History Learner
Airman
- 22
- Jul 24, 2025
Axis victory scenarios are a pretty common trope in Alternate History and the plausibility of such is often hotly debated. Over the last few decades it has become generally accepted that success or failure revolves around the battlefields of the Eastern Front but there remains a persistent strain of thought that the Manhattan Project is the ultimate check on such scenarios. After a recent trip to the National Archives, I believe I have found the smoking gun that can put that particular argument to bed and which raises the general plausibility of such scenarios in general.
As the world awaited the start of what would become Fall Blau in the Summer of 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered up a contingency planning document to investigate under what conditions the U.S. would be inclined to seek an armistice and what exactly the terms of such a document would be. Now, with direct access to the Strong memo to quote verbatim, the strategic thinking of American leadership at that critical juncture of WWII comes into clarity. From the opening page of Strong's memo, we are advised of what exactly would drive American leadership to offer an armistice:
As stated before, the key issue is the defeat of the USSR by the Germans. This was openly suggested across a plethora of sources-including the aforementioned statement by President Roosevelt-so its position as first condition is no surprise. Certainly, this also underlines the immense role of the Eastern Front in Western Allied planning and thinking and leads credence to the modern strain of historical research emphasizing that front in WWII. As for the other conditions, (C) was directly tied (A) from what we know of Turkish thinking at the time; Ankara was hedging its bets and the collapse of the Soviets would buttress a Pro-Axis stance given the strategic balance at play. As far as (B), it was something of a surprise to me personally how highly rated the Vichy French were in American thinking (It comes across in multiple other documents I viewed). One can make the case the Vichy already were cooperating with the Axis but I think the collapse of the Soviets combined with the end of Turkish neutrality would certainly make this more so.
With the conditions out of the way, what of the terms? For one, a key theme in American thinking throughout the document is realism. They directly state they will need to make an effort for the occupied nations of Europe but are unlikely to achieve much there. In particular, it is directly stated that not much can be done for Czechoslovakia for example and they will have to accept that:
Another concession early on is the status of the blockade of Axis Europe, which is considered impossible to sustain in the context of the armistice:
With those two out of the way, we arrive at the meat of the matter and for that I am going to provide screenshots so the terms can be read verbatim:
Immediate Thoughts
A.) The demand for evacuations from Western Europe-but without resulting movement in of Free European forces-suggests the Allies were content to accept a Finlandization of sorts for the region as a neutral buffer between the two blocs. Of note, though, is the complete lack of mention of Luxembourg and the 6th Meridian East line as the boundary in France; this would leave all of Alsace-Lorraine on the German side of the armistice line. Reading between the lines on that is clear, I think.
B.) The demand for an evacuation from Eastern European countries is made but with no timeline for that to be set and the specifics to be decided at a future peace conference, effectively pushing that off as an issue for some undefined point in the future. Combined with the "statement of disinterest" by the Allies for Europe east of the 6th Meridian, we can again read between the lines and realize this is a face saving gesture for those governments in exile by the United States but without any real teeth.
C.) Interestingly, there is a specific demand with a timetable set for the Germans to pull out of Italy and its colonies. Likewise, the demand the German High Command declare itself disinterested in Africa south of the 20th Parallel North pending the final peace treaty would de-facto mean conceding the Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa. Taken together, I do wonder if this was an attempt by the Allies to both increase Italy's autonomy vis-a-vie Germany as well as use the lost colonies to drive a wedge between them.
D.) To be expected, there is a specific clause for the Germans to repudiate the Anti-Comintern Treaty and all other associated treaties with Japan as well as a requirement that they state themselves as disinterested in the regions east of the 60th Meridian; in other words, the Indo-Pacific Basin. Further buttressing this is the statement early on that the Allies would take the strategic offensive in the Pacific after assuming the defense in the ETO. Taken together, this pretty firmly show the intention of American decision makers to continue the war against Japan to its conclusion. Tying into the above, I would expect the Japanese to respond by occupying the Italian concession at Tianjin which would, again, amplify the political tensions between Italy and Germany.
