher peak while I believe Russia passed Germany in about 1942/43 having moved a lot of industry eastwards.
Please bear with me as I haven't been sure how to reply to some posts. Before the middle 1990s it was not uncommon for mention to be made, such as the one you spoke of, about the manufacturing of luxury items, like the fur coats while the troops were suffering. However in every case when mentioned, these points were presented as apparent oddities or anomalies of the Nazis. You are right in stating that the explanation usually given is that the Nazis didn't want the population to suffer due to the war, fearing a repeat of what had happened in WWI. It is only since the mid 90s that historians looking at the leadership's reasoning have come to the view the Nazis feared the populaces view towards those privations would also be viewed as a failure of the political system as a whole. The 'Huge' monies that had been made available to the military by the German government were based on nothing less than catastrophic deficit spending. This was viewed by AH as a very important reason for deciding on war in 1939.
 
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Please bear with me as I haven't been sure how to reply to some posts. Before the middle 1990s it was not uncommon for mention to be made, such as the one you spoke of, about the manufacturing of luxury items, like the fur coats while the troops were suffering. However in every case when mentioned, these points were presented as apparent oddities or anomalies of the Nazis. You are right in stating that the explanation usually given is that the Nazis didn't want the population to suffer due to the war, fearing a repeat of what had happened in WWI. It is only since the mid 90s that historians looking at the leadership's reasoning have come to the view the Nazis feared the populaces view towards those privations would also be viewed as a failure of the political system as a whole. The 'Huge' monies that had been made available to the military by the German government were based on nothing less than catastrophic deficit spending. This was another huge reason for AH deciding on war in 1939.
I dont understand how this is some modern revelation. Your two statements "the explanation usually given is that the Nazis didn't want the population to suffer due to the war" and "the Nazis feared the populaces view towards those privations would also be viewed as a failure of the political system as a whole". Are exactly the same thing, arent they? Hitler stole a march in his rearmament, but didnt keep marching, so he cast around for wonder weapons to dig him out of the hole he dug himself into. By the end of 1941 he was in control of almost all of Europe and parts of Asia and Africa but was being out produced in most important areas by one of his three main adversaries, the smallest one.
 
I dont understand how this is some modern revelation. Your two statements "the explanation usually given is that the Nazis didn't want the population to suffer due to the war" and "the Nazis feared the populaces view towards those privations would also be viewed as a failure of the political system as a whole". Are exactly the same thing, arent they? Hitler stole a march in his rearmament, but didnt keep marching, so he cast around for wonder weapons to dig him out of the hole he dug himself into. By the end of 1941 he was in control of almost all of Europe and parts of Asia and Africa but was being out produced in most important areas by one of his three main adversaries, the smallest one.
It's not so much a revelation as it is a modern realization. For many years after the war historians preferred not to call the Nazis 'Socialists' or when they did it was only to state the the Nazis were using the word 'socialism' as a cover for something other. Only recently have historians begun to admit that the Nazis were indeed Socialists. There are many today who still cannot or will not face that fact. The Nazis were more worried about appearing to be a failed political system to the people than they were about any set backs they might suffer during the war.
 
Going from factory to the boneyard can also be said of B-17s and B-24s. Once the war in Europe was over, many of these planes weren't needed either.
They weren't, but in the aircraft manufacturing world, you just don't turn off the production line like a light switch. The airframes that continued to flow after V-E day were part of a contractual obligation between the government and manufacturer.
 
Going from factory to the boneyard can also be said of B-17s and B-24s. Once the war in Europe was over, many of these planes weren't needed either.
And in Australia the last 10-20% of the Beauforts did that starting May 44 - cant remember what serial on but that was at the same time the RAAF eventually published the first edition of the Beaufort repair manual.
 
As for the most over produced aircraft, I'd like to nominate the Blackburn Botha, although production started in the mid-30s, it was realised it was useless in all the roles it was designed to carry out, and even when relegated to training units it continued to kill crews right up to 1944...... and the made almost 500 of them!
 

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