Hybrid aircraft carriers (1 Viewer)

[Shortround6]

Your classification into different types of carrier makes it sound like each nation had some pre-ordained plan to achieve that end.

Sorry for the confusion. Sometimes ships wound up with similar (outwardly) characteristics for different reasons.

Edit:- Ranger and Wasp can't, IMHO be classified as a "type". Their origins and the drivers for their designs were totally different.

They certainly were not a "class". But they were both smaller, cheaper carriers built to budget/tonnage restrictions. And they sacrificed similar things. Like protection and speed although not in same amounts. The Wasp, being about 5 years newer could take advantages of some advantages in marine propulsion/machinery and other things.
My point, although not stated well, was that the two 'smaller' carriers would be more difficult (although not impossible) to combine into tactical units with the bigger, faster carriers.
They might have worked OK together although that never happened.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Right, but the working space has to be wider to accommodate the blocks.

Hiya D don4331 , further to our conversation about Krupp's sliding breech-blocks, Drachinifel's Drydock episode released today has a segment addressing these knock-on effects further. I hope I got the timestamp right to take you directly to the question and his answer:


View: https://youtu.be/sG0DZ--K3eo?t=3586

 

[don4331]

Hiya D don4331 , further to our conversation about Krupp's sliding breech-blocks, Drachinifel's Drydock episode released today has a segment addressing these knock-on effects further. I hope I got the timestamp right to take you directly to the question and his answer:


View: https://youtu.be/sG0DZ--K3eo?t=3586

You got the timestamp correct:

1st the picture for E EwenS

Left barrel shows the projectile pushed (rammed) from the lift onto the transfer mechanism and the cartridge case and fore charge on its 'cage'
Right barrel shows the projectile already rammed into the breach, and the cartridge case and fore charge being rolled down to be breach.
Probably not how I would have done it; but it worked...

2nd the picture of Scharnhorst's triple:

With the packaging of Scharnhorst's turret, the 38cm barrels themselves can be at same distance as 35cm barrels in KGV, give or take a few cm.

We note that there are cartridge ejection ports on outside of gun carriages which do result in the turret being larger.

And I understand that the sliding breech mechanism, requires the cartridge (for gas check).

But does it require the full cartridge as historically used? Or could it have been a 'wafer' which wouldn't have needed the elaborate ejection ports. On other hand, if you have a working solution, why mess with it?​

 

[Shortround6]

And I understand that the sliding breech mechanism, requires the cartridge (for gas check).
But does it require the full cartridge as historically used? Or could it have been a 'wafer' which wouldn't have needed the elaborate ejection ports

I think the Germans used a two part system. Two powder charges. The base charge (rear charge) was in the cartridge case and depending on type of powder was 111.5kg in a 900mm long cartridge case that weighed 70kg ( lot of brass). The Fore charge was 99.5kg and was contained in a silk bag. Both the fore charge and rear charge (cartridge case) were rammed together.
The Germans also thought the cartridge case offered some sort of protection from propellent fires. I don't know if it did or if was just wishful thinking. It is supposed to have slowed the flame travel, a bit more time for the flooding to take effect?
The British after Jutland had gone to storing their charges in metal cannisters and only taking them out of the cannisters at some point in the travel from magazine to gun (might depend on exact gun and mount?) KGV class used 4 powder bags and stored two bags per case/cannister.

 

[ssnider]

I have read that during the Battle of Dogger Bank, when the Seydlitz's rearmost turret and magazine burned out, none of the powder in casings burned. Then again, the German powder was very different then Cordite.

 

[Juha3]

Hi
The British Air Commission that arrived in the USA at the end of May 1938 was looking for various aircraft to fulfil requirements which included a FAA fighter. The only aircraft that the USA was able/willing to sell were the; Vought SB2U Vindicator, Curtiss SBC Helldiver and a Grumman two-seat fighter (and probably the F3F). None of these was what was needed, indeed because of this the order for Fulmars was increased from 127 to 250 machines (source; page 11, 'Air Arsenal North America' by Butler and Hagedorn).
The first Buffalo production machine was rolled out in June 1939, while the first production Wildcat was ready to fly in February 1940, both too late for use off Norway in early 1940.
The first Buffalos that arrived in the UK was in August 1940, this was a Belgian order of 32 aircraft that arrived too late for that country. In August 1940 six Martlets (Wildcat), non-folding, turned up, by October 1940 the total was 44. The Fulmar entered first line service with the FAA June 1940.
Wildcats and Buffalos did not exist to "save the day" in this scenario.

