Hybrid aircraft carriers (4 Viewers)

[z42]

Italy, France. Netherlands, Belgium all have remote colonies. All of which are treaty and/or otherwise constrained.

Italy and France had navies big enough that they could have built carriers (France did, and Italy tried although too little too late) at higher priority before WWII had they so wanted.

It's not a cost issue, its a range problem: The peace time range numbers produced by only running 1 boiler and cruising turbines in fair seas, falls off the cliff when you need to keep all boiler lit and run on main turbine while operating in a seaway. So, you need the foresight to see the problem and have developed solutions. (high speed tankers, replenishment underway, etc)

You need to include the cost of logistical support for your fleet in your total budget. If you can't otherwise afford it, you need to scale down the numbers/size of your fighting ships; having a bunch of harbor queens has limited usability.

Well, CV Graf Zeppelin did have 16 x 15cm guns (would that make her a hybrid?). But how easily can na AMC mission kill your aircraft carrier?? KM doesn't want the opposite of HMS Sydney vs KM Komoran.

I think the GZ was a 'real' carrier, although one with an exceptionally heavy gun armament. As for an AMC surprising and mission killing or even sinking your raider, that's always a risk, sure. Though the carrier could have it's spotter or bomber plane flying close passes to try to recognize the ship, and spot any potential guns to reduce the risk.

 

[z42]

I think the LHDs mission is amphibious assault, not sea control so no.

Fair enough. I was thinking in of an LHD being a sort-of hybrid carrier in terms of having both a big flight deck as well as the docking platform for launching boats.

 

[don4331]

Have Glorious' five operational Swordfish on deck, torpedo-armed and fueled, with their crews and engines on five minute readiness, along with two (or even one) of her nine operational Sea Gladiators running a 60 mile diameter circuit around their ship, and the two German battlecruisers will have a very bad day.

By the time the Germans detect Glorious (historically at 4pm), she would have had sufficient warning from her Gladiator patrol to light up all boilers, move away at speed and launch her five Swordfish. The odds are that at least one torpedo will strike home. Meanwhile a radio call is made to HMS Ark Royal to launch a larger Swordfish operation.

Historically, air launched torpedoes had a <10% chance of hitting and <5% of doing serious damage. A 5 Swordfish attack is a target practice exercise for the KM BBs.

Victorious managed 1 hit on Bismarck; taking advantage of attacking out of the sun.​

Ark Royal managed 0 hits on Sheffield; 1 hit on Bismarck, taking advantage of attacking out of rain - i.e. on attack run before Germans could bring guns to bear.​

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When Tirpitz was attacked be Apple cores on a clear day, she shot down 2 in sequence and the others dropped early to avoid the same fate.​

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By the time Ark Royal's operation could be readied, the ugly twins would be under cover of Luftwaffe Bf.110s. Swordfish vs Luftwaffe fighters didn't end well for FAA during Channel Dash.​

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Having CAP up really only means Glorious may successfully get up to speed and avoid getting shelled.

 

[z42]

The armor protection still makes a lot of sense when the possible air attack is considered, be that by the bombs or by the torpedoes.
British were about to introduce the armored flying deck for their carriers, that also should be considered wrt. the weight and the top weight.
For sake of simplicity, we can leave the armor protection on the big hybrids as they were the interwar battleships, minus the armor protection related to the guns behind the main bridge. The flying deck remaining unarmored.

My understanding is that WWII era carriers tended to have a lot of the armor weight in the flight or hangar decks, with relatively weak belt armor, as they weren't designed to resist a battleship shooting it's guns at them. Whereas an aerial attack by dive bombers was definitely a risk taken into account, hence tonnage spent on deck armor. Thus, a design that retains the armor layout of the parent pure gunship design might be fairly suboptimal.

The only people that might consider the hybrids as the raiders are probably the Germans.
Against the unescorted merchant ships, the 250 kg bomb will suffice, nut there are also the guns on the ships if the unlucky ship is caught nearby. The merchant ship will also provide the on-hand training for the aircrew - cruel as that sounds - as well as for the deck crew.
The German raiders hybrids don't need to operate just by themselves, the 'normal' ships, auxiliary cruisers, U-boats and MP aircraft can also play along. British will need to make the task groups centered around their own carriers to tackle this problem; having the groups of cruisers will not cut it.

