1939-1942 FAA: Better aircraft or more aircraft?

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Somewhat based on earlier comments, I'm going with better aircraft but with some caveats:
Countries start building battleships 1st when they start rearmament because battleships take the longest to construct, fit out and commission (in theory)​
But if we explain (sell) to treasury, that aircraft carrier take even longer than battleships to construct, fit out, commission and train air group, therefore we get them started 1st​
The 2nd part - aircraft designers need a higher minimum landing requirement. RN needs to get rid (mothball) Hermes, Argus and Eagle and build 3 Ark Royals. This allows better aircraft - minimum landing speed may increase 10 knots because all the carrier in the fleet can turn 30kn (versus some <20), landing distances may be extended with longer decks.​
Lastly, you now have 3 carriers * 72 (design) + 3 * 48 (yes, I know Furious is short a couple) aircraft; opening ratios were 50% TSR/50% fighters So, now you are talking 200 fighters/dive bombers + spares (25%) + additional for base protection...more/less equal to the order for RAF's premier fighters, therefore you get the 'A team working the design. Same for the TSR aircraft.*​
Therefore, '34 budget gets 3 Ark Royals. We'll put off some other refits to find the money/batch 1 will be 2 KGVs rather than 3 with 2nd BB batch replacing a CV with the 3rd KGV.
It's critical to start before the Abyssinian Crisis - after RN gets cold feet about fighter protection and goes with armoured carriers, the order for planes gets cut in 1/2 and you get the 'C' team working on design.​
I'll pull in the FAA order for the Griffon by 2 years ('36 start, not '38) dropping Peregrine and Exe to get early Griffon
As the carriers are bigger/faster, the pilot can be seated lower (we might need to put FAA pilots in Spitfire/Buffalo to show <beat them over head> him what he would get for visibility in single seater)
Resulting in the RN gets a Firefly prototype in mid '37, issues sorted and production in '39 (OK, it might be closer to a Griffon power Fulmar, but its still 300+ kn aircraft and we can work on clean up/more powerful Griffons - I'm thinking Typhoon -> Tempest path).​
Much as I would like a single seater, until aircraft have VHF/UHF radios and ships have Radar/Fighter control, I can't see giving up the back seater.​
*I'm nervous that the 'improved' TSR aircraft is Fairey Barracuda; but the 'early' models won't have armour/self sealing tanks and the other weight increases of the late WWII planes. And the Griffon Barracuda seems to be OK as torpedo/dive bomber.
 
Somewhat based on earlier comments, I'm going with better aircraft but with some caveats:
Countries start building battleships 1st when they start rearmament because battleships take the longest to construct, fit out and commission (in theory)​
No. Countries start building a new class of battleships in the 1930s because it was a battleship centric world and Admirals around the world were expecting to fight the next Jutland style action. It was 1942 before things began to change. 10 Dec 1941 was the first time that a major warship, battleship or aircraft carrier, had been sunk at sea, by any aircraft. Interwar the role of the TB in the RN was to inflict enough damage on an enemy warship to slow it down for the big guns of the fleet to sink. The USN virtually gave up on the TB in the early 1930s only ressurecting it with the TBD Devastor (service entry late 1937). The intended target for its dive-bombers were an enemy's carriers not its battleships.

New construction battleships (by dates laid down):-
France - Dunkerque 12/32; Richelieu 10/35
Italy - Littorio & VV 10/34
Britain - 2xKGV 1/1/37 + 3 more 5-7/37
USA - North Carolina 10/37
Japan - Yamato 11/37

And no it doesn't necessarily follow that a battleship willl take significantly longer than a carrier to build. Both types took 3-4 years at peacetime build rates. Many of the ships ordered for the RN were delayed during construction for a variety of reasons. KGV contractual build time was 43 months (actual 48 months). Carriers of whatever navy took similar times to build (Ark Royal 39 months, Illustrious 36 months, USS Yorktown 40 months, Enterprise 46 months, IJN Hiryu 36 months). CV-8 Hornet was an exception at 25 months. The contractual build times for the Essex class when ordered was c36 months.

But even in 1945 the battleship was not dead in the eyes of the Admirals.

France's battleship programme ground to a halt in June 1940 with the escape of the Jean Bart from its builders yard. But postwar they completed her to a modified design.