Mike

In fact it might have been possible to acquire Brewster fighters just before Norwegian Campaign. Fortunately for the Finns the UK governement didn't make a try.
The FiAF B-239 timetable
The first shipment of 11 a/c left NY for Bergen Norway on 13 Jan 40, the crossing took 2 weeks, the rest were shipped in 3 lots of which the last one arrived to Bergen on 13 March 40 [they departed from NYC on 20 Jan, 7 Feb and 19 Feb 40 [source: Kari Stenman and Andrew Thomas Brewster F2A Buffalo Aces of WW 2 Osprey Aces 91 (2010)]. In the contract Brewster had promised faster delivery and it was later forced to pay compensation to Finland for the delay. The planes were assembled in Sweden and the first 4 were flown to Finland on 1 March 40, before end of the Winter War (13 Mar 40) 2 more were flown to Finland. 3 of the first 4 were flown to Pyhäniemi in Hollola on 5 March 40. Pyhäniemi was an ad hoc depot base utilising a frozen lake as the landing area but FiAF began to flow also combat sorties from there, first 2 B-239 combat sorties were flown from there on 7 Mar 40, no contact.. One more combat sortie was flown on 11 March, again without contact to Soviet planes. Not surprisingly, after all the plane was a product of Brewster, there were some critical defects, the anchorages of aileron linkage rods were too weak, there were leakages from integral fuel tanks etc. The defects had been fixed well before the start of the Continuation War in late June 1941.

 

[EwenS]

In fact it might have been possible to acquire Brewster fighters just before Norwegian Campaign. Fortunately for the Finns the UK governement didn't make a try.
The FiAF B-239 timetable
The first shipment of 11 a/c left NY for Bergen Norway on 13 Jan 40, the crossing took 2 weeks, the rest were shipped in 3 lots of which the last one arrived to Bergen on 13 March 40 [they departed from NYC on 20 Jan, 7 Feb and 19 Feb 40 [source: Kari Stenman and Andrew Thomas Brewster F2A Buffalo Aces of WW 2 Osprey Aces 91 (2010)]. In the contract Brewster had promised faster delivery and it was later forced to pay compensation to Finland for the delay. The planes were assembled in Sweden and the first 4 were flown to Finland on 1 March 40, before end of the Winter War (13 Mar 40) 2 more were flown to Finland. 3 of the first 4 were flown to Pyhäniemi in Hollola on 5 March 40. Pyhäniemi was an ad hoc depot base utilising a frozen lake as the landing area but FiAF began to flow also combat sorties from there, first 2 B-239 combat sorties were flown from there on 7 Mar 40, no contact.. One more combat sortie was flown on 11 March, again without contact to Soviet planes. Not surprisingly, after all the plane was a product of Brewster, there were some critical defects, the anchorages of aileron linkage rods were too weak, there were leakages from integral fuel tanks etc. The defects had been fixed well before the start of the Continuation War in late June 1941.

In 1938 USN placed an order for 54 F2A-1 with Brewster. These began to be delivered from mid-1939 with 11 entering service before the end of the year, 9 or 10 with VF-3 on Saratoga.

Finland first approached the US Govt in Sept 1939 to investigate the possibility of purchasing US aircraft. When Finland was invaded the USA agreed, and to speed up deliveries also agreed to divert the remaining 43 of this USN order to Finland as B-239 denavalised and with a different equipment fit. By the time deliveries were made to Finland in early 1940 43 aircraft had somehow become 44. That was why Finland was able to get its Buffalos so quickly.

The USN agreed to have its undelivered aircaft replaced by a batch of 43 new build F2A-2 that finaĺly came off the production line Sept-Dec1940.

Delivery of this eecond USN batch was delayed however by the US Govt agreeing to give a Belgian order for 40 B-339B, placed in Dec 1939, production priority. One was diverted to France and captured by the Germans. 6 were put aboard the French carrier Bearn in Canada and ended up in Martinique where they were destroyed. The remaining 33 were diverted to Britain, arriving from Aug 1940. Some were later sent to the Middle East.

Britain had no interest in the Buffalo until it went shopping in early 1940 for a fighter suitable for use, not in Europe, but in second line theatres, like the Far East, where the opposition was expected to be operating aircraft of lesser performance. Seeking early delivery it found its choice was between the Seversky P-35 and the Buffalo. The Buffalo was chosen as Seversky had just won a contract to supply Sweden with 120 P-35A and it was believed Brewster would be able to deliver quicker. Unfortunately that proved a false hope, with the first B-339E Buffalo Mk.I not being delivered until March 1941.

