Benefits of a British Flying Tigers Unit?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

A

Admiral Beez

Major
9,363
10,689
Oct 21, 2019
Toronto, Canada
The First American Volunteer Group (AVG) was formed in April 1941 to fight alongside the nationalist Chinese against the invading Japanese. In return the Americans gained knowledge and experience of Japanese aircraft and tactics (did Chenault share this with USN aviators?).

Could Britain have similarly fielded a BVG in April 1941? What aircraft would be sent? The Gloster Gladiator was active in China, but I'd rather see Hurricanes. To where? Perhaps two squadrons of Hurricanes could be sent to join the AVG? How does this play out diplomatically?
 
There were moves afoot to create a British Volunteer Group. Intent was to take a squadron's-worth of Buffalos (and another of Blenheims) from Singapore and put them under Chennault's command. Chinese senior officials visited Singapore in 1941 and were shown the Buffalo aircraft. The Australian and New Zealand Governments were approached and granted approval for their personnel to volunteer. It's possible that a proportion of the 100% reserves sent to support 67 Squadron in Burma were, in part, intended for China. Far East Command was also selecting operationally-ready airframes from the existing squadrons in late November 1941, presumably to ensure any BVG could be made operational as rapidly as possible. The Japanese invasion of Malaya forced the cancellation of the entire project.
 
Last edited:
Resp:
Re: Did Chenault share knowledge of Japanese aircraft and tactics w the USN? Not sure. However, Chenault did send a full report on the capabilities of the A6M Zero in late 1940 or early 1941, to both the USAAF (Gen Marshall or Arnold [can't remember which]) and to RAF leadership. Since 60 percent of the AVG pilots were recruited from the USN/USMC, these pilots certainly took their knowledge with them when they returned to their respective service branch. Chenault also traveled to Hawaii in April 1941 where he briefed AAC (before they became USAAF) pilots for 3 hours on the Zero's capabilities. I have found no record to suggest USN pilots were present; however, since the USN shared space at Hawaii it would be logical that some Navy pilots were present. Were carriers moored at Pearl Harbor, or out to sea that day? Knowing Chenault, and the size of Japan's Navy he likely would have offered an invitation to the USN when he visited Hawaii in April 1941.
Just my two cents.
 

The AVG may have been formed in April 1941 but it didn't enter combat until 20 Dec 1941, two weeks after the first engagements between US and British forces and the Japanese air arms. There is scant evidence that Chennault actually undertook combat operations with the Chinese Air Force and certainly considerable doubt that he met the Zero in combat.

The British had pretty accurate knowledge of the Zero's performance as of at least November 1941 and it was distributed to operational squadrons. Alas, it appears that the squadrons either ignored or didn't believe the report.
 
Real:
True. However, Chenault flew several combat missions (as an observer) with the Chinese AF against the Japanese . . . long before the AVG was formed. He wasn't sitting around on his hands. He spent plenty of time with his AVG pilots on the 'dos and don'ts before his pilots took to the air. Chenault knew that Anglos tended to underestimate Japan's capabilities, particularly the Americans. He knew that the Zero had far greater range than any Allied single engine fighter at that time. That it was agile and could turn inside nearly anything the Allies had at that time.
His lack of actual air combat time, as in one-on-one experience . . . may have contributed to the information falling on deaf ears. According to one author, USAAC leadership 'simply threw his report in a desk drawer' only to be seen years after WWII by historians. Chennault was forced to resign from the USAAC, circa 1936, when he was caught teaching advanced (progressive rather than traditional) fighter tactics. The Air Corps was only teaching what it had learned during WWI, which Chennault thought inadequate. Chennault's report was never shared with those who could have used it.

Google: jstor.org Air Power History/Fall 2016 'Dealing With The Zero' p.25 by John F. O'Connell
 
Last edited:
There's no political benefit in supporting a Nationalist Socialist regime.
There's no political benefit in supporting a Nationalist Socialist regime bent on uniting China, a China for the Chinese. The Empire preferred warlords. Look at ROC (Taiwan) today, the railways are 50% state run, and they have a LVT (land value tax). There's only a handful of countries in the World with an LVT.
 
I'd prefer a Squadron each of Buffaloes and Blenheims in Hong Kong.
 
Kevin J said:
I'd prefer a Squadron each of Buffaloes and Blenheims in Hong Kong.
Click to expand...
Hong Kong? That indefensible place should have been all but abandoned and evacuated after Japan seized FIC in Sept. 1940. The map below shows us that the British frontline from the FIC seizure onwards was clearly going to be the Malay-FIC coast and the Burma-Thai border. This is where British forces need to be concentrated.



Sending the two Canadians regiments to Hong Kong was a dumb move. Allocating the few available Buffaloes there is an equally poor choice. Unless..... those Buffaloes are assigned to HMS Hermes. Having an aircraft carrier in the region without any modern monoplane, single-seat fighters is criminal. So, put a FAA station at Singapore, so the force can be put aboard Hermes and put to sea once war is threatened.
 
