starling
Airman 1st Class
perhaps this is why allied tanks attempted to get in behind the mk6 tank.yours,starling.
Best/favorite WW2 heavy tank
- Thread starter Danielmellbin
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- Thread starter
- #42
Danielmellbin
Airman 1st Class
- 122
- Jun 22, 2008
Due to the angle in this test the armour is thicker than that of the Tiger I - and it can also deflect some of the shots.
As you know this was my point all along!
-to get back on track- APDS ammo accounted for only some 6% of brittish AT crews ammo - and as such - The Tiger I was in trouble when faced with 17pdrs. Indeed it was in trouble when faced with mostly any AT-guns of 43/44 vintage. The King Tiger gave back the glory days of the Tiger I - having practically inpenetrable armour as was the case for the Tiger I in 42/43. The same goes for the gun - the L56 was begining to have some problems by 44 (although not many!) - the L71 "cured" this completely.
- Thread starter
- #43
Danielmellbin
Airman 1st Class
- 122
- Jun 22, 2008
Again - since only a small percentage of the AT crews ammo was APDS - then for all practical purposes the 17pdr was a threat to the Tiger I at 1000yds+ and didn't have to close to the ridiculous range you mentioned earlier.
Even if they had used APDS ammo then the problem would not have been penetrating power but rather - like I said at first - :accuracy.
All in all - The arrangement of the Tiger I's armour was by early '44 making it a waste of resources when compared to the Panther and King Tiger. (probably why it was taken out of production!).
Still waiting for any kind of proof of 100mm of nonsloping armour shattering a 17pdr APDS round's tungsten carbide core....
- didn't notice that part until now. You can skip the whole childish condescending part next time 
Daniel,
The report clearly states:
The 17pdr SABOT fired in this test has penetrating power equal or slightly better than that of the 17pdr APCBC
As for the effectiveness of the Tiger Ausf.E's armour, you should read WWII Gunnery Ballistics by Robert D. Livingston Lorrin R. Bird. The shatter gap problem is mentioned there.
Also you should read up on the importance of BHN and its effect on armour effectiveness against AP projectiles, as well as face hardening and the difference between cast and rolled homogeneous armour.
That's not the point Daniel, the point is that the APDS fails to improve on penetration performance over the std. APCBC round! And so, like the board also concludes, what's the use of the round when it is also extremely inaccurate ??
Furthermore if you read Livingston Rexford's book you'll notice that the effectiveness of the APDS round decreases radpidly with any slope, as does it for the APCR HVAP rounds.
Never made any childish condescending remarks at all Daniel. So relax and leave be with the rollingeyes, ok?
Have a nice day.
The report clearly states:
The 17pdr SABOT fired in this test has penetrating power equal or slightly better than that of the 17pdr APCBC
As for the effectiveness of the Tiger Ausf.E's armour, you should read WWII Gunnery Ballistics by Robert D. Livingston Lorrin R. Bird. The shatter gap problem is mentioned there.
Also you should read up on the importance of BHN and its effect on armour effectiveness against AP projectiles, as well as face hardening and the difference between cast and rolled homogeneous armour.
That's not the point Daniel, the point is that the APDS fails to improve on penetration performance over the std. APCBC round! And so, like the board also concludes, what's the use of the round when it is also extremely inaccurate ??
Furthermore if you read Livingston Rexford's book you'll notice that the effectiveness of the APDS round decreases radpidly with any slope, as does it for the APCR HVAP rounds.
Never made any childish condescending remarks at all Daniel. So relax and leave be with the rollingeyes, ok?
Have a nice day.
parsifal
Colonel
During WW II, the phenomenon known as shatter gap resulted in hits with too much penetration failing to defeat the armor.
The British noted this oddity in Libya and other North African areas, where rounds that could penetrate beyond 1000 yards would fail at shorter ranges, or hits would fail at short range and then start to penetrate further out.
The theory on shatter gap is that when hits penetrate on half the hits at a given velocity (the basis for most penetration data), there are certain impact forces on the projectile nose. If the velocity is increased and the armor thickness is held constant, the round moves armor out of the way faster, which leads to increased inertial forces on the ammo nose.
If the projectile nose is too soft, such that it absorbs much of the impact energy, the nose can shatter and break up. U.S. and Russian ammunition fell into the shatter gap nose hardness range (less than 59 Rockwell C). While British ammunition was harder than the threshold, some characteristic of the projectiles made it vulnerable to shatter gap.