Italy continued her battleship programme to April 1943 with completion of the Roma in June 1942 and work continuing on the fourth ship, Impero until April 1943 albeit at a slow rate..

Britain's planned Lion class were put on hold at the outbreak of WW2 but weren't cancelled until 1945. BUt design work on a new battleship went on into the postwar years.

The US suspended the Montana class in 1942 because it had higher priorities in the construction programmes. But it didn't cancel them until July 1943. The USN pursued construction of 2 more Iowas in 1945 and while suspending them at the end of the war began work on a redesign.

For the IJN work continued until July 1942 when it was decided to convert her to a carrier following the Midway disaster. Work on the fourth ship had ceased in March 1942 due to a shortage of materials to comlete her.

So just how do you intend to change the attitudes of every navy the world over to abandon the tried & tested battleship for the completely untested aircraft carrier?

And navies didn't start building battleships before carriers. They were being built simultaneously. Britain laid down 5 KGV in 1937 & 4 Illustrious class carriers.
But if we explain (sell) to treasury, that aircraft carrier take even longer than battleships to construct, fit out, commission and train air group, therefore we get them started 1st​
See above re build times.

RN plans called for a new carrier's air group to assemble about 6 months prior to the completion of the carrier itself. The RN training programmes were designed to fit that schedule. So 18-24 months to train a pilot. Less tme than it takes to build the carrier they will operate from.

But then we begin to hit the problems of the conflict between the RN and the RAF. Provision of at least 50% of the pilots and all the maintenance personnel and the training thereof was an RAF matter. In the early 1930s the RN had to go out and prove to them that a carrier could operate effectively more aircraft than the RAF thought possible. Until then the RAF wouldn't buy any more even though the RN was paying for them.

Inskip reported in late 1937 with the recommendation that the FAA be transferred from the RAF to the RN, but it didn't become fully effective until May 1939. Meanwhile the RN had to set up an entire system of control from scratch and begin recruiting personnel to man those aircraft. The RAF agreed to supply a number of pilots in the interim, but then failed to deliver due to its own expansion. And it was decided during 1938 that training of FAA personnel (pilots & maintenance crews) should remain with the RAF.


The 2nd part - aircraft designers need a higher minimum landing requirement.​
Yes. But with the RN banned from talking to the aviation companies and having lost virtually all of its aviation experts in the RNAS to the RAF on 1 April 1918, it lost touch with what was possible in aircraft terms. And as the relationship with the RAF deteriorated in the early 1930s the Air Ministry technical advisory committees met infrequently, and they limited the RN contribution to relatively junior officers.

RN needs to get rid (mothball) Hermes, Argus and Eagle and build 3 Ark Royals. This allows better aircraft - minimum landing speed may increase 10 knots because all the carrier in the fleet can turn 30kn (versus some <20), landing distances may be extended with longer decks.​
Under the Treaties mothballing was not an option. They either had to be somehow reclassified (Argus & USS Langley for example) or scrapped within certain time limits of the completion of the new tonnage (6 months to strip & 18 to completely scrap IIRC).

Argus was in reserve from April 1930 until converted 1936-38 as a Queen Bee carrier, allowing her reclassification as an auxiliary and freeing up her Treaty tonnage to build Ark Royal.

Eagle & Hermes rotated on the China Station from 1930 to 1939, returning to Britain to refit (no Singapore Dockyard until 1938), so really only one in commission at a time. But they could be kept until new ships appear.


Lastly, you now have 3 carriers * 72 (design) + 3 * 48 (yes, I know Furious is short a couple) aircraft; opening ratios were 50% TSR/50% fighters So, now you are talking 200 fighters/dive bombers + spares (25%) + additional for base protection...more/less equal to the order for RAF's premier fighters, therefore you get the 'A team working the design. Same for the TSR aircraft.*
Therefore, '34 budget gets 3 Ark Royals. We'll put off some other refits to find the money/batch 1 will be 2 KGVs rather than 3 with 2nd BB batch replacing a CV with the 3rd KGV.
It's critical to start before the Abyssinian Crisis - after RN gets cold feet about fighter protection and goes with armoured carriers, the order for planes gets cut in 1/2 and you get the 'C' team working on design.​
In 1934, the world is only just coming out of the Depression that started in 1929. Money was tight. That was one cause of the delay from 1931 to 1934 in including a new carrier in the Warship Programmes. Another was technical, while arrester gear trials were carried out in 1933. At that point RN planning was looking at a new carrier in the 1933 Programme (delayed to 1934 - Ark Royal not laid down until Sept 1935 in the end) for completion in 1936, one in 1936 for completion in 1939, one in 1939 for completion in 1942, one in 1942 for completion in 1945, one in 1945 for completion in 1948. That then changed in 1936.