The final USN order was for 108 F2A-3 was not placed until Jan 1941.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I think the Germans used a two part system. Two powder charges. The base charge (rear charge) was in the cartridge case and depending on type of powder was 111.5kg in a 900mm long cartridge case that weighed 70kg ( lot of brass). The Fore charge was 99.5kg and was contained in a silk bag. Both the fore charge and rear charge (cartridge case) were rammed together.
The Germans also thought the cartridge case offered some sort of protection from propellent fires. I don't know if it did or if was just wishful thinking. It is supposed to have slowed the flame travel, a bit more time for the flooding to take effect?
The British after Jutland had gone to storing their charges in metal cannisters and only taking them out of the cannisters at some point in the travel from magazine to gun (might depend on exact gun and mount?) KGV class used 4 powder bags and stored two bags per case/cannister.

The British always stored their charges in metal canisters. The problem was that the battle cruiser gun crews were not following procedures and were removing the charges from the canisters prematurely in order to maximize rate of fire. After Dogger Bank the BC force learned the wrong lesson and decided that firing as quickly as possible was paramount.

Battle of Jutland - The Outcome - British Self-critique - Ammunition Handling

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Ise and Hyuga were useful supply ships. They contributed so little in combat value that it's fair to say their conversions were throwing good money after bad.

As for autogyros, didn't the Japanese have one hell of a time trying to train conventional pilots? How much more complex might it be to train rotary pilots? Even in 1943 their flight schools were struggling to keep up with fixed-wing demand.

The "good radar" thing might be a problem too in that timeframe.

Supply ship armed with 14" guns. I cannot think of a greater waste of resources. The hybrid carriers were the answer to a question that should never have been asked.

 

[tomo pauk]

The hybrid carriers were the answer to a question that should never have been asked.

What is that question?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

What is that question?

"Should we take up two drydocks and spend millions of yen doing partial conversions which cannot perform either role well?"

 

[tomo pauk]

"Should we take up two drydocks and spend millions of yen doing partial conversions which cannot perform either role well?"

Seems legit.
The conversions should've been towards the greater flying deck that supports 'wheeled' A/C and more aircraft in the bigger hangars. Also earlier.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

Supply ship armed with 14" guns. I cannot think of a greater waste of resources. The hybrid carriers were the answer to a question that should never have been asked.

But if you wanted to get a convoy through the largest naval cordon in history, apparently these were the best ships ever.

IIRC, those big 14" guns were half removed after its conversion to a hybrid carrier-battleship. The other big guns on it were dual-purpose cannon and its AA armament exceeded any other carrier that I'm aware of. The question, IMO, should be whether carriers should have had more anti-aircraft firepower and better radar added. And the answer to that, is yes. And get rid of the 14" guns and replace them with more AA cannon.

However, it was useless as a battleship and its commander and captains knew it. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf, these ships were deployed in a ship-to-ship engagement, supposedly to hunt down damaged capital ships. The Ise and Hyuga's commander wisely chose to not engage the Americans, knowingly full well that they lacked the firepower, speed, or really anything, to be anything more than a support unit.

Ultimately, it proved to be a lucky ship because its useless conversion to a carrier just happened to provide the IJN with a ship that had greater storage capacity than any capital ship but the durability and protection of a battleship.

What is that question?

What happens when a battleship and a carrier fall in love?

IMO, interesting concept. Had the IJN used the ship for ASW with autogyros and MAD it would have been an excellent combat vessel.

 

[SaparotRob]

"Should we take up two drydocks and spend millions of yen doing partial conversions which cannot perform either role well?"

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

IIRC, those big 14" guns were half removed after its conversion to a hybrid carrier-battleship.

They were built with 12x14" guns. The conversions saw the after four guns removed, leaving 8 main-battery weapons.

The other big guns on it were dual-purpose cannon and its AA armament exceeded any other carrier that I'm aware of.

I don't think that's the case. The Ise class had 6" secondaries that were not capable of AA. As for tertiary AA, the 25-mm cannons were poorly-suited, having slow rate-of-fire and generally manually-trained.

HMS Ark Royal, on the other hand, had 16x4.5" truly DP cannons mounted in eight twin turrets, and I can't tell you the number of 40-mm pom-poms but they were far better than the 25-mm Japanese cannons.

The Essex class had 12x5" true DP weapons, eight mounted in twin turrets and four open-mount singletons and were festooned with 20- and 40-mm cannon for close-in work, both superior to the slow and unguided 25-mm Japanese weapons.

The question, IMO, should be whether carriers should have had more anti-aircraft firepower and better radar added.