A carrier (hybrid or not) using it's recon capability to provide targeting information to a group of submarines could be a potent combination. Assuming you can keep the (hybrid) carrier alive from enemy hunter groups, which is probably a big assumption.

There's also the issue that if Germans are seen to be building a lot of ships with flight decks in the 1930'ies, the RN is certainly going to react as well, probably by building more carriers. So instead of the hybrid Graf Spee wreaking havoc with impunity in the South Atlantic, maybe we'd have seen the carrier battle of River Plate instead, with the same outcome as OTL?

 

[SaparotRob]

Fair enough. I was thinking in of an LHD being a sort-of hybrid carrier in terms of having both a big flight deck as well as the docking platform for launching boats.

I doubt you and I are the only people who look at an LHD and think carrier.

 

[ThomasP]

One aspect that I think should be emphasized re this topic is that the design can be from the keel up - ie we do not need to think in terms of most of the historical WWII era designed hybrid/through-deck cruiser style carriers. I say this because it is clear that taking an already existing ship like the Tone or Furious (both of which were designed as gunships, had turrets fore and aft, and the associated armour arrangements) there are perhaps too many compromises to build a worthwhile hybrid/through-deck cruiser style carrier.

 

[EwenS]

One aspect that I think should be emphasized re this topic is that the design can be from the keel up - ie we do not need to think in terms of most of the historical WWII era designed hybrid/through-deck cruiser style carriers. I say this because it is clear that taking an already existing ship like the Tone or Furious (both of which were designed as gunships, had turrets fore and aft, and the associated armour arrangements) there are perhaps too many compromises to build a worthwhile hybrid/through-deck cruiser style carrier.

It was only very early iterations of the Tone design that had 3 turrets forward and 2 aft. While still on the drawing board and before they were laid down the design had already been totally reworked to suit their intended new role as "aircraft cruisers" so as to place all the turrets forward and the then expanded aviation facilities aft.

Another reason for the 4 turrets forward design was that the IJN had begun to recognise it had a dispersion problem with the gun layout on previous cruisers. Placing all the main armament forward reduced, if not totally eliminating, that problem.

Furious may have begun life intended as a gun ship with single 18in fore and aft, but lost the forward one before completion. However she was stripped all the way down to main deck level in 1921 before the Washington Conference and subsequently being rebuilt. She was also rearranged internally to suit her new role as a carrier.

 

[Shortround6]

A few notes.
The sisters carried almost 150 tons of shells alone for the rear turret. (450 shells max x 330kg per shell) plus about 163kg per propelling charge or about another 74 tons.
The 15cm ammo was around another 115 tons. This allows for the storage of a fair amount of aviation ordnance.
It also shows some of what is being given up. The whole idea of big gun ships was to deliver large amounts of shell/HE at a distance from the ship. Nowhere near the distance that aircraft could but much further than shore based guns could.

The late 30s and early 40s saw some huge changes in ship, weapon and sensor technology. For the last it went from the the good old eyeball and perhaps radio finding to radar (and sonar). The aircraft extended search distance much further than a man in lookout position at the top of a mast but it still depended on the the ability to 'see' both in darkness and in bad weather. Radar did a both. It extended over the horizon a little bit and it didn't care if it was dark or foggy. It was better than naked eyes in rain/snow but much reduced. But aircraft had somewhat the same limits. Couldn't fly in bad weather/darkness. You went from the late 30s with flying but with the same vision problems sailors had had for thousands of years to both ships and planes being able to 'see' in the dark when they got search radar into planes (actual shooting and bombing in the dark took another few years).
In 1937-38 carriers had some real strengths, they also had some weaknesses. They could really reach out and touch an enemy from 100-200 miles away, if they could find them and hit them in daylight. At night they had no more range than ships of WW I and earlier did (starshells and searchlights.) and with their light gun armament nighttime donnybrooks (non Japanese torpedo ranges) were too dangerous to contemplate as a standard battle form (emergency only). By 1941-43 (depending on navy) they could fly search planes at night to help keep the enemy from sneaking up on them. British could actually attack at night (operational losses from night landings would be higher) but this required lots of training and special planes.
Some ships might have been a good idea in 1937, in 1942 they might have been a death trap. It took 3-4 years to build a large ship.

