Battle of the Denmark Straights, what if..

Purely a what if, but how do you think the Battle would have evolved if ADM Holland had flagged the battle from Prince of Wales and not Hood?

If Hood had been sunk, would have continued with PoW and continued to engage Bismark?

No, the POW had problems with her guns and could not continue the fight even if they wanted to.

Opinion:
The Prince of Wales would have ended up as a flaming wreck or sunk. Most likely sunk.
The Bismarck would have been severely damaged if she had not tried to run away.

On the assumption that all damage that was historically inflicted on Bismarck would still happen and additional damage would result from a longer battle, Bismarck may not have been able to run for as long as she did.

If Bismarck did not take the waterline hit in the bow from PoW and took no other hits on or below the waterline, she should have been able to escape.

More What If:
What if Admiral Leutjens had chosen to take on a full load of fuel before the beginning of the mission?
What if Prince of Wales did not have the historical armament issues?

My own opinion is that a single King George V class battleship is nearly an even match for Bismarck class.
Although their main gun calibers are different, the weight of their broadsides is very close and when ships are that evenly matched, my expectation is that in a fight to the finish, one is destroyed and the other is crippled.
Of course there is also Prinz Eugen and while she is not a match in a BB fight, she is not a small ship and probably carried torpedoes to make things interesting.

- Ivan.

There were problems galore from the british perspective. You have one BB (the PoW) not worked up properly, with many of the onboard systems not functioning or breaking down during the battle. Unlike KM capital ships, where about 6 months was spent to train the crews and get them to work as an integrated team, the RN had a nasty habit of sending ships into action with crews not fully integrated. The crews were a good mix of old salts and new chumps, but the crews were not worked up to work as a team.


As a consequence, the PoW could not be viewed as a ship ready for combat, much less a ship able to act as flagship in a Task Group. if the PoW had been the designated flagship it is unlikely the TG would even have been capable of getting into the fight, and if it did was not capable of excercising an effective C&C function on a sustained basis. The command system of the TG is not just the admiral, though he is important, it has to be the supporting executive staff as well, and the relative 'newness" of the PoW staff meant this would have been a function they would have struggled with.


The hoods shortcoming stem from the age of the ship. She was revolutionary in 1916 when designed, but she had not been properly modernised since then. She was an experienced and well trained unit, well able to fill the roles of flagship in the TG, but ther levels of protection were so poor in 1941 that she was well out of her depth when ranged against a top shelf opponent like the Bismarck.

Regarding the "Mighty Hood", there should be a little more background.
The original plan for the British was to build several very large (for the time) battlecruisers of the Admiral class.
I don't remember how many but expect the total number would probably have been 4 as was British custom.
They liked the idea of an entire division of identical ships. Hood was the first.

The problem was that at Jutland, the vulnerability of the battlecruiser became rather obvious with the destruction of
Indefatigable, Queen Mary, Invincible and the very near loss of Lion.
While the Indefatigable and Invincible were fairly old ships, the Queen Mary was not and the Lion was flagship of the Battlecruiser Squadron.

That led to updates to the Hood which was under construction.
By the end of the war, the need was no longer there but it would have been bad for morale purposes to scrap a ship that was so far along so she was completed in 1920. She was the last battlecruiser built by the British which shows the degree of faith they had in the concept.
Her size and speed were her only real assets. Her gun power was easily matched by quite a few other ships and her armour was obviously not adequate. She was definitely pretty though....

- Ivan.

Ivan1GFP said:

My own opinion is that a single King George V class battleship is nearly an even match for Bismarck class.
Although their main gun calibers are different, the weight of their broadsides is very close and when ships are that evenly matched, my expectation is that in a fight to the finish, one is destroyed and the other is crippled.
Of course there is also Prinz Eugen and while she is not a match in a BB fight, she is not a small ship and probably carried torpedoes to make things interesting.

- Ivan.

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Could be or it could be that the first to land a hit that knocks out the ranging equipment can pulverise the other with little accurate return fire.

pbehn said:

Could be or it could be that the first to land a hit that knocks out the ranging equipment can pulverise the other with little accurate return fire.

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You are assuming that there is only a single range finder and director position. There are many of varying size and quality.
I do find it very interesting that Bismarck lost two main gun turrets to a single large caliber hit during her final battle.
Prince of Wales did not have to win a 1 v 1.5 fight. It just had to damage Bismarck's seaworthiness and the German would never make it home.
Think about how things actually turned out: A single hit at the waterline in Bismarck's bow contaminated a significant quantity of her fuel AND prevented her from making better speed to get away. That hit did not impact her fighting ability and had no chance of sinking her.

