Shortround6
Major General
It was found that about 50% of rifle use was under 200 meters and 98% of rifle use was under 400 meters.We do also have to remember that it was discovered in World War II (and even World War I) that most combat (something like 90%) happened at ranges of at max 400 yards or meters, often less.
However.
Just about 50% of machinegun use was over 400meters.
So we have problem with with using one cartridge for both jobs.
You are correct. However see above. What cartridge do you need for machinegun use at 600-800 meters?You don't need like a .308 Win/7.62mm NATO, .30-06, .303 British, 8mm Mauser, 7.62x54mmR, 7.7mm Arisaka, or even rounds like 6.5mm Carcano or 6.5mm Arisaka for those ranges.
Then we can get into the two different main theories of how the squad should operate. And there was some spread between the two.
Germans believed before the the war that the main firepower of the squad was the machinegun (MG 34). The riflemen in the squad were supposed to carry ammo, protect the gun at close range from being flanked and/or provide enough cover fire while the MG moved/relocated. This was also supposed to be coordinated with the neighboring squads. All squads in the platoon were not supposed to move at once as a general rule.
Americans were the opposite, they believed that the squads fire power came from precision rifle fire. The BAR was to support the squad's riflemen.
Most everybody else was in-between. British were a lot closer to the Germans than to the Americans but the British did have the best bolt action rifle of the war.
War also changed drastically between 1939 and 1944/45. The British army went from about 40 radios per division to around 1000 radios (?). Artillery support got a lot stronger and a lot quicker and that meant that the squads, even if they had higher rate of fire guns, didn't fight at longer ranges anymore. Their attached forward artillery observers simply called in artillery fire on targets that were any real distance away.
US was following that path, nobody else had the radios.
Germans were chasing the new shiny toys. Using 8-12 men to move/support one MG 34/42 was a bit wasteful and the M 98 was not that good a close range weapon. They had run into some Soviet semi-automatics and wanted some of their own. They managed to screw this up royally and by the time they had tooled up for the G 43 and were making it in quantity, they had changed their minds and went for the assault rifle, and then they changed their minds again and instead of building the assault rifle they had they spent time coming up with StG 45. Whatever we may think of the concept of that rifle, changing the production lines over in the spring/summer of 1945, had the Germans lasted that long, was not going to make any difference at all.
Also shows the difference between guns intended for urban fighting and guns needed for open area fighting (large wheat fields, plains, deserts).
I have mentioned it before in other threads. The British, in the battalion, started the war with two(2) 3 in mortars (and not very good ones) per battalion. After the BoF they changed to 6 mortars per battalion. The duties of the 'riflemen' were changing and the expectation's of the riflemen to engage in long range fire were decreasing.
Now the advantage or disadvantage of using the same cartridge for both the rifle and the MG can be argued and it has gone back and forth since WW II the full power MG being shifted to company level and then back to squad level at different times and in different armies. It also tends to change depending on where an army was fighting.
Ammo supply and consumption has also undergone a lot of thought/consideration/theorizing. If you ever get the chance see a few chapters written by Melvin Johnson (Semi-auto rifle and MG designer) arguing for the adoption of the semi-automatic rifle against the officers who thought the riflemen would exhaust their ammo too quickly and so the army should stick with bolt action rifles. Conservatism was not confined to the horse cavalry