Thumpalumpacus
Major
That's if they could fit three in at all, what with their breech design (sliding block rather than interrupted-screw.)
Better German naval strategy 1930-1945?
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That's if they could fit three in at all, what with their breech design (sliding block rather than interrupted-screw.)
Shortround6
Major General
Unless the British invite the Germans to stop in for tea and crumpets while they refuel this doesn't work.
Using google maps it is about 1600 miles from the Ems to just off Brest going by way of the Orkney-Shetlands gap, going about 30 miles off the Scottish western Islands and around 30-40 miles off the west coast of Ireland.
You can play games with the downward side of the trip but it is about 520-530 miles from the Ems to John O' Groats and with a lot German ships having trouble sailing 3000 miles a round trip without "extra" fuel is not going to happen.
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- #123
So you bring along some oilers. Historically, the Deutschlands operated as far away as the Indian ocean, with the support of tankers, so presumably the Germans are aware of the idea.
Now, the cruisers and destroyers supporting the CV should ideally have longer range than the historical German ones, so as to not need to meet up with a tanker all the time, but operating in the north Atlantic doesn't look infeasible even if they have to go around the UK. Now if the UK gets involved, getting the carrier task group and fleet oilers past the UK undetected is a much iffier proposition. Probably not even worth trying, except maybe very early in the war.
Shortround6
Major General
They are, obviously.
It also did not work well in the Norway campaign. 1200 miles from the German coast to Narvik. They got there, needed tankers to go home.
French had 77 (?) post WW I subs in service.
They had 32 post WW I large destroyers and 26 small (1300 ton standard, 1900-2000ton full load)
10 light cruisers and 7 heavy cruisers.
French heavy units?
French carrier is junk, ignore it.
And of course the French will make no changes to their own building programs in response to the changes in the German naval programs or the change in the political situation?
A large part of the French fleet was in the Med because it was expected the British would take care of the North Sea and Channel.
If Britain sits this war out and France has more than a few weeks notice ships would be moved to new bases accordingly.
Seems like a lot of effort to put several not very big carriers west of France for limited times.
France needs imports but not as bad as Britain, trying to starve France out by cutting off food is not going to work and unless Italy joins in (and even then) shutting down the Med ports is going to be impossible.
Shortround6
Major General
As far as German destroyers go, it looks a lot like they were trying to match/exceed the French contre-torpilleurs rather than the British 1300-1400ton ships.
The French ships had some of the same strengths and weaknesses.
Making smaller, slower, lighter armed ships may have been asking the Germans for too much sacrifice in prestige
The French ships had some of the same strengths and weaknesses.
Making smaller, slower, lighter armed ships may have been asking the Germans for too much sacrifice in prestige
Thumpalumpacus
Major
"Several" German carriers? Good luck with that.
The KM studied the problem of supplying its fleet during Atlantic operations from the late 1920s and that resulted, after various trials and exercises, in the design and construction of the Dithmarschen class supply ships. 6 ordered and laid down from 1936 with 5 completed, 3 before the outbreak of WW2.
Dithmarschen (to USN in 1945 later as AO-110 Conecuh)
Altmark/ Uckermark
Westerwald / Nordmark (to RN in 1945 as Northmark / Bulawayo)
Franken
Ermland
"They were innovative and effective ships that would play a major part in the subsequent development of replenishment at sea. The Dithmarschens could each carry nearly nine thousand tons of fuel oil and four hundred tons of lubricating oil, as well as ammunition, spare parts, provisions, and water. They were equipped with repair shops, hospital facilities, and large boats used to transfer stores. They were also quite well armed, with three 150 mm deck guns, two 37 mm and four 20 mm antiaircraft guns,plus eight machine guns. These extra features reduced the liquid cargo that could be carried but added significantly to the diversity of support that could be provided.The Dithmarschens were the longest and fastest tankers then in service with any navy. This length was necessary to achieve high speed. A coincident benefit of their streamlined hull form was exceptional fuel economy; 12,500 miles at fifteen knots, without expending cargo fuel. All this was necessary to support long-range commerce raiding operations that, as was known from the outset, would be furtive, gauntlet-running enterprises."
