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Does the lack of Ark Royal's sinking impact the designed redundancies and damage control systems of the and Implacable classes?
I like the idea of Glorious or her sister being repaired in time for a larger Taranto raid of Nov 1940. Judging by the damage though, it's likely Courageous that joins the RN strike that day.I think the answer is "Yes."
The HMS Glorious was lost due to operational errors; the RN would make similar changes to its operational procedures whether the ship was lost or was towed into port, listing, flooded, and smoldering.
The HMS Glorious was lost due to operational errors; the RN would make similar changes to its operational procedures whether the ship was lost or was towed into port, listing, flooded, and smoldering.
There's nothing wrong with using carriers to attack subs, and with more than two dozen depth charge armed Swordfish four destroyers is probably sufficient. So the tools and the mission are not to blame. But the carrier should have been running at 30 knots in erratic manoeuvres and operating at least fifty miles away from wherever u-boats were predicted to be.Sending a Fleet carrier out to go sub hunting with only 4 destroyers could only be done by somebody who ignored the lesson of the Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue.
To be fair, there were no proven ASW tactics yet, the RN didn't have disposable escort carriers (though Argus is close to a CVE), and the Germans knew their business. The war was only a few days old, there was no contemporary experience to draw from, and Courageous was operating well into the Atlantic where threat was likely perceived to be lower.The tools, mission and training, tactics are very much to blame.
The Courageous was also lost due to operational errors.
An alternate history doesn't need faulty weapons or bad aim on the German's side, it just needs smarter decisions on the British side. Sending a Fleet carrier out to go sub hunting with only 4 destroyers could only be done by somebody who ignored the lesson of the Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue.
Granted it doesn't give you any lessons in damage control or construction for new carriers,
You want "luck" for the Glorious? Put up even two aircraft (of any kind) at a time sweeping the intended course just 50 miles ahead of the carrier. two is for redundancy, so you have one in the air or in position no matter what.
Lack of stupidity nets 2 operational carriers instead of 2 sunk ones, let alone damaged.
HiWere any plane-carrying cruisers in the area to scout out subs for the destroyers to attack?
TSR is Fleet Air Arm speak for Torpedo-Strike-Reconasance, the designation for the Swordfish, Albacore and Barracuda. What If posts sometimes use Our Timeline (OTL) and In This Timelime (ITTL) to differentiate between what occurred in real life and what is being suggested as occurring. But I should have put that in the first post, as I hate the exclusionary nature of acronyms."S&G without TSR or CAP aloft, per OTL. But ITTL"
Can you translate your acronyms to what they mean?
Send the destroyers without the carrier or add a light cruiser ot two (two actually helped rescue the survivors so they were not only at sea but in the general area,) This was a case of the RN having needed to be "seen doing something" rather than a well thought out plan to really protect the merchant ships.The question to answer is what were the realistic alternatives to sending a carrier?
There's a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking here. This was 14 days after the war began, everyone was learning.Or it was a case to total overconfidence in the ability of the Swordfish and the sonar on the destroyers.
There's a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking here. This was 14 days after the war began, everyone was learning.
I agree with everything you wrote here. Very succinctly put.Some people were relearning what they had known in WW I.
Some people were going to war with totally untested weapons or weapons that been unchanged since 1918.
The Swordfish of 1939 did not have radar. It is subject to question whether they had actual depth charges or 100/250lb anti-submarine bombs.
The whole concept of organizing hunting groups in 1939 should have been laid to rest by any halfway competent friday night quarterback/coach.
If swanning about all over the ocean with aircraft was a waste of effort, the sending out around 100 anti-sub ships in groups with 1 mile range asdic into a 3000 mile wide ocean can only be seen as pure folly. Not to mention that by sending out the hunter groups there weren't enough ships left to escort the convoys properly.
Double fail.