Lower weight 106 Squadron bomb loads:
112 x 30-lb incendiaries (3.360 lbs nominal total, consisting of 14 x 8 x 30-lb SBC) carried in late 1942 and early 1943
1,260 x 4-lb incendiaries (5,040 lbs nominal total, consisting of 14 x 90 x 4-lb SBC) carried in late 1942 and early 1943
5 x 1,000-lb bombs (5,000 lbs nominal total) carried in late 1942.
Thanks for the details, I did not think even to Italy in 1942 the loads fell that far. I went and looked at the monthly totals, average Lancaster load at night, the October page is hard to read.
Average Lancaster load at night
October 1942, 6,083 pounds, 517 sorties bombed, 726 tons HE, 677.9 tons Incendiary.
November 1942, 4,908 pounds, 602 sorties bombed, 640.2 tons HE, 679 tons Incendiary.
December 1942, 6,006 pounds, 564 sorties bombed, 620.9 tons HE, 891.3 tons Incendiary.
Average Halifax load at night
October 1942, 5,799 pounds, 332 sorties bombed, 375.8 tons HE, 483.7 tons Incendiary.
November 1942, 4,077 pounds, 262 sorties bombed, 229 tons HE, 247.9 tons Incendiary.
December 1942, 4,998 pounds, 221 sorties bombed, 200.2 tons HE, 291.9 tons Incendiary.
They were dropping many more 1,000 pound bombs than 500 pound ones, around 40% of Lancasters carrying a 4,000 pound bomb, I am wondering if there was a shortage of bombs at the time.
However, all bomber types,
October 1942, 258 night sorties attacked targets in Italy, 1,230 targets in Germany.
November 1942, 843 night sorties attacked targets in Italy, 487 targets in Germany.
December 1942, 698 night sorties attacked targets in Italy, 355 targets in Germany.
The all Lancaster force that bombed Milan by day on 24 October carried an average of 3,992 pounds of bombs, all up 51.8 tons HE 87.2 tons Incendiary. Harry Holmes in his Lancaster book noted in early 1942 the Lancaster maximum weight was 60,000 pounds, rising to 63,000 pounds by November, allowing a bigger bomb load.
The B-17 could carry 8,000 lbs internally, but this had to be 8 x 1,000-lb SAP bombs; only 6 x 1,000-lb GP bombs could fit.
According to B-17 bomb loads for the 401st Bomb Squadron of the 91st Bomb Group for Nov. 1942 through June 1944:
10 x 500-lb bombs (21.9% of sorties)
12 x 500-lb bombs (18.6% of sorties)
42 x 100-lb incendiaries (12.0% of sorties)
5 x 1,000-lb bombs (11.5% of sorties)
6 x 1,000-lb bombs (6.0% of sorties)
Many references use the 12,600 pounds of 1,600 pound AP as the B-17 and B-24 maximum internal load. Few SAP bombs were dropped by the USAAF in Europe so the HE capacity ruled. The list of bomb loads only covers 70% of sorties but averages to close to the wartime ones. The 15th Air Force Target and Duty Sheets normally give the type of bombs dropped or at least their weights, by group, but I have not done an analysis.
None of which change the losses to AAA ...and they still generally outweigh the losses to fighters except for heavy bombers, where they are about equal.
So there are no examples of flak guns causing the sorts of casualties to USAAF heavy bombers that fighters did.
I am trying to figure out if you are trying to be the comedy relief on this topic. You are aware that the most dangerous animal to humans in many countries, after humans themselves of course, is the horse, based on the number of people they kill. Or maybe local herbivores like deer when they collide with vehicles. After all sharks kill only around 70 people per year world wide. Time to send the horse and deer types extinct to reduce the risks to humans. As long as you believe death numbers have nothing to do with the number of opportunities for a fatal interaction you can go and feed the bears in the wild, they are safer, they kill fewer people each year, so do tigers, lions and even polar bears the last land carnivore that still treats humans as just meat, the other land carnivores have worked out killing apes of the hairless kind results in lots of hairless apes coming after you.