Max speed was 21 knots.
Nordmark supplied Deutschland in 1939 during her North Atlantic sortie, and the Admiral Scheer during her 1940/41 raiding cruise
They were the precursor to the large "one stop" supply ships of the late 20th century like the RFA Fort Victoria class. Type no longer favoured due to changed health & safety rules.
The KM took up a number of civilian tankers to support their overseas operations. For example the Dutch tanker Papendrecht was taken over while under construction, renamed Lothringen which supported Operation Rheinubung onl to be captured in June 1941 and taken over by Britain as the RFA Empire Salvage, from which Britain learned much about at sea replenishment equipment. IIRC the last such tankers to be sunk by the RN were Brake & Charlotte Schliemann in the Indian Ocean in Feb/March 1944, where they were supporting U-boat operations. Raiders also made use of fuel from captured tankers.
Shortround6
Major General
Getting back to the original premise, it seems to me that there was little or nothing the Germans could do that would affect the overall outcome.
Certain battles and/or engagements yes. Extend certain campaigns, probably. Alter the overall course or outcome of the war, no.
The reverse is not true for the British. Much like Jellicoe in WW I, he could not win WW I at sea, he could loose it though.
The RN could not defeat Germany (make it surrender) but it could loose the war by not getting enough supplies into England or enough war material to other places.
Germany was too out numbered and could not make up the difference (industrial capacity, especially once the US joined).
Germany actually did a pretty good job of trying down British forces and causing them to expend resources (ship building and oil) way out of proportion to what the Germans actually spent.
Any changes in German Strategy has to be measured against that and not a simple scoreboard like a football game.
Any changes in German strategy/building programs has to take into account changes in British/French building programs (fewer BB before the war and more subs means the British start building a lot more escorts sooner and the like).
Germans had multi pronged threat to British commerce, the U-boats, merchant raiders and heavy raiders. Which required different solutions/counter measures. Significantly changing the mix means the British can change the force responding to the change/s and is that good or bad for the Germans?
More German merchant raiders and fewer cruisers/armored ships/battleships means the British don't have to build as many large ships. The old WW I cruisers can handle more areas escorting against merchant raiders. British can build more light cruisers (and not cruisers with twelve 6in guns/treaty heavy cruisers with different guns). British can pay off some of the old R class BBs and save on manpower, repairs, fuel.
Trick strategies (concentrating on one aspect/prong) allows the British to concentrate on that aspect/prong instead of spreading out their effort, diluting it.
Certain battles and/or engagements yes. Extend certain campaigns, probably. Alter the overall course or outcome of the war, no.
The reverse is not true for the British. Much like Jellicoe in WW I, he could not win WW I at sea, he could loose it though.
The RN could not defeat Germany (make it surrender) but it could loose the war by not getting enough supplies into England or enough war material to other places.
Germany was too out numbered and could not make up the difference (industrial capacity, especially once the US joined).
Germany actually did a pretty good job of trying down British forces and causing them to expend resources (ship building and oil) way out of proportion to what the Germans actually spent.
Any changes in German Strategy has to be measured against that and not a simple scoreboard like a football game.
Any changes in German strategy/building programs has to take into account changes in British/French building programs (fewer BB before the war and more subs means the British start building a lot more escorts sooner and the like).
Germans had multi pronged threat to British commerce, the U-boats, merchant raiders and heavy raiders. Which required different solutions/counter measures. Significantly changing the mix means the British can change the force responding to the change/s and is that good or bad for the Germans?
More German merchant raiders and fewer cruisers/armored ships/battleships means the British don't have to build as many large ships. The old WW I cruisers can handle more areas escorting against merchant raiders. British can build more light cruisers (and not cruisers with twelve 6in guns/treaty heavy cruisers with different guns). British can pay off some of the old R class BBs and save on manpower, repairs, fuel.
Trick strategies (concentrating on one aspect/prong) allows the British to concentrate on that aspect/prong instead of spreading out their effort, diluting it.