With regard to Tiger armor, shatter gap normally occurs when the armor thickness is close to, equal to or thicker than the projectile diameter. U.S. 76mm APCBC hits on Tiger armor would fall into this category.
If 76mm APCBC hit the Tiger driver plate at 12° side angle, the resultant resistance would equal 109mm at 0°. With shatter gap, rounds fail when they have 1.05 to 1.25 times the armor resistance, which would result in M10 failures from point blank to 550 meters range, and then penetrate from 550m to 750m.
On M10 hits against the Tiger side armor at 30° side angle, the resistance would equal 103mm at 0°, and M10 hits would be expected to fail from point blank to 800m, and then penetrate from 800m to 1000m.
U.S. Navy tests during WW II against 3" armor at 30°, using 76mm APCBC, resulted in 50% penetration at about 2069 fps impact, and then the hits failed from 2073 fps through 2376 fps.
Firing tests with 75mm APCBC did not appear to result in shatter gap failures, suggesting that impact velocities above 2000 fps would be required for nose failure.
Prior to Normandy, the Americans calculated that their 76mm gun would be sufficient to stop Panthers and Tigers, since the 100mm frontal armor on those panzers could theoretically be penetrated to 1250m by M10's and 76mm armed Shermans. Shatter gap may be responsible, in part, for the sorry showing of those guns in France against heavy German armor.
The British noted this oddity in Libya and other North African areas, where rounds that could penetrate beyond 1000 yards would fail at shorter ranges, or hits would fail at short range and then start to penetrate further out.
The theory on shatter gap is that when hits penetrate on half the hits at a given velocity (the basis for most penetration data), there are certain impact forces on the projectile nose. If the velocity is increased and the armor thickness is held constant, the round moves armor out of the way faster, which leads to increased inertial forces on the ammo nose.
If the projectile nose is too soft, such that it absorbs much of the impact energy, the nose can shatter and break up. U.S. and Russian ammunition fell into the shatter gap nose hardness range (less than 59 Rockwell C). While British ammunition was harder than the threshold, some characteristic of the projectiles made it vulnerable to shatter gap.
With regard to Tiger armor, shatter gap normally occurs when the armor thickness is close to, equal to or thicker than the projectile diameter. U.S. 76mm APCBC hits on Tiger armor would fall into this category.
If 76mm APCBC hit the Tiger driver plate at 12° side angle, the resultant resistance would equal 109mm at 0°. With shatter gap, rounds fail when they have 1.05 to 1.25 times the armor resistance, which would result in M10 failures from point blank to 550 meters range, and then penetrate from 550m to 750m.
On M10 hits against the Tiger side armor at 30° side angle, the resistance would equal 103mm at 0°, and M10 hits would be expected to fail from point blank to 800m, and then penetrate from 800m to 1000m.
U.S. Navy tests during WW II against 3" armor at 30°, using 76mm APCBC, resulted in 50% penetration at about 2069 fps impact, and then the hits failed from 2073 fps through 2376 fps.
Firing tests with 75mm APCBC did not appear to result in shatter gap failures, suggesting that impact velocities above 2000 fps would be required for nose failure.
Prior to Normandy, the Americans calculated that their 76mm gun would be sufficient to stop Panthers and Tigers, since the 100mm frontal armor on those panzers could theoretically be penetrated to 1250m by M10's and 76mm armed Shermans. Shatter gap may be responsible, in part, for the sorry showing of those guns in France against heavy German armor.
parsifal
Colonel
According to Jentz (JENTZ, Thomas L.; Germany's TIGER Tanks - Tiger I and II: Combat Tactics; op. cit.), "The Tiger's armor was invulnerable to attack from most tank guns firing normal armor-piercing shells or shot at ranges over 800 meters, including the American 75 mm and the Russian 76 mm. It is obvious that the 17-pdr. firing normal APCBC rounds could defeat the frontal armor of the Tiger I at most combat ranges for tank vs. tank actions in Europe. However, by 23 June 1944, only 109 Shermans with 17-pdrs. had landed in France along with six replacements. By the end of the war, on 5 May 1945, the British 21st Army Group possessed 1,235 Sherman tanks with 17-pdrs., while the remaining 1,915 Sherman tanks were all equipped with the 75 mm M3 gun".
