Bomber Command, World War II (1939-45); and the lies and corruptions of Geopolitics

[taly01]

Found this article about British Bomber Command in WW2, what interesting is the incredible expense Britain spent on its heavy bomber campaign. I always wondered how Britain managed to build some 16,000's 4 engine bombers and some 20,000 2 engine bombers.

Bomber Command, World War II (1939-45); and the lies and corruptions of Geopolitics

Regular readers will know that I have fairly recently become very interested in the aircraft of World Wars I and II - which is the re-ignit...

charltonteaching.blogspot.com

What I had not realized until recently was that strategic bombing was By Far the major British war effort and expenditure - dominating all RAF policy, consuming most of RAF expenditure, and using more resources than the entire British Army and Royal Navy put together!

Think about that for a moment...

I guess the Royal Navy had more expense but alot of ships were built pre-WW2.

 

[tomo pauk]

In the words of Jeremy Clarkson:
- Oh, no. Anyway...

 

[33k in the air]

That article seems to fall prey to the long-standing myth that all Bomber Command did was incendiary area raids on German cities. It did plenty of that, certainly, but it also bombed many other targets. Less than half the bomb tonnage dropped during the war by Bomber Command was done in area raids.

Nor does the article seem to take into account the direct and indirect effects the bombing had on the German economy. The campaign against the Ruhr from March through July 1943, for example, resulted in German war production stagnating for the subsequent seven months. German steel production from January 1943 through Sept. 1944 was 7.2% below what it would have otherwise been due to the effects of air raid alarms and air raid damage.

Of course the strategic bombing effort consumed an enormous amount of resources. But it was also the only tool the Allies had to strike directly at Germany until the second half of 1944.

 

[pbehn]

Regular readers of Bruce Charlton's tripe will know until recently he didnt know anything about WW1 and 2 but after discovering a few meaningless factoids that he doesnt source, he still doesnt. He sounds like another "Bomber Mafia" nut job. Bombing was the only interest of the RAF, home defence and the battle of the Atlantic was sub contracted to Iceland and Greenland, a new internet "FACT" that I am happy to share.

 

[taly01]

It piqued my interest in that the huge expense of a strategic bomber force for Britain is overlooked. One opposite is the enormous resources the Germans spent on Flak guns in response, i've seen it was something like ~10% of their war effort at times.

Great Britain's WW2 effort was mostly keeping convoys running across the Atlantic, bombing occupied Europe & Germany, and keeping the Mediterranean and Suez Canal open. The Mediterranean Campaign is shockingly neglected in modern British WW2 revisionism, where its all about Battle of Britain and D-Day.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

German civil labour force was around 36 million people which included nearly 6 million helping family members, mostly women, mostly farming. The USSBS noted the loss of German output due to area bombing was, 1942 to 1945, 2.5%, 9%, 17% and 6.5%. The British Bombing Survey Unit conclusions are roughly half of the USSBS figures, using the method of looking at output from unbombed towns and assuming they were independent of the bombed ones. Given all the economic connections that existed it meant the more effective area bombing became, that is causing more than dislocation in the bombed town, the less the calculated effect. The usually low level of damage and the slack in the German economy meant there were few major effects on war production before 1944.

There are no sources in the article, so where do the reported facts come from?

Personnel, British military strength kept growing for most of the war peak RAF 1,002,000 in June 1944, RN 783,000 and Army 2,920,000 in June 1945. The RAF passed RN strength by June 1940, in June 1944 there were 3.5 people in the Army+RN to 1 in the RAF. That is a lot of resources. Next we need to deduct Coastal and Fighter Commands, the 2nd Tactical Air Force in Europe, plus the RAF in the Middle East plus the RAF in the Far East etc. Bomber Command was a minority of RAF personnel and aircraft strength while being a majority of the most expensive aircraft. Bomber Command did around 392,000 sorties, Fighter+Coastal+Army Co-Operation Commands plus 2nd TAF did around 1,043,000 sorties. Then comes the rest of the RAF, in the Mediterranean around 160,000 tons of bombs dropped, Bomber Command 955,000 tons. Bomber Command had around 38,500 RAF personnel killed, out of 69,600 RAF killed during the war, a majority, otherwise it is under half the total RAF effort. So if Bomber Command was more than the other services, the RAF as a whole was more than twice the other services.

