Battle of Britain Hurricane or Wildcat

[pbfoot]

One way of looking at it, though, was that the production contract for the first batch of F4F3s was awarded in August 1939 If the US had been at war then, like the UK was, there is little doubt that the Wildcat could have been operational in late summer 1940. That is a stretch but the two AC were somewhat contemporaneous. Another point is that the F4F3 with all protected tanks carried 147 gallons of internal fuel. I don't believe the Hurricane carried that much and all tanks were not protected. If I had been a pilot, that point alone would have made me choose the Wildcat.

But how are you getting the things to the UK , none of the Ferry route airstrips were operational

 

[buffnut453]

Thanks for covering my 6 Waynos.

The other factor that must be considered is that pilots don't get to choose the aircraft that are procured (this is linked to Renrich's comment). To do so would ignore a host of logistics issues that have to be factored into the procurement process. The aircraft itself may be a world-beater but if it's permanently grounded because it's too hard to maintain, then it ain't much use. I'm not saying this was the case with the F4F but some of the potential logistic challenges have already been identified in this thread. At risk of re-stating:

1. Different weapons unless the Spit was also to be armed with 50 cals(although, again, there was a sweeping assumption that there would be enough 50cals in the UK - again, a huge hypothetical)
2. Different tools - US and UK imperial measures are different, presenting niggling problems for maintainers trying to support both aircraft types (with resultant flight safety issues)
3. Different engines which complicate interoperability, including different starting mechanisms
4. Deep repair of aircraft - the Hurri and Spit could be rebuilt at various factories, even when considerably damaged, whereas no such provision would exist for the Wildcat
5. Resupply of replacement airframes - as with #4, new Wildcats would be delivered at the end of an extremely long and fragile resupply route whereas Hurris were built on the island (or are we now to assume, hypothetically, that British factories would licence-build US aircraft - something that has absolutely no precedent!)

A couple of final points that haven't yet been raised related to the Wildcat's undercarriage. I wonder whether the Wildcat's undercarriage would have presented issues on the RAF's grass airfields. I know it was designed to take a lot of stress from carrier landings but it's rather narrow and the aircraft's CofG is relatively high which would suggest a risk of ground-looping. It's probably a trivial point but I still wonder...also, I wouldn't want to be a pilot taking off in the middle of a bombing raid and having to hand crank my undercarriage. The infamous "Wildcat Wobble" would have a whole new connotation!

I don't doubt that having 50cals in the BoB would have been a huge advantage, and I don't doubt that the F4F-3 was a better aircraft than the Hurri MkI but I still have issues with the sweeping hypotheticals that make the entire comparison irrelevant.

 

[buffnut453]

In addition much better visibility for gunnery

Renrich, methinks you're stretching a point here. How did the F4F offer "much better visibility" than the Hurricane? Both had framed canopies that were faired into spines along the top of the fuselage. Sounds like they were much of a muchness when it came to pilot visibility.

 

[Shortround6]

The Martlet first showed up in squadron service about 2 months before the MK II Hurricane which might balance out the performance a bit. Some web sites claim the early versions had feed troubles with the .50 cal guns.

 

[buffnut453]

One way of looking at it, though, was that the production contract for the first batch of F4F3s was awarded in August 1939 If the US had been at war then, like the UK was, there is little doubt that the Wildcat could have been operational in late summer 1940. That is a stretch but the two AC were somewhat contemporaneous. Another point is that the F4F3 with all protected tanks carried 147 gallons of internal fuel. I don't believe the Hurricane carried that much and all tanks were not protected. If I had been a pilot, that point alone would have made me choose the Wildcat.

Sorry, Renrich...I'm not picking on you but, again, some of these statements are simply not justifiable. From first contract award to delviery of the first F4F-3 prototype was about 6 months which is damned fast by anyone's measure - it would be hard to improve on that even if the US was at war. If the Wildcat could have been operational in the summer of 1940, surely the USN would have made it so? As it was, at least according to Wikipedia (so probably not true...but it illustrates my point), there was only one fully equipped squadron of F4F-3s at the time of Pearl Harbor. While the Hurricane and Wildcat had overlapping periods of operational effectiveness, one must also consider the pace of technological development...and the fact that the Hurricane was in combat before the Wildcat even entered service. The first prototype Wildcat wasn't finished until Feb 40 - there's no way it could become a viable operational aircraft across more than half of Fighter Command in the time available.

