Thumpalumpacus
Major
That's if they could fit three in at all, what with their breech design (sliding block rather than interrupted-screw.)
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Would the Germans have been left with a white elephant had they tried to go for triple 15" turrets?
For a hypothetical war against France where the UK stays out of it, they can go around the UK.
Unless the British invite the Germans to stop in for tea and crumpets while they refuel this doesn't work.
They are, obviously.So you bring along some oilers. Historically, the Deutschlands operated as far away as the Indian ocean, with the support of tankers, so presumably the Germans are aware of the idea.
[...] several not very big carriers west of France [...]
The KM studied the problem of supplying its fleet during Atlantic operations from the late 1920s and that resulted, after various trials and exercises, in the design and construction of the Dithmarschen class supply ships. 6 ordered and laid down from 1936 with 5 completed, 3 before the outbreak of WW2.So you bring along some oilers. Historically, the Deutschlands operated as far away as the Indian ocean, with the support of tankers, so presumably the Germans are aware of the idea.
As far as German destroyers go, it looks a lot like they were trying to match/exceed the French contre-torpilleurs rather than the British 1300-1400ton ships.
The French ships had some of the same strengths and weaknesses.
Making smaller, slower, lighter armed ships may have been asking the Germans for too much sacrifice in prestige
"Several" German carriers? Good luck with that.
Getting back to the original premise, it seems to me that there was little or nothing the Germans could do that would affect the overall outcome.
Certain battles and/or engagements yes. Extend certain campaigns, probably. Alter the overall course or outcome of the war, no.
Germany was too out numbered and could not make up the difference (industrial capacity, especially once the US joined).
Germany actually did a pretty good job of trying down British forces and causing them to expend resources (ship building and oil) way out of proportion to what the Germans actually spent.
Any changes in German Strategy has to be measured against that and not a simple scoreboard like a football game.
Any changes in German strategy/building programs has to take into account changes in British/French building programs (fewer BB before the war and more subs means the British start building a lot more escorts sooner and the like).
Germans had multi pronged threat to British commerce, the U-boats, merchant raiders and heavy raiders. Which required different solutions/counter measures. Significantly changing the mix means the British can change the force responding to the change/s and is that good or bad for the Germans?
More German merchant raiders and fewer cruisers/armored ships/battleships means the British don't have to build as many large ships. The old WW I cruisers can handle more areas escorting against merchant raiders. British can build more light cruisers (and not cruisers with twelve 6in guns/treaty heavy cruisers with different guns). British can pay off some of the old R class BBs and save on manpower, repairs, fuel.
Trick strategies (concentrating on one aspect/prong) allows the British to concentrate on that aspect/prong instead of spreading out their effort, diluting it.
Too much focus on Germany and ignoring the fact that Britain had another enemy in the Far East to consider - Japan.Getting back to the original premise, it seems to me that there was little or nothing the Germans could do that would affect the overall outcome.
Certain battles and/or engagements yes. Extend certain campaigns, probably. Alter the overall course or outcome of the war, no.
The reverse is not true for the British. Much like Jellicoe in WW I, he could not win WW I at sea, he could loose it though.
The RN could not defeat Germany (make it surrender) but it could loose the war by not getting enough supplies into England or enough war material to other places.
Germany was too out numbered and could not make up the difference (industrial capacity, especially once the US joined).
Germany actually did a pretty good job of trying down British forces and causing them to expend resources (ship building and oil) way out of proportion to what the Germans actually spent.
Any changes in German Strategy has to be measured against that and not a simple scoreboard like a football game.
Any changes in German strategy/building programs has to take into account changes in British/French building programs (fewer BB before the war and more subs means the British start building a lot more escorts sooner and the like).
Germans had multi pronged threat to British commerce, the U-boats, merchant raiders and heavy raiders. Which required different solutions/counter measures. Significantly changing the mix means the British can change the force responding to the change/s and is that good or bad for the Germans?
More German merchant raiders and fewer cruisers/armored ships/battleships means the British don't have to build as many large ships. The old WW I cruisers can handle more areas escorting against merchant raiders. British can build more light cruisers (and not cruisers with twelve 6in guns/treaty heavy cruisers with different guns). British can pay off some of the old R class BBs and save on manpower, repairs, fuel.
Trick strategies (concentrating on one aspect/prong) allows the British to concentrate on that aspect/prong instead of spreading out their effort, diluting it.
As mentioned in post #106 that introduced this particular subthread, by sacrificing the Bismarcks and Hippers they could for the same tonnage have built three small carrier task groups, each with a 23kton carrier, a 10kton CL, and 5 2kton destroyers. Now, if they want to maintain a presence in the Atlantic, it probably means one task force is under repair/refitting, another is transitioning to/from the area, and one on station. For just a raid, maybe they could manage to sortie two such task forces together, depending of course when this raid is supposed to take place.
I'm thinking more about getting Goering to support these plans.
Hitler sneezes on some magic pixie dust and gives the KM full control over their own aviation. Goering is of course furious but has to stuff it.
