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This might be of interest
Going back to Bf-109E versus Spitfire MkI/II. Is there any other website showing a comparison apart from wwiiaircraftperformance? in this website the level speeds shown are for a Bf-109E1, are there graphs showing E3 and E4?
As I see it the Spit was a lovely plane to fly, the 109 not so much.
It still had an impressive kill ratio though.
Because that would be exactly what you say it is - a comparison of tactics vs tactics, rather than machine vs machine.One thing I have noticed in our discussions of aircraft A vs B is that we tend to assume they operate 1 vs 1 in making comparisons
What about the effect of numbers ? Deployment tactics ?
I know for example that the Thach Weave worked with 2 Wildcats
Box formations of B-17s were a much tougher prospect than just a B-17 on its own etc
What about the melee of say 10 versus 10 - I have a feeling this may soon start to even the playing field in some respects and smooth out some of the advantages of any one type
Oh, there are plenty, but not on certain sites.Didn't the Spitfire had these little fences on the wing top, exactly because skin wrinkling, failurues?
But for example the Mk II manual also instructs the pilot to caution:
Scource: 109 Myths Lots of badly damaged Spitfires were repaired and put back into service as well, of course.The magazine has it wrong or has misintepretated the numbers. Luftwaffe lost about 1500 Me-109's in landing gear failures. Note that German loss reports often lump destroyed and damaged (10 to 60% damaged) together. It was also a standard practise to rebuild even heavily damaged airframes. While rebuilding/refurnishing these planes were also upgraded to the latest standards and latest equipment. This means that large proportion of these damaged/destroyed planes were not complete losses, but returned to squadron service.
Using these pages as a reference gives a false impression of events.
And this is different to the Me 109 wing failures how?Using these pages as a reference gives a false impression of events.Reinforcing strips (hardly wing fences) were added above the wheelbays of a small number of Spitfires, but this was by no means representative of the majority of them. The pages from Morgan and Shacklady simply show that while there were several incidents involving Spitfires there were also several causes for them - only to be expected in a mass produced, high performance fighter which was often put under considerable strain.
I have not seen the primary source for this, so excuse me if it was posted in this thread. But does it say specifically these 121 were the only accidents, or was it simply a sample for analytic purposes. Very significant for your 121 out of 22,000.To summarise:
There were 121 Spitfire crash investigations between 1941 and May 1945 involving serious structural failure:
22 aileron instability
46 pilot overstressed airframe
20 pilot error in cloud
13 misuse of oxygen system- pilot error
3 pilot blacked out
17 engine failure/fire (Glider)
121 out of 22,000?
The Spitfire V test alluded to by Kurfurst was after a series of Spitfire V crashes which occured in 1942. Investigation by Jeffrey Quill, amongst others, showed that the sole reason for these crashes was bad loading on the part of RAF squadrons, which brought the cg far too far back in the fuselage. KF likes to think this report was representative for all Spitfires and has posted it several times as "evidence" that all Spitfires were inherently accident prone. Read the rest of the discussion in the threads posted in the wing breakages.And this is different to the Me 109 wing failures how?.
This was a quote from Glider from information taken from Spitfire A Complete Fighting History. I don't have the book, and I should revise my posting to include this as a quote. I seem to recall that this was out of a chapter written by one of Britain's leading air crash experts.I have not seen the primary source for this, so excuse me if it was posted in this thread. But does it say specifically these 121 were the only accidents, or was it simply a sample for analytic purposes. Very significant for your 121 out of 22,000.
So you think he fabricated them?Again, Kurfurst has used the " Pilot's Notes" several times in the past as evidence that the Spitfire was all but impossible to fly, yet the only place these pages can be found is on his own website
Then maybe Glider can shed some light into this.This was a quote from Glider from information taken from Spitfire A Complete Fighting History. I don't have the book, and I should revise my posting to include this as a quote. I seem to recall that this was out of a chapter written by one of Britain's leading air crash experts.
Because that would be exactly what you say it is - a comparison of tactics vs tactics, rather than machine vs machine.
The 'effect of numbers' argument breaks down over the Eastern Front where the best Luftwaffe tactics simply couldn't shoot the VVS fighters down faster than they could be replaced. That only tells you that if you swarm a quality machine with enough inferior machines, you'll eventually defeat it.
1 vs 1, under idealised conditions, tells us more about the merits of the machines and what the designers got right or wrong.
I don't think there's anything wrong with your melee approach, as long as it's depicted as such because it's a different issue.
For the most part, noI wonder if some types of plane lend themselves better to working in groups - bit like ants or bees working in organised teams / hives etc ?
They said the B17 was a better group formation plane than the Liberator for example - well I have read that here and there, although the Liberator could fly further more efficiently even if it did slip and slide etc etc
As for reliable information on the number of 109 crashes. That would be very hard to acquire. And without putting it into perspective (airfield conditions, crews...) not very representative of the plane. I thought I saw a comparison of the allegedly reliable and forgiving Fw190 vs the Me 109 on this forum a while ago and the difference was not very significant.