I'd also like to re-engage on the subject of armament. According to 'Cactus Air Force', the early F4Fs suffered frequent gun stoppages during air combat manoeuvring. Heavier theoretical firepower is no use if it fails you in combat. In addition, according to Kinney (who flew the aircraft at Wake), the aircraft assigned to VMF-211 had neither armour plate nor self-sealing fuel tanks - and that was in Nov 41!

So, was the performance advantage that great? It sounds like the figures for the F4F-3 are for an airframe unburdened by armour plate or self-sealing fuel tanks, and the theoretical advantage of 50cals was undone by the stoppages caused by combat manouevres in the early aircraft.

 

[vanir]

Shortround is a much better expert on guns than me, so correct me if I'm wrong but weren't the 8-gun armament considered to have the same take down ability, upon a relatively unarmoured aircraft as four fifties in terms of projectile weight laid on the target in a given time? The documentation I have is clear in providing the British reasoning of reliability, at the time the decision was made the .50 was considered relatively untested. Also the preferred armament was always going to be four Hispanos but I don't know, something about the feed systems.

Also noteworthy once again is that improved armouring happened during the course of the BoB, Hurricanes had no trouble shooting down Heinkells for the most part, it was towards the end of the conflict that German bombers were more heavily armoured and subsequent Hurris were upgunned to compensate. I've seen people post timeframes on the addition of increased cockpit floor armour on the He-111 before, for example, can't remember if it was at this site.

And with hits, more guns gives a better spread to a larger degree outside convergence would appear the obvious argument. I'm sure I've read somewhere the Hurri was particularly useful in hitting targets hard well inside convergence range, whilst it was actually difficult not to hit something or other with at least a few rounds from a Spit. It was a matter of aim at the wing root a little outside convergence and hit the pilot, the engine, the tailplane, the aircraft behind him...

 

[JoeB]

Joe I accept your position of the hurricane vis a viz Japanese fighters, but against the european axis aircraft, the Hurricane was quite effective. The obvious comparison has to be Hurricane versus Me 109e. I would suggest the Me 109 had the advantage overall, but the margin was not as great as the straight up performance figures might suggest. the hurri remained a competitive fighter well into 1941. .

The Hurricane didn't necessarily do as poorly on average v Bf109 but distinctly less than 1 kill ratio, and some periods and episodes much worse. Also complicating the comparison is the Spitfire/Hurricane team in many cases in ETO v Hurricane by itself in Far East. So again the overall Hurricane record v Type 1 in 1942 and 43 was around 1:4 against the Hurricane (19:81), and actually showed no trend of improvement between those two years (slightly worse in 1943). But the Hurricane's record v Bf109E in Battle of France,mainly on its own, was worse than [1:3 (54:171, SORRY THAT'S A TYPO, IT'S 74:151 SO 1:2]). In the period of Bf109E operations over Malta in early 1941 v Hurricane only it was 30:0 in favor of the 109's in fighter-fighter combat. An obviously exceptional unit was involved (7./JG26, single staffel <10 a/c strong responsible for most of those kills) but that's still a remarkable result. The kill ratio in North Africa in Hurricane v 109E period was also in favor of 109 more than somewhat, though not as onesided as Malta. So the Far East results aren't actually that far out of line with Hurricane on-own statsv Bf109E in Europe, though probably worse on average overall.

OTOH though a fairly indirect comparison, Hawk 75, a relatively similar a/c to the F4F, had a much better ratio in the Battle of France v the Bf109E than the Hurricane (23:38 ). Source of BoF stats is the new book "Battle of France Then and Now". The Hawk (Mowhawk) also did notably better in Burma than the Hurricane v Type 1, 8 kills for 7 losses, smaller sample but enough of a discrepancy v Hurricane's result to indicate a difference. F4F v Hawk of course occurred over Morocco in Nov 1942 and was distinctly in F4F's favor, too few combats to draw much conclusion quantitatively, but I can't see an argument that the Hawk was a much better a/c than the F4F.

I still don't see any reason to go for the Hurricane over F4F in pretty much any situation, assuming you can have the same number of each (a big if for mid 1940, no doubt). The basic stats (and F4F was also highly manueverable) are not in the Hurricane's favor particularly, and the combat records suggest a strong intangibles advantage to the F4F. I don't see any reason that would play out radically differently in case of opponent like Bf109E than the Japanese a/c, and the proxy evidence of Hawk 75 doesn't indicate it.