Bismarck as I see it was never the toughest kid on the block much as popular literature makes her out to be. People who don't know any better equate size with power and that is why Bismarck and Hood were the "most powerful". I believe the reality was a bit different.
She was basically a much enlarged and faster update of the Baden / Bayern class from the Great War.

Consider what else was afloat when she was commissioned.
With 4 x 2 x 15 inch guns, she was matched in gun power by Hood and any of the Queen Elizabeth class and quite a few of the older British battleships as well.
Nagato, Mutsu had 4 x 2 x 16 inch.
Nelson and Rodney had 3 x 3 x 16 inch.
As mentioned earlier, King George V class had ONLY 14 inch guns, but although the caliber was smaller, they threw shells that were much heavier than typical for a 14 inch gun.
USA was not in the war, but they had the Colorado class and in a year would have the North Carolinas.

Also, when comparing displacement of these ships, recognize that the treaty measurement was "standard displacement" and often that is the number that is quoted in books. Most countries tended to cheat on those numbers to some extent. The US in particular tended to understate the numbers by a fair amount. The original design may have been within treaty limits, but as built, they were heavier.

Look further and see what the deep load displacement is. The navies tended to play games with standard displacement. A ship might only specify 50 rounds per main gun in standard displacement but actually be capable of carrying 150 rounds per main gun (hypothetical numbers). When she sails, it is highly unlikely she will only be carrying 50 rounds per main gun.
When this system of understating capacities is carried across many ship's systems, the difference can be quite a lot of tonnage.

Gun power takes a certain amount of tonnage.
Protection also takes tonnage.
Interestingly, Speed takes a LOT of size and tonnage.
Before the Great War, the British had a practice of building a battleship and then building its battlecruiser counterpart. The battlecruiser would be significantly larger and generally displace a bit more but also carry less armament and much less armour.

- Ivan.

Ivan1GFP said:

Regarding the "Mighty Hood", there should be a little more background.
The original plan for the British was to build several very large (for the time) battlecruisers of the Admiral class.
I don't remember how many but expect the total number would probably have been 4 as was British custom.
They liked the idea of an entire division of identical ships. Hood was the first.

The problem was that at Jutland, the vulnerability of the battlecruiser became rather obvious with the destruction of
Indefatigable, Queen Mary, Invincible and the very near loss of Lion.
While the Indefatigable and Invincible were fairly old ships, the Queen Mary was not and the Lion was flagship of the Battlecruiser Squadron.

That led to updates to the Hood which was under construction.
By the end of the war, the need was no longer there but it would have been bad for morale purposes to scrap a ship that was so far along so she was completed in 1920. She was the last battlecruiser built by the British which shows the degree of faith they had in the concept.
Her size and speed were her only real assets. Her gun power was easily matched by quite a few other ships and her armour was obviously not adequate. She was definitely pretty though....

- Ivan.

Click to expand...

There are some elements of this account that deserve further clarification.

Design
The experiences at Jutland were largely coincidental to the preparation of the hood design.

Hood was designed specifically to overcome the protection issues that affected the older BCs that had fought at Jutland but which were known well before that time. But this wasn't even the main concern at the time. Hoods design actually began well before Jutland

in the Autumn of 1915, the Admiralty instructed the Director of Naval Construction (DNC), Sir Eustace Tennyson-d'Eyncourt, to prepare design proposals for a new experimental fast battleship.

The goal of Sir Eustace's designers was to envision something decidedly superior to the current generation of ships. A number of key wartime deficiencies and problems common to many warships had been observed. The most prevalent of these were the combination of low freeboard and high draught – Due to increased war time loads (extra provisions, personnel, fuel and ammunition), many vessels were operating at heavier weights than originally planned. The extra weight caused potentially serious problems: ships now sat so low in the water, that in rough seas, secondary armament batteries (usually mounted in rows "cut" into the hull sides) were frequently awash. This often made the guns unusable and significantly detracted from a vessel's firepower potential. It also contributed to poor sea keeping, as notable quantities of sea water would penetrate the hulls around the gun battery openings, resulting in even more weight to deal with. The resulting high draught seriously degraded some vessels' abilities to operate in shallow waters. Accordingly, the designers were told to ensure that the new vessels incorporated the necessary features of high freeboard, high-mounted secondary armament and shallow draught. Additionally, the ships had to make in excess of 30 knots and use the new 15" main gun system.

