Germany -- No Battleships No Mediterranean

[Admiral Beez]

But indeed, even if they had worked as well as the Germans hoped, they were a tool for winning a drawn out war of attrition, the kind of war Germany had very little chance of winning in the first place.

That's my main point. Anything that doesn't slingshot the Wehrmacht into Moscow before Christmas 1941 it's not worth doing.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It's worth noting that even taking Moscow in 1941 doesn't automatically entail a Soviet surrender.

 

[Admiral Beez]

It's worth noting that even taking Moscow in 1941 doesn't automatically entail a Soviet surrender.

True. There are no guarantees. But using a greater focus of resources and manpower (including that diverted from the Kriegsmarine) to knock out Moscow before winter 1941 and presumably forcing Stalin to flee would be the best chance for success. And if we have a solid logistical train as I suggest (with fuel to operate it), the Wehrmacht has a better chance of surviving the scorched earth that awaits them.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

And if we have a solid logistical train as I suggest (with fuel to operate it), the Wehrmacht has a better chance of surviving the scorched earth that awaits them.

This is the big elephant in the room. Logistically, the Wehrmacht simply was not prepared for an Eastern Front lasting beyond Oct 1941.

 

[z42]

It's worth noting that even taking Moscow in 1941 doesn't automatically entail a Soviet surrender.

Sure, no guarantees. And even trying to take a big city like Moscow might very well turn into a Stalingrad-esque meat grinder that the Wehrmacht could ill afford.

Anyway, toppling the regime was the goal. If there isn't a decent prospect of achieving it, maybe don't start the invasion in the first place? Well, except nazis being nazis and doing nazi things and all that.

 

[Shortround6]

Indeed. But unless Germany can defeat the USSR by mid 1942 the war is lost anyway. Maybe skip the U-Boats as well, and that silly DoW on the US. Then, using your new logistics fleet, race for Moscow.

Starting in 1936 (?) the British (and French?) don't have to worry about any German Navy? Or anything newer than the three pocket battleship/heavy cruisers?
British blow the Italian fleet away in the summer of 1940. They don't have to worry about any German navy and can afford to lose 3-4 old battleships fighting the Italians.
Invasion of Norway doesn't happen, or doesn't succeed.
France builds a smaller Navy and builds another 1000 tanks before 1940, or more towed artillery. Or more AA guns.
In 1941 France may be hanging on by their toenails or maybe they lasted until Sept 1940. Germans may not be able to attack Russia in June of 1941 and starting in late July or August means they won't reach Moscow in numbers in Dec 1941 even with 40,000 more trucks.

Assuming that the British and French will not alter their own weapons procurement in the 3-4 years while Germany forsakes their navy to get a particular desired outcome seems to be poor planning.
German U-boats hit (not all were sunk) over 1200 ships by the end of 1941.
More cargos that made it and multiple cargoes over 2 years means the UK would be stronger and in better shape to send material to Russia once the Germans do attack.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Starting in 1936 (?) the British (and French?) don't have to worry about any German Navy? Or anything newer than the three pocket battleship/heavy cruisers?
British blow the Italian fleet away in the summer of 1940. They don't have to worry about any German navy and can afford to lose 3-4 old battleships fighting the Italians.
Invasion of Norway doesn't happen, or doesn't succeed.
France builds a smaller Navy and builds another 1000 tanks before 1940, or more towed artillery. Or more AA guns.
In 1941 France may be hanging on by their toenails or maybe they lasted until Sept 1940. Germans may not be able to attack Russia in June of 1941 and starting in late July or August means they won't reach Moscow in numbers in Dec 1941 even with 40,000 more trucks.

Assuming that the British and French will not alter their own weapons procurement in the 3-4 years while Germany forsakes their navy to get a particular desired outcome seems to be poor planning.
German U-boats hit (not all were sunk) over 1200 ships by the end of 1941.
More cargos that made it and multiple cargoes over 2 years means the UK would be stronger and in better shape to send material to Russia once the Germans do attack.