The British Bombing Survey Unit calculated Bomber Command absorbed 7% of British War Effort, less early, rising to 12% in the final 2.5 years. Even doubling that still leaves 75% to other war efforts, you would need to quadruple it to get to more than the Army+Navy. In million man years, Navy 3.24, Army 12.74, Air Force 4.87, then around 7.8 million man years producing equipment for the RAF, (including 2.7 worth of heavy bombers) meaning the RAF absorbed 28% of war effort. A nice calculation but it does not take into account things like fuel usage (including 100 octane was more expensive than 80 octane army fuel). Plenty of non British personnel were trained in places like Canada using aircraft paid for by Britain, including spare parts as another British cost but those personnel then served in RAF controlled units.

Certainly the RAF on average required the most trained personnel, the costliest equipment and the most resources per operation, so it was expensive in relative terms, where are the costings showing under half of it was so expensive?

Bomber Command did around 336,000 bombing sorties, it also did 18,700 mine sorties, the mining rated as quite effective, the bomb tonnage of 955,000 tons include 122,500 on troops and defences, 64,500 on V weapons, 97,900 on oil targets, 138,000 on transport, campaigns rated as effective, the biggest category was towns, 431,000 tons, the generally least effective strikes. So after deducting the campaigns that worked about half the tonnage dropped remains. Area bombing was not worth the cost for much of the war as the damage done was too diffuse to have a war impact, in the second half of 1944 that switched as the repair system was overwhelmed, minor production stopping damage had to wait its turn. It took until end September 1944 for Bomber Command to reach the half way point of bombs dropped on Germany.

The reported billion pounds spent by Britain on Air Raid Precautions would have paid for all the 4 engined bombers built.

Apparently there were undefined massive distortions in the WWII narrative done in the 1960's, Noble Frankland noted when the Bomber Command History came out in the early 1960's it was mainly criticised for being too harsh on the command, a decade later it was being criticised as being too easy. The 1970's were when Ultra first came out.

In the 1920's RAF planning assumed a hostile France, it was the only opponent around, in the second half of the 1930's it became Germany, initially from German bases, as far as I know the worst case scenario was from airfields in Belgium, fighter and bomber strengths and types were calculated accordingly, assuming a still active France, same for naval strength. In any case the RAF problem in mid 1940 was trained pilots, not fighter aircraft. The 1940 shipping crisis was for exactly the same reasons, France out of the war, hostile bases all along the European Atlantic Coast, including the need to hold forces in Britain for counter invasion duties. Lots of unescorted merchant ships sailing independently in the Atlantic.

The 1943 crisis was heavily escorted convoys being mauled by wolf packs, generally in the gap that existed between land based air cover from North America and that from Britain. Plugged by very long range aircraft, B-24, a type Bomber Command only used in small numbers in 1944/45 for counter measure sorties, plus more surface escorts and escort carriers. Churchill is on record saying the u-boat campaign really worrying him, then is supposed to think coastal command was unnecessary?

Given the web site views on science I assume it is pushing for pardons for anyone found guilty using forensics, avoiding modern medicine, including surgery, ignoring weather forecasts and not using modern vehicles given their new materials construction, at least. Science is research, you do the work and publish the results, here we have someone saying do not trust the researchers, presumably excluding themselves.

 

[pbehn]

It piqued my interest in that the huge expense of a strategic bomber force for Britain is overlooked.

Where did he quote a source for that? Bomber Command spent 2 pounds, three shillings and sixpence ha'penny in the whole war, less than the cost of a round of drinks in a good gentleman's club. There is another factoid without ack up to pique peoples interest. The auther wants to make points about the world today and re writes the past to do so. At the top of the article he says this "Bruce G Charlton. Anonymous comments are deleted without being read. Comments are moderated (pretty severely). Established commenters are privileged, but in general I only publish comments that I judge to contribute to the intended effect of the blog post." So he doesnt allow facts into the discussion.

