Best strategy to avoid nuking Japan

[GrauGeist]

This thread looks interesting to me because I think if we can find a good answer we may be able to let North Koreans open their doors without using our military power now. Their style is a copy of pre-war Japanese.

Very good point, Shinpachi, but while most people have the ability to learn from past mistakes and tragedies, it seems that politicians and leaders don't.

I'm not sure why this is, but until they do, we're doomed to repeat history over and over again

 

[Balljoint]

Just a couple of disjointed points. The US submarine blockade was instrumental in defeating Japanese air forces. Japan didn't have the backyard mechanics and farm boys that enabled the US to do fairly complex maintenance/repair on planes in the field. Instead their planes were shipped back for factory repair. Few made it back thanks to the subs.

Whatever the alternatives may have been, the US was in fact mobilizing for the invasion of Japan. If the invasion had occurred, Japan as a distinct civilization probably would have been extinguished. Only the emperor could decide to surrender. And even when he decided to do so, there was a palace revolt in opposition to the decision. In the larger scheme, the bombs were great shock and awe but a small factor in the total death and destruction brought to bear upon Japan.

The bombs weren't so much an incremental increase over firebombing where the destructive energy was on the ground rather than in the bomb, as they were a distinct new and overwhelming means that overcame the resolute fanaticism. Turning up the heat slowly probable wouldn't have had the same result.

 

[stona]

The bombs weren't so much an incremental increase over firebombing where the destructive energy was on the ground rather than in the bomb, as they were a distinct new and overwhelming means that overcame the resolute fanaticism. Turning up the heat slowly probable wouldn't have had the same result.

Exactly.

Cheers

Steve

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Japan didn't have the backyard mechanics and farm boys that enabled the US to do fairly complex maintenance/repair on planes in the field. Instead their planes were shipped back for factory repair. Few made it back thanks to the subs.

I'd like to know your references on that. From what I understand, Japanese mechanics were pretty skilled and well trained. Japanese aircraft as a whole did have an interchangeability issue that has been well documented. There was probably greater reasoning why some of their aircraft were sent back to the factory; perhaps limitations from the manufacture on what type of maintenance and repairs were permitted in the field.

When you say "fairly complex maintenance/repair on planes in the field," what are you talking about? Structural repairs? Engine overhauls? Mechanics aren't "cut loose" to make repairs at their beckon, usually there was a maintenance/ engineering officer or a factory representative that provided the required data in the case of say major structural repairs for example. Given the data and the tools available, I think all combatants during WW2 had very capable mechanics across the board.

 

[Balljoint]

I'd like to know your references on that. From what I understand, Japanese mechanics were pretty skilled and well trained. Japanese aircraft as a whole did have an interchangeability issue that has been well documented. There was probably greater reasoning why some of their aircraft were sent back to the factory; perhaps limitations from the manufacture on what type of maintenance and repairs were permitted in the field.

When you say "fairly complex maintenance/repair on planes in the field," what are you talking about? Structural repairs? Engine overhauls? Mechanics aren't "cut loose" to make repairs at their beckon, usually there was a maintenance/ engineering officer or a factory representative that provided the required data in the case of say major structural repairs for example. Given the data and the tools available, I think all combatants during WW2 had very capable mechanics across the board.

The premise was related to me during a dinner perhaps thirty years ago by a gentleman -unfortunately I've lost his card- who was the Pacific Theater Engineer for Curtiss-Wright. He was rather emphatic about the effectiveness of the subs once they got torpedoes that worked.

At this point it's admittedly hearsay. However, the discussion in Shattered Sword about the Japanese mechanics being trained specialists in short supply, i.e. a major loss to the IJN at Midway, does tend to corroborate the theory.

I would think the Japanese mechanics, as with most things Japanese, were excellent. It's just that there weren't all that many of them.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

At this point it's admittedly hearsay. However, the discussion in Shattered Sword about the Japanese mechanics being trained specialists in short supply, i.e. a major loss to the IJN at Midway, does tend to corroborate the theory.

You still had the JAAF as well as land based IJN units, it is possible that there were shortages but more than likely later in the war.

 

[Balljoint]

You still had the JAAF as well as land based IJN units, it is possible that there were shortages but more than likely later in the war.