The Tiger I armor could take a lot of punishment, as can be seen by the number of hits taken by Tiger 312. One of the Tigers from 2.Kompanie, sPzAbt.504, lost in the first days following the Allied landings on Tunisia on 10 July 1943.
The armor of the Tiger I was not well sloped, but it was thick. Here is where many fail to understand that, in terms of World War II tank warfare, thickness was a quality in itself, since armor resistance is mainly determined by the ratio between armor thickness and projectile diameter (T/d). The T/d relationship regarding armor penetration demonstrates that the more the thickness of the armor plate overmatches the diameter of any incoming armor piercing round, the harder it is for the projectile to achieve a penetration. On the other side, the greater the diameter of the incoming projectile relatively to the thickness of the armor plate which it strikes, the greater the probability of penetration. This explains why the side armor of the Tiger I, being 80 mm thick, was so difficult to be penetrated at combat ranges by most Allied anti-tank and tank guns, whose calibers were overmatched by the thickness of the Tiger I armor.
The rolled homogeneous nickel-steel plate, electro-welded interlocking-plate construction armor had a Brinell hardness index of around 255-280 (the best homogeneous armor hardness level for the corresponding thickness level of the Tiger's armor, by WW II standards), and rigorous quality control procedures ensured that it stayed that way. About this issue, and according to Thomas L. Jentz, "there is no proof that substandard german armour plate was used during the last years of the war. All original documents confirm compliance with standard specifications throughout the war" (JENTZ, Thomas L. Germany's TIGER Tanks, VK45.02 to Tiger II: Design, Production Modifications).
Moreover, in the same reference book, Jentz presents the data from a British testing of the Tiger's armor protection by firing different guns against it. The tests were realized in a place beside the the main road from Beja to to Sidi N'sir in Tunisia, on May 19, 1943. The reports from these tests stated that the resistance of the Tiger's armor was "considerably higher than that of the British machineable quality armor. The side armor, with a thickness of 82 mm (nominal thickness was 80 mm) had a resistance equivalent of 92 mm of British armor" (Jentz, op cit, page 15). However, a little further, when addressing directly the issue of the Tiger's armor quality, the report states that "The armor plates (with exception of the hull roof plates) did not show any marked tendency to brittleness, and their behavior generally was not unlike British mechineable plates. The following table gives a list of Poldi hardness, corrected to Brinell figures, taken at the surface of the armor".
Armor Nominal Thickness Brinell Hardness No.
Turret Roof 25 mm 290
Hull Roof 25 mm 335
Glacis 60 mm 265
Hull Sides 60 mm 265
Turret Sides 80 mm 255
Superstructure 80 mm 260-255
Hull Rear 80 mm 255
Driver's Front Plate 100 mm 265
Hull Front 100 mm 265
Mantlet 100-200 mm 280
NOTE: Actually, the Tiger I chassis Nbr. 250570, object of the trials, was assembled in early October 1943, and its armor would have been rolled, cut, hardened, and welded together at least three months earlier - that is, before July 1943.
The Tiger, as a result of it's intrinsic doctrinal mission - that is, to effect a breakthrough and to support medium tanks, during the breakthrough, by destroying enemy tanks - was, production-wise, a very expensive and resource consuming tank. The nominal cost of a Tiger was 250,800 Reichsmarks. In contrast, a PzKpfw III Ausf. M cost RM 103,163, a PzKpfw IV Ausf. G RM 115,962, and a PzKpfw V Panther RM 117,100; all these figures are exclusive of weapons and radios. However, the final cost of the Tiger's production was even higher - 299,800 Reichsmarks (Source: HAHN, Fritz. Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933-1943 Band 1 Band 2. Koblenz : Bernard Graefe Verlag, 1987, in Christian Ankerstjerne's Panzerworld web site. Accessed in June 21, 2007).
Christopher W. Wilbeck, in "Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Heavy Tank Battalions in World War II", citing the Tigerfibel (the Tiger's manual), states that the final cost of the Tiger's production was much higher - 800,000 Reichsmarks - and 300,000 man-hours were required to produce one single Tiger. The Tigerfibel , in view of making those numbers more personal to the Tiger crewmen, stated that it was required one week of hard work from 6,000 people to produce one Tiger. It also stated that 800,000 Reichsmarks figure was equivalent to the weekly wages for 30,000 people.
The frontal vertical plating was massive enough to withstand virtually anything. Tiger I disabled by a side penetration that hit the engine and caused the suspension to collapse.
