Ok but if they built 7,251 in 1942 some of these could have been put in P-40s, P-51s, and / or Spitfires, right? Instead of going into various planes that never left Canada?
The USAAF and the British had a deal with respect to the allocations of the Packard built Merlins (under license). The balance of the allocations for the Brits were essentially none of the AAF business. On the other hand Materiel Command favored the P-40F and were indisposed to installing in the P-51.
The battle at that time was the A-36 procurement and Mat.Cmd wanted nothing to do with it, and were lobbying to shut down production of Mustangs after the Mustang IA purchase completed in Nov. It was only when Military Requirements in Plans Division prevailed, the Mat.Cmd. was forced to acquire Mustangs for the AAF and that resulted in the claw-back of 58 P-51-NA from the 150 commitment of Mustang IA.
While Arnold was getting briefed during his May 1942 trip to UK on the Merlin Mustang project at R-R, NAA was getting indications from their beltway bandits in DC that both Ambassador Winant and Ass't Secy War Lovett were very favorable to the project and stated so to Arnold by letter in June 1942.
It was around this time that Mil.Req. jammed the P-51A contract as follow on to A-36 and further specified that the P-51A contract could be converted to the P-51B at any time, based on outcome of flight tests. Which they did, but Arnold approved the NA-102 P-51B-1 contract in August and the P-51A contract balance to the P-51B-5 followed quickly.
Production design and tooling for the P-51B-1 was in progress while NA-101 was undergoing the Merlin mod from the P-51-NA airframe.
There were a lot of moving parts in 1942 that essentially changed the mix of 1650-1s and the very new 1650-3 to be built. From the very beginning the Brits made it clear ~ May 1942 that they supported the Merlin Mustang conversion and pressured Materiel Command to allocate future AAF 1650-3 production commitments to North American and wind down 1650-1 production in 1943 to focus on spare engines for the P-40F/L.
BTW this chain of events was paralleled by a strong desire for NAA to deliver completed P-51B airframes for final assembly in UK where Merlins would be installed. That project died because of two year lead time to execute any possible plan - and dilute NAA resources to deliver to production commitments to AAF.
IMO, absent the actual exchange of correspondence, the narrative above explains why neither Curtiss nor Lockheed ever were considered for allocations to P-40/P-60 or P-38 projects.
As Shortround pointed out, the P-39 was never a practical destination for a multitude of reasons, and it should be pointed out that the P-63 has a stretched airframe and wing movement to enable the Allison 2S/2S with auxiliary second stage engine installed.
The timeline to deliver a flying P-51B with a functional production ready V-1650-3 could not have been compressed much due to issues with the early 1650-3. Recall that the XP-51B airframe was ready in late September, but the first of two 1650-3 delivered to NAA failed in the first week of October during engine run-up tests. The second one was delivered in mid-November and then there was a pause until May when the production deliveries began. Then there was a strike at Packard which cost June/July commitments to be far short, which caused a delay of operations in UK from late September to December 1. 1943.