Search aircraft are not one way, that is to say they are not invisible. An Arado 196 (or Ju 87X) spotted off the Azores is a real clue there is a German ship somewhere within 300km (or less).
With radar the ship being 'spotted' might be able to track it for a distance and get a better idea of where it goes after it is out of visual range, giving a better idea of the home ship's general location.

Hybrids don't bring enough air power to a fight compared to a standard carrier. They also don't bring enough gun power to a fight if the weather (vision) is bad. They might be useful in certain scenarios. They might be bad in others.

Now I will also explain that I consider most pre-WW II carriers not to be standard carriers. I will further say that anybody aside from the US, Britain and the Japanese had very little hope of building a decent standard carrier. Even the US had a mixed bag in 1941/42.

Due to the fast change in aircraft some of the late 20s carriers were rather deficient in capabilities compared to a 1941-43 carrier. Even the Lexington and Saratoga were a bit light on ordnance and fuel for the size of their air group. They were very useful but their tonnage and air group numbers were a little high. Most of the British fleet of samples and left overs had some rather important problems which lead to the two worst being shuffled off to out of the way places as much as possible. A small flight deck may be better than no flight deck, but a small flight deck without adequate fuel and ordnance does not bring the increase in fighting power it might seem compared to another carrier of similar nominal size.

 

[z42]

Interesting writeup on the various plans for carriers for the Italian navy during the interwar years and WWII, including some hybrid carrier plans.

Development Of Italian Aircraft Carriers

The story of the Italian aircraft carrier program is longer and more controversial than usually…

comandosupremo.com

 

[EwenS]

Interesting writeup on the various plans for carriers for the Italian navy during the interwar years and WWII, including some hybrid carrier plans.

Development Of Italian Aircraft Carriers

The story of the Italian aircraft carrier program is longer and more controversial than usually…

comandosupremo.com

With regard to the Aug 1925 meeting, Michele Consetino wrote this in an article in Warship 2015 titled "The Bonfiglietti Project: An Aircraft Carrier For The Regia Marina" -

"The view of all but one of the admirals was that the Regia Marina did not have a requirement for an aircraft carrier. A preliminary design for a hybrid cruiser-carrier which had resulted from previous (albeit vague) requirement was also discussed, but the committee flatly rejected it."

The latter seems to be the vessel depicted in the first drawing. Note however the configuration of the stern. This seems to hark back to articles first published in a naval magazine of 1919 for a vessel that would carry both seaplane and wheeled aircraft, as was intended in a private venture conversion by Ansaldo of the hull of the incomplete battleship Francesco Caracciolo in the same period. (Mixing seaplane and wheeled aircraft was also a feature of inter war British carriers.)

The second drawing was for a design drawn up by Lt Gen Filippo Bonfigleitti, Naval Engineering Corps of the Italian Navy (they used army ranks) in 1929 after studying existing seaplane and aircraft carriers from around the world. The main purpose of this ship was to carry aircraft. The 8x152mm in twin mounts were fitted for the same reasons as the 8in guns in the Lexingtons, self protection. In the case of the RM the threat was seen to be attacks from fast destroyers and cruisers. So not a hybrid. Apart from the usual tonnage and stability considerations the ship had to be able to transit through the Taranto Canal which gave access to the naval dockyard where She would be maintained and refitted.

Details were:-
Displacement standard - 15,400 tonnes
Length oa - 220m
Beam max - 30m
Machinery - 70,000shp, 2 shaft, 29 knots
Endurance - 1,800nm @ 29 knots; 4,200nm @ 20 knots
Armament - 8x152mm (4x2); 16x100mm (8x2); 8x37mm (4x2)
Armour - Belt 60mm; decks 35/40/60mm, conning tower 100mm-40mm
Aircraft - 12xFiat BR1 bombers, 12xIMAM Ro 1 recce, 18xFiat CR20 fighters.

From this were developed a number of alternative smaller designs ranging from 11,500 to 14,000 tonnes.

None of these were detailed designs. Much work would still have been required to turn them into a set of plans ready to give to the builders.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

It needs to be emphasized that the Ise and Hyuga were some of the most successful ships of Japan's late-war campaigns, if not the most successful.