Quill devotes an entire chapter to longitudinal stability (pages 229-241 Murray 1983) in his book "Spitfire a Test Pilot's Story" in which he goes into detail about the problems involving several Spitfire Vs which broke up in 1942; Quill describes the problem of Spitfire Vs breaking up; he then goes on to describe the solutions which were a): to ensure that when new equipment was added that the loading was kept within limits and b):the design of bobweights, which were added to the elevator circuit, as well as the modified elevators fitted to later Spitfire marks. After the bob-weights were fitted, and the loading sorted out, the problem disappeared.
Quill
"In general configuration the Mk I and Mk II production aeroplanes were almost identical to the prototype and so there was no problem with their stability." (231-232)
"The Mk III Spitfire did not go into production, but the success of the bobweight experiment in curing its instability...opened up the possibility of its use for later marks of Spitfire....which was just as well as we had to...respond to a nasty situation which developed in 1942.
The Mk V aircraft was...in full service with Fighter Command and,...a fair amount of additional operational equipment had gradually crept into the aircraft, most of it stowed within the fuselage. The aftmost acceptable position for the aircraft's centre of gravity had been fixed in the mormal course of flight testing by the firm and by the A AEE....Any rearward movement of the centre of gravity in service, for whatever reason, would begin to destabilise the aircraft. Therefore, for each sub-variant of the Mk V detailed instructions for the correct loading of the aircraft were issued to squadrons....However the importance of these loading instructions was not generally appreciated in squadrons and in the daily round of operational activity they tended to be disregarded." (pages 232-233 -Quill goes on to describe 65 Sqn's Spitfire Vbs which were found to be dangerously unstable)
"There was thus a real chance that, as of that moment, in almost every squadron in the Command Spitfires were flying in a dangerous state of instability....Up to that time there had been a distressing and increasing incidence of total structural failure of Spitfires in the air, which was causing great comcern in the MAP and especially at Supermarine." (pages234-235) Once the bobweights had been introduced and, in later marks, the modified mass balances on the elevators...it was statistically established that, as soon as the longitudinal stability of the Spitfire was thus brought under control, the problem of the unexplained breakings-up of aircraft in mid-air,...'softly and suddenly vanished away'." (page 238 )
What is interesting is that Quill points out that the majority of Spitfire Vs in service may have been dangerously unstable. If this was the case it is even more striking how few of them actually broke-up.
The report, one page of whick Kurfurst uses to imply that all Spitfires were inherently likely to break-up, is dated April-July 1942, and is one of those written during the investigations of the problems described by Geoffrey Quill.
X4266, according to Morgan and Shacklady, was originally a Mk I "11-4-42 hand(ling), stab(ility), recovery from dive and steep turns. Comp. trials with BM559..."
BM559 "hand stab characteristics recovering from dives. Steep turns to assess aeroelastically stresses. Comp trials with X4266 fitt (?) DeH and Rotol props. Trls with and without 6 1/2 intl wt in elevator system.
So you think he fabricated them?
thought I remembered reading an interview on this subject many years ago- and finally found it in a yellowed copy of Alfred Price's 'Spifire At War' (published 1974). It's germane to this discussion (as my teacher used to say) because the person being interviewed is none other than Mr Eric Newton who spent the war with the Air Accident Investigation Branch. He was still employed by them as an investigator in 1974- the time of the interview- so presumably still had the facts at his fingertips. This body was, and is, independent of the RAF.
Mr Newton was called in to investigate Spitfire crashes which could not be immediately attributed to pilot error (the same crashes which are detailed in Morgan and Shacklady).
....In the nature of my work I tend to concentrate on an aircraft's failings and ignore its good points; but how safe was the Spitfire? I think the figures speak for themselves; a total of more than 22,000 were built, and we were called in on only 130 occasions- and in not all of those was the Spitfire at fault. If one considers that she was not a simple trainer built for ease of handling, there can be no doubt that the Spifire was a remarkably safe little aircraft."
To summarise:
There were 121 Spitfire crash investigations between 1941 and May 1945 involving serious structural failure:
22 aileron instability
46 pilot overstressed airframe
20 pilot error in cloud
13 misuse of oxygen system- pilot error
3 pilot blacked out
17 engine failure/fire
This would be correct as in July 1940 all Spit II were in the front line and only had 100 Octane.
Kurfurst's paper must date from around June 1941 when Spit II were being issued to training command who did use 87 Octane.
This might be of interest. It should be noted that the words are very similar to Kurfurst's paper. He did post a link once and there were some problems with the paper he put a link to.
Namely it was dated June 1940 but gave the instructions for firing 2 x 20mm and 4 x LMG or 8 x LMG. Also it had the details for both 87 and 100 Octane fuel.
In June 1940 the were no Spit IIB and they all had 100 Octane fuel.
The one I have posted is dated July 1940 and despite titled Spit IIa and IIb only gives the instructions for firing 8 x LMG. Also the fuel is only 100 Octane. This would be correct as in July 1940 all Spit II were in the front line and only had 100 Octane.
Kurfurst's paper must date from around June 1941 when Spit II were being issued to training command who did use 87 Octane.
Yet we have people using very select pieces of information to imply that the Spitfire was either inherently unsafe and/or accident prone.
I repeat, the selected paragraph from a report on Spitfire V crashes in 1942 is related to a very particular set of circumstances caused by poor maintenance at a squadron level. It is, in fact, evidence that Supermarine and the RAF were very actively engaged in solving the problem.