Between the fall of 1915 and early 1916, multiple battleship designs (differences/variations in length, beam, draught, armour, machinery and performance) were prepared. About this time, the requirement was changed at the behest of Admiral Jellicoe, from that of a fast battleship to a large battle cruiser. This change was influenced in part by recently confirmed reports of German plans to construct a new class of "super battle cruisers."

The vessels of the Imperial fleets Mackenson class, if completed, would be impressive specimens: they would displace between 30,000 - 35,000 tons, be capable of speeds approaching 30 knots and would boast a powerful armament headed-up by 13.78" main guns. In typical German fashion, these vessels would also have very good armour protection. Simply put, the Mackenson would clearly out-match any of the British battle cruisers in service at that time. This was clearly unacceptable to the Royal Navy.

Construction
Intially only 3 ships were ordered. In April 1916, the Admiralty placed orders for three vessels of the so-called New Admiral class: Hood, to be built by John Brown & Company Ltd, at Clydebank, Howe, to be built by Cammell Laird & Company, Ltd and Rodney from Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Company, Ltd.

Sometime later, a fourth ship, Anson, was contracted from W.G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Company, Ltd.

The effects of Jutland
The design was gradually altered to include what was felt to be the necessary improvements. In addition to increased armour/protective plating, there were also armament changes/upgrades (addition of above water torpedo tubes, changes to the main gun mounts, etc.). The increased weight spread along the slender hull would subject the vessel to great stress. As such, it became necessary to incorporate additional reinforcements for strengthening purposes. By August 1916, the "final" design had at long last been approved. Hoods box keel was finally laid on 01 September 1916

The effects of the post war naval treaties
The new ship came in at displacement substantially greater than the "final" design. This was to have far reaching implications in the post war treaty at Washington and London where limits to capital ships displacements made it necessary to scrap many of the new fast BBs then under construction in a number of countries. A few exceptions were allowed to allow wartime construction to be examined. Morale had little or nothing to do with the decision to retain the Hood. Because the Hood was at an advanced stage of construction, as a special case, the RN was allowed to keep her. I am fairly certain that in exchange both the Americans and the Japanese were permitted to retain certain overszed hulls for conversion into carriers (Lexingtons and the akagi/Kaga class0 whilst the French were similarly permitted to convert the slightly older Bearn. But the treaty forbade the laying down or completion of other new ships that exceeded treaty limits

Battlecruiser or Fast battleship?
Due to her extreme size, superb speed, large calibre armament and somewhat "larger than life" legend, she is often referred to (by modern day historians amd enthusiasts) as being not necessarily the last British battle cruiser, but the world's first true modern "fast battleship." This view is understandable when one compares Hood's protective armour and weaponry to contemporary battleships such as the Queen Elizabeth class, Hood was indeed a better armed and better protected ship. Of course, when one compares her armour/protective arrangement to those of the true fast/modern battleships that appeared in her latter days, it is clear that she was not quite up to par. At best, she was just a "super battle cruiser." Indeed, she always held an official designation of battle cruiser- the Admiralty knew full-well of her potential armour deficiencies.

So why, if she wasn't really a battleship, did the Admiralty employ her as one during the Second World War? Largely because of a lack of big gun resources. Her reputation was also a key factor...due to her somewhat inflated legend, she was widely feared the world over. Of course, that very same legend may have impaired the Admiralty's judgment as well– she had been the "Mighty Hood" for so long that despite her known deficiencies, many may have actually thought her invincible.

Together the Hood and the KGV were more than a match for the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen. One was deficient in protection but had a good crew the other in the state of its crew and not being fully worked up but the odds were still on their side.
With the Hood gone the KGV did all she could in the circumstances. Without the lucky hit the Hood would have lasted longer in the fight but the Bismarck would have taken more damage and been forced to run for home. The Hood was old but her fire control was pretty good and she did have Type 284 Radar control for her main guns so the probability is that she would have done some damage before being knocked out of the fight.
The Prinz Eugen was a first class Heavy Cruiser but couldn't have stayed in the fight for long, a couple of hits would have put her in dire danger of just loosing speed and the RN had two 8in cruisers in the area (a factor that is often overlooked), who would have loved that scenario.

As soon as the Bismarck started trading shots with another capital ship of any type, the chances were that she would take damage and be forced to turn for home. What happened in the battle was probably the best case scenario for the German Navy.