Up until they were semi-sunk (but not fully disabled) at port toward the end of the war, the USN had thrown absurd amounts of aircraft and bombs at both carriers and gotten almost no results while losing horrendous amount of USN aircraft in the trade. And on top of that, both hybrids managed to break through the blockade of Japan with their convoy, despite coming under overwhelming amounts of fire from aircraft to subs. I believe that both ships had more ordinances flung at them, and survived, than any other ship of the war.

A major question we should ask is: Why? Or maybe How?

Hyuga's captain and later commander, Chiaki Matsuda, was an inventor with a love for radar (he eventually had over 100 patents to his name). Ise and Hyuga had been used as technical demonstrators for prototype radar systems, so it would make sense if both ships had been using some kind of radar data in their fire control systems. The commander referred to his AA system as "massed" anti-aircraft fire and it remained the most effective anti-aircraft system employed by the Japanese during the war. Unfortunately, the details are scant on it, other than what's mentioned on Japanese wikipedia. What we know for certain is that both hybrids bristled with 25mm anti-aircraft cannon and were expertly helmed. So these two factors alone could account for their extreme survivability and success in the later stages of the war. But having the most experienced radar operators in the fleet as well as that high superstructure to mount antenna, might have also played a role in the Hyuga and Ise's durability.

Getting back to tomo pauk 's original question about design and role, the critical failing of both ships was more related to Japan's lack of a coordinating body for scientific breakthroughs. Japan in 1943 had autogyros and MAD (megnetic anomaly detectors). A hybrid carrier with good radar as well the ability to continuously operate autogyro launching, rearming, and recovery, would have been devastating to USN subs operating in a cordon around Japan.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Ise and Hyuga were useful supply ships. They contributed so little in combat value that it's fair to say their conversions were throwing good money after bad.

As for autogyros, didn't the Japanese have one hell of a time trying to train conventional pilots? How much more complex might it be to train rotary pilots? Even in 1943 their flight schools were struggling to keep up with fixed-wing demand.

The "good radar" thing might be a problem too in that timeframe.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

Ise and Hyuga were useful supply ships. They contributed so little in combat value that it's fair to say their conversions were throwing good money after bad.

As for autogyros, didn't the Japanese have one hell of a time trying to train conventional pilots? How much more complex might it be to train rotary pilots? Even in 1943 their flight schools were struggling to keep up with fixed-wing demand.

The "good radar" thing might be a problem too in that timeframe.

That is right on the money. Their Suisei strike aircraft, of which the Hyuga and Ise could launch around 22, could not be operated without another carrier nearby. And they could only be launched without fighter escort. In comparison, the Kabaya Ka-1 and Ka-2 autogyros didn't need special catapults or another carrier to land. But there's one big reason why the Japanese navy wasn't operating them: it was an Army aircraft.

For this reason, the hybrids couldn't be equipped with what would have been an excellent sub hunter.

The army, on the other hand, built small aircraft carriers for the explicit purpose of launching ground assault operations from them, with the autogyros in an anti-submarine warfare role. The army had around 50 in service, but only embarked 30 due to the fact they didn't have very many carriers.

It would be disingenuous of me to say the hybrid was a good design, despite its overwhelmingly successful performance as a blockade runner. After all, I believe it had never launched any aircraft in combat, because of a lack of strike aircraft. (I think it was able to embark with, and possibly deploy, recon aircraft, which again would have enhanced the hybrids' ability to avoid combat). But had the army not had a monopoly on autogyros, the Ise and Hyuga could have been great in the ASW role, particularly if outfitted with MAD devices. But as it stood, it was outfitted with completely useless catapults and hangars for aircraft. I think there is untapped potential in the design though, which was largely borne out by Anti-submarine warfare ships in the modern era.

 

[EwenS]

It needs to be emphasized that the Ise and Hyuga were some of the most successful ships of Japan's late-war campaigns, if not the most successful.

Up until they were semi-sunk (but not fully disabled) at port toward the end of the war, the USN had thrown absurd amounts of aircraft and bombs at both carriers and gotten almost no results while losing horrendous amount of USN aircraft in the trade. And on top of that, both hybrids managed to break through the blockade of Japan with their convoy, despite coming under overwhelming amounts of fire from aircraft to subs. I believe that both ships had more ordinances flung at them, and survived, than any other ship of the war.

