Dr. Hillel Avihai
Analyzing the general characteristics of aviation terrorism from the late 1960's to the 1980's shows that the major role of the aircraft was emphasized by a combination of two main elements. The first is the rationality factor, which was expressed in the release of prisoners resulting from a terrorist attack aimed at achieving politically-orientated objectives, such the El-Al hijacking of July 1968. The second element is publicity, which was the hallmark of the TWA hijacking on August 1969 by Leila Khaled and, perhaps the most significant event that establishes this proposed assumption, the Dawson Field incident of September 1970.
This assumption is based on the "hijacking for negotiation" tactic, which was the most common tactic of aviation terrorism during the late 1960's and until the late 1970's. Except for a few cases (mainly aerial terrorist acts of the early 1970's conducted by Jibril's PFLP-GC), the terrorists' main demand was to exchange prisoners as well as attracting worldwide attention. Following a question addressed to Leila Khaled during an interview for the Washington Times as to the purpose of the hijacking, she was quoted as saying:
"The objective was to free prisoners, and to bring the world's attention to the Palestinian cause…Look, I had orders to seize the plane, not to blow it up. I am no Kamikaze pilot. I care about people. If I had wanted to blow up the plane, no one could have prevented me'. "
However, this 'gentle' mode of hijacking seems to have become an archaic tactic, converting the hostages from being pawns on the terrorism chess board to dispensable targets. This is emphasized by the transition from 'rolling action' to 'immediate action'. 'Immediate action', which includes ground attack, ground or air sabotage, MANPADS attack and suicide attacks, is characterized by the fact that no negotiation takes place within the latter mode of air terrorism, unlike 'rolling terrorism', which refers to a negotiation process in which hostages are released after the release of jailed terrorists.
The practice of abandoning the hostage exchange tactic and moving to an 'immediate action' tactic is indicated by the following figure:
Despite the dramatic increase of 'immediate action' incidents, as indicated in the figure above (left side), the number of casualties has not increased dramatically, except for in the 11 September attacks. This evidence can be explained by the fact that some of the counted 'immediate action' casualties are not known, such as in the case of the Georgian Airways TU-134 MANPADS attack (20 September 1993).
Another explanation is that the figure above includes failed attempts, such as the Nezar Hindawi case (17 April 1986), the Air-India flight 301 sabotage attempt where the bomb exploded at Narita airport and the TWA mid-air sabotage (2 April 1986) with only four casualties. Should the aircraft have exploded, the number of casualties would have reached more than a hundred. The same is true of Richard Reid's attempt to blow up the American Airlines Boeing 767 in mid-air (22 December 2001). In other words, the figure above indicates the unquestionable dramatic rise of 'immediate action' incidents.
Regarding the number of casualties, the figure indicates actual casualties rather than potential casualties. It is obvious that the terrorists who committed the 'immediate action' attacks were aiming at causing mass casualties, otherwise they would have chosen a 'softer' tactic, such as hijacking. As indicated, the impact of 'immediate action' and adopting the aerial suicide mission represents the mass-casualty potential of such a tactic, as demonstrated by Al-Qaeda on September 11th, 2001.
From this point of view, it would be worthwhile dividing the term 'immediate action' into two. The first is sabotaging the aircraft or downing it with MANPADS and the second is using the aircraft as a guided missile to be crashed into selected targets. As to the former tactic, it is a practice that was generally linked to secular terrorist organizations, such as the PFLP-GC, UNITA, Sikh terrorists (who are not defined as 'fundamentally religious'), North Korean terrorists (who are definitely not 'fundamentalist religious terrorists') and state-involvement such as in the cases of Libya (the Pan-Am sabotage) and Syria (the 'Nezar Hindawi' case, April 1986). Regarding the PFLP-GC, one may argue that Jibril's cooperation with the Iranians in the late 1980s may represent a fundamentalist affiliation. This argument has no solid ground, since Jibril was the first Palestinian to adopt the sabotage tactic using barometric triggers, in which he specialized. In that period, (early 1970's), there was no fundamentalist Islamic influence since the Iranian revolution took place only in 1979, so the general affiliation of the PFLP-GC was secular and Marxist-Leninist orientated.