The point regarding Japan's aircraft maintenance logistics, while I think sound and significant, was made rather succinctly in support of Oldskeptic's earlier-made point about the effectiveness of allied submarines. To amplify a bit, Japan was an island nation almost completely devoid of natural resoures, particulatly oil. It early in the war conquered an empire rich in resources and established an outer offense/defense island perimeter linked by its maritime fleet to return resources to the home island and to supply military men and materials to the islands. Rather than embedding the limited aero mechanics in these far-flung island outposts, their logistic system centralized the repair stations, again linking with ships rather than distributing the limited resources. Once the Allied submarines ramped up the supply links were effectively severed and system collapsed. Certainly the interdiction of fuel and food were critical, but loss of preexisting resources such as engines sent for repair was particularly damaging.

IMO the Pacific war an island and sea war with Burma and China background activities in a strategic sense. Serious Japanese air capability ended with the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The kamikaze attack during the Battle off Samar signaled recognition of a strategic military defeat and the start of a terror strategy of inflicting casualties rather than attaining victory. Japan's sacrifice of its Northern Force's toothless carriers confirms this. Maintenance and repair are not germane to kamikaze operations.

After the Philippines, if Japan couldn't bring a military asset to bear at Iwo or Okinawa, the asset was stranded and useless.

 

[pinsog]

Wasn't there talk in 1945 of using heavy bombers to spray Japanese fields with herbicides to kill the crops and push them even deeper into famine? I can't remember where I read that.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The point regarding Japan's aircraft maintenance logistics, while I think sound and significant, was made rather succinctly in support of Oldskeptic's earlier-made point about the effectiveness of allied submarines.

I'd buy that rather than pointing to aircraft maintenance and the specific tasks accomplished and/ or permitted in the field. With all due respect to your source that compared Japanese mechanics to US boys, unless one could touch on specifics, you're dealing with loose speculation. Again, maintainers are pretty limited on what they are authorized to do on aircraft and engines (not to say any mechanic bent or violated rules to get things fixed). There might have been some "farm mechanic" innovations on locally manufactured tools to get the job done easier and/ or faster.

 

[rank amateur]

Perhaps a bit of topic at this point of the discussion, but years ago I've read somewhere that on august 7 1945, Hirohito held a radiospeach in which he informed his subjects on the event the day before. After he told them how Hiroshima was devasted by a single bomb he remarked: "these events are not necessary to our advantage".

This phrase has always struck me as totaly misplaced but it might give us a little insight in the state of mind of the Japanese governement at that time. We are now debating a strategy of how to avoid the use of nuclear devices but in the real world, it took the allieds 2 bombs before the Japanese figured surrendering might not be such a bad idea after all.

 

[gumbyk]

it took the allieds 2 bombs before the Japanese figured surrendering might not be such a bad idea after all.

Given the short time between the two bombs, I, personally am not too sure that the plan wasn't always to drop both.

Three days isn't a lot of time to get everyone together and to make a decision as big as surrender.

BUT - That's a personal thought... I'm not stating it as fact.

 

[bobbysocks]

i do give hirohito that much. he decided not to let his country be completely turned into a wasteland and spared the carnage...unlike hitler who cared less who or what survived.

 

[stona]

Given the short time between the two bombs, I, personally am not too sure that the plan wasn't always to drop both.

Groves had always said that two bombs would be required. The military men seem to have gone over the head of the President on this. It is important to note that the Uranium war head for Little Boy and the Plutonium core and initiator for Fat Man were both flown to Tinian on the same day, July 26th, the day Little Boy unloaded from USS Indianapolis. Fat Man arrived on August 2nd.

On the morning of August 10, 1945, Robert Bacher of the Environmental Physics Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory was supervising the loading of a plutonium core onto a truck. Robert Oppenheimer then appeared and told Balcher to stop loading the core. No further shipments were to be made, Oppenheimer said, without an explicit order from President Truman. The implication is that the second bomb on Nagasaki had taken Trumann by surprise and he did not want a third bomb dropped without his express consent.

It has been suggested (Goldberg, Christman and others) that Major General Leslie Groves alone had directed the bomb's use on Nagasaki, as a bureaucrat anxious to justify the money that had been invested in its development, and also as a military man who wanted to hasten the end of the war.