- Thread starter
- #129
As far as German destroyers go, it looks a lot like they were trying to match/exceed the French contre-torpilleurs rather than the British 1300-1400ton ships.
The French ships had some of the same strengths and weaknesses.
Making smaller, slower, lighter armed ships may have been asking the Germans for too much sacrifice in prestige
I was thinking of something like a German version of a Tribal or Fletcher in the 2000-ton range. Do the basics well, don't try to do too much.
As mentioned in post #106 that introduced this particular subthread, by sacrificing the Bismarcks and Hippers they could for the same tonnage have built three small carrier task groups, each with a 23kton carrier, a 10kton CL, and 5 2kton destroyers. Now, if they want to maintain a presence in the Atlantic, it probably means one task force is under repair/refitting, another is transitioning to/from the area, and one on station. For just a raid, maybe they could manage to sortie two such task forces together, depending of course when this raid is supposed to take place.
Oh, I fully agree. I'm sorry if I've misled you to believe I think that a different German naval (or anything, really) strategy would have enabled them to win the war. At most, prolong the inevitable.
Yes, this is all true. But it goes the other way as well, in that diluting their efforts cost the Germans a lot as well. The capital ships, say, not only used up a lot of steel that could maybe have been used more productively elsewhere, but also required setting up a lot of specialized manufacturing capability to produce BB guns and armor, which doesn't have much application outside battleships (well, railway guns and coastal fortifications, to some limited extent..).
Or, say, if the Germans would have decided to go all-in on u-boats. Yes, that would mean the Allies could concentrate on ASW (lots of corvettes, hedgehog launchers, radar-equipped patrol aircraft earlier?) and not bother with having capital ships available to counter potential German convoy raids with surface ships. But on the other hand, going all-in on u-boats could have allowed Germany to introduce things like snorkels, burst transmission radios, acoustic homing torpedoes, and u-boats with better submerged performance (perhaps not exactly the Type XXI, but something better than the Type VII which historically was their mainstay)? All of which they introduced or at least experimented with towards the end of the war, but of course by then it was much too late to have much of an impact. Which way would the balance tip in the end, would it have been overall better or worse for them compared to what they historically did? I don't know really, but it's fun (for some definition of fun at least!) to think of such scenarios and what their responses could potentially be.
Too much focus on Germany and ignoring the fact that Britain had another enemy in the Far East to consider - Japan.
Did Britain actually build too many large ships in this scenario? AGFA was signed in June 1935. These are the major warships planned pre-war for 1935 onwards and laid down bwtween .
1935 Estimates - 3 Town class cruisers
1936 Estimates - 2 KGV, 2 Illustrious, 2 Belfast, 5 Dido
1937 Estimates - 3 KGV, 2 Illustrious, 2 Dido, 5 Fiji
1938 Estimates - 2 Lion (very little was done on these before suspension in Oct 1939), 1 Implacable, Unicorn, 3 Dido, 4 Fiji
1939 Estimates - 2 Lion (never laid down), 1 Implacable, 4 Fiji (2 canx on outbreak of WW2. Order of the other pair was brought forward 6 months and they were laid down in Nov 1939)
Total completed 5 battleships, 6 carriers, 26 cruisers (3 Town, 2 Belfast, 10 Dido, 11 Fiji). These should have all been completed by mid-1942 but with WW2 delays it stretched into 1943 for the cruisers and 1944 for the carriers.
On the outbreak of WW2 Britain and the Commonwealth nominally had 64 cruisers with the most recent completions being the 5 Town / Belfast class noted above. Of the 64, 27 were WW1 designs that completed between 1917 & 1926 and some had already gone to Reserve / been disarmed / been converted to AA ships and had to be reactivated. About 15 were reactivated from July 1939 through to Jan 1942. All were obsolete for fighting a modern war. Had it not been for some deals done outwith the Treaties it should have been at least 7 less. 5 of the C class should have been scrapped in 1937 under the Treaties but were allowed to be kept if converted to AA cruisers. Plans kept changing, but at one point all the C & D classes were scheduled for conversion to AA ships with 4"/4.5" guns for convoy protection, no good for hunting raiders. In the end only 6 C class ships underwent such conversions 1937-40, with the remainder of the conversions being cancelled on the outbreak of WW2. Without WW2 more of these ships would have been headed for the breakers yards as the new ships noted above entered service.