 

[taly01]

Yes Bruce Carlton is a "character", thanks for the data Geoffrey I knew someone here would have some better researched facts about GB war costs.

 

[elbmc1969]

Where did he quote a source for that?

There has been a very good, detailed accounting analysis of Bomber Command. The infrastructure costs were staggering. I have the article somewhere, but digging it out is going to be a nightmare.

 

[pbehn]

There has been a very good, detailed accounting analysis of Bomber Command. The infrastructure costs were staggering. I have the article somewhere, but digging it out is going to be a nightmare.

That is OK, I will wait.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey elbmc1969,

Is this the article/paper you are referring to?

 

[elbmc1969]

I believe it's this: https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/664

I don't know if there's a revised version.

 

[ThomasP]

Same document I believe, just a different file name.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The Thesis idea is Britain had a world leading aviation industry pre WWII, profitable, then Britain spent lots of money on the war and made a mess of the aviation industry along with the country. The theme seems rather wrong, a lot of good material in the thesis but it comes with limits. Costings are shaky, but probably underestimate the cost of British built aircraft. Odd that the thesis uses Bomber Command War Diaries for statistics when the official ones are around in the histories the thesis quotes.

Some simple notes, Minor point 893 is British military aircraft production for Britain in 1935, it excludes exports and civil types.

"The analysis in this thesis shows that Bomber Command's share of the expenditure was at least £2.78 billion. This amount equated to 9.4 percent of total British government spending during World War II and 12.1 percent of her spending on defence during that time." Which is in line with the BBSU numbers, 7% early, 12% in the final 2.5 years. The thesis adds things like cost of fuels, loss of agricultural production to the figures.

"However, £2.78 billion was equivalent to 46.77 percent of total British government expenditure outside of defence" That comes across as a shock figure, similar percentages could be made for other branches of the military.

"In 1945, the aircraft factories, bomber airfields and all of the personnel and services created to operate and sustain them, began the process of decommissioning, closing and scrapping. They were not to contribute to the future economic welfare of the country" What does Castle Bromwich make these days, similar for the other factories, plus the occasional airfield, providing a pool of trained people, like mechanics and aircrew the civil system drew on post WWII

"The real importance lies in the potential distortion of the British economy that the size of the investment in strategic bombing may have caused. This distortion may help in explaining Britain's poor economic performance in the decades following the end of the war." So 12% of war expenditure does that sort of thing? How about the other 88%? Or the loss of so much merchant shipping with the rise of the US fleet? The loss of London as financial capital of the world? The move to the US Dollar as the world currency? All those invisible imports from transactions, insurance, shipping fees etc. gone. The damage done in air raids, the deliberate decisions to under maintain things?

"The only apparent loser in the arrangement appears to have been the British taxpayer who funded the aeronautical research and design that the firms were then exporting for profit." An interesting statement, presumably the British aircraft firms only did such work when paid for by the government and then used the results for their civil designs. The US it is supposed to be private sector.

"Boeing's B-17 and the A.V. Roe's Lancaster were similar aircraft but the price of the B-17 was more than twice that of its British counterpart. This discrepancy cannot be explained by profiteering or a lack of efficiency on the part of Boeing. Most likely it is due to the price of the Boeing aircraft being a more realistic appraisal of the true cost of production" The thesis uses $US4.25 dollars to the pound. Statistical Digest 1944 B-17 48,100 pounds, B-26 45,275 pounds. Thesis says 64,637 and 53,411 pounds. The Statistical Digest says the B-25 33,500 pounds. The Digest is fly away from factory, modification centres were expensive. "the average price paid by the MAP for a Lancaster during World War II was £31,985" get the impression that may not include some items? Post war the British were quoting 37-40,000 for a Lancaster I. 25-26,000 pounds for a Wellington. The thesis "Wellington at £20,606" cost to MAP. The 1941 budgets had a Lancaster at between 41,400 to 43,600 pounds depending in factory, a Wellington 26,400 pounds. The Harry Holmes figure of 58,974 pounds for a Lancaster translates to over $250,000. Avro are reported to have taken around 80,000 worker hours to build the first Lancasters, down to 20,000 hours in 1945.