Another fact that helped the Tigers a lot was the "shatter gap" effect which affected allied ammunition, a most unusual situation where rounds with too high an impact velocity would sometimes fail even though their penetration capability was (theoretically) more than adequate. This phenomenon plagued the British 2 pounder in the desert, and would have decreased the effectiveness of U.S. 76mm and 3" guns against Tigers, Panthers and other vehicles with armor thickness above 70 mm. It should be noted that the problems with the 76 mm and 3" guns did not necessarily involve the weapons themselves: the noses of US armor-piercing ammunition of the time turned out to be excessively soft. When these projectiles impacted armor which matched or exceeded the projectile diameter at a certain spread of velocities, the projectile would shatter and fail.
Penetrations would occur below this velocity range, since the shell would not shatter, and strikes above this range would propel the shell through the armor whether it shattered or not. When striking a Tiger I driver's plate, for example, this "shatter gap" for a 76mm APCBC M62 shell would cause failures between 50 meters and 900 meters. These ammunition deficiencies proved that Ordnance tests claiming the 76 mm gun could penetrate a Tiger I's upper front hull to 2,000 yards (1,800 meters) were sadly incorrect.
As a general rule, BHN (Brinell Hardness Index) effects, shot shatter, and obliquity effects are related to the ratio between shot diameter and plate thickness. The relationship is complex, but a larger projectile hitting relatively thinner plate will usually have the advantage. There is an optimum BHN level for every shot vs plate confrontation, usually in the 260-300 BHN range for World War Two situations. Below that, the armor is too soft and resists poorly, above that, the armor is too hard and therefore too brittle.
The Tiger I armor could take a lot of punishment, as can be seen by the number of hits taken by Tiger 312. One of the Tigers from 2.Kompanie, sPzAbt.504, lost in the first days following the Allied landings on Tunisia on 10 July 1943.
The armor of the Tiger I was not well sloped, but it was thick. Here is where many fail to understand that, in terms of World War II tank warfare, thickness was a quality in itself, since armor resistance is mainly determined by the ratio between armor thickness and projectile diameter (T/d). The T/d relationship regarding armor penetration demonstrates that the more the thickness of the armor plate overmatches the diameter of any incoming armor piercing round, the harder it is for the projectile to achieve a penetration. On the other side, the greater the diameter of the incoming projectile relatively to the thickness of the armor plate which it strikes, the greater the probability of penetration. This explains why the side armor of the Tiger I, being 80 mm thick, was so difficult to be penetrated at combat ranges by most Allied anti-tank and tank guns, whose calibers were overmatched by the thickness of the Tiger I armor.
The rolled homogeneous nickel-steel plate, electro-welded interlocking-plate construction armor had a Brinell hardness index of around 255-280 (the best homogeneous armor hardness level for the corresponding thickness level of the Tiger's armor, by WW II standards), and rigorous quality control procedures ensured that it stayed that way. About this issue, and according to Thomas L. Jentz, "there is no proof that substandard german armour plate was used during the last years of the war. All original documents confirm compliance with standard specifications throughout the war" (JENTZ, Thomas L. Germany's TIGER Tanks, VK45.02 to Tiger II: Design, Production Modifications).
Moreover, in the same reference book, Jentz presents the data from a British testing of the Tiger's armor protection by firing different guns against it. The tests were realized in a place beside the the main road from Beja to to Sidi N'sir in Tunisia, on May 19, 1943. The reports from these tests stated that the resistance of the Tiger's armor was "considerably higher than that of the British machineable quality armor. The side armor, with a thickness of 82 mm (nominal thickness was 80 mm) had a resistance equivalent of 92 mm of British armor" (Jentz, op cit, page 15). However, a little further, when addressing directly the issue of the Tiger's armor quality, the report states that "The armor plates (with exception of the hull roof plates) did not show any marked tendency to brittleness, and their behavior generally was not unlike British mechineable plates. The following table gives a list of Poldi hardness, corrected to Brinell figures, taken at the surface of the armor".
Armor Nominal Thickness Brinell Hardness No.
Turret Roof 25 mm 290
Hull Roof 25 mm 335
Glacis 60 mm 265
Hull Sides 60 mm 265
Turret Sides 80 mm 255
Superstructure 80 mm 260-255
Hull Rear 80 mm 255
Driver's Front Plate 100 mm 265
Hull Front 100 mm 265
Mantlet 100-200 mm 280
NOTE: Actually, the Tiger I chassis Nbr. 250570, object of the trials, was assembled in early October 1943, and its armor would have been rolled, cut, hardened, and welded together at least three months earlier - that is, before July 1943.