So the orders are barely keeping up with the aging ships needing to be taken out of service or converted for other tasks.
Back in the 1920s the size of the RN cruiser fleet requirement was stated to be 70 (but without any detailed explanation given) and figures of 100 were being bandied about in the 1930s. To achive the latter figure, orders would have had to have exceeded the 7 per year ordered 1936-1938.
Most of the old WW1 ships had been designed for use in the North Sea and lacked the range for use on the extended shipping lanes in the southern Atlantic & Indian Ocean, but were used there for lack of anything better. But if you look at the larger County & Town classes, you will find that they too spent a lot of time patrolling those far flung shipping lanes to which, with greater range they proved better suited.
The RN new build in the 1930s was not in the main about increasing the size of the fleet overall, but replacing old obsolete vessels with modern ships fit for the world of the 1930s / 1940s. Only the outbreak of WW2 forced their retention / reactivation.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I'm thinking more about getting Goering to support these plans.
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- #132
don4331
Senior Airman
But who cares what the RN is doing when the planned foe is the NM?
Building an anti-RN fleet in '35 is guaranteed get you removed from office as the boss doesn't want to rile the UK.
The K class cruiser role was to prevent the aforementioned French cruisers from getting into Baltic (Once in Baltic they would be able to blockade East Prussia from rest of Germany allowing Poland to annex it). In that model, the ability to operate in the Atlantic really wasn't critical.
The NM is building CLs of 7,200 tons (Duguay Trouin class)/7,600 tons La Galissonnière class) mounting 4x2/3x3 respectively 15cm guns capable of 28,500 yds.
If you want to match the firepower of the NM cruisers, the 15cm/60 with 28,100 yds. range seems to be the correct gun.
The K class issues are result of being the 1st Reichsmarine ships designed with welded hulls trying reduce weight to match ships with 20% more displacement (Versailles limiting Germany to 6k tons/cruisers.) But just about every navy had issues initially with welded hulls. There were never issues with the steam powerplants of RM CLs. By the time of Leipzig/Nuremburg, there aren't issues with hull and "industrial" diesels have been replaced with "marine" ones which worked.
Similarly, the German Zerstörers are being built to oppose the French contre-torpilleurs. Vauquelin-class, not to mention the follow on Le Fantasque and Mogador classes with 138.6mm guns/38+ kn. top speeds needs some serious speed/firepower in return. You can't build Contre-torpilleur's speed in destroyer size hull using low pressure steam.
OK, KM could have made use of 'medium' pressure steam, i.e. 600psi/850° F ala Fletchers but then you need ability to cut enough gears for double reduction gearboxes.
Note: 3 or large vs 6 small boilers is an engineering decision, not a function of high pressure vs low or medium steam. And the land based and prototype plant in civilian hull trials were producing very good results.
The biggest issue - there weren't any follow on hulls in the pipeline - it was supposed to be short/sharp war (really only a battle) and then the long term plan could be resumed. When you lose 1/2 your destroyers and cruiser just before/in the invasion of Norway, you can't afford to lose the remaining ships and they become 'harbour queens'.
don4331
Senior Airman
The 1934 class Zerstörer is almost exactly 1:1 German version of the Fletcher (same 5x5", basically same speed, same length/beam/draft/fineness (aka displacement). The biggest differences are medium vs high pressure steam, and 'cruising' turbine design (USN solution was unique - changing the steam injection point on main turbines to maintain relatively high efficiency at lessor speeds; It avoids atrocious efficiency of running main turbines at slow speed and/or drag of cruising turbine clutches at high speed).
As E EwenS has beat me up*; in '30s, if you stand on your soapbox and promote carrier task forces:
1. They will put you in padded room as with only biplanes/no radar/etc - your carrier is little more than a floating gasoline tanker.