Most other purpose-built carriers did have those improvements.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

They were built with 12x14" guns. The conversions saw the after four guns removed, leaving 8 main-battery weapons.

Thanks for the reply. You are right that the later Essex class definitely had more effective AA by any measure, although in sheer weight it would have had fewer tonnage in guns than the Ise and Hyuga because the Type 89 guns were DP. Also, the 14" guns were also technically DP. But you're right, not quite half removed. 1/3rd removed.

I don't think that's the case. The Ise class had 6" secondaries that were not capable of AA. As for tertiary AA, the 25-mm cannons were poorly-suited, having slow rate-of-fire and generally manually-trained.

HMS Ark Royal, on the other hand, had 16x4.5" truly DP cannons mounted in eight twin turrets, and I can't tell you the number of 40-mm pom-poms but they were far better than the 25-mm Japanese cannons.

The Essex class had 12x5" true DP weapons, eight mounted in twin turrets and four open-mount singletons and were festooned with 20- and 40-mm cannon for close-in work, both superior to the slow and unguided 25-mm Japanese weapons.

I'm trying to communicate that the hybrids survived because they had a lot of AA. IIRC, Shokaku and Zuikaku (purpose built carriers) did have a lot of AA like you predicted. Yet their AA wasn't able to drive off dive bombers targeting Zuikaku. As impractical as hybrids design was, credit where credit is due. Somehow Ise and Hyuga's ineffective guns did drive off a f-ton of aerial bombs and torpedoes. Doesn't that count for something? It's frankly weird that no one is willing to recognize this.

By the way, random info here: there's a source on Japanese Wikipedia which claims both hybrids used radar guidance for ship targeting. But I don't have any sources as to its FCS. My guess is it used manual targeting against aircraft.

Most other purpose-built carriers did have those improvements.

In the context of the conversation, I wasn't saying hybrids were good. But rather they had good AA (for a Japanese ship). And the lesson that should have been learned is why they survived overwhelming air attacks, unlike all the other carriers in the Japanese fleet which mostly had glass jaws, except for Shokaku and Zuikaku.

 

[EwenS]

However, it was useless as a battleship and its commander and captains knew it. During the Battle of Leyte Gulf, these ships were deployed in a ship-to-ship engagement, supposedly to hunt down damaged capital ships. The Ise and Hyuga's commander wisely chose to not engage the Americans, knowingly full well that they lacked the firepower, speed, or really anything, to be anything more than a support unit.

At Leyte Gulf, Ise & Hyuga were part of Ozawa's Northern Force coming down from Japan itself. It comprised:-

Carriers - Zuikaku, Zuiho, Chitose & Chiyoda carrying only 108 aircraft.
Hybrids - Ise & Hyuga
Cruisers - Oyodo, Tama & Isuzu
Plus 9 destroyers

Its role was as a decoy force to draw off the main US TF38 with its fast battleships and CV/CVL, a role it fulfilled admirably. It allowed the other Japanese forces Centre & Southern forces, coming up from the DEI to engage with US forces off Samar and at Surigao Strait and respectively.

Neither Ise nor Hyuga came anywhere near 14in gunfire range of US warships.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Somehow Ise and Hyuga's ineffective guns did drive off a f-ton of aerial bombs and torpedoes. Doesn't that count for something? It's frankly weird that no one is willing to recognize this.

Can you quantify this? It's my understanding that the vast vast majority of American attacks were aimed at the true flattops.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

Neither Ise nor Hyuga came anywhere near 14in gunfire range of US warships.

This event took place a day before Leyte officially began on October 24. But Japanese Wikipedia refers to it as the Battle of the Philippines (see the translation below).

After the Air Battle Over Taiwan, the Japanese believed they had damaged a large number of battleships (they had not) and deployed the Ise and Hyuga to "finish off" the survivors. Here's a quote from the Japanese Wikipedia article:

As the vanguard unit of Ozawa's main force, the Matsuda Branch was formed, and on October 24, it went south to attempt a gun battle with the American fleet, but was not blessed with an opportunity to meet the enemy, and rejoined the main force at 7 a.m. on the 25th[26​].

