Bf 109 vs He 112/100 - Political decisions

ALL weapons programmes, including fighter development in the 1930s, peace time and war time, have essentially three aspects. Technical, economic and political. The economic aspect has an effect on the technical aspect (no one has unlimited funds) and the political controls the economic to a greater or lesser extent.
How much individual personalities and rivalries have an effect depends on many factors. In a totalitarian system there is usually more opportunity for individuals rather than organisations (read committees) to wield power so the potential for petty personal rivalries to affect the decision making process is higher than in more democratic systems. In such systems there is also the potential for the economic aspect to lack proper control for political reasons.
Steve

You also have to look at timing. How far along certain programs actually were and how fast certain companies could actually deliver on a full program ( as in actual construction of series aircraft.)
To keep from picking on the Germans the US ordered the P-40 (524?) not because it was really what they wanted or was the best potential fighter but because it promised the fasted delivery and the US was woefully short of modern fighters. Production P-40s in 1940 or Wonder plane X in 1941 or 1942?
Most US and British companies at the start (or just before) of the war had small design staffs and had trouble with more than 2-3 different designs at the same time. Supermarine had a number of different designs but wasn't capable of building even several different prototypes at the same time without the time to build stretching out into around two years while getting the Spitfire into production. Perhaps company "B"s submission (paper airplane) isn't quite as good but promises to ready to fly 6-8 months sooner, which do you pick?
We debate about wither Northrop got screwed but Northrop was a small company in WW II and the P-61 was it's first real product ( Jack Northrop went through companies like some people go through cars, a new one every few years). Northrop had to farm out a lot of work on the B-35 bomber program to Martin. Large scale production would have meant farming out to how many companies? (yes it was done but it does delay service use of large numbers of aircraft.)

A lot of times air staffs/ministry's had to try to decide if a company could actually build the required aircraft in a timely fashion in addition to just building a few prototypes (and sometimes the prototypes could not even be built in a timely fashion) They also had to judge if prototype "A" at the 193X fighter/bomber trials was really ready for production, needed minor tweaking or needed a stem to stern redesign in order to be produced in quantity AND meet ALL requirements. There is an awful lot of wiggle room in there for politics and and awful lot of wiggle room for the "we was robbed" crowd when their plane didn't actually meet ALL the requirements.

All good points. I certainly wasn't singling out the Germans in any way, just remarking that totalitarian regimes tend to throw up the 'personality issues' more than others. That's not to say they don't exist elsewhere. It is a common misconception that a regime like Nazi Germany's is somehow more efficient when in fact the reverse is true in many areas.

If you want a good example of the technical/economic/political aspects at work during the development of a weapons system look no further than Britain's TSR-2. Under 'political' you can add inter service rivalries which are far more prevalent in democratic systems and have had a serious impact on several UK and US projects. In totalitarian systems the service leaders are more likely to do what they are told. I suppose shooting a few serves to 'encourager les autres'

Cheers

Steve

Under 'political' you can add inter service rivalries which are far more prevalent in democratic systems and have had a serious impact on several UK and US projects.

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At least one British ex-artillery man thought the British Army went to war with a bunch of WW I leftover artillery pieces because the RAF "promised" it could do ground support between the wars and so should get the budget money that would have gone to new artillery pieces. Budget (allocation) battles between Air Forces and Navies are legendary in a number of countries and often seem to take precedence over actually defeating an enemy

If I remember, Udet was at least responsible for the fanatical devotion by the LW to the dive-bomber concept.

Njaco said:

If I remember, Udet was at least responsible for the fanatical devotion by the LW to the dive-bomber concept.

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Less often known was that Ernest Udet took Eric "Winkle" Brown for his first flight at an German airshow Brown's father had taken him too, the experienced German fighter and aerobatic pilot making it something spectacular. Udet encouraged Brown to both to learn to fly and to learn German. In 1939 Brown was at a fancy German private college at Salem near Lake Constance when war broke out. He was detained by the German police and then kicked out of the country via Switzerland, he was even allowed to keep his MG sports car with the reason being that "we have no parts". Brown's affability and cultural competence in German probably saved him grief several times as he was able to head warnings from German ground crew. Some of Udets aerial displays are on you tube. Very amazing.