Put shortly, most every "what if?" has a "well, then ..."

 

[Admiral Beez]

Starting in 1936 (?) the British (and French?) don't have to worry about any German Navy?

If there was any time that avoiding naval buildup would have benefited Germany it's in in 1890s onwards. Skip building anything larger than a Siegfried-class coastal defense ship for Baltic service. Follow the Dutch model of colonial cruisers, while also avoiding much of the Weltpolitik's needless antagonizing of Britain. And then when Germany decides to invade France and Russia (while avoiding Belgium), Britain may either look away or (as long as it doesn't perceive German hegemony over the continent) even help finance the operation.

OTOH, the problem for Germany in the mid-late 1930s is that the country is broke, and can only survive by pillaging resources and cash from occupied France, Norway and its neighbours. But this only kicks the financial can down the road for a little while. Germany must invade the USSR, since there is no money otherwise. Stopping the Kreigsmarine's surface fleet construction does nothing to help avoid Germany's coming financial collapse. War is always first and foremost about money.

 

[Shortround6]

Until the 1920s and 30s naval power was, rightly or wrongly, in indicator of a country's world power. It's ability to influence things at great distances other than marching on foot past it's own borders.
The Germans did spend too much on the High Seas fleet but trying to play world power with a handful of obsolete when built crappy gun boats was not the answer either.
German's colonies may have been something of a net loss, I don't know but influence/prestige is very hard to judge.
In 1914 using ships to bombard enemy coastline cities and towns was a hundreds of years old practice. Building coastal forts means you are not spending money on the field army.
Was Germany self-sufficient in raw materials/ and food?
If not, how much do you spend on a navy to at least create problems for enemy raiders?
Britian stays neutral but France can blockade Germany because the Germans spend too little on their navy? Germans spend money on their navy forcing the French to spend money on their navy and have less money to spend on the French army?

A powerful navy was also seen as an advertisement for the shipbuilding industry as a whole. Not just exporting warships.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Until the 1920s and 30s naval power was, rightly or wrongly, in indicator of a country's world power. It's ability to influence things at great distances other than marching on foot past it's own borders.
The Germans did spend too much on the High Seas fleet but trying to play world power with a handful of obsolete when built crappy gun boats was not the answer either.
German's colonies may have been something of a net loss, I don't know but influence/prestige is very hard to judge.
In 1914 using ships to bombard enemy coastline cities and towns was a hundreds of years old practice. Building coastal forts means you are not spending money on the field army.
Was Germany self-sufficient in raw materials/ and food?
If not, how much do you spend on a navy to at least create problems for enemy raiders?
Britian stays neutral but France can blockade Germany because the Germans spend too little on their navy? Germans spend money on their navy forcing the French to spend money on their navy and have less money to spend on the French army?

A powerful navy was also seen as an advertisement for the shipbuilding industry as a whole. Not just exporting warships.

At some point in time, Otto von Bismark is supposed to have shown someone his map of Africa. This map showed Germany located between France and Russia with a possibility of a war on two fronts. Any meddling France and Russia did in Africa sucked up resources that otherwise could be used against Germany. It was what he wanted them to do.

Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote claiming that to be a world power, a nation required a powerful navy. I don't think Bismark bought into any of this. Great Britain had a powerful, world dominating navy because they were an island. They could keep their army small (and politically not dangerous) because damn foreigners could not get their large, professional armies across the English channel. Germany, France, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russia all faced threats from armies already on the continents and not vulnerable to naval activity. Large navies were luxuries that perhaps they could not afford.

 

[Shortround6]

France and Germany both had coastlines. Germany, depending on year, had somewhere around 1200km. West of Denmark the ports rarely froze.
Russia had a huge coast, but the Baltic was not year-round. The Black Sea could be shut off at any time. Trade to Murmansk before 1914?
Austro-Hungaria wanted to be a sea power but it's access was limited.

Germany and France had fought twice from 1866 to 1914 without Britian getting involved.
It takes decades to build a navy. You can't often do it in a few years when alliances change.