Joe

 

[Cromwell]

I'd also like to re-engage on the subject of armament. According to 'Cactus Air Force', the early F4Fs suffered frequent gun stoppages during air combat manoeuvring. Heavier theoretical firepower is no use if it fails you in combat. In addition, according to Kinney (who flew the aircraft at Wake), the aircraft assigned to VMF-211 had neither armour plate nor self-sealing fuel tanks - and that was in Nov 41! .

I think the .50 cal had a problem with jamming in other planes too - like the Mustang

I found this on P-51 Mustang - The Call of Duty Wiki - Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, Call of Duty 4, Call of Duty 2, characters, and more :-

"Unfortunately, the 50's were placed at an angle in the wings, causing jamming problems after heavy maneuverings. Most of the Mustangs A's were shipped to the CBI, where they performed escort to the B-24 Bombers stationed there. "

 

[Markus]

Shortround is a much better expert on guns than me, so correct me if I'm wrong but weren't the 8-gun armament considered to have the same take down ability, upon a relatively unarmoured aircraft as four fifties in terms of projectile weight laid on the target in a given time? The documentation I have is clear in providing the British reasoning of reliability, at the time the decision was made the .50 was considered relatively untested. Also the preferred armament was always going to be four Hispanos but I don't know, something about the feed systems.

That is the problem. RCMG are fine for shooting at ill-protected A/C but once the war began A/C got better and better protection. As the test showed a 4mm armour plate could stop an AP round and the RAF was short of AP rounds by the time of the BoB.

@renrich: IIRC a Hurricane carried just under 90 gallons of fuel.

 

[Vincenzo]

Yep


To the earlier point from another poster about greater probability of 8 x .303s hitting the target over 4 x .50s, well, if both sets of guns are harmonised the way you want them, what's the difference between missing the target with one set over the other? If you've missed, you've missed.

hitting probability it's different and for me higher for 8 .303s because you've 160 rounds on air a second in this case and 52 rounds a second with 4 .50s, but sure the efficency it's a favour to .50s set because the energy of round it's more high (over 6 times higher for AP, much more for API)

 

[Colin1]

hitting probability it's different and for me higher for 8 .303s because you've 160 rounds on air a second in this case and 52 rounds a second with 4 .50s, but sure the efficency it's a favour to .50s set because the energy of round it's more high (over 6 times higher for AP, much more for API)

Agree with you generally
still think if you're a lousy shot you're a lousy shot; spraying the point in space where the aircraft used to be won't be helped by greater weight of fire. The advantage of going after bombers is that they are limited in their evasive manoeuvres, the efficiency of the .50s would tell significantly. Bombers that made it back to France with 'thousands of .303 bullet holes in them' very likely wouldn't have under an assault from .50s.

I'm not the ballistics man on here but don't .50 cal rounds travel faster at a flatter trajectory? That might solve alot of deflection issues for novice pilots.

 

[buffnut453]

I think the .50 cal had a problem with jamming in other planes too - like the Mustang[/I]

There were problems with 50cals jamming in several aircraft installations immediately following US entry into the war. Examples include the P-51 you cite above, the P-36, P-40 and, of course, the Buffalo.

 

[renrich]

It is all a fantasy since the F4F3 was not in Britain at the time of the BOB. Could it have been? Possibly. Would it have been effective if it had been? Probably. On paper would it have been more effective than the Hurricane? Seems so.

The F4F3 was more heavily armed. See Eric Brown for comparison between Wildcat and Hurricane. It had a better rate of climb and at least a good performance at altitude. I said it had better visibility for gunnery. One reason that the RAF did not train their pilots for full deflection shooting was because of poor visibility over the nose. The USN did train for full deflection shooting because the Wildcat did have good visibility over the nose. See Lundstrom for a discussion of deflection shooting in "The First Team." The Wildcat with protected tanks was much more survivable than the Hurricane. The Wildcat had much longer firing time with it's guns. The Wildcat could have gotten to Britain the same way the SB2Us (French V-156) got to France in August, 1939. On board ships. The spares could have come on the ships just like the V-156 spares.

Early Wildcats in WW2 and also P51Bs did have jamming problems with the 50 BMGs but it was not a problem with the guns but with the feed system. The P51 problems were not as easily remedied as those with the Wildcats. The Wildcat problems had not shown up earlier because they had not flown with full ammo trays.