"The price quoted for the Packard Merlin during World War II by the USAF Museum is $US25,000." USAAF average price for P-51 Engine, 28-Feb-43 $17,558, 31-Jul-44 $17,328, 31-Aug-44 $17,545, 30-Nov-44 $17,558

A pricing question is what was paid for, given Government Furnished Equipment made up a fifth to a quarter the price of a B-17. It would appear like the shipping industry the US was prepared to pay a premium for rapid delivery of output, paying for second and third shifts and weekend work in a way Britain did not or could not do.

Apparently as late as the Hampden, Wellington and Blenheim France was the target, hence them being short range tactical aircraft. The Luftwaffe was subordinate to the Army. Bombing restrictions lifted once Churchill became Prime Minister, not the 10 May attack on Belgium, Holland and France, and Bomber Command hit German targets on the night of 10 May.

"OBOE, a tight radar beam that the attacking force flew along to the target." No.

The Gotha bombings in WWI seem to have caused 25 casualties per ton of bombs dropped. The 1930's RAF estimates for WWII upped that to 50, no idea how the figure was calculated. The British report 3,531 V-1 eluded the defences of which 2,419 reached London 24,165 people killed or seriously wounded, 1,115 V-2 arrivals, including 61 off shore caused 9,277 killed or seriously wounded, no data on slightly wounded.

"I will argue, shows that the British aircraft industry was highly efficient, ably managed and a commercial success between the wars. Instead, after 1945, the relative decline of Britain as an aircraft manufacturer was due to the nation's bankruptcy caused by the cost of the war." The pre war US industry was more successful, mostly civil, not military, making it more sustainable, post war they sold 35,000 civil aircraft in 1946. Sales then halved every year for the next 3. Apparently the increasing cost and complexity of designs had nothing to do with the decreasing number of aircraft firms, nor the problems with the Comet and other airliner and transport designs have anything to do with Britain not creating a large post war aviation industry.

"Yet, by 1935, Britain was operating three metal bi-plane aircraft, the Fairey Swordfish, Gloster Gladiator and the Gloster Gauntlet, as frontline combat aircraft." Beyond the obvious that all were fabric covered, not all metal, Gauntlet first production January 1935, Gladiator February 1937, Swordfish February 1936.

"For political reasons, the Air Ministry ordered some aircraft types such as the Fairey Battle, Blenheim, Whitley and the Hampden" Political reasons? The Blenheim swings between terrible and wonderful in the thesis.

Beaverbrook ordered the construction of 4 underground factories, therefore add around 2 million pounds to the cost of Bomber Command.

"Of the aluminium used by the aircraft industry, it is reasonable to say that Bomber Command consumed 794,000 tons,", 15 short tons of aluminium per airframe, around 53,000 four engined bombers. Britain's total structural weight of aircraft produced 1935 to 1945 is put at 362,000 short tons, not all of that would be aluminium, but there is spares production.

"At its peak in June/July of 1943, the Air Ministry and MAP had approximately 3,619,500 civilian workers under their direct or indirect control" which the thesis states is about twice other estimates, as it is counting workers those other estimates do not. Total civil workforce 17,444,000, how the calculation is done is unclear, there is no aviation industry sub heading in the UK Statistical Digest. You can largely remove Agriculture and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Textiles, Clothing, Food, Leather, Electricity, Banking, Government, Civil defence etc. as the RAF was 1 million out of under 50 million in Britain. Metals, Engineering, Vehicles and Shipbuilding total 4,659 million, 574,000 Chemical industry, 170,000 building supplies, 726,000 construction, 123,000 other manufacturers, about 6,250,000 workers.

"British aircraft firms and enabled some of them to dominate the world aircraft industry by exporting British government technology for profit." The examples are things like the Bristol Jupiter, essentially the pre depression British aviation industry, once it overcame the post WWI shock is supposed to remain leading edge all the way to 1940, the RAF aircraft mix in 1940 is due to the British designing to fight France, not Germany. Failure of thinking, not technology etc.

