Alternative light and anti-tank guns, 1935-45

[yulzari]

Basically the Italian gunners (and commanders) were trying to do the best they could in very bad situation.
The Italians never really made a new/more powerful AT gun than the 47/32.
View attachment 871995
While it was a good combined infantry gun/anti-tank gun in 1938-1940 it was past it's sell by date in 1941.
It came apart for easy transport. It fired a useful HE shell, especially compared to other counties 37mm AT guns.
But it had no shield to protect the gunners from both HE shells (shorts, a directed didn't matter even if a gun had shield) and from machinegun fire.
It also had been out classed by tank armor in 1941.
Trying to use old mountain howitzers like the 65/17, even with HEAT rounds was not a real solution. The 'solution' being used in Russia was even worse. Even larger, more powerful field artillery guns being used as AT guns because the Italian army didn't have any AT guns that could deal with the T-34 in an efficient manner.
The 10.5/32 was an extreme example
View attachment 871996
Please note than when moved by horses the barrel was pulled out an carried on a separate wagon with its own team of 6 horses. Ammo was moved by another wagon?
These are not infantry guns. These are not AT guns. They are guns of desperation used by desperate men.

To be fair, neither was the British use of 25pdrs. They used them, they knocked out German tanks, but it was a poor use the guns. British spent a lot of time/effort into giving the 25pdr some anti-tank capacity, at least one projectile in service, one or more projectiles in development. Two different rounds (AT rounds were had projectiles crimped place for faster loading) and the development of the muzzle brake to handle the later super charge hi-velocity load.
All to cover up the fact that they went cheap on the 2pdr with the standard AP round and that they were late with the 6pdr which as an AT gun, beat the stuffing out of the 25pdr in just about every category.
If your field guns are in the forward lines playing at being AT guns they are not doing field gun work. Laying down HE fire and smoke as needed or firing illuminating rounds at night.
Plenty of British tanks were destroyed in North Africa by towed AT guns at ranges over 1000 yds/meters that were not 88mm guns.

The 2 Pounder was not a cheap gun in its class. It was still an effective anti tank gun into 1942.

The British were not indolently late to swap to the 6 Pounder. They consciously chose to delay its production with the fall of France and the loss of most of the army's anti tank guns. It was a wise decision at that critical time. They understood that there would be consequences as a result but accepted them as necessary when the home islands were all but bereft of any anti tank guns. The Blacker Bombard is today thought of as an emergency Home Guard weapon but it was actually for emergency issue to the regular army to defend Britain in 1940 and saw service in North Africa.

We have perfect hindsight but in the summer of 1940 the choice was not 2 Pounder or 6 Pounder but some guns or no guns to defeat a probable and imminent invasion. It is easy to scoff at the realities of the USM with our hindsight but the hazard then looked very real and very close. The 6 Pounder was intended to become the standard anti tank (and tank) gun for 1941 onwards and British tanks in North Africa would have come with 6 Pounder guns and be the anti tank guns of the army. The exploratory work for the successor 75mm high velocity 6 Pounder was already begun in 1940.

Had France not fallen the 2 Pounder would have been replaced in production by the 6 Pounder in late 1940 but that would mean the 2 Pounder production would end with a hiatus before the 6 Pounder could begin production. That was the plan but events in France overtook it. Britain had to have anti tank guns in 1940 and the 2 Pounder was the only possible choice and still a very viable one in the short term.

 

[Shortround6]

The 2 Pounder was not a cheap gun in its class. It was still an effective anti tank gun into 1942.

The British were not indolently late to swap to the 6 Pounder. They consciously chose to delay its production with the fall of France and the loss of most of the army's anti tank guns. It was a wise decision at that critical time. They understood that there would be consequences as a result but accepted them as necessary when the home islands were all but bereft of any anti tank guns. The Blacker Bombard is today thought of as an emergency Home Guard weapon but it was actually for emergency issue to the regular army to defend Britain in 1940 and saw service in North Africa.

