See pages 51-54 of this theseis for more on US plans for biological warfare against Japan
No Strategic Bombing? (1 Viewer)
- Thread starter Howard Gibson
- Start date
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The aspects you mention receive little attention because they were never implemented. The use of chemical weapons against military targets was seriously considered, and stockpiles of them, including a large quantity of tear gas were being amassed, but there is no evidence that the US ever seriously intended to use the deadly gasses (phosgene, blister or blood agents) against strictly civilian targets, If you can provide evidence to the contrary, ante up! The complete eradication, genocide, of all Japanese residents was NEVER intended. You may offer a few inflammatory quotes by known mouthy high ranking individuals, like Patton or Halsey, but not by the cooler heads actually in charge: Roosevelt, Truman, Stimson, Marshall, Grew and Hull.There are another couple of aspects to an invasion of Japan that were being seriously considered but generally receive little attention. Firstly the use of poison gases against both military and civilian targets. Secondly the use of biological weapons in any attempt to blockade Japan and starve it into submission.
Poison gas
Certainly the American public's view of using poison gas seemed to soften as 1945 went on and casualties began to mount in the Iwo Jima & Okinawa campaigns.
Should We Use Poison Gas?
How public opinion influenced military policy on poison gas in World War II.www.nationalww2museum.org
After the WW1 experience poison gas was a much feared weapon that the international community sought to limit if not eliminate via international Treaty, for example the Geneva Protocols of 1925 which the US signed up to but didn't get round to ratifying until 1975. One result of the fear of its use against the civilian population in Britain was the issue of gas masks to every man, woman & child in the country in 1938/39 and the development of gas masks for animals like dogs and horses.
Why Britain issued gas masks in 1939
To protect civilians from the effects of dreaded gas raids, respirators were issued to the entire population. Find out more about life in 1939 from Findmypast.www.findmypast.co.uk
Had Britain been invaded in 1940 there was every intention of using poison gases against the invaders. Virtually all the warring nations in WW2 had gas weapons and moved them around in their rear areas as required. And there were accidents.
Air raid on Bari - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
So while the article I linked covered the US position, the question remains as to how Japan might have used poison gases either as a first use against an invasion, or in retaliation. It had used them previously in China.
Japanese expert uncovers Japan's use of chemical weapons during WWII
A Japanese scholar who focuses on tracing Japan's wartime chemical weapons legacy on Wednesday reviswww.bastillepost.com
Unit 731 - Wikipedia
Biological weapons
There are several stories about how Japan used these in China from 1937 onwards, and their development at Unit 731 (see above). In 1945 it even formulated a plan to attack California with biological weapons.
But the Allies too developed biological weapons in WW2. Amongst other things, Britain weaponised Anthrax and tested it. Churchill had to be reigned in from using it by the Chiefs of Staff.
Gruinard Island - Wikipedia
The US also had a biological weapons programme. Had the option to starve Japan into submission been taken, there were plans to target her crops biologically to hurry up the process.
When you begin to look at the various options to defeat Japan at the end of the day and despite the casualties they inflicted both immediately and subsequently, the A-bombs, were probably the cheapest option in terms of the destruction of human life.
It was the fear of causing genocide by starvation that biological weapons to starve Japan into submission was considered but was ultimately rejected. One of the many logistical obstacles Marshall wrestled with was how to feed Japanese survivors, particularly civilians. US planners had factored in a quantity of rations for refugees and POWs to be landed with the invasion forces. Chemical and biological agents designed to kill crops and leave the land barren was rejected by the US as counterproductive.
The atomic option was seen as the best hope to humanely end the war, but US military planners were far from certain dropping the first few bombs would force a surrender. After the first two were dropped and there was no immediate capitulation, Marshall and Stimson got into a huge fight over employment of the third bomb, and it took Truman to settle the matter. Given the slow production of nuclear material, Marshall wanted to hold onto the third bomb and add it to the hand full that were projected to be ready by the planned November-Dec 45 invasion of Kyushu. Marshall wanted them to be available to employ tactically to support the invasion. Stimson wanted to drop the third bomb on another target city ASAP, and to continue dropping A-bombs city-by-city as they were available to force a surrender and prevent a disastrous invasion (for all parties involved). Truman sided with Stimson, and components for the third bomb were released for immediate shipment to Tinian. Fortunately for the entire world, the Japanese accepted the Potsdam terms and the Emperor announced the surrender a few days later ending the war.
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Very interesting, but the conclusions concerning employment against Japan are purely the author's speculation. Research and development of biological agents for the most part were defensive in nature. The clearly stated intent for production of agents was for possible retaliation, NOT first use.
MIflyer
Captain
Well, one unexpected result of there not being a US or RAF strategic bombing program would have been a reduction in the Germans' ability to stop Allied tanks. Losses among 88MM flak crews were very high late in the war. That was not because the Allies were trying to destroy heavy AA positions but rather because the 88 crews were taken away from air defense in frantic efforts to stop breakthroughs from Allied tanks. If the Allies had not been sending heavy bombers over in large numbers the 88MM flak guns would not have been built and thus would not have been available to steal for tank defense.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Even the fire-bombing campaigns exacted a human toll higher than both atom bombs and was absolutely horrific.
The US military had been working on specific fire-bombing tactics for Japanese targets, even building a "town" with traditional style buildings to evaluate it's effectiveness. The original idea was to literally level Japanese cities by fire - Operation Meetinghouse was a part of that plan.
erniemurray
Recruit
- 3
- Mar 31, 2025
I believe the war was shortened by the strategic bombing of the Reich's petroleum resources and production facilities (think Ploesti) and their means of transporting petroleum products to where they were needed. The Nazi's would have fought on (with teenagers and geriatrics) had they not quite literally "run out of gas" (think tanks abandoned in the Ardennes). Allied tactical airpower would have been neutralized (or at least greatly compromised) if it had to go up against a fully staffed, trained, fueled, and operational Luftwaffe. I suspect the oil strategy together with the attrition hastened by the strategic bombing
shortened the war considerably.
erniemurray
Recruit
- 3
- Mar 31, 2025
Besides eliminating loss of life to Allied military forces, the A-bomb almost certainly resulted in less loss of civilian life than the fire-bombing of every major city in Japan would have. Considering that fire-bombing was the only viable alternative considered by the Allied Command, it can even be argued that the A-bomb was the more humane choice (as between these two inhumane alternatives).