The Tiger, as a result of it's intrinsic doctrinal mission - that is, to effect a breakthrough and to support medium tanks, during the breakthrough, by destroying enemy tanks - was, production-wise, a very expensive and resource consuming tank. The nominal cost of a Tiger was 250,800 Reichsmarks. In contrast, a PzKpfw III Ausf. M cost RM 103,163, a PzKpfw IV Ausf. G RM 115,962, and a PzKpfw V Panther RM 117,100; all these figures are exclusive of weapons and radios. However, the final cost of the Tiger's production was even higher - 299,800 Reichsmarks (Source: HAHN, Fritz. Waffen und Geheimwaffen des deutschen Heeres 1933-1943 Band 1 Band 2. Koblenz : Bernard Graefe Verlag, 1987, in Christian Ankerstjerne's Panzerworld web site. Accessed in June 21, 2007).
Christopher W. Wilbeck, in "Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Heavy Tank Battalions in World War II", citing the Tigerfibel (the Tiger's manual), states that the final cost of the Tiger's production was much higher - 800,000 Reichsmarks - and 300,000 man-hours were required to produce one single Tiger. The Tigerfibel , in view of making those numbers more personal to the Tiger crewmen, stated that it was required one week of hard work from 6,000 people to produce one Tiger. It also stated that 800,000 Reichsmarks figure was equivalent to the weekly wages for 30,000 people.
The frontal vertical plating was massive enough to withstand virtually anything. Tiger I disabled by a side penetration that hit the engine and caused the suspension to collapse.
Another fact that helped the Tigers a lot was the "shatter gap" effect which affected allied ammunition, a most unusual situation where rounds with too high an impact velocity would sometimes fail even though their penetration capability was (theoretically) more than adequate. This phenomenon plagued the British 2 pounder in the desert, and would have decreased the effectiveness of U.S. 76mm and 3" guns against Tigers, Panthers and other vehicles with armor thickness above 70 mm. It should be noted that the problems with the 76 mm and 3" guns did not necessarily involve the weapons themselves: the noses of US armor-piercing ammunition of the time turned out to be excessively soft. When these projectiles impacted armor which matched or exceeded the projectile diameter at a certain spread of velocities, the projectile would shatter and fail.
Penetrations would occur below this velocity range, since the shell would not shatter, and strikes above this range would propel the shell through the armor whether it shattered or not. When striking a Tiger I driver's plate, for example, this "shatter gap" for a 76mm APCBC M62 shell would cause failures between 50 meters and 900 meters. These ammunition deficiencies proved that Ordnance tests claiming the 76 mm gun could penetrate a Tiger I's upper front hull to 2,000 yards (1,800 meters) were sadly incorrect.
As a general rule, BHN (Brinell Hardness Index) effects, shot shatter, and obliquity effects are related to the ratio between shot diameter and plate thickness. The relationship is complex, but a larger projectile hitting relatively thinner plate will usually have the advantage. There is an optimum BHN level for every shot vs plate confrontation, usually in the 260-300 BHN range for World War Two situations. Below that, the armor is too soft and resists poorly, above that, the armor is too hard and therefore too brittle.
eddie_brunette
Senior Airman
The Panther for me, but not in poll(or am I blind, me wife drove over my glasses yesterday)
Achtung Panzer! - Panther
Here is body on my [WIP] Halinski Panther
edd
Achtung Panzer! - Panther
Here is body on my [WIP] Halinski Panther
edd
Parsifal when you copy from another place you should always use quotation marks (""). Otherwise good article.
Now about t/d, well it doesn't have as large an effect as implied, and the reason US 76mm APCBC projectiles shattered was entirely due to being either too soft or too brittle, neither is good. It had nothing to do with the t/d ratio.
The t/d ratio theory originates from the early 1800's IIRC, and was concieved by a frenchman who's name now escapes me. It was developed for the round shots of the time and is really very obsolete when it comes to predicting the penetrative performance of 20th century AP projectiles. Also as we know the general rule of thumb when it comes to armour penetration is that you want to concentrate as much power to as small an area as possible (Within reason), which is why arrow head SABOT rounds are the std. AP round for use against armour today. However as noted in the article the quality of the projectile itself is of very high importance as well, as if its either too soft or too brittle it'll simply shatter on impact. For this reason the Germans the Allies generally tended to face harden their AP rounds to some 400-450 BHN with the underlying metal core being around 300+ BHN, IIRC.