That highlighted statement doesn't stand scrutiny. Just some data I can quickly put my hands on in Winton's "The Forgotten Fleet" from the USN July / Aug 1945 operations against the Japanese mainland. That included 2 days, 24 & 28 July, when they threw everything that they had against the remains of the Japanese Fleet in the waters around one of the main IJN bases at Kure. Their operations covered everywhere from Kyushu in the south to Hokkaido in the north.

The US fleet consisted of 10 Essex and 6 Independence carriers with nearly 1,200 aircraft. There were 13 strike days, during which 10,678 offensive sorties were flown (i.e. those against enemy shipping or over enemy territory) with a combat loss rate of just 1.39% per offensive sortie. (there were a further (7,485 defensive sorties CAP & ASW patrols etc)

So about 150 aircraft lost, if my maths is right. There was a further 0.55% by way of Operational Losses (deck landing accidents etc). So about another 60 aircraft. So total losses of about 210 aircraft in total. It sounds a lot but that was over 13 strike days. So just an average of 16 aircraft per strike day out of 1,200 carried by the carriers. Many of the crews were rescued by subs or ships or rescue aircraft. The claims were for 2,408 enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged and 924,000 tons of shipping destroyed or damaged, including Ise & Hyuga.

In between each series of strikes TF38 was able to refuel and replenish from its fleet train. During these periods it was able to replace all the aircraft and aircrew it needed to. There were escort carriers dedicated to bringing replacement aircraft forward to the fleet.

You will find details of their movements here.

Imperial Battleships

Imperial Battleships

There is a period from just after Midway until Oct 1944 where they played virtually no part in the war, between refits, conversion and training time. Then they were active for a few months. By the end of March 1945 they had been laid up effectively as floating AA batteries.

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

That highlighted statement doesn't stand scrutiny. Just some data I can quickly put my hands on in Winton's "The Forgotten Fleet" from the USN July / Aug 1945 operations against the Japanese mainland. That included 2 days, 24 & 28 July, when they threw everything that they had against the remains of the Japanese Fleet in the waters around one of the main IJN bases at Kure. Their operations covered everywhere from Kyushu in the south to Hokkaido in the north.

The US fleet consisted of 10 Essex and 6 Independence carriers with nearly 1,200 aircraft. There were 13 strike days, during which 10,678 offensive sorties were flown (i.e. those against enemy shipping or over enemy territory) with a combat loss rate of just 1.39% per offensive sortie. (there were a further (7,485 defensive sorties CAP & ASW patrols etc)

So about 150 aircraft lost, if my maths is right. There was a further 0.55% by way of Operational Losses (deck landing accidents etc). So about another 60 aircraft. So total losses of about 210 aircraft in total. It sounds a lot but that was over 13 strike days. So just an average of 16 aircraft per strike day out of 1,200 carried by the carriers. Many of the crews were rescued by subs or ships or rescue aircraft. The claims were for 2,408 enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged and 924,000 tons of shipping destroyed or damaged, including Ise & Hyuga.

In between each series of strikes TF38 was able to refuel and replenish from its fleet train. During these periods it was able to replace all the aircraft and aircrew it needed to. There were escort carriers dedicated to bringing replacement aircraft forward to the fleet.

You will find details of their movements here.

Imperial Battleships

Imperial Battleships

There is a period from just after Midway until Oct 1944 where they played virtually no part in the war, between refits, conversion and training time. Then they were active for a few months. By the end of March 1945 they had been laid up effectively as floating AA batteries.

Thanks for the info. I'd point out that we cannot estimate individual aerial USN combat losses against the Ise and Hyuga in this manner as many ships were involved. But it seems you think I shouldn't have used the word "horrendous"? In that case, I'll just use the Japanese citation.

We also can't use Japanese claims here either, because of how prone gunners are to overclaiming. Both ships' gunners reported a large number of shoot-downs. The IJN believed the ships' aerial gunnery methods to be highly effective. Whether it was six or 60 shootdowns, the fact remains that the ships' AA layout, crew training, and technology made it among the IJN's best aerial defenses used against the USN.