Focusing on MANPADS, this tactic was adopted by fundamentalist religious terrorists such as Al-Qaeda only in the third millennium, first in the Mombassa incident (2002) and later in Iraq (DHL cargo Airbus in 2003). From this point of view, one may find reinforcement to Wilkinson's (2001) argument as to the role of secular terrorism in terrorist activities. Yet, as these tactics were adopted by fundamentalist religious terrorist organizations, such as the Ramzi Yousef's 'Bojinka' plot to use a dozen US airliners and blow them up in mid-air (Bergman, 2006), one has to consider the magnitude of the plan regarding the potential number of casualties that could have resulted should this plan have been carried out.[ii]
As emphasized by the latest events, religious terrorist attacks constitute a far greater casualty potential than secular terrorism due to the spiritual fundamentalist ideology, which is characterized by far greater objectives than national liberation. In addition, fundamentalist ideology contains a philosophy that deals with culture clash and therefore it is more global rather than a fight for the liberation of a specific territory. Therefore, the combination of spiritual belief and global philosophy makes religious terrorism far more dangerous than a national liberation struggle. This fact was emphasized by Hoffman (1998) arguing that in 1995, for example, 25 per cent of total international terrorist attacks were conducted by religious fundamentalist terrorist groups and caused 58 per cent of all casualties that same year.[iii]
On the other hand, it is worthwhile mentioning that fundamentalist religious terrorist organizations also used 'traditional tactics' such as hijacking, as in the case of TWA's flight 847 hijacking to Beirut (June 1985) or HUM's (Harakat Ul-Mujahidin) hijacking of the Air-India Airbus (24 December 1999). These organizations are Islamic orientated fundamentalists and HUM is a member of Osama Bin Laden's international Islamic front. Despite this fact, HUM used 'rolling action' (hijacking) rather than 'immediate action' (total destruction by using the aircraft as a flying missile).[iv] Still, actual evidence shows that the practice of using the aircraft as a flying missile is exclusively affiliated with fundamentalist religious terrorism frameworks.
Despite the fact that the first to crash an aircraft into a strategic target were the Japanese Kamikaze ('Divine Wind') during the Second World War, it was not considered terrorism since it was aimed at military targets. Another incident was an attempt rather than an actual suicide mission - in 1972, in what is considered a criminally-orientated hijacking of the Southern Airways jet en route from Birmingham, Alabama (USA) to Montgomery, hijackers threatened to crash a Boeing 727 into the Oak Ridge nuclear reactor. Yet, these incidents were not terrorist-orientated events, so Bin-Laden's 2001 attack is the first ever example of using an aircraft as a flying missile.
Regarding aerial terrorism per-se, previous incidents showed some evidence as to terrorists' intentions to use the aircraft as a flying missile. For example, in the TWA Boeing 727 hijacking to Beirut by Amal/Hezbollah (June 1985) there were rumors that the terrorists had plans to crash the jet following Beirut airport's refusal to permit the jet to land and that the terrorists announced that they were 'suicide terrorists' and would crash the jet into the Ba'abda presidential palace. The same is true of the Pan-Am hijacking by Abu Nidal on 5 September 1986 where it was believed that the terrorists intended to crash the Jumbo jet into the center of Tel-Aviv. There was also the attempted El-Al hijacking by college student Taufik Fukra (18 November 2002) who told Turkish interrogators he had planned to divert the jet back to Tel-Aviv and crash it into a building, in imitation of the attacks on the World Trade Centre.[v]
Analyzing the general characteristics of aviation terrorism from the late 1960's to the 1980's shows that the major role of the aircraft was emphasized by a combination of two main elements. The first is the rationality factor, which was expressed in the release of prisoners resulting from a terrorist attack aimed at achieving politically-orientated objectives, such the El-Al hijacking of July 1968. The second element is publicity, which was the hallmark of the TWA hijacking on August 1969 by Leila Khaled and, perhaps the most significant event that establishes this proposed assumption, the Dawson Field incident of September 1970.
This assumption is based on the "hijacking for negotiation" tactic, which was the most common tactic of aviation terrorism during the late 1960's and until the late 1970's. Except for a few cases (mainly aerial terrorist acts of the early 1970's conducted by Jibril's PFLP-GC), the terrorists' main demand was to exchange prisoners as well as attracting worldwide attention. Following a question addressed to Leila Khaled during an interview for the Washington Times as to the purpose of the hijacking, she was quoted as saying:
"The objective was to free prisoners, and to bring the world's attention to the Palestinian cause…Look, I had orders to seize the plane, not to blow it up. I am no Kamikaze pilot. I care about people. If I had wanted to blow up the plane, no one could have prevented me'. "
However, this 'gentle' mode of hijacking seems to have become an archaic tactic, converting the hostages from being pawns on the terrorism chess board to dispensable targets. This is emphasized by the transition from 'rolling action' to 'immediate action'. 'Immediate action', which includes ground attack, ground or air sabotage, MANPADS attack and suicide attacks, is characterized by the fact that no negotiation takes place within the latter mode of air terrorism, unlike 'rolling terrorism', which refers to a negotiation process in which hostages are released after the release of jailed terrorists.
The practice of abandoning the hostage exchange tactic and moving to an 'immediate action' tactic is indicated by the following figure:
Despite the dramatic increase of 'immediate action' incidents, as indicated in the figure above (left side), the number of casualties has not increased dramatically, except for in the 11 September attacks. This evidence can be explained by the fact that some of the counted 'immediate action' casualties are not known, such as in the case of the Georgian Airways TU-134 MANPADS attack (20 September 1993).
Another explanation is that the figure above includes failed attempts, such as the Nezar Hindawi case (17 April 1986), the Air-India flight 301 sabotage attempt where the bomb exploded at Narita airport and the TWA mid-air sabotage (2 April 1986) with only four casualties. Should the aircraft have exploded, the number of casualties would have reached more than a hundred. The same is true of Richard Reid's attempt to blow up the American Airlines Boeing 767 in mid-air (22 December 2001). In other words, the figure above indicates the unquestionable dramatic rise of 'immediate action' incidents.