Had the RN been able to slow the Bismarck then the end would have been the same, just sooner.

I don't fully buy the "lucky hit" claims completely, because the germans in their exceptionally well prepared ships made every effort to make their shooting accuracy as faultless as possible. In this regard they were doing all they could to make their own luck

There are some things about this battle that don't add up. Why did Holland place Hood as the lead ship in his battle line? Why weren't the shadowing cruisers called in for support (I concede probably to avoid breaking radio silence). The angle of approach is well known, as well as the reasons why Holland decided to do that but if he had accepted a shallower more lengthy rate of closure, would the additional broadside firepower have been worth that penalty. I cant help thinking that the british Admiral was just too keen to close the range, at the cost of compromising his broadside power

There are some things about this battle that don't add up. Why did Holland place Hood as the lead ship in his battle line? Why weren't the shadowing cruisers called in for support (I concede probably to avoid breaking radio silence). The angle of approach is well known, as well as the reasons why Holland decided to do that but if he had accepted a shallower more lengthy rate of closure, would the additional broadside firepower have been worth that penalty. I cant help thinking that the british Admiral was just too keen to close the range, at the cost of compromising his broadside power

Holland was trying to maintain radio silence and surprise the Germans, this is the likely reason for not using the cruisers. At the end of the day, the Royal Navy had the advantage anyway, 1 battlecruiser and 1 battleship versus 1 cruiser and 1 battleship.

I also think that Holland was not sure if the Germans were going to engage, a few months before Scharnhorst and Gneiseau had escaped without fighting. Also, a few hours before the battle radar contact was lost, forcing Holland to take the risk.

Ivan1GFP said:

You are assuming that there is only a single range finder and director position. There are many of varying size and quality.
I do find it very interesting that Bismarck lost two main gun turrets to a single large caliber hit during her final battle.
Prince of Wales did not have to win a 1 v 1.5 fight. It just had to damage Bismarck's seaworthiness and the German would never make it home.
Think about how things actually turned out: A single hit at the waterline in Bismarck's bow contaminated a significant quantity of her fuel AND prevented her from making better speed to get away. That hit did not impact her fighting ability and had no chance of sinking her.
.

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I knew that most capital ships had many different systems, RADAR being a comparatively new addition. However the radio ranging is probably the easiest to damage, if that is lost and your opponent still has it you are at a big disadvantage. To some extent all hits are lucky shots because both ships are moving and the ballistics of the shells are not perfect. A broadside or salvo just has a statistical probability of a hit not a guarantee. To be that was the problem of the surface raider strategy. Your enemy doesn't have to win a fight "duking" it out to the death, just a few hits were frequently enough to turn a top class battle ship into a much reduced threat in need of long repairs.

parsifal said:

The effects of the post war naval treaties
The new ship came in at displacement substantially greater than the "final" design. This was to have far reaching implications in the post war treaty at Washington and London where limits to capital ships displacements made it necessary to scrap many of the new fast BBs then under construction in a number of countries. A few exceptions were allowed to allow wartime construction to be examined. Morale had little or nothing to do with the decision to retain the Hood. Because the Hood was at an advanced stage of construction, as a special case, the RN was allowed to keep her. I am fairly certain that in exchange both the Americans and the Japanese were permitted to retain certain overszed hulls for conversion into carriers (Lexingtons and the akagi/Kaga class0 whilst the French were similarly permitted to convert the slightly older Bearn. But the treaty forbade the laying down or completion of other new ships that exceeded treaty limits

Battlecruiser or Fast battleship?
Due to her extreme size, superb speed, large calibre armament and somewhat "larger than life" legend, she is often referred to (by modern day historians amd enthusiasts) as being not necessarily the last British battle cruiser, but the world's first true modern "fast battleship." This view is understandable when one compares Hood's protective armour and weaponry to contemporary battleships such as the Queen Elizabeth class, Hood was indeed a better armed and better protected ship. Of course, when one compares her armour/protective arrangement to those of the true fast/modern battleships that appeared in her latter days, it is clear that she was not quite up to par. At best, she was just a "super battle cruiser." Indeed, she always held an official designation of battle cruiser- the Admiralty knew full-well of her potential armour deficiencies.

So why, if she wasn't really a battleship, did the Admiralty employ her as one during the Second World War? Largely because of a lack of big gun resources. Her reputation was also a key factor...due to her somewhat inflated legend, she was widely feared the world over. Of course, that very same legend may have impaired the Admiralty's judgment as well– she had been the "Mighty Hood" for so long that despite her known deficiencies, many may have actually thought her invincible.