But who cares what the RN is doing when the planned foe is the NM?A major problem for the Kriegsmarine is that a lot of their ships were just plain bad designs compounded by bad designs of machinery. Then they squared the problems by trying to do too much, armament/speed or combinations.
Leipzig was and improved Koln and the Kolns were among the worst cruisers built between the wars. Not hard to improve them but what do you get in the end?
The British town classes are not impressive on paper but they worked. Germans spent too much tonnage on trick propulsion and leading edge guns/armament.
German 5.9s out ranged the British 6in guns by around 4000yds? trouble is that nobodies 6in guns could hit at max range. Germans paid for long range with short barrel life, they also had less magazine capacity. They carried about 50% more torpedoes. and so on.
Same with the Destroyers, it wasn't the 15cm guns so much as the roughly 70,000hp engines needed for the 36-38kt speeds. British Tribal class had 44,000hp and 1/2 the boilers (not quite fair the British boilers were not the high pressure steam type).
Only 18 destroyers were completed with 5.9in guns.
The Big German ships scared the British. A few 10kton 6in cruisers and 15 2kton destroyers would not even have been a decent lunch for the RN.
The 1934 class Zerstörer is almost exactly 1:1 German version of the Fletcher (same 5x5", basically same speed, same length/beam/draft/fineness (aka displacement). The biggest differences are medium vs high pressure steam, and 'cruising' turbine design (USN solution was unique - changing the steam injection point on main turbines to maintain relatively high efficiency at lessor speeds; It avoids atrocious efficiency of running main turbines at slow speed and/or drag of cruising turbine clutches at high speed).I was thinking of something like a German version of a Tribal or Fletcher in the 2000-ton range. Do the basics well, don't try to do too much.
As mentioned in post #106 that introduced this particular subthread, by sacrificing the Bismarcks and Hippers they could for the same tonnage have built three small carrier task groups, each with a 23kton carrier, a 10kton CL, and 5 2kton destroyers. Now, if they want to maintain a presence in the Atlantic, it probably means one task force is under repair/refitting, another is transitioning to/from the area, and one on station. For just a raid, maybe they could manage to sortie two such task forces together, depending of course when this raid is supposed to take place.
Oh, I fully agree. I'm sorry if I've misled you to believe I think that a different German naval (or anything, really) strategy would have enabled them to win the war. At most, prolong the inevitable.
Yes, this is all true. But it goes the other way as well, in that diluting their efforts cost the Germans a lot as well. The capital ships, say, not only used up a lot of steel that could maybe have been used more productively elsewhere, but also required setting up a lot of specialized manufacturing capability to produce BB guns and armor, which doesn't have much application outside battleships (well, railway guns and coastal fortifications, to some limited extent..).
Or, say, if the Germans would have decided to go all-in on u-boats. Yes, that would mean the Allies could concentrate on ASW (lots of corvettes, hedgehog launchers, radar-equipped patrol aircraft earlier?) and not bother with having capital ships available to counter potential German convoy raids with surface ships. But on the other hand, going all-in on u-boats could have allowed Germany to introduce things like snorkels, burst transmission radios, acoustic homing torpedoes, and u-boats with better submerged performance (perhaps not exactly the Type XXI, but something better than the Type VII which historically was their mainstay)? All of which they introduced or at least experimented with towards the end of the war, but of course by then it was much too late to have much of an impact. Which way would the balance tip in the end, would it have been overall better or worse for them compared to what they historically did? I don't know really, but it's fun (for some definition of fun at least!) to think of such scenarios and what their responses could potentially be.
Well, quoting from the above-mentioned post #106 (Better German naval strategy 1930-1945?):
The 1934 class Zerstörer is almost exactly 1:1 German version of the Fletcher (same 5x5", basically same speed, same length/beam/draft/fineness (aka displacement). The biggest differences are medium vs high pressure steam, and 'cruising' turbine design (USN solution was unique - changing the steam injection point on main turbines to maintain relatively high efficiency at lessor speeds; It avoids atrocious efficiency of running main turbines at slow speed and/or drag of cruising turbine clutches at high speed).
As E EwenS has beat me up*; in '30s, if you stand on your soapbox and promote carrier task forces:
1. They will put you in padded room as with only biplanes/no radar/etc - your carrier is little more than a floating gasoline tanker.2. The big gun ships still rule and take the longest to build; so, getting Admirals to delay their battleships will result in your being like Julius Caesar and even your friends will be sticking knives in your back.3. A carrier in '35 was the 1st strike equivalent of the 70s ballistic missile submarine (RN would be unable to prevent KM CV from launching 70+ airplane** attack which would devastate which ever city they attacked and the subsequent riots would end the war) So, if you really want to panic RN, build a bunch of CVs.
Germany would have needed Graf Zeppelin/Peter Strausser sized carriers if they insisted on using land-based aircraft as the compliment.
For all the Wunderwaffe that Germany came up with, they had zero clues for naval aircraft.
Several Japanese naval types were based on Heinkel designs and the Luftwaffe could have tapped into that resource, especially since Heinkel had a repoir with Japan, complete with engineers in Japan, who could have got the RLM up to speed on Japanese maratime aircraft in real time.