Last edited:
I agree that Hong Kong is an outpost, just as the Falklands were, but there's no reason that its orders couldn't have been "hold until relieved". It would have been better stationing POW off Penang to provide radar cover for them and ordering our troops at Kota Bharu to have retreated to Kuala Lumpur.
 
Goodness no. First of all, I don't believe there was any experience of directing RAF fighters from RN battleships. British aircraft carriers used their radar to guide FAA aircraft via the ship's Aircraft Direction Room (equal to USN's CIC), but that would be pioneer stuff for a battleship. The KGV class have radar for early warning of air attack and for spotting their shellfire, not for fighter direction. Better to put a radar station in Hong Kong.

And putting the RN's latest battleship at Hong Kong without FAA air cover is insane. No, RAF air cover for PoW is not sufficient, since they'll be quickly neutralized by the IJAF. If there are any additional Buffaloes they (and the two Canadian regiments) should be sent to Malaya to join its defences. With proper leadership, more aircraft and support thereof Malaya, not Hong Kong may have held out.
 
Last edited:
I wrote Penang not HK. Perhaps Repulse in HK, POW in Penang. Let them get hit, sink, rest on the harbour floor. So long as their radar still works.
.
 
Kevin J said:
I wrote Penang not HK. Perhaps Repulse in HK, POW in Penang. Let them get hit, sink, rest on the harbour floor. So long as their radar still works.
.
Click to expand...
Resp:
Anything based along the coast would be subject to Japan's Navy, which could move freely and concentrated. To survive, a BVG would have to move inland. Then the BVG would have to be supported by China. Corregidor was lost because enough ships could not have survived against Japan's Navy at the time. LTC Eisenhower told General Marshall . . . "Everything sent would be lost . . . a loss we cannot afford if we are to fight a two front war (Germany as well as Japan). We have to fight on our terms . . . and not be sucked into their battle plan."
 
Kevin J said:
I wrote Penang not HK. Perhaps Repulse in HK, POW in Penang. Let them get hit, sink, rest on the harbour floor. So long as their radar still works.
.
Click to expand...
Ah, yes. I was confused, as you said

"there's no reason that (Hong Kong's) orders couldn't have been hold until relieved. It would have been better stationing POW off Penang to provide radar cover for them...".

For them, I took as being those you mentioned in Hong Kong, but I forgot where Penang was.
 
It worked for the Marat in Leningrad.
 
Kevin J said:
It worked for the Marat in Leningrad.
Click to expand...

It requires luck, the right depth harbor and some element of resupply, and probably a few other things.

If hit by bombs and torpedoes it requires the ship to sink on a somewhat even keel. It requires either undamaged oor unflooded aux machinery spaces (or shore power?) as the big guns are not hand worked. It requires undamaged or lightly damaged (un flooded ) magazine and hoist spaces (or a crap load of manual labor to load the guns).
I have no idea how much support from shore the Marat got. Food (cooked?) , or even ammo.

Planning on having your ship sunk by the enemy with all kinds of functioning equipement is rather wishful thinking.

USS Oklahoma.

It might happen the way you want, it might not.

Planning your defence around having it happen the way you want is not the best plan.
 
The AVG never fought against Zeros in China. Zeros operated in China on experimental basis before the AVG was established and were gone by the time it had. The Zero that the AVG got ahold of wasn't shot down - it made an emergency landing due to poor weather while on a ferry flight to French Indo-China on Dec 1, 1941. As for BVG, I am sure that the Brits had other things to worry about in 1940-1941 then the defense of China. They barely even thought of the defense of Singapore and Hong-Kong.
 
Resp:
I am aware that many pilots misidentified enemy Japanese single engine planes (w retractable landing gear) as Zeros. However, the A6M2 first enter combat in China in 1942. I cannot furnish the source of Chennault's extensive report on the Zero. However, he did collect information on various Japanese planes. If I remember correctly, he flew as an observer in at least two engagements by Chinese pilots. He did travel to Hawaii months before the Japanese attack on US Forces at Hawaii, where he briefed USAAC (possiblely USN as well) for 3 hrs on the Zero's capabilities; it had extreme range (for that time). He also sent a very detailed report on same to either Gen Arnold, or Gen Marshall (which ended up in a desk drawer never to be disseminated).
 
You must log in or register to reply here.

Users who are viewing this thread

Total: 1 (members: 0, guests: 1)

Similar threads

A
The Myth of the British "Fixing" The Corsair
8 9 10
Replies
183
Views
13K
EwenS
E
WWI Aces Flying WWII Planes
Replies
17
Views
1K
Admiral Beez
A
S
"Generations" of fighter aircraft
2
Replies
22
Views
582
Thumpalumpacus
Flying Boeing P-26 Peashooter
Replies
10
Views
1K
GregP
A
British Aerial Ordnance Exotica
Replies
2
Views
866
Shortround6
S
Menu
Log in
Register