Now about t/d, well it doesn't have as large an effect as implied, and the reason US 76mm APCBC projectiles shattered was entirely due to being either too soft or too brittle, neither is good. It had nothing to do with the t/d ratio.
The t/d ratio theory originates from the early 1800's IIRC, and was concieved by a frenchman who's name now escapes me. It was developed for the round shots of the time and is really very obsolete when it comes to predicting the penetrative performance of 20th century AP projectiles. Also as we know the general rule of thumb when it comes to armour penetration is that you want to concentrate as much power to as small an area as possible (Within reason), which is why arrow head SABOT rounds are the std. AP round for use against armour today. However as noted in the article the quality of the projectile itself is of very high importance as well, as if its either too soft or too brittle it'll simply shatter on impact. For this reason the Germans the Allies generally tended to face harden their AP rounds to some 400-450 BHN with the underlying metal core being around 300+ BHN, IIRC.
- Thread starter
- #49
Danielmellbin
Airman 1st Class
- 122
- Jun 22, 2008
Nice to see you edited out the "cant you read?" remark and your own roll eyes. Which kindof contradicts that statement...
Anyway - yes I can read and what I read is "equal or slightly better" - not "useless penetration power when compared to APCBC" as you said.
Just to get this straight: Your primary point maaany posts ago was "17pdrs firing APDS where totally incapable of penetrating the armour of the Tiger due to the shatter effect". This has not been backed sofar. In any event the 17pdrs didn't use many APDS rounds - so its a bit redundant to discuss it. As I also mentioned just after that - I would not prefer WW2 models of APDS - because of their lack of accuracy caused by what i mentioned earlier. But - my point in all this bickering is that the Tiger I was no longer "invunerable" to AT fire in the latter half of 43 and onwards - thus not being as usefull for its main (official) purpose - namely breakthrough. The King Tiger restored this capability (plus all the things about the gun... bla-bla repeating myself
).And thanks a bunch for the article/book qoute Parsifal
- very informative- Thread starter
- #50
Danielmellbin
Airman 1st Class
- 122
- Jun 22, 2008
Which makes the test you bring forward kindof irrelevant as the Tiger had nonsloping armour.
- Thread starter
- #51
Danielmellbin
Airman 1st Class
- 122
- Jun 22, 2008
damn - hope ya got some new ones. Contacts ftw
and no the Panther is not there as it was a medium tank. True that its weight might suggest otherwise but its inteded use was as a main battle tank of the panzer divisions not breakthrough/heavy infantry support. Which in my mind rules it out as a heavy tank.Daniel,
Here's what you said:
"The almost 90 degree armour meant that despite its armour thickness too many AT guns could "handle" it by 43/44"
Which I'm afraid just isn't the case. The 17pdr was the only gun available to the Allies which was capable of taking on the Tiger at sane ranges and then have a hope of surviving. The US 76mm guns proved completely incapable, and so did the Soviet 76 85mm gun. Heck like I said even the 122mm D-25T sometimes had troubles against the Tiger's armour, and at ranges as close as 500m. The IS-2 below was knocked out after having fired an AP round at the Tiger Ausf.E which hit the front glacis and bounced off, after which the Tiger sent an 88mm APCBC projectile straight through the IS-2's turret front:
Here's what you said:
"The almost 90 degree armour meant that despite its armour thickness too many AT guns could "handle" it by 43/44"
Which I'm afraid just isn't the case. The 17pdr was the only gun available to the Allies which was capable of taking on the Tiger at sane ranges and then have a hope of surviving. The US 76mm guns proved completely incapable, and so did the Soviet 76 85mm gun. Heck like I said even the 122mm D-25T sometimes had troubles against the Tiger's armour, and at ranges as close as 500m. The IS-2 below was knocked out after having fired an AP round at the Tiger Ausf.E which hit the front glacis and bounced off, after which the Tiger sent an 88mm APCBC projectile straight through the IS-2's turret front:
Attachments
Well can you ? Cause you seem to be forgetting your own words otherwise.