Udet certainly was a strong proponent of dive bombing however he wasn't the only one. Despite purchase of dive bombers from Curtiss in the USA junkers already had aircraft such as the K-47 in test.

In some ways the decisions made by Milch, Udet and Jenkoshenk were excellent given the outcomes of the Battle with France and Poland. However in the long term they were completely inadequate. I would reserve judgement as to their competence, I know that matter weighed on them heavily as the latter two committed suicide. I believe these men were told of the massive amounts of fighters they would need as America prepared its "100,000" but were unable to act.

You also have to remember that in some cases they didn't know what they were up against. The Luftwaffe lost thousands of flight instructors when they were used as transport pilots. Many of those would have been alive had the Luftwaffe cyphers been secure.

During the first world war the Germans had "marine flieger" or naval air arm, most known for operating Zeppelins. During the second the Luftwaffe had complete control even so far as operating the aircraft on its Air Craft carrier, the never completed "Graf Zeppelin". This lack of breakup possibly lead to the inadequacies of the Luftwaffe's support for the Navy in long range aircraft. There were incidently some extremely impressive Blohm + Voss flying boats but they seem to have been civilian in origin.

"Budget (allocation) battles between Air Forces and Navies are legendary in a number of countries and often seem to take precedence over actually defeating an enemy"

In Germany there was a battle between the Kriegsmarine(Navy) and Luftwaffe over the GEMA company and its radar work (Seetakt). In Germany radar had been invented by the head of the Signals Branch of the Navy's (a Physicist by the name of von Kunhold) expansion of active sonar research to radio frequencies through work with a trusted company then called "tonographie" whose sound recording equipment was used to train sonar operators and provide reference sounds (which morphed into GEMA). The Navy wanted to contract GEMA for its exclusive use and pressured the directors heavily when they did Luftwaffe work in the form of the Freya radar. This rivalry was in some cases no productive. There was further tension between von Kunhold and Telefunken because the head of R+D Rudolf Runge (son of the Runge in Runge-Kutta method) had initially scoffed at von Kunhold's ideas on radar embarrassing the man and leading to a tension between the two. von Kunhold was a proponent of microwaves and this meant relations between him, the Navy and the powerful Telefunken (who were equipped to develop advanced vacuum tubes such as magnetron and more capable than the small GEMA) was absent.

You will find similar issues on the allied side wrt to ASV radar and even Watson Watt trod on US toes when he went about disrespecting the excellent US SCR268,270 and 271 and US Navy radars such as CXAM, all operating on 50cm waves rather than 10m of Chain Home. On the whole though the Britsih seem to have avoided too many issues. The Admiralty developed excellent 50cm radar while the UK Army under the New Zealander Buttment developed a 50cm radar for protection against hostile ships. (In the UK the Army was in charge of AAA and Shore protection, In Germany the Luftwaffe did FLAK while the German Navy did harbor protection). the UK Army's 50cm radar eventually became Chain Home Low (CHL) presumably under RAF command.

The German's eventually somewhat agreed with Watson Watt developing their own omnidirectional radar based around Chain Home but using a Wassermann receiving aerial. They wanted to use it to track and guide V2 missiles.

Shortround6 said:

At least one British ex-artillery man thought the British Army went to war with a bunch of WW I leftover artillery pieces because the RAF "promised" it could do ground support between the wars and so should get the budget money that would have gone to new artillery pieces. Budget (allocation) battles between Air Forces and Navies are legendary in a number of countries and often seem to take precedence over actually defeating an enemy

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Your latter point is correct, I've scratched my head over some of this internecine feuding on several occasions!

Your artillery man was quite wrong. The new born RAF fought tooth and nail to avoid precisely that role as it saw a danger of becoming a subsidiary of the Army and then losing its independence and being re-absorbed by the Army. Many Army officers wanted that to happen.

What the RAF did do is offer itself as a CHEAP solution to petty colonial wars, tribal insurrections and the like. This it did in the Middle East and India for example. It meant that expensive boots on the ground were supposedly not needed, much to the Army's dismay. It was also a way for the RAF to assert its independence.