Regarding the number of casualties, the figure indicates actual casualties rather than potential casualties. It is obvious that the terrorists who committed the 'immediate action' attacks were aiming at causing mass casualties, otherwise they would have chosen a 'softer' tactic, such as hijacking. As indicated, the impact of 'immediate action' and adopting the aerial suicide mission represents the mass-casualty potential of such a tactic, as demonstrated by Al-Qaeda on September 11th, 2001.
From this point of view, it would be worthwhile dividing the term 'immediate action' into two. The first is sabotaging the aircraft or downing it with MANPADS and the second is using the aircraft as a guided missile to be crashed into selected targets. As to the former tactic, it is a practice that was generally linked to secular terrorist organizations, such as the PFLP-GC, UNITA, Sikh terrorists (who are not defined as 'fundamentally religious'), North Korean terrorists (who are definitely not 'fundamentalist religious terrorists') and state-involvement such as in the cases of Libya (the Pan-Am sabotage) and Syria (the 'Nezar Hindawi' case, April 1986). Regarding the PFLP-GC, one may argue that Jibril's cooperation with the Iranians in the late 1980s may represent a fundamentalist affiliation. This argument has no solid ground, since Jibril was the first Palestinian to adopt the sabotage tactic using barometric triggers, in which he specialized. In that period, (early 1970's), there was no fundamentalist Islamic influence since the Iranian revolution took place only in 1979, so the general affiliation of the PFLP-GC was secular and Marxist-Leninist orientated.
Focusing on MANPADS, this tactic was adopted by fundamentalist religious terrorists such as Al-Qaeda only in the third millennium, first in the Mombassa incident (2002) and later in Iraq (DHL cargo Airbus in 2003). From this point of view, one may find reinforcement to Wilkinson's (2001) argument as to the role of secular terrorism in terrorist activities. Yet, as these tactics were adopted by fundamentalist religious terrorist organizations, such as the Ramzi Yousef's 'Bojinka' plot to use a dozen US airliners and blow them up in mid-air (Bergman, 2006), one has to consider the magnitude of the plan regarding the potential number of casualties that could have resulted should this plan have been carried out.[ii]
As emphasized by the latest events, religious terrorist attacks constitute a far greater casualty potential than secular terrorism due to the spiritual fundamentalist ideology, which is characterized by far greater objectives than national liberation. In addition, fundamentalist ideology contains a philosophy that deals with culture clash and therefore it is more global rather than a fight for the liberation of a specific territory. Therefore, the combination of spiritual belief and global philosophy makes religious terrorism far more dangerous than a national liberation struggle. This fact was emphasized by Hoffman (1998) arguing that in 1995, for example, 25 per cent of total international terrorist attacks were conducted by religious fundamentalist terrorist groups and caused 58 per cent of all casualties that same year.[iii]
On the other hand, it is worthwhile mentioning that fundamentalist religious terrorist organizations also used 'traditional tactics' such as hijacking, as in the case of TWA's flight 847 hijacking to Beirut (June 1985) or HUM's (Harakat Ul-Mujahidin) hijacking of the Air-India Airbus (24 December 1999). These organizations are Islamic orientated fundamentalists and HUM is a member of Osama Bin Laden's international Islamic front. Despite this fact, HUM used 'rolling action' (hijacking) rather than 'immediate action' (total destruction by using the aircraft as a flying missile).[iv] Still, actual evidence shows that the practice of using the aircraft as a flying missile is exclusively affiliated with fundamentalist religious terrorism frameworks.
Despite the fact that the first to crash an aircraft into a strategic target were the Japanese Kamikaze ('Divine Wind') during the Second World War, it was not considered terrorism since it was aimed at military targets. Another incident was an attempt rather than an actual suicide mission - in 1972, in what is considered a criminally-orientated hijacking of the Southern Airways jet en route from Birmingham, Alabama (USA) to Montgomery, hijackers threatened to crash a Boeing 727 into the Oak Ridge nuclear reactor. Yet, these incidents were not terrorist-orientated events, so Bin-Laden's 2001 attack is the first ever example of using an aircraft as a flying missile.
Regarding aerial terrorism per-se, previous incidents showed some evidence as to terrorists' intentions to use the aircraft as a flying missile. For example, in the TWA Boeing 727 hijacking to Beirut by Amal/Hezbollah (June 1985) there were rumors that the terrorists had plans to crash the jet following Beirut airport's refusal to permit the jet to land and that the terrorists announced that they were 'suicide terrorists' and would crash the jet into the Ba'abda presidential palace. The same is true of the Pan-Am hijacking by Abu Nidal on 5 September 1986 where it was believed that the terrorists intended to crash the Jumbo jet into the center of Tel-Aviv. There was also the attempted El-Al hijacking by college student Taufik Fukra (18 November 2002) who told Turkish interrogators he had planned to divert the jet back to Tel-Aviv and crash it into a building, in imitation of the attacks on the World Trade Centre.[v]