The proof is in the pudding: their convoy escaped withering assaults unscathed, despite being bombarded numerous times by aircraft and submarines. Here's a poorly translated quote from Japanese Wikipedia on Ise from the Battle of Leyte Gulf:

In the anti-aircraft battle at this time, the barrage fire devised by Commander Chiaki Matsuda was effective, and many aircraft were shot down (30~70 aircraft). It was also very effective to avoid bombs, which sailed at cruising speed and steered abruptly as the enemy carrier-based bombers were preparing for a descent. From the point of view of the ship's bombers conducting dive-bombing, this maneuver is lost because the target is missed. In addition, once a ship bomb had descended, it could not make a major target correction and could not rise again unless a heavy bomb was dropped. From these, the naval bomb had no choice but to drop the bomb and climb while deflecting its aim.

Ise escorted the first group of aircraft carriers Zuikaku-Zuiho[41].​ The Ozawa Task Force, which had few fighter escorts, was subjected to a one-sided air attack by American carrier-based aircraft, and the three carriers, Zuikaku, Zuikaku, and Chitose, were sunk. Chiyoda and the destroyer Hatsutsuki were captured by the American cruiser fleet and sunk after a gunfight.

Ise and Hyuga turned around and headed south in search of the American fleet, but did not meet them.[43]​ Ise suffered 7 killed and 80 seriously wounded[44]​, 4 close-range bullets flooded the bulge about 800-900 tons, 1.5 degrees to the left inclination, all main gun armor-piercing shells, 160 main gun anti-aircraft shells, 2000 high-angle gun conventional rounds, 120,000 machine gun bullets, 480 shells remained.[45]​ 63 American planes shot down in anti-aircraft combat[46]​Or 44 aircraft shot down, 12 uncertain aircraft[47]​, In the battle detailed report, " Duplicate Surumo equivalent Almono no Goku"[48].​

In other words, regardless of the true number of USN losses, their gunners performed well, particularly given that the Ise was more or less an obsolete warship relegated to transport duties.

It's also worth mentioning that both ships were equipped with an early multi-rocket, anti-aircraft weapon. It wasn't accurate but the psychological effect apparently drove off dive bombers. Also, I got something wrong earlier: the catapults had been removed as well as the aircraft. The hangars were used to stack oil drums and shipping containers. In other words, these ships were also loaded up with fuel and manufacturing materials, making their extraordinary bomb-dodging performances even more mouth dropping.

 

[Shortround6]

Now I will also explain that I consider most pre-WW II carriers not to be standard carriers. I will further say that anybody aside from the US, Britain and the Japanese had very little hope of building a decent standard carrier. Even the US had a mixed bag in 1941/42.

To further explain this, the US had 3 different types of carriers. The Lex and Saratoga, the Ranger and Wasp and the Yorktown, Enterprise and Hornet. While the aircraft park was similar speed, protection, aviation fuel capacity and magazines (?) varied more than the number of aircraft which did affect both their offensive power and their ability to go into harms way (Ranger).

British were, to some extent, worse. The five old carriers were not uniform in most ways except for the Glorious and Courageous. The Furious had similar looks but it didn't have quite the same storage, including only about 60% of the aviation fuel. All three had dated machinery from WW I and a more modern design would have used fewer but larger boilers that would take much less space allowing for more of something or several somethings. (ship fuel oil, aircraft fuel, ordnance, rations for crew, etc) The Ark Royal carried about 3 times the fuel for about 25% more aircraft even if given official number of aircraft. Obviously a more capable aircraft carrier. The roughly 25% increase in fuel oil allowed for some extra days at sea, especially considering they never wanted to get close to running the tanks dry. Illustrious class sacrificed aircraft capability for protection (the armored flight deck).

The Japanese had a similar fleet of samples until the Shokaku.
With different navies build ships with different priorities (offensive power, protection, range/endurance) it is very hard to judge what the world standard was, except there wasn't one.
Just knowing that a planned ship was supposed to carry a given number of planes, like 36, doesn't really tell us what a navy planed to do with those aircraft and/or for how long (days) in a combat area.
Different weather conditions can also affect ship design/operations with the British showing the importance they placed on planes being able to find their carrier again. This is one of those things that changed a lot in just a few years with better radios and signals (beacons) and radar. Or even willingness of admirals/captains to reveal their own ships location to potential enemies to get planes/crews back on board. Operating in some areas of the Pacific with better weather allowed for different choices.

Choices the French, Germans and Italians could make depended on their own experience, doctrine and expected conditions. The French Joffre and sister seem a little lacking in aircraft (40 planes for 18-20,000ton ship) but without more knowledge of the amount of armor and other details it is a little hard to judge. They were hoping for a decent range.