Meantime people can go look at the USAAF Statistical digest and note in 1942 the average effective 8th Air Force Heavy Bomber sortie fired about 2,272 rounds, in 1943 1,326, in 1944 236, in 1945 107, or alternatively can note of the 66,115 effective heavy bomber sorties to end May 1944 1,749 or 2.65% are listed as lost to enemy aircraft and 675 or 1.02% to flak. This represents under a quarter of total sorties flown. June 1944 to May 1945 has 208,806 sorties, 703 lost to enemy aircraft or 0.34% and 1,746 lost to flak or 0.84%. So to June 1944 the threat to the heavy bombers by fighters was 7.8 times that of the rest of the war, the threat by flak 1.2 times. The allies, mostly the USAAF, were quite successful in removing the threat of USAAF heavy bombers being intercepted for over 75% of the sorties flown.
Since we are into statistics projecting the future, continue the 2.65% loss rate to the end of the war and that is 5,533 heavy bombers, an increase of 4,830, upping total 8th Air Force losses from flak and fighters to 9,721 versus 4,891 in reality and a not quite 3 bombers lost to fighter for every one to flak.
There is almost nothing random about a wartime aircraft mission.
The plans were not random but in statistical terms there is plenty random, who is flying that day, how accurately the aircraft are being navigated/guided, what can be seen when there are some clouds around, the weather itself particularly at the target, whether decoy missions work or surprise is kept, like overflying an unexpected ship on approaching the coast. Who is higher and ahead when hostile formations come into sight, where the sun is relative to the formations and so on. Examples like which city and which part of that city was hit by the second atomic bomb. The Germans knew the USAAF was after Ploesti from radio intercepts, then came navigation errors. The first Schweinfurt timetable derailed by fog. Operation Pedestal, after leaving Gibraltar being spotted by a French airliner, which then decided to tell the world. In 1945 the low level Mosquito raid on Copenhagen, one lost so close to the target some of the formation thought the in session girl's school it crashed into was the actual target. The 17 April 1942 Augsburg raid, low level, 12 Lancasters, one formation accidentally encountered German fighters. The Hurricane pilot taking off alone in France in May 1940, flying around Sedan to see what a breakthrough looked like while listening to the BBC and then encountering hostile aircraft, but below him.
Go research how many times a flight of ONE fast photo-reconnaissance aircraft was successfully found and attacked and get back with me. It isn't very often. So, sure, I'll agree with you for large formations of escorted bombers. But I disagree strongly with your contention for small formations of fighters and/or fast bombers with a specific target. They almost always got through, and were planned so they also usually got through with the element of surprise.
Is this allied or axis interceptors? And fast is what in absolute and relative terms? To spell it out flying in a single high speed aircraft has much less chance of being fired at than one of a large formation of slower and probably lower aircraft, even if it is hostile airspace for longer than any of the formation. Compare like with like.
Have you read the history of RAF 2 Group, given its many attempts to attack targets in small formations, the times none of the Blenheims came back, the Knapsack raid on 12 August 1941, 54 Blenheims sent 10 MIA. Plenty of what were then considered fast Blenheim reconnaissance sorties did not come back in 1939/41. The ultimate WWII fast bomber was the Mosquito, in about a year of mostly low level small size day missions, 726 sent, 144 aborts, 48 MIA, 6.6% of those sent, 8.2% of those credited with attacking.
The shift in goal posts from things that effect the chances of interception to "getting through" is fun, the 1943 Schweinfurt missions got through, the USAAF B-26 mission that lost all of its aircraft might have got through, that is some of the aircraft might have bombed before being shot down.
Since you are the one saying everyone else is wrong, "Go research how many times... and get back to" us. ETO/MTO. Start with heavy bomber formations mauled by flak guns like they were mauled by fighters. The 9th Air force ran thousands of small fighter formation specific missions, on top of the armed reconnaissance ones, they almost always got through, surprise was helped by the targets usually being so close to the front line.