In 1934 both Hermes & Eagle are only 10 years old (from completion as carriers). Money had been spent on them during that time to keep them relatively up to date. The Washington Treaty declared that the life of a carrier was 20 years. How do you persuade a Treasury to replace 2 more ships with new construction against the financial and political background.

As for the large repairs / reconstruction of capital ships from 1933-40, the RN viewed that work as essential to keep its battlefleet effective until such times as new construction came along. It was not a replacement for new construction. Back to the battleship centric world again.

The 1936 RN Programme included 2 KGV (laid down 1 Jan 1937 - the very very very earliest date possible under the Treaties) and 2 Illustrious class carriers. The 1937 Programme included 3 KGV and another 2 Illustrios class carriers. All 9 ships in both programmes were laid down in 1937.

I'll pull in the FAA order for the Griffon by 2 years ('36 start, not '38) dropping Peregrine and Exe to get early Griffon
I doubt that was possible.

Firstly Griffon history. From the RR Buzzard of 1925 through the R series racing engines to the Griffon I of 1933 that was only run on a test rig. But RR then had to concentrate on Merlin development. RR only returned to the "Griffon" in 1938/39 when it was completely redesigned incorporating much learned in Merlin development. That is why the true Griffon Mark nos start with the Griffon II. And that was with an eye to future fighter aircraft, principally for the RAF.

Peregrine was the final development of the Kestrel series of engines using many components therefrom as well as lessons from early Merlin development. So just how much development time did it absorb? They only built 301 Peregrine engines between 1938 & 1942.

The Exe was a new engine design and doesn't seem to have been a bad engine, other than its oil consumption. Being an air cooled X inline layout it held certain advantages especially for a carrier aircraft. Its cancellation forced a major redesign of the Barracuda to take the Merlin and its cooling radiators which formed a major part of its weight growth problem. Whether it could have been developed from its 1,150hp to keep up with the weight growth in the Barracuda for other than engine reasons is another matter.
As the carriers are bigger/faster, the pilot can be seated lower (we might need to put FAA pilots in Spitfire/Buffalo to show <beat them over head> him what he would get for visibility in single seater)
Not a good idea. With long nosed fighters visibility in and around the deck was a huge problem. Hence the adoption of the curved approach to landing a Seafire & Corsair. In the Firebrand they even fitted an extra ASI on the side of the fuselage, outside the cockpit, in the pilot's line of sight to allow him to concentrate on his curved approach. Look to the final generation of piston engined fighters to see how the pilot's seating postion was RAISED to improve his visibility e.g. Spiteful v Spitfire, Fury/Sea Fury v Tempest.
Resulting in the RN gets a Firefly prototype in mid '37, issues sorted and production in '39 (OK, it might be closer to a Griffon power Fulmar, but its still 300+ kn aircraft and we can work on clean up/more powerful Griffons - I'm thinking Typhoon -> Tempest path).

Much as I would like a single seater, until aircraft have VHF/UHF radios and ships have Radar/Fighter control, I can't see giving up the back seater.
*I'm nervous that the 'improved' TSR aircraft is Fairey Barracuda; but the 'early' models won't have armour/self sealing tanks and the other weight increases of the late WWII planes. And the Griffon Barracuda seems to be OK as torpedo/dive bomber.
The Griffon engined Barracuda V was a big disappointment. While power was increased from 1,640hp of the Merlin 32 in the Barracuda II/III to 1,890 or even 2,020 hp in the Barracuda V top speed only rose by 15-20mph and its warload capabilities hardly changed. The earliest Griffon engine, the IIB only produced 1,720hp. The Mark V grew even heavier and a weight reduction programme saw it lose the TAG in the rear cockpit. After 2 years of development 1943-45 it still wasn't considered fit for service with a number of problems still to be overcome (including a noisy cockpit). The major area of improvement was the ability of the Mark V to climb away from an aborted carrier landing even with its flaps & landing gear down, something the Mark II/III struggled to do.
 