However, from the commander's Wikipedia page (the translation is not 100% accurate):

"In the Battle of the Philippines, I was aboard the "Hyuga" and led the "Ise" in a sortie, but on the 24th, Kurita's fleet was sent to the Sibuyan Sea. I struggled with it and retreated to the west of Ichiji, which has a lot to do with the Ozawa Task Force. Before Mr. Kurita could evacuate, the Philippine base air force had destroyed the enemy ships, and since there were three wounded enemy battleships left ahead of us, the order was given that the "Ise" and "Hyuga" should pursue the remaining enemy and destroy them with their cannons. So I went south with four destroyers, as a vanguard unit, away from the main force of the carrier force, including the Zuikaku. I thought it was a good opportunity, even though it was risking my life. Kurita's fleet also appears. If "Ise" and "Hyuga" were to leave from the north, the U.S. task force would be pinned down from the north and south, and the probability of success would become even stronger. So as I went further and further south, I saw a lot of light flashing on the horizon. I thought this was a night attack by friendly forces. However, if we continued to rush forward, it was the middle of the night, and there was a possibility that we would fight each other with friendly aircraft, so I decided to wait for dawn, so I changed course from south to east. However, Mr. Kurita sent a telegram of reversal while we were preparing for an assault. So Secretary Ozawa said that there was no point in advancing only with Matsuda's unit when Kurita's unit had reversed, so he ordered my unit to turn around and join the main unit. So I gave up and headed north. Soon, however, Kurita's fleet would have re-turned and resumed its advance in the Sibuyan Sea. The Ozawa unit did not receive this telegram of reversal. If I had received it, it would have been a different story. After the battle was over, Secretary Ozawa said that he did not know that Kurita's forces had turned around again and were charging towards Leyte Gulf.

Can you quantify this? It's my understanding that the vast vast majority of American attacks were aimed at the true flattops.

I will quickly try to list some of the attacks on Ise from English and Japanese Wikipedia before it was perma-moored:

1. The American submarine USS Halibut spotted the Fourth Carrier Division at 17:42 and manoeuvered to attack, missing with six torpedoes at 18:43.
2. ...they were unsuccessfully attacked by the submarine USS Sea Dog before their arrival at Kure on the 29th.
3. The second wave of aircraft attacked at 10:05 and the ship's gunners claimed to have shot down five of the ten dive bombers. Ise was near missed eight times, although one small bomb struck No. 2 turret.
4. Ise rescued 98 survivors from Zuihō before the next attack began around 17:26. She was the primary focus of this wave and was attacked by about 85 dive bombers and at least 11 torpedo bombers.
5. The American submarine USS Halibut spotted the Fourth Carrier Division at 17:42 and manoeuvred to attack, missing with six torpedoes at 18:43.
6. ...despite gunfire from a group of four American cruisers.
7. the division arrived safely on 27 October. After leaving the island the following day, they were unsuccessfully attacked by the submarine USS Sea Dog before their arrival at Kure on the 29th.
8. On 13 February the submarine USS Bergall unsuccessfully attacked the ships as did the submarine USS Blower.
9. The convoy reached the Matsu Islands, off the Chinese coast, on the 15th and was unsuccessfully attacked by the submarine USS Rasher
10. On the way, it was attacked several times by air raids by US Army Air Corps aircraft and US Navy submarines (Burgor, Blower, Flasher, Bashaud, etc.)[79] ​。 However, both attacks were successfully avoided or repelled in advance[Note 5].​ On both occasions, she was able to evade attacks by American planes by hiding behind nearby squalls.
11. In addition, Hyuga and Kasumi's radar detected surface targets[88].​ Three U.S. submarines (Blower, Burgor, Flasher) fired a large number of torpedoes one after another[89]​, but not a single one hit[90]​[ 91]​。
12. There was also an ineffective attack by 18 medium bombers but cloud cover is what broke up this attack, although the hybrids' radar allowed the ships to hide in squalls.

Hyuga has a separate entry which shows it dodged a similar number of attacks.

I failed to mention that the true number of anti-aircraft guns on both ships isn't fully known as it had been upgraded around October of 1944 to add additional anti-aircraft systems to the useless flight deck. These included light weapons (probably 25mm cannon) and a multi-launch anti-aircraft rocket system.

(I also made a mistake in an earlier post. Both hybrids launched strike aircraft in October but suffered heavy losses which were never replaced.)

 

[peceed]

The biggest problem with hybrid carriers is that half of the displacement and armament is in the wrong place from a tactical point of view.

Additionally, carriers require a lot of empty space that cannot be sensibly armored, which makes any attempts at hybridization completely fruitless.

The most reasonable solution that can be included in this category is a low-profile German raider equipped with self-defense fighters and reconnaissance planes.

I once wanted to use catapults and a hook system mounted on the top of the aircraft fuselages (attached to the wing base) for landing on a rope. However, a classic deck could be more practical to implement.

Despite its technical audacity, such a solution loses in cost efficiency to auxiliary cruisers, which themselves seem quite attractive candidates for operating small groups of aircraft.