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Hello Parsifal,

Thanks for adding and correcting the background information.
One minor clarification: The Japanese were actually trying to use the Akagi and Amagi for carrier conversions.
These were a pair originally intended to be completed as battlecruisers.
A major earthquake damaged Amagi beyond economical repair and the battleship Kaga was substituted.
That is why Akagi and Kaga were never really a matched pair even though they operated tactically as such.

If the Hood had superior protection to the next newest class of "battleship", the Queen Elizabeth, then why not continue with the three following ships? A result of the Washington Treaty perhaps?

Do you suppose that the German battlecruisers of the Great War were closer to the "fast battleship" concept?

- Ivan.

if you look at Jutland, some of the German Battlecruisers took an incredible amount of punishment.

pinehilljoe said:

if you look at Jutland, some of the German Battlecruisers took an incredible amount of punishment.

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....and survived.

Ivan1GFP said:

Hello Parsifal,

Thanks for adding and correcting the background information.
One minor clarification: The Japanese were actually trying to use the Akagi and Amagi for carrier conversions.
These were a pair originally intended to be completed as battlecruisers.
A major earthquake damaged Amagi beyond economical repair and the battleship Kaga was substituted.
That is why Akagi and Kaga were never really a matched pair even though they operated tactically as such.

If the Hood had superior protection to the next newest class of "battleship", the Queen Elizabeth, then why not continue with the three following ships? A result of the Washington Treaty perhaps?

Do you suppose that the German battlecruisers of the Great War were closer to the "fast battleship" concept?

- Ivan.

Click to expand...

The Derfflinger class was a class of three battlecruisers. The ships were ordered for the 1912–13 Naval Building Program of the German Imperial Navy as a reply to the RNs three new Lion Class BCs that had been launched a few years earlier. The preceding Moltke and the incrementally improved Seydlitz represented the end of the evolution of Germany's first generation of battlecruisers and were as a generalisation better protected but worse in firepower compared to their RN counterparts. The Derfflinger class had considerable improvements, including a larger primary armament, all of which was mounted on the centerline, eliminating the restricted arc of the amidships turret. The ships were also larger than the preceding classes at 26000 tons. They preceded the Hood class by 3 years, but were not as good as the Hood. If the hood is considered at best a borderline fast BB, then the Derfflingers are even less of a BB

Of greater interest was the Mackensen class which were laid down but never completed. The Mackensen class was the last class of German BCs from the WWI era though others were projected. The design initially called for seven ships, but three of them were redesigned as the replacement "Yorck Class. None were completed, after wartime shipbuilding priorities were redirected towards U-Boat construction

The design of the Mackensen class was a much improved version of the previous Derfflinger class. The most significant improvement was a new, more powerful 35 cm (14 in) gun, compared to the 30.5 cm (12.0 in) gun of the earlier ships. The Mackensen -class ships also featured more powerful engines that gave the ships a higher top speed and a significantly greater cruising range. The Mackensen design provided the basis for the subsequent Ersatz Yorck class, armed with 38 cm (15 in) main-battery guns.

The Mackensens represent a step in the direction of the fast BB concept, but in my opinion represent no greater advance to the Hood in that regard

1. Mackensen Class
Displacement :31000tons
Main armament: 8 x 13.8 in guns
Protection
Main belt: 100–300 mm (4-12 in)
Turrets 270 mm (11 in)
Deck 30 to 80 mm (1.2 to 3.1 in)
Many would argue that the german ship had superior armouring schemes and better distribution of armour. Im not convinced of that

2. Hood Class
The Hood class by comparison
Displacement :46000tons
Main armament: 8 x 15 in Mk I BL guns
Protection
Main belt: 152–305 mm (7-12 in)
Turrets 270-368 mm (11-15 in)
Deck 19 to 76 mm (075 to 3 in)

Mackenson was inferior to the Hood in all thicknesses except the deck armouring, and it was the deck armouring, or lack thereof that cause the loss of the Hood.

I don't think the Mackensons have any greater association to the concept of a fast battleship over the Hood. What led to the failure of the hood was not her basic design, to me it was the failure of the RN to keep her modern in the interwar period. By 1941, the ship badly needed her main armament to be upgraded to be able to fire the new super propelled shells as had been done in the modernised warspites (and which enabled her to set the record for long range fire at 26000 yds)

Marcel said:

No, the POW had problems with her guns and could not continue the fight even if they wanted to.