We have perfect hindsight but in the summer of 1940 the choice was not 2 Pounder or 6 Pounder but some guns or no guns to defeat a probable and imminent invasion. It is easy to scoff at the realities of the USM with our hindsight but the hazard then looked very real and very close. The 6 Pounder was intended to become the standard anti tank (and tank) gun for 1941 onwards and British tanks in North Africa would have come with 6 Pounder guns and be the anti tank guns of the army. The exploratory work for the successor 75mm high velocity 6 Pounder was already begun in 1940.

Had France not fallen the 2 Pounder would have been replaced in production by the 6 Pounder in late 1940 but that would mean the 2 Pounder production would end with a hiatus before the 6 Pounder could begin production. That was the plan but events in France overtook it. Britain had to have anti tank guns in 1940 and the 2 Pounder was the only possible choice and still a very viable one in the short term.

In my estimation the British had several avenues open to them in 1940 and some options in 1941 that could have paid off in 1942.
Yes, they needed to keep making 2pdrs in 1940.
But they kept making the original, expensive 2pdr carriage. Barrel production ran ahead of carriage production. A simpler split carriage might have eased production problems and gotten numbers somewhat sooner enabling slightly earlier change over to the 6pdr.
The real problem, again in my estimation, was the lack of improved ammo for the 2pdr for way too long. Not talking about cored ammo. I am talking about just a slightly boosted velocity AP round using the same crappy projectile, or an earlier introduction of the APCBC round, or providing HE ammo for the 2pdr. All of which was done but not until the 6pdr was being issued. Something is off. If you are going to stick with the old gun, give it better ammo to buy more time.
These are separate issues.
Unfortunately, somewhat repeated with the 6pdr. Better projectiles showed up 1 to 2 years after the guns and not counting cored projectiles. HE ammo was not as late as 2pdr HE but it was made in somewhat smaller than desired quantities? 18 million AP rounds before 1944 compared to about 2.5 million HE rounds?
Maybe better 2pdr ammo would not have prevented 25pdrs from being used as AT guns at times but a lot of things are a sliding scale. A few less 25pdrs being used as AT guns means a few more 25pdrs being used for artillery support (assuming enough ammo). Ripple effects instead of outright changing a battle.

 

[tomo pauk]

The 2 Pounder was not a cheap gun in its class.

Indeed. That was a bug, not a feature.

It was still an effective anti tank gun into 1942.

One would need the rosiest of the glasses to agree with that. The moment Germans started making the Stugs, Pz-IIIs and -IVs with 50-60mm front armor - and that is true for the best part of 1942 - the 2pdr hit the wall of steel: when tested by the British, it made no penetration of the 60mm thick armor at any distance, while the 50mm armor was penetrated under 200m with the 'normal' ammo, and under 400m with the HV (but still full-bore) ammo.
If the gun was with the lighter carriage and if the combat was in the bocage, jungle or in Balkans (so the gunners have chance of attack from the side), the penetration from the sides would've still been a plus. Unfortunately, 1942 means that 90% of the AT combat by the British troops was on the open terrain of North Africa, and expecting that German tankers will exposing the weaker sides to the AT gunners is not realistic.

Already the US 37mm firing APC shots was getting better results, let alone the 6pdr or the 75mm, and the 75mm firing the APC doubled the effective range vs. the 6pdr firing the simple AP ammo (eg. 1000m vs. 500-600m against the 30mm+30mm plates). The tests in question were undertaken by the British in May of 1942, and can be read in the 'Panzertruppen 1933-42' by T. Jentz.

 

[Shortround6]

The 2pdr APCBC would go through about the same armor at 500yds that the plain shot (not HV plain) would do at 100rds. And it would go through about the same armor at 1000yds as the plain shot would do at 500yds. Giving better chances for success on flanking shots. There was a considerable improvement at 2000yds but this is rather academic. AT guns should, in general, not being revealing themselves at such ranges (unless in portee?) and British tanks with the elevation by shoulder muscle had real problems shooting at long range no matter what the projectile.
According to one book the 2pdr HV showed up North Africa at the same time or slightly after the APCBC. If so, it was way too late.
2pdr was great armored car gun in 1943/44