Even if Germany doesn't have overseas ambitions, it does need to defend its own coast.
Is it cheaper to build a bunch of forts or is cheaper to build a decent coast defense force?
Cheap coast defense winds up being very expensive because it doesn't work so whatever money spent was wasted.

 

[z42]

Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote claiming that to be a world power, a nation required a powerful navy. I don't think Bismark bought into any of this. Great Britain had a powerful, world dominating navy because they were an island. They could keep their army small (and politically not dangerous) because damn foreigners could not get their large, professional armies across the English channel. Germany, France, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russia all faced threats from armies already on the continents and not vulnerable to naval activity. Large navies were luxuries that perhaps they could not afford.

Mahan and Corbett were excellent reading if you were the naval hegemon, or had the aspirations and means to take the place of the current hegemon. For a smaller navy with little realistic prospect of challenging the hegemon, maybe the continental school like Castex and Wegener would have more useful ideas?

 

[z42]

Even if Germany doesn't have overseas ambitions, it does need to defend its own coast.
Is it cheaper to build a bunch of forts or is cheaper to build a decent coast defense force?
Cheap coast defense winds up being very expensive because it doesn't work so whatever money spent was wasted.

Yes, Germany had a need to defend its coast. But building up the HSF to threaten the RN was a strategic mistake that soured UK-German relations, just for stroking the ego of the idiot Kaiser.

The question of coastal fortifications vs navies is interesting. I suspect sometime in the first half of the 20th century there was a kind of inflection point as technology developed to the point of making expensive fixed fortifications mostly obsolete.

 

[Shortround6]

Yes, Germany had a need to defend its coast. But building up the HSF to threaten the RN was a strategic mistake that soured UK-German relations, just for stroking the ego of the idiot Kaiser.

Yes, challenging the RN to build race was stupid.
Matching or slightly exceeding the French might have been less provocative, and a lot cheaper.
Germans might have managed with 12-16 heavy ships instead of 25 or so.
They might have gotten away with even less as the 6 Dantons were neither fish nor fowl. Four 12 in guns and twelve 9.4in (6 per side) might work in a short-range battle, not very good if the range was long, like over 13,000 meters.

The question of coastal fortifications vs navies is interesting. I suspect sometime in the first half of the 20th century there was a kind of inflection point as technology developed to the point of making expensive fixed fortifications mostly obsolete.

Sea going ships vs coastal fortifications is interesting and they had several hundred years to work it out until the Crimean war.
After that it was race much like many other weapons races.
Steam gave better speeds (marginally) and freedom from wind/weather/currents.
Improved metallurgy gave larger guns that could fire 8in and large exploding shells (still balls) that could hurt forts much more than solid round shot.
Ships also started to be covered in iron (at least a few) that could resist smaller shore-based guns. Large ones were still a problem.

By the 1860s they had rifling which allowed for elongated projectiles for better penetration and range, better steam engines, a lot more armor (although sometimes trying use 6-8in worth of 1 in plates didn't work so well).
And then we start getting into basic heat treatment. Cocoa (Brown) powder (1870s-90s) even bigger guns, really slow firing. Steel armor instead of iron.

Fort geography changed. Longer ranged guns meant you could move the gun batteries further from the choke points. Fort architecture changed with hidden guns behind sloped walls instead of gun ports in vertical walls. Smokeless powder made for a huge increase in range and shore guns began to get better fire control. And then the fire control race started

Who was ahead at any given moment is hard to tell, unfortunately land based forts tended to stay in use for longer than most iron or steel ships so many forts could be out matched by more modern ships.