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What about politics and dealing with facist italy? Axis, and prognoses to war.
Was that an argument in the discussion,?
Shortly, the UK was dealing with Stalin's USSR. A deal like this may be enough to split Mussolini from Hitler, and a neutral Italy would be a major gain for the UK, as there would be far less strength needed in the Med
 
Shortly, the UK was dealing with Stalin's USSR. A deal like this may be enough to split Mussolini from Hitler, and a neutral Italy would be a major gain for the UK, as there would be far less strength needed in the Med
Was neutrality a feasible path economically for Italy? After Sept 1939 and Germany had to go for broke and invade the USSR as they'd be truly broke otherwise.
 
Mussolini came to power in 1922 and rapidly turned Italy into a dictatorship. He embarked on his war in Ethiopia in 1935. TBH, given Il Duce's mindset, I don't see any way for him NOT to become part of the Axis pact. He certainly wouldn't fit in with the democratic powers.
he seems to have had a problem with math.
The German 'plan' was to take over countries to loot that
1. had something to loot.
2. were fairly close
3. weren't going cost more to take over than the loot was worth. Germans had some trouble with the last part.

Italy decides to take over Abyssinia, over 2000 miles away by plane and if Britain decided the Italians cannot use the Suez canal? But Britain was friendly to the Italians at the time.
What they had to loot was certainly questionable and the war did not go fast or easy, for various reasons. So fails on all counts.
The Duce decided to recoup his fortunes by attacking Albania and their rich stores of.............................................

At least it was closer.
He was still having trouble with the profit and loss part.
 
Mussolini came to power in 1922 and rapidly turned Italy into a dictatorship. He embarked on his war in Ethiopia in 1935. TBH, given Il Duce's mindset, I don't see any way for him NOT to become part of the Axis pact. He certainly wouldn't fit in with the democratic powers.
Franco pulled off a neutral Spain and got to live into the 1970s. But I get what you mean. Italy's best chance to remain neutral is to hold back about a year to see how things go. Germany's lack of victory against Britain in 1940 will have shown Mussolini to be a prudent player, and Germany's disaster at the Battle of Moscow (Oct 1941 to Jan 1942) will make him look like a savant for keeping Italy out of it. And if Germany finds success in the USSR due to its lack of a North African/Greece distraction, Italy can join with Germany (and Japan?) in summer 1942. But I bet Mussolini will remain neutral as by now Germany has declared war on the USA and Japan has just lost their fleet at Midway.

From summer 1942 onwards it's all downhill for the Axis, and Mussolini will be a national hero for keeping Italy out of it.
 
The political background to the Reggiane 2000 purchase plan was that Italy expected that the war between France/Britain and Germany would grind to a Great War slog and Italy would get little out of joining in the fun. The Reggiane order was a welcome opportunity to acquire some scarce Sterling exchange and the willingness to run the deal for these and the Caproni light bombers through Portugal to get around German concerns demonstrates the expectation that Italy would remain neutral for the immediate future.Had France not fallen then I have no doubt that the deal would have gone ahead and be completed. I only mentioned it above as the Reggiane 2000 was used by the Italian navy and I had the momentary passing thought of them being modified in the UK to fixed wing naval fighters.
 
If Italy is not a member of the Axis, than Germany would most likely not get pulled into North Africa, which in turn, would not bode well for the Soviet Union.

Of course, Germany would also not get 300,000-plus Italian troops on the Soviet front, RN's Mediterranean Fleet wouldn't tied down by the Italian Royal Navy in the Med or the assistance of Italian submarines (perhaps less effective than German ones, but far more effective than nothing) early in the Battle of the Atlantic. At best, a non-belligerent Italy is neutral change for Germany.
 
Of course, Germany would also not get 300,000-plus Italian troops on the Soviet front, RN's Mediterranean Fleet wouldn't tied down by the Italian Royal Navy in the Med or the assistance of Italian submarines (perhaps less effective than German ones, but far more effective than nothing) early in the Battle of the Atlantic. At best, a non-belligerent Italy is neutral change for Germany.
How many total German personnel were committed to the Afrika campaign?