Anyone with time to analyse the Spaatz papers in the Library of Congress will see evidence of much radio traffic generated on Tinian in the second week of August (45). This clearly shows that the U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces wanted the third bomb to be dropped on Tokyo as a wake up call for the Japanese government, which was stalling on agreeing to the United Nations surrender terms.
General Arnold made it quite clear that the third target was already decided and would be Sapporo on the northern island of Hokkaido.

This third bomb was of course never used. It seems that the heavy bits were already en route to Tinian when General Marshall officially "delayed" the shipment of the core and initiator for the second Plutonium device (third bomb) on 11th August. This, just one day after Oppenheimer had told Bacher to stop loading the core, has led some to suggest that the brakes were being applied from the top and it was the President who considered that two was enough. Some in USASTAF were quite happy to keep dropping bombs as they became available.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Conslaw]

What I would have done differently, with the benefit of 70 years of 20-20 hindsight, is that I would have invaded Iwo Jima right after the Marianas, in the Summer of 1944. At that time Japan hadn't yet heavily fortified the island, and the kamikaze units were not yet online, so the US could have taken the island much more easily, with lower casualties both on the ground and on the ships at sea. The airfields on Iwo would have been ready 6 months earlier. This would have reduced B-29 losses. If a Sub tender could be brought to the Iwo area, then the submarine scourge of the empire would have had a very short combat radius. A sub could lay a load of mines, and go get another load in just a few days. A US base on Iwo might have discouraged the Japanese from heavily fortifying the Philippines, instead choosing to fortify the home islands and flail against the US forces at Iwo. If so, It would have been easier and quicker for the US to establish a presence in the Philippines and cut off Japanese supply lines from the west. Okinawa would be assaulted by late 1944. With its sea lanes cut off before the end of 1944, Japan would have a hard time withstanding the US blockade and bombing until August 1945 when the atomic bombs were ready.

 

[bob44]

That is a very interesting scenario Conslaw. The US invades Iwo Jima. The Japanese still hold the Philippines. The Japanese still have a very big surface fleet. Perhaps another thread to discuss this.

 

[Conslaw]

As for where to get the troops for a July 1944 invasion of Iwo Jima, I'd look first to the troops earmarked for Guam. The Guam invasion could be delayed. Regarding the Japanese fleet after an Iwo July landing: They would still be licking their wounds after the Marinas debacle. With Americans holding an airfield 700 miles from Japan, the IJN might be goaded into a poorly planned counterattack without carrier airpower, one much more like the last voyage of the Yamato than the complex Leyte counterattack. If so, the combined fleet's fighting power would have been destroyed earlier than October 1944.

 

[GregP]

In WWII nobody much knew what atomic bombs were about or what the eventual consequences would be … it was a new weapon with a BIG explosion. The scientists might have known about radiation fallout and might not have had a complete grasp, but the impetus was to attack and win the war. Germany was already beaten.

I think the Atomic Bomb was dropped because we had it, the Japanese had not indicated to us that our surrender terms, which had been clearly communicated to them, were acceptable, and because we wanted to avoid excessive casualties. Later we knew the horror of fallout and the cost in human suffering. Today we see things as if the people in charge KNEW what they were starting. I believe we knew we would kill within a certain zone, but did NOT know the ultimate consequences of the radiation and subsequent human toll. Maybe the scientists did, but maybe not the civilian or military leaders.

If we HAD known, then the decision to drop the bomb might have been a lot harder, but let's remember that the attack on Pearl Harbor was the largest loss of life in a sneak attack ever previously recorded by the USA. The "powers that be" might not have been as concerned about Japanese casualty consequences as much as punishing the perpetrators of the Pearl Harbor attack.

If we had known all the consequences, I'd like to think we might have done it differently … but I can't say for sure. I have spoken with WWII vets who had sympathy with the Japanese and with vets who only wanted to kill them after Pearl Harbor, and still DO. Unprovoked attack will DO that … but WAS it unprovoked?

We tried to cut off their raw materials and they responded as a nation must ... or die. I have NO idea what was fair but, if the reverse had been true, what would WE have responded with? gain, I can't say.

In retrospect, the atomic bombs were pretty much inevitable once we had them unless Japan had surrendered first. They didn't and it was an unfortunate necessity to prevent loss of life in the anticipate invasion.