So, with my thoughts out of the way, what say you? I'll be attaching a copy of the document so that anybody that wishes to read it in full can do so.
As the world awaited the start of what would become Fall Blau in the Summer of 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered up a contingency planning document to investigate under what conditions the U.S. would be inclined to seek an armistice and what exactly the terms of such a document would be. Now, with direct access to the Strong memo to quote verbatim, the strategic thinking of American leadership at that critical juncture of WWII comes into clarity. From the opening page of Strong's memo, we are advised of what exactly would drive American leadership to offer an armistice:
As stated before, the key issue is the defeat of the USSR by the Germans. This was openly suggested across a plethora of sources-including the aforementioned statement by President Roosevelt-so its position as first condition is no surprise. Certainly, this also underlines the immense role of the Eastern Front in Western Allied planning and thinking and leads credence to the modern strain of historical research emphasizing that front in WWII. As for the other conditions, (C) was directly tied (A) from what we know of Turkish thinking at the time; Ankara was hedging its bets and the collapse of the Soviets would buttress a Pro-Axis stance given the strategic balance at play. As far as (B), it was something of a surprise to me personally how highly rated the Vichy French were in American thinking (It comes across in multiple other documents I viewed). One can make the case the Vichy already were cooperating with the Axis but I think the collapse of the Soviets combined with the end of Turkish neutrality would certainly make this more so.
With the conditions out of the way, what of the terms? For one, a key theme in American thinking throughout the document is realism. They directly state they will need to make an effort for the occupied nations of Europe but are unlikely to achieve much there. In particular, it is directly stated that not much can be done for Czechoslovakia for example and they will have to accept that:
Another concession early on is the status of the blockade of Axis Europe, which is considered impossible to sustain in the context of the armistice:
With those two out of the way, we arrive at the meat of the matter and for that I am going to provide screenshots so the terms can be read verbatim:
Immediate Thoughts
A.) The demand for evacuations from Western Europe-but without resulting movement in of Free European forces-suggests the Allies were content to accept a Finlandization of sorts for the region as a neutral buffer between the two blocs. Of note, though, is the complete lack of mention of Luxembourg and the 6th Meridian East line as the boundary in France; this would leave all of Alsace-Lorraine on the German side of the armistice line. Reading between the lines on that is clear, I think.
B.) The demand for an evacuation from Eastern European countries is made but with no timeline for that to be set and the specifics to be decided at a future peace conference, effectively pushing that off as an issue for some undefined point in the future. Combined with the "statement of disinterest" by the Allies for Europe east of the 6th Meridian, we can again read between the lines and realize this is a face saving gesture for those governments in exile by the United States but without any real teeth.
C.) Interestingly, there is a specific demand with a timetable set for the Germans to pull out of Italy and its colonies. Likewise, the demand the German High Command declare itself disinterested in Africa south of the 20th Parallel North pending the final peace treaty would de-facto mean conceding the Italian colonies in the Horn of Africa. Taken together, I do wonder if this was an attempt by the Allies to both increase Italy's autonomy vis-a-vie Germany as well as use the lost colonies to drive a wedge between them.
D.) To be expected, there is a specific clause for the Germans to repudiate the Anti-Comintern Treaty and all other associated treaties with Japan as well as a requirement that they state themselves as disinterested in the regions east of the 60th Meridian; in other words, the Indo-Pacific Basin. Further buttressing this is the statement early on that the Allies would take the strategic offensive in the Pacific after assuming the defense in the ETO. Taken together, this pretty firmly show the intention of American decision makers to continue the war against Japan to its conclusion. Tying into the above, I would expect the Japanese to respond by occupying the Italian concession at Tianjin which would, again, amplify the political tensions between Italy and Germany.
So, with my thoughts out of the way, what say you? I'll be attaching a copy of the document so that anybody that wishes to read it in full can do so.