Additionally, how many aircraft, AFVs plus all the support logistics (fuel, spare parts, food, etc.) were committed?
 
Of course, Germany would also not get 300,000-plus Italian troops on the Soviet front...
Ah yes, the Italians (and Hungarians and Romanians). Those useless tits assigned to defend the Wehrmacht's flank at Stalingrad. Has anyone ever been happy to have the Italian army on their side? They seem more a burden needing rescue or diverted resources than anything else.

My post aside, here a more fair assessment...

 
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And speaking of Merlins, just think of how many invaluable Merlins were used to pull around target tugs (on Battles, aforementioned Henleys, Defiants etc.), a waste only the british can "accomplish". Better have even a fraction of those Merlins actually do something useful to the war effort, be it on Fulmars, Sea Hurricanes, even Seafires.
A waste only the British can accomplish? Look up Brewster Aircraft or the He 177 for starters. There are plenty of examples of wasted efforts for all countries.
 
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Americans seem to get a free pass in these discussions because chronology is not taken into account. The war had been going on for over 2 years before the shooting started for the US. Even then they still had P35s in front line squadrons and their standard bomber was the B18.
Does anyone seriously believe that the if the RAF were equipped with B18s instead of Battles or P35s and 36s instead of Hurricanes in May 1940 they would have been better off?
 
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Americans seem to get a free pass in these discussions because chronology is not taken into account. The war had been going on for over 2 years before the shooting started for the US. Even then they still had P35s in front line squadrons and their standard bomber was the B18.
Does anyone seriously believe that the if the RAF were equipped with B18s instead of Battles or P35s and 36s instead of Hurricanes in May 1940 they would have been better off?
It is even worse with USN carrier groups.

In 1939 the standard USN carrier fighter was the F2F/F3F biplane which only began to be replaced starting with Saratoga with a few (10) monoplane F2A Buffalos from mid-1940. F4F-3 Wildcats only began to enter service Nov/Dec 1940. Enterprise was still flying her biplane fighters into late summer 1941 when sufficient Wildcats became available.

Biplane dive bombers in the shape of the SBC were still figuring in the front line carrier groups until well into 1941 when sufficient SBD became available (87 SBD-2 produced from Nov 1940 with SBD-3 production only starting in March 1941). Hornet's VB-8 & VS-8 had to work up late 1941 / early 1942 on biplane SBC-4, only getting the last off their SBD-3 on arrival in the Pacific in March 1942.
 
Yes the US was backwards in 1939-40, but there is a bit of having it both ways in 1940-41.

Of the 524 P-40s ordered in April of 1939 the USAAC got the last one in May of 1941, in part because they allowed almost 800 Tomahawks to be exported by April of 1941. USAAC benefited in that they only got 200 of the original P-40s and the rest divided between the B & C models. But it does mean that the USAAC had to use older aircraft in service squadrons.
The P-36 vs Hurricane question is interesting. The Army never ordered a later version of the P-36 after the C which was a change order on the later P-36 aircraft initially ordered in 1938) The export Hawk 75s got higher powered engines and better armament.
B-18s are a question, they were 'standard' because the US was in a 'pause' in purchasing. They knew they were obsolete and they had the luxury of waiting for new designs instead of occupying factories and airfields with planes that had been designed in 1934-35. US was building the B-23 in a small batch starting in late 1939 and lasting until Sept 1940.
Many of the B-23s were issued to squadrons that had been flying A-17As, The US allowed the French to buy 93 (?) of the existing A17s, refurb them (got new engines for one thing) but France had fallen and Britain benefited (or got stuck with them) by the time they were ready for delivery. The RAF transferred 60 of them to the SAAF (17 got lost/sunk enroute) and the SAAF used them as trainers until they were preplaced by...............wait for it..................Fairey Battles at the end of 1942.
US was also allowing Douglas DB-7s and Martin 167s to be exported. In part to get money for factory expansion but both of them show the difference that 4-5 years can make over the Blenheim. Also means that the US kept older planes in service while newer planes left the country.