We DID have an alternative … the US had developed a copy of the V-1, called the JB-2 (jet bomb-2) Loon and could have used thousands of them on Japan. Likely it would have caused more casualties than the A-bomb, but without radiation.

Which would be better in an ideal world? If YOU are President Truman, what would YOU decide, given the choices: V-1 assault, atomic bomb, or invasion … with the current war casualty list in your desk? ... given that we were attacked by surprise to start with (Truman wasn't President when we were attacked) and that we were spending into heavy debt to win the war, as was everyone else.

I'd probably have made the same call as Truman, but cannot be sure since real deaths are not involved in a "what if."

If we had hindsight, then no. But we didn't HAVE hindsight. Onl a new weapon that promised to be a GOOD one.

Who knew it would later be the impetus to cease world war in 1945? WWI had not done it ... maybe the new scale of A-bomb destruction WOULD ...

A tough call either way since large casulaties were cerainly suspected.

 

[stona]

Many of the scientific calculations were borne out by the Trinity test and subsequent explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One scientist had even accurately predicted the size and rate of ascent of the fireball.

The effects of radio active fall out, rather than the direct exposure to the various radiations released by the explosion, are sometimes over stated.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tyrodtom]

In WWII nobody much knew what atomic bombs were about or what the eventual consequences would be … it was a new weapon with a BIG explosion. The scientists might have known about radiation fallout and might not have had a complete grasp, but the impetus was to attack and win the war. Germany was already beaten.

I think the Atomic Bomb was dropped because we had it, the Japanese had not indicated to us that our surrender terms, which had been clearly communicated to them, were acceptable, and because we wanted to avoid excessive casualties. Later we knew the horror of fallout and the cost in human suffering. Today we see things as if the people in charge KNEW what they were starting. I believe we knew we would kill within a certain zone, but did NOT know the ultimate consequences of the radiation and subsequent human toll. Maybe the scientists did, but maybe not the civilian or military leaders.

If we HAD known, then the decision to drop the bomb might have been a lot harder, but let's remember that the attack on Pearl Harbor was the largest loss of life in a sneak attack ever previously recorded by the USA. The "powers that be" might not have been as concerned about Japanese casualty consequences as much as punishing the perpetrators of the Pearl Harbor attack.

If we had known all the consequences, I'd like to think we might have done it differently … but I can't say for sure. I have spoken with WWII vets who had sympathy with the Japanese and with vets who only wanted to kill them after Pearl Harbor, and still DO. Unprovoked attack will DO that … but WAS it unprovoked?

We tried to cut off their raw materials and they responded as a nation must ... or die. I have NO idea what was fair but, if the reverse had been true, what would WE have responded with? gain, I can't say.

In retrospect, the atomic bombs were pretty much inevitable once we had them unless Japan had surrendered first. They didn't and it was an unfortunate necessity to prevent loss of life in the anticipate invasion.

We DID have an alternative … the US had developed a copy of the V-1, called the JB-2 (jet bomb-2) Loon and could have used thousands of them on Japan. Likely it would have caused more casualties than the A-bomb, but without radiation.

Which would be better in an ideal world? If YOU are President Truman, what would YOU decide, given the choices: V-1 assault, atomic bomb, or invasion … with the current war casualty list in your desk? ... given that we were attacked by surprise to start with (Truman wasn't President when we were attacked) and that we were spending into heavy debt to win the war, as was everyone else.

I'd probably have made the same call as Truman, but cannot be sure since real deaths are not involved in a "what if."

If we had hindsight, then no. But we didn't HAVE hindsight. Onl a new weapon that promised to be a GOOD one.

Who knew it would later be the impetus to cease world war in 1945? WWI had not done it ... maybe the new scale of A-bomb destruction WOULD ...

A tough call either way since large casulaties were cerainly suspected.

You seem to be counting on our copy of the V-1 being a lot more effective than the V-1 was in real life.
Over 10,000 launched, more than 6000 people killed. At that rate it going to take one heck of a lot of Loons to begin to inflict the amount of casualties equal to the nukes or even conventional bombing.
Almost 2000 allied aircrew were killed bombing the V-1 launch sites. In a indirect way that might have been it most effective use.

 

[gjs238]

Bomb trucks were needed for the firebombing to be effective.
The JB-2 was a bomb taxi.