 

[ssnider]

One of the cornerstones of British foreign policy was no dominate power on tythe Europe continent. {n 1871 that happened and the British leaders considered a war with Germany inevitable. Although the Kaiser made a lot of blunders, appeasing the British was never going to work. Also building the HSF proved insanely popular with the German people and was worth the cost for internal politics and bringing a sense of unity to the country. Many of the states still had their own armies, postal systems etc. Also, Germany tried twice to negociate a treaty with Britian (one in 1910) in which they would stop building dreadnoughts in exchange for a guarantee at Britian would remain neutral should France and/or Russia attacked Germany. Britian refused. Germany quit the Navel race in 1910 anyway and Britian knew it.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Even if Germany doesn't have overseas ambitions, it does need to defend its own coast.
Is it cheaper to build a bunch of forts or is cheaper to build a decent coast defense force?
Cheap coast defense winds up being very expensive because it doesn't work so whatever money spent was wasted.

Bismark's view of this was that if the British landed troops in Europe, he would have the police arrest them. The Royal Navy was not an existential threat to Germany. The French army was, especially if the Russians helped.

 

[ssnider]

Bismark's view of this was that if the British landed troops in Europe, he would have the police arrest them. The Royal Navy was not an existential threat to Germany. The French army was, especially if the Russians helped.

Germany lost WW1 because Britian starved them to death and don't down play the impact of the Gritish army on the western front.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Yes, Germany had a need to defend its coast. But building up the HSF to threaten the RN was a strategic mistake that soured UK-German relations, just for stroking the ego of the idiot Kaiser.

Even at the height of Germany's territory, its coast outside of the Baltic was small, equal to about 350 km. Such a tiny smidge of Atlantic (well, North Sea) coastland did not need an ocean going navy. And any German with a solid understanding of the British would understand that a lack of a battlefleet does not make your trade vulnerable to Royal Navy attack. Germany should have built a Baltic fleet and your fortifications to counter the Russians - and then focused on the Army and political reform. And skip any foreign empire beyond trading ports like Tsingtao.

 

[Admiral Beez]

don't down play the impact of the Gritish army on the western front.

FWIW, the UK does not really have a "Gritish" tradition. Corn grits is more of an American diet, so the closest Britain has is porridge aka oatmeal. FYI, here's the US Army's recipe for grits.

https://quartermaster.army.mil/jccoe/publications/recipes/section_e/e00200.pdf

 

[Shortround6]

Even at the height of Germany's territory, its coast outside of the Baltic was small, equal to about 350 km. Such a tiny smidge of Atlantic (well, North Sea) coastland did not need an ocean going navy. And any German with a solid understanding of the British would understand that a lack of a battlefleet does not make your trade vulnerable to Royal Navy attack. Germany should have built a Baltic fleet and your fortifications to counter the Russians - and then focused on the Army and political reform. And skip any foreign empire beyond trading ports like Tsingtao.

View attachment 875898

Sort of overlooks the importance of that coastline to Germany.
With the Ems, Weser, and Elbe rivers feeding the ports of Emden, Bremerhaven/Bremen and Hamburg respectively.
Brunsbüttel is the western end of the Kiel canal.
Much of Germany's maritime trade would be through that coastline and not the eastern coastline.

Bismark's comment/s might have been important at the time they were made (18??). But.....

Kiel Canal was finished 3 years after he died. Improvements in other canals and improvements in rail transport in the late 1800s changed Germany's place in the world significantly.
By 1914 Germany was 2nd largest exporter in the world, 2nd only to UK. Germany had started a bit late being a largely agriculture economy in 1850 but changed over to an industrial economy faster than the other European powers. This meant both imports and exports.
What may have been good strategy in the 1860-70s was no longer good strategy in 1900.
Naval technology was also changing enormously in just 6 decades. From mostly wooden ships with smooth bore muzzle loaders and under 20lb boiler pressure and single expansion steam engines to through iron and then steel hulls, Breech loading rifled guns and then smokeless powder and boiler pressure going over 200lbs and the going to triple expansion engines and the start of turbines.

Germany after 1900 did spend too much on the navy but to ignore the navy or resort to the "gunboat doctrine" was not the answer. The "gunboat doctrine" (or allied doctrines) was trotted out periodically as a cheap way of dealing with a superior enemy but since it never worked it turned out to be an expensive failure. The "gunboat doctrine" dates back to at least President Jefferson in 1803 (?). It kept taxes down. It didn't do much else.