The Navy also kept a lot of old planes in service, part because of money and part because better planes were being sold to France and Britain (and others).
Sometimes it was just because the factories involved didn't have the floor space to build several orders at the same time and the US agreed to delayed deliveries to speed up deliveries
to France, Britain and DEI. Wither the US would have actually ordered more is a good question but they would have gotten what they did order sooner and replaced some of the older stuff sooner so the fleet of antiques might not have looked so bad in late 1941.

Interesting "what if" the B-23 had gotten the B-17E 'treatment'?
800px-B-23_Dragon_in_flight.jpg

Top turret, waist guns, slightly newer engines?
Still would not be a B-25 but????

Edit. Not saying that the exported US Aircraft did a whole lot in the grand scheme of things (NA?) but keeping a few hundred of them home would have reduced the number of obsolete aircraft the US was using in 1941.
On the other hand, not sure that 524 P-40s no letter that arrive 4-5 months early is that much better than the P-35s/P-36s that were kept on. The P-40 no letter had only one gun in each wing (and cowl .50s were, shall we say problematic?) and had unprotected tanks and no pilot protection. Was speed enough to make a big difference? The P-40B&C that arrived a bit later were somewhat more combat capable.
 
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The U.S. was still locked in the Great Depression when Germany started the shooting war in '39 - yes, the USAAC and USN had new types coming down the pipeline, but in limited numbers.

As such, the older types were kept in service.

This all changed when the U.S. went on a war footing, but that would be a few years down the road.
 
Yes the US was backwards in 1939-40, but there is a bit of having it both ways in 1940-41.

Of the 524 P-40s ordered in April of 1939 the USAAC got the last one in May of 1941, in part because they allowed almost 800 Tomahawks to be exported by April of 1941. USAAC benefited in that they only got 200 of the original P-40s and the rest divided between the B & C models. But it does mean that the USAAC had to use older aircraft in service squadrons.
The P-36 vs Hurricane question is interesting. The Army never ordered a later version of the P-36 after the C which was a change order on the later P-36 aircraft initially ordered in 1938) The export Hawk 75s got higher powered engines and better armament.
B-18s are a question, they were 'standard' because the US was in a 'pause' in purchasing. They knew they were obsolete and they had the luxury of waiting for new designs instead of occupying factories and airfields with planes that had been designed in 1934-35. US was building the B-23 in a small batch starting in late 1939 and lasting until Sept 1940.
Many of the B-23s were issued to squadrons that had been flying A-17As, The US allowed the French to buy 93 (?) of the existing A17s, refurb them (got new engines for one thing) but France had fallen and Britain benefited (or got stuck with them) by the time they were ready for delivery. The RAF transferred 60 of them to the SAAF (17 got lost/sunk enroute) and the SAAF used them as trainers until they were preplaced by...............wait for it..................Fairey Battles at the end of 1942.
US was also allowing Douglas DB-7s and Martin 167s to be exported. In part to get money for factory expansion but both of them show the difference that 4-5 years can make over the Blenheim. Also means that the US kept older planes in service while newer planes left the country.

The Navy also kept a lot of old planes in service, part because of money and part because better planes were being sold to France and Britain (and others).
Sometimes it was just because the factories involved didn't have the floor space to build several orders at the same time and the US agreed to delayed deliveries to speed up deliveries
to France, Britain and DEI. Wither the US would have actually ordered more is a good question but they would have gotten what they did order sooner and replaced some of the older stuff sooner so the fleet of antiques might not have looked so bad in late 1941.

Interesting "what if" the B-23 had gotten the B-17E 'treatment'?
View attachment 794713
Top turret, waist guns, slightly newer engines?
Still would not be a B-25 but????

Edit. Not saying that the exported US Aircraft did a whole lot in the grand scheme of things (NA?) but keeping a few hundred of them home would have reduced the number of obsolete aircraft the US was using in 1941.
On the other hand, not sure that 524 P-40s no letter that arrive 4-5 months early is that much better than the P-35s/P-36s that were kept on. The P-40 no letter had only one gun in each wing (and cowl .50s were, shall we say problematic?) and had unprotected tanks and no pilot protection. Was speed enough to make a big difference? The P-40B&C that arrived a bit later were somewhat more combat capable.
That's actually another advantage the US had. The initial expansion of the US aircraft industry was largely paid for by French and British orders.
 
If the British & French had kept Herr Hitler under control, There would have been no need to buy from the U.S. We could have remained constrained by the depression for a few more years.
 

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