Still a fantasy. The Wildcat was not available. The BOB was won with Hurricanes and Spitfires. Britain was saved because the German commanders knew that they could not invade successfully in 1940 because of the RN and Hitler had no real appetite for the invasion anyway. Too bad the Wildcat could not have been available in a few squadrons at least. Maybe more RAF pilots survive and more LW crew die.

 

[buffnut453]

Sorry, Renrich, but I'm going to disagree again. The Wildcat could not have been ready in time for the BoB. There's no "possibly" about it, which is why I fail to understand the point of this thread.

As for the question about armament reliability, it's largely irrelevant whether it was the guns or the ammo chutes that were at fault. The problem was not discovered until much later in the service life of the F4F.

Again, the Wildcat didn't have protected fuel tanks until much later in its life - the back end of 1941 at the earliest.

Finally, I'm wondering about your statement "Maybe more RAF pilots survive and more LW crew die." I hope it's just a function of rapid typing rather than a statement to be taken at face value - it it's the latter, then it's a pretty crass thing to say on an international forum.

 

[pbfoot]

. One reason that the RAF did not train their pilots for full deflection shooting was because of poor visibility over the nose. The USN did train for full deflection shooting because the Wildcat did have good visibility over the nose. See Lundstrom for a discussion of deflection shooting in "The First Team."

Bull S**T where do you think you learnt the art of deflection shooting , I 've seen you post this many times and the US forces were taught deflection shooting and aerial combat by the RFC in Texas in 1917-18 and by the RFCIC in Canada during the same period. Now i gotta go to library to get my references.

 

[buffnut453]

Thanks PBFoot, you reminded me of another point I wanted to make.

I think the "Fighting Area Tactics" had more impact on training of RAF fighter pilots than anything else. I've certainly never seen any statements to support your assertion that the RAF didn't go in for deflection shooting or that it was the aircraft that prompted such a tactical approach. Can Renrich cite some sources, please, to justify his statement?

 

[Markus]

I'm not the ballistics man on here but don't .50 cal rounds travel faster at a flatter trajectory? That might solve alot of deflection issues for novice pilots.

The muzzle velocity of a 40´s cal.50 was 840 to 860 m/s, that of a a cal.303 was 760 m/s.

 

[renrich]

No need for expletives. What was taught in WW1 has nothing to do with the training and AC in WW2. Go to page 458 Lundstrom, "The First Team" and read the Appendix 2, "Fundamentals of Fixed Aerial Gunnery" Especially read the second paragraph on page 467. I had sore wrists after trying to maneuver my hands in a 90 degree deflection run.

 

[buffnut453]

Oh, and while I'm at it, one final point which I missed in Renrich's earlier post:

The Wildcat could have gotten to Britain the same way the SB2Us (French V-156) got to France in August, 1939. On board ships. The spares could have come on the ships just like the V-156 spares.

How many ships would be required to provide sufficient Wildcats and spares to equip and sustain more than 60% of Fighter Command? That's around 35 squadrons each with at least 18 aircraft at the front line. On top of that, the RAF needed an reserve of airframes to replace operational losses which probably amounted to 50% (give or take) of the front-line strength, and you'd need to factor in aircraft in deep maintanance or undergoing depot- or factory-level repairs (typically around 20-30% depending on flying hours). Then you've got to keep replacement airframes flowing to the UK despite the U-boat threat, and that's not factoring in provision of spares (every nut, bolt, component to keep the aircraft flying) or aircraft in Operational Training Units. Sustaining a force of this size is a vastly different proposition to your cited example of the V-156 (which amounted to just 24 airframes and no enduring spares provision).

 

[buffnut453]

No need for expletives. What was taught in WW1 has nothing to do with the training and AC in WW2. Go to page 458 Lundstrom, "The First Team" and read the Appendix 2, "Fundamentals of Fixed Aerial Gunnery" Especially read the second paragraph on page 467. I had sore wrists after trying to maneuver my hands in a 90 degree deflection run.

Don't disagree the USN trained hard in deflection shooting but where's your source to justify the statement that the length of the Hurricane's nose prevented deflection shooting (oh, and if you're deflection shooting then you're in a turning fight which would cause your 50cal ammo trays to jam in a Wildcat!). Please can we have some sources to back up these statements about RAF air gunnery?