2. The big gun ships still rule and take the longest to build; so, getting Admirals to delay their battleships will result in your being like Julius Caesar and even your friends will be sticking knives in your back.
3. A carrier in '35 was the 1st strike equivalent of the 70s ballistic missile submarine (RN would be unable to prevent KM CV from launching 70+ airplane** attack which would devastate which ever city they attacked and the subsequent riots would end the war) So, if you really want to panic RN, build a bunch of CVs.
*I didn't adequately explain myself and got the appropriate response
**Using USN numbers for planes on 23k ton carrier; KM carrier probably doesn't achieve this on its own, but 2-3 acting in concert could.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
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- #136
Interesting. But what gives, then? The Fletchers are commonly(?) seen as one of the best, if not the best, general-purpose destroyers during the war, and the German ones more or less universally crap?
Seems options 1 and 3 are mutually contradictory. You can't at the same time be laughed out of the room for suggesting to replace manly battleships with flimsy biplanes, and at the same time those same flimsy biplanes constitute the most fearsome weapon known to man which would cause panic in the RN (and the civilian population)! So which is it?
I think one reason Germany potentially could be in a better position to go all-in on naval aviation instead of big gun ships is that they a) have little to lose b) are starting from scratch. For someone like the RN to go all-in on carriers (disregarding any treaties) is that if they bet wrong and naval aviation doesn't turn out to be such a potent force as WWII later showed it to be, they lose their empire. So RN can't make such a reckless bet. But Germany? They start from zero, whereas other navies already have lots of big gun ships. For aviation it's slightly different, as it's developing so quickly that everyone has to renew their fleets every few years anyway. And Germany started seriously looking into dive bombing in the 1930'ies, testing early Stuka versions during the Spanish Civil War. So in a way they were already at the forefront of dive bombing (as the early land-based part of WWII also showed), they just need to park their Stukas on a boat to be able to reach ships out of range from their airbases. Well, "just" is pulling quite a lot of weight here, but still.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
On top of everything else, Graf Zeppelin was proposed to carry just over 40 planes, not "70+". Further to that, 30 single-engined dive-bombers carrying 550-kg bombs isn't going to do much hurt to a city without some tremendous lucky hits.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Germany would have needed Graf Zeppelin/Peter Strausser sized carriers if they insisted on using land-based aircraft as the compliment.
For all the Wunderwaffe that Germany came up with, they had zero clues for naval aircraft.
Several Japanese naval types were based on Heinkel designs and the Luftwaffe could have tapped into that resource, especially since Heinkel had a repoir with Japan, complete with engineers in Japan, who could have got the RLM up to speed on Japanese maratime aircraft in real time.
For all the Wunderwaffe that Germany came up with, they had zero clues for naval aircraft.
Several Japanese naval types were based on Heinkel designs and the Luftwaffe could have tapped into that resource, especially since Heinkel had a repoir with Japan, complete with engineers in Japan, who could have got the RLM up to speed on Japanese maratime aircraft in real time.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
The Germans could also have learnt how to stow 60+ a/c on a 33,000t hull, maybe by ditching the stupid 8" gun armament.
The Japanese put 63 or so on the Hiryu/Soryu, about 15,000t lighter, and the Americans put 72-80 on the Yorktowns at 25,000t. GZ gets 42-45 a/c at 33,000t.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Germany's location doesn't give carrier task forces much room to "get lost" and evade the RN. The RN was able to contain the Imperial German Navy in WW 1 in part due to Germany's lack of an "east coast". There are a limited number of routes out for deep draft warships. German torpedo boats would evade pursuing British ships by running into the shallower waters. The Baltic is even more restricted. The German Sea isn't as conducive for air operations as the Pacific is and might reduce training time. Practicing air operations in the Atlantic as "express mail" ships is clever and I can see Germany pulling it off but Germany's strengths lay elsewhere. The RN has a head start in carrier aviation practices and operations over everybody and I don't know if Britain would've been eager to share notes.
I just can't see Germany as a major sea power. It's the tyranny of geography.
I just can't see Germany as a major sea power. It's the tyranny of geography.