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PoW had 7 of 10 guns functioning when she turned away and laid smoke.
Not ideal, but a concern for Bismarck

. At the end of the day, the Royal Navy had the advantage anyway, 1 battlecruiser and 1 battleship versus 1 cruiser and 1 battleship.

I also think that Holland was not sure if the Germans were going to engage, a few months before Scharnhorst and Gneiseau had escaped without fighting. Also, a few hours before the battle radar contact was lost, forcing Holland to take the risk.

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British also had heavy cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk

The British battlecruisers in WW I suffered from two problems, the often noted thin armor, and the cordite propellent that tended to explode in magazine fires.
The German propellent tended to (but not always) burn a bit slower (helped by a large portion of it being in cartridge cases) which, while burning violently, didn't seem to blow the ships to pieces.

The middle series of British battlecruisers were handicapped by the use of large tube boilers which required more weight and larger boiler rooms (also more weight/larger hull) than small tube boilers of equivalent power. The extra weight had to made up somewhere and unfortunately it was in made up with less armor.

parsifal said:

The Mackensens represent a step in the direction of the fast BB concept, but in my opinion represent no greater advance to the Hood in that regard

1. Mackensen Class
Displacement :31000tons
Main armament: 8 x 13.8 in guns
Protection
Main belt: 100–300 mm (4-12 in)
Turrets 270 mm (11 in)
Deck 30 to 80 mm (1.2 to 3.1 in)
Many would argue that the german ship had superior armouring schemes and better distribution of armour. Im not convinced of that

2. Hood Class
The Hood class by comparison
Displacement :46000tons
Main armament: 8 x 15 in Mk I BL guns
Protection
Main belt: 152–305 mm (7-12 in)
Turrets 270-368 mm (11-15 in)
Deck 19 to 76 mm (075 to 3 in)

Mackenson was inferior to the Hood in all thicknesses except the deck armouring, and it was the deck armouring, or lack thereof that cause the loss of the Hood.

I don't think the Mackensons have any greater association to the concept of a fast battleship over the Hood. What led to the failure of the hood was not her basic design, to me it was the failure of the RN to keep her modern in the interwar period. By 1941, the ship badly needed her main armament to be upgraded to be able to fire the new super propelled shells as had been done in the modernised warspites (and which enabled her to set the record for long range fire at 26000 yds)

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Hello Parsifal,
Thanks for taking the time to present some background history.

The Derfflinger class was exactly what I was thinking of regarding early fast battleship.
As for a comparison against the Hood, it is pretty ridiculous considering the difference in size, tonnage, and time of completion.
Hood was nearly twice her displacement and was not completed even by the end of the war.
Derfflinger fougnt in battles that affected the design of Hood. Naturally one would expect a ship completed 7-8 years later to be superior.
I believe Derfflinger's advance in armament was not so much the lack of amidships turrets as found on Konig class battleships but the elimination of wing turrets as found on Seydlitz and older ships. Amidships turrets are not such a horrible idea if there is space below decks not required by the larger machinery of a faster ship.

I figure Derfflinger should be compared with her contemporary German battleship and in this regard, she compares well.
German ships as you pointed out always tended to favour protection over main armament and she was no exception.

I have always discounted the Mackensen class because they were not completed by the end of the war.
In this regard, I suppose they were comparable to Hood though I don't remember how close Mackensen was.
Imagine though that Hood had NOT been completed and was broken up as Mackensen and sisters were.
Would she then also represent the great advance that you see her as now?
When comparing Hood against Mackensen, there is still the consideration that Hood is 50% bigger.

Regarding Hood's weakness in deck armour:
Admiral Holland certainly recognized that issue when he chose to close the distance as rapidly as possible to avoid the exposure.

There is always that element of chance and he didn't get the dice rolls.

- Ivan.

The vast majority of WW I battleships had main armament elevations of around 15 degrees (or less) it was only at the very end of the war and post war that the elevations were changed to around 30 degrees and then the new ships of the 30s went to around 40 degrees. Hood was caught in the change over, she got the 30 degrees of elevation but was too late to change the deck armor without a lot of reworking.

Older British turrets were modified to give 30 degrees elevation.

Please note the "eyebrows" over the guns where the turret roof was cutaway and modified to allow the greater elevation.
Newer turrets, like the Hood, had a higher turret roof to begin with.

Obviously angle of fire affects range and angle of decent.