- Thread starter
- #54
Danielmellbin
Airman 1st Class
- 122
- Jun 22, 2008
Dude... again... please stop that s***. To answer your rude questioning: please explain the significant difference between:
A.)"The almost 90 degree armour meant that despite its armour thickness too many AT guns could "handle" it by 43/44".
B.) "The Tiger I was no longer "invunerable" to AT fire in the latter half of 43 and onwards"
Anyway... moving on
"122mm soviet AT-gun unable to defeat a tiger at 500 meters" you say? Yea - sure it probably happened once or maybe twice due to point of impact and other conditions on the battlefield. But the odds of it happening more than once or twice....?
Guns able to defeat the Tiger E due to armour penetration under normal combat conditions/ranges from late '43:
British: 17pdr
American: 17 pdr
Russian:
85mm (although (as you mentioned) problems where encountered against frontal armour at long and even medium range).
100mm
122mm
152mm (ISUs)
Guns able to defeat the King Tiger due to armour penetration under normal conditions/ranges from time of introduction to wars end:
Brittish: none
American: none
Russian: the 100 and 122 might have a chance against the side armour (maybe the 152 ISUs could even penetrate frontal armour - haven't done the math or examined any combat records - so no idea on that except a gut fealing that the sheer energy released on impact would in many cases damage the tank in other ways even if the shot wouldn't penetrate the armour).
In '42/early '43 the Tiger E had no "armour penetration enemies" on the battlefield - however - as seen above this changed dramatically in late '43. When introduced in '44 The King Tiger enjoyed all the benefits that the Tiger E had in its earlier days.
The concept of "heavy tanks" was pretty much abandoned after WW2 as MBT's were evolved. And as such the King Tiger is in my opinion the best heavy tank to ever have seen action. Don't get me wrong: Other choices are fine and well and maybe also better choices due to other ways of judging the tank (time of service, impact on war, personal linkings and so on...). But the Tiger E and King Tiger are much more subjected to comparison than the other choices since one replaced the other. I believe that the relative weakness of the armour and gun of the Ausf E outweighs the benefits of its slightly better reliability when compared to the Ausf B.
starling
Airman 1st Class
these comparisons are all well and good ladies and gents,but in war all this stops,does it not.i have read of the js tanks 122mm rounds simply knocking the turret off tigers,sheer kinetic energy apparently.and also achillies t.d,s killing king tigers in normandy.the german mk4,5 or6,did not have it all their own way,as some people and authors have said.yours,starling.
Soren, Daniel
If you too can not keep is civil, the thread will be closed...
If you too can not keep is civil, the thread will be closed...
- Thread starter
- #57
Danielmellbin
Airman 1st Class
- 122
- Jun 22, 2008
Too true. The Tigers always runs away with the attention: It really shows how effective german propaganda was (and ofcourse how quickly rumours spread on the battlefield) that some 2000 (never more than 300 operational at the same time - usually app.150) tanks have made such a stir even to this day. But I dont think anybody have claimed that they had it all.
To my knowledge all the King Tigers in normandy where taken out by typhoons or other aircraft (but im far from sure)... Do you have any additional info on that Sterling? Have tried to find info on the battles in which King Tigers took part in Normandy for a looong time - never managed...
Adler - ofcourse. However if people are rude to me I find it hard not to "retaliate" - human nature i think...
parsifal
Colonel
I couldnt quote completely for two reasons, firstly, I have taken the quote from a third secondary source (the original source material - jentz,- is adequately credited), and secondly there are some comments of my own in the text. it is not a direct quote of the source mateial as a result of that.
I thought that i made it clear enough that this is not my own material.
I should also say that Shatter Gap is not a phenomena that happens with every round fired, sometimes it works, and sometimes it doesnt. Also, ther is a real risk that there may be a scab effect in the interior of the tank, with some armour flakes detaching and having a shrapnell effect on the inside of the tank.
However, as a general comment, the armouring scheme of the tiger (I II) was very effective
eddie_brunette
Senior Airman
damn - hope ya got some new ones. Contacts ftw
Aaahhhh, thank you. My limited knowledge on tanks is showing
WW2 Tanks is a relative new subject for me
Edd
Kurfürst
Staff Sergeant
I agree with the first part but not the seocond part; no tanks at no point of the war were 'invulnerable' to AT means. Some were very difficult to destroy. While the 17 pdr was a valid threat to the Tiger, until there were far too few 17pdr AT guns around and the bulk was still 6 pdrs (ie. much into 1944), the Tiger I was certainly useful in its roles.