So called 'Tribal Pacification' in 1927, in Mohmand country, India, by aircraft, took two days and there were no RAF casualties. The entire operation coat 23,000 Rupees. A similar operation in 1908, undertaken by the Army, had taken two months, 257 soldiers were killed or wounded (the British didn't bother to count 'tribal' casualties) and the cost was 18,000,000 Rupees.

Some things don't change! Now we call it 'shock and awe'.

Cheers

Steve

I think there is an element of truth to it. There were an awful lot of "Army Cooperation" aircraft built and used during the 1920s and 30s that had capabilities a bit beyond what was really needed or what was normal in some other air forces for such duties, which to be honest were rather widespread and all encompassing.
Budgets were tight and while the RAF certainly didn't want to become/revert to be being a subsidiary of the Army it needed some of the "normal" army budget for expansion. A lot more "Army Cooperation" aircraft were built than could really be justified by the size of the standing army in the 20s and early 30s. Dozens of aircraft per division?
The term "Day Bomber" is also rather loose or elastic. Granted few Biplanes were high performance or long ranged but the British had a bunch of "Army Cooperation" aircraft that could carry a pair of 250-260lb bombs and had a range of around 400-500 miles which is a bit short for strategic work even the 1920s.
British army got new (or newer) field artillery (18pdrs on high speed carriages and later 18/15pdrs) but long range artillery (for counter battery or interdiction) was almost non-existent except for those WW I left overs.

From a "Flight" Magazine article (which is certainly not "official") on the Lysand providing transport for Army staff officers"ander.
"An outline of the work of a typical army co-operation squadron takes in the duties of tactical reconnaissance, spotting for the artillery, attacking ground targets with bombs and machine guns, dropping supplies by parachute, providing transport for army staff officers."

Bolding is by me. According to "wiki" out of the 175 Lysanders deployed to to France 108 were lost and I believe another source says over 70 of the 108 were lost in combat. Later in the war the tactical reconnaissance, spotting for the artillery and providing transport for army staff officers was in a large part taken over by Taylorcraft Auster. The very popular (sarcasm) picking up a message with a hook duty may have also gone to the Austers. Some tactical reconnaissance being done by camera equipped fighters.

Army didn't need new 6in guns to hit rail heads, heavy artillery or supply depots 5-10 miles behind the lines (WW I thinking) because the RAF could do it without the RAF really getting embroiled in the "land battle" ( strafing trenches, trying to bomb pill boxes or other front line support.

What you are describing was defined in 1944 as 'General Air Support', attacking targets not in close proximity to friendly troops but immediately behind the battle front. This is not interdiction as it was understood then. Nowadays we would call it Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI).
This is different to 'Close Air Support' which was defined, at the time, as attacking and destroying, in response to Army requests, targets engaging or being engaged by the forward British troops, thereby improving the tactical situation of the moment.
In the inter war period the RAF was not interested in either of these roles which it thought, and repeatedly said, was the role of the Army and its guns.
Interdiction, the use of air power to isolate the battlefield by destroying, disrupting and delaying enemy forces, communications and supplies, often in areas far removed from the battlefield itself was something the RAF was dragged to, kicking and screaming, in the immediate post WW2 period. It believed this to be a misuse of its bombers. Harris still thought so in 1944.

Army Cooperation was the air support that the RAF was equipped to provide to the Army in 1939. It emphasised reconnaissance. Only one school (at old Sarum) existed where junior Army officers were trained under the auspices of No.22 Group for liaison duties with the squadrons detailed to support the BEF in France. These squadrons were to provide tactical reconnaissance, photographic reconnaissance and artillery spotting. They might choose to attack a target behind the lines but this was not what they trained for nor was it part of their official mission.
They formed part of an 'Air Component' of fighter and reconnaissance units with the BEF alongside the independent Advanced Air Striking Force of light bomber squadrons. Both were under the aegis of British Air Forces in France Command, under Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt.
The RAF had fought long and hard for its independence and wasn't about to give it up because the Germans had started another war.

The system was inefficient, cumbersome and simply didn't work. The RAF proved incapable of supporting the Army in a tactical way in 1940 and beyond. The blame lies with both services. The problem wasn't solved in Europe, it was solved in the Western Desert in 1941/42 by men like Tedder and Coningham.

Cheers

Steve

We may be arguing two different things, however;

In the inter war period the RAF was not interested in either of these roles which it thought, and repeatedly said, was the role of the Army and its guns

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During the inter war period the Army got NO new guns for such use and not only no "new" guns but NO new builds of old designs. It was only at the end of the 1930s that design work made much progress on the 4.5in gun and the 5.5in. And the first 4.5in guns were mounted on old 60pdr carriages. many sources claim this was in the 30s but while that is technically correct it is quite misleading. Only about 19-20 conversions were made in 1938-39 with the vast bulk of the conversions being done in 1940 (209?).

There may be some confusion as to what the army's position was, what the RAFs position was (behind doors) and what the politicians position/believes were or what they were trying to impose on both the Army and RAF as part of controlling expenditures (like restricted the wingspan of the Short Stirling to keep down growth and cost).

BTW the quote about the duties of the Army cooperation squadron is from a 1939 edition of "Flight" so it seems to pre date 1944 by quite a bit.

The Lysander takes a bit of explaining as it was a priority program in 1939-40, first flew in 1936 and was going into squadron service in 1938 (?) and the gun armament and bomb load of a Hs 123.





Some Lysanders could carry four 20lb bombs (or smoke floats) on a rack under the rear cockpit.

Internet dispositions seem to be allover the place.

The RAF may have promised the politicians that they would/could support the army and so the army didn't need to spend money on new guns (give it to the RAF instead) even if the support turned out to be lacking in practice. The RAF did spend a bit of money on the Hawker Henley, the Fairey P.4/34 and the Bristol 148;



The Bristol was built to the same specification as the Lysander and had the strange provision for the rear seater/gunner to be able to lay prone in the bottom of the fuselage in order to aim the bombs ?????

A rather strange provision for plane intended for tactical reconnaissance, artillery spotting, message picking up and transport of army staff officers.

Granted the RAF didn't actually use ANY of these aircraft to support the army in tactical operations but there sure seems to have a lot of activity going on design wise for types of aircraft that could potentially support the Army.

In 1939 the Army cooperation squadrons set off to France with the missions of reconnaissance and artillery spotting. This is what the Army liaison officers and their RAF counterparts were trained to do on the course(s) at Old Sarum. Dropping a few bombs to inconvenience the Germans was not part of their remit, whatever 'Flight' says. That's not to say they didn't do it.
If the Army wanted some kind of interdiction or other air support it came from the AASF. Communications were so poor during the German offensive in 1940 that Army officers were having to telephone London to arrange it.
Cheers
Steve

The RAF was also supposed to able to bomb German industry/military targets in 1939/40. In actual fact they often couldn't find the right city.

Just like the Fairey Battles were not supposed to be Army support/interdiction squadrons many of the Lysanders were used in that role and paid the price of poor training and tactics (fighter coordination) however brave the crews were.

The Fact is the Army had NO new guns (aside from the handfuls of 4.5in barrels on old carriages) and precious few old ones for long range or interdiction missions. The RAF, whatever they may or may not have promised in budget battles in the early/mid 30s was unable/unwilling to offer support in a meaningful way. Gallant attempts by squadrons in France notwithstanding.

Something sure fell in the hole. Now maybe the politicians wanted to believe that they wouldn't have to pay for guns if they had bombers and didn't really listen to what the RAF was saying. But the RAF/Air ministry sure put out specifications for tactical aircraft even they wound up not buying many (200 Hawker Henley dive bombers used as target tugs?). Despite what the "course" at Old Sarum covered the planes (Lysanders) were certainly equipped with bomb racks/supply drop racks. While two .303 guns is pretty pathetic for strafing lets remember that it is double what the Fairey Battle had, or the Blenheim of the time or any other British "bomber" that might be used in a tactical role (Hampden?). It was double what the Hs 126 could offer and was a bit better than the Hs 123 (Lysander guns were not sychroed) and fully the equal of wing armament of the Ju 87. It was also as good or better than any of the German twin engine bombers of the time used in a strafing role.
Lack of training and doctrine were limiting factors.