Prices seems to be from two sources, nothing on for example the prices paid for US Aircraft ordered pre Lend Lease. Lost agricultural production caused by the airfields assumes all land taken over was suitable for crop growing. Every Mosquito was a bomber, so was every Halifax and Stirling. While Whitley etc. service in Coastal Command not considered, and lots more. Costings logic seems sound but I am no accountant trained in accrual methods, but not a lot of good cost data and some rather big errors elsewhere. For all the opportunity cost mentions nothing on deploying Bomber Command resources to say Coastal Command or the Middle East, or what other military force would have been more cost effective, nothing on how much the USAAF used RAF developed equipment and experience and what that meant to the war.

 

[Jugman]

Mr. Faye had a conclusion in search evidence. His assertion that "America did not dominate aero-engine manufacture in the continental United States, let alone in the world market." is so ludicrous and demonstrably false that I can not take anything he writes seriously. His comparison of the Type 142 to the DC-2 is another example of mental gymnastics.

 

[Jabberwocky]

Holey Moley was that ever a tough read. Perhaps the forum could do a collective and comprehensive rebuttal?

One of my (least) favourite parts was in the comments by Mr Charlton.

"The four-engined US Flying Fortresses and Liberators were only marginally "heavy" bombers, since their bomb capacity was limited by their multi-gun armament, many crew, and protective armour. The two-man, twin-engined, unarmed, "wooden-wonder" Mosquito could carry more bombs - *much* faster - than a Flying Fortress, and with fewer casualties."


Per USAAF in service testing documentation, the B-17B had a useful (internal) bomb load of 4,800 lbs (consisting of 8 x 600lb GP bombs). It had a standard range of 2,400 miles with an internal load of 4,000 lbs. The B-17B is in squadron service by July 1939.

B-17 bomb load capabilities improved substantially through the war. Most notably with the lengthened B-17E and then higher weight and higher powered B-17F.

By the time the Mosquito was flying in prototype form in November 1941, the B-17E was already seeing combat service. This variant was capable of handling an 8,000 lb internal bombload - either 8 x 1,000 lbs GP bombs or 4 x 2000 lbs GP bombs - albeit at some cost in range.

Dedicated bomber Mosquitos entered service in 1942 with an internal load of 4 x 500 lb bombs. It wasn't until variants with two stage Merlin engines and the bulged belly modification were put into service in the middle of 1943 that the option of either 6 x 500 lb (four internal, two on the wings) or a single 4,000 lb 'cookie' became available.

The standard bomb loads for the B-17G (the most common wartime variant, and most common variant in the ETO) operating in Europe were:

2 x 2000 lb GP bombs
2 x 2000 lb GP bombs and either 2 x 500 lb GP bombs or 2 x 1000 lb GP bombs
6 x 1,000 lb GP bombs
6 x 1,600 lb AP bombs
8 or 10 x 1000 lb AP bombs
12 x 500 lb GP bombs
16 x 250 lb GP bombs

From the USAAF Statistical Digest, the average bomb load per sorties for B-17s in the 8th AF was 5,140 lbs and the B-24 average 5,320 lbs.

Meanwhile, bomber and pathfinder Mosquitos averaged about 2,385 lbs per sortie.

The USAAF credits the B-17G a maximum wartime bomb load of 17,600 lbs.

The RAF's B-17 Fortress II data sheets give a maximum bomb load of 12,800 lbs (8 x 1,600 lb AP bombs), with an option for 2 x 1,000 lb on the wings. That's a total of 14,800 lb, or more than three times the maximum bomb load of the Mosquito.

According to the same RAF data sheets, the standard internal maximum bomb load for their Fortresses was either 8,800 lb (Mk IIA) or 9,600 lb (Mk III). Both with a range of 1,640 miles.

So, yes. The B-17/B-24 were true heavy bombers. And, no. The Mosquito did not carry more bombs than a B-17.

 

[Shortround6]

The B-17B is in squadron service by July 1939.

This is not quite right. The first B-17B was delivered to the Air Corp in July 1939. It took until March 1940 to get all 39 built/delivered. None had power turrets.

However in Jan 1940 the British heavy bomber squadrons were equipped Wellington MK Is, IAs, ICs and Whitley's of 6 different types, 3 of which were not suited for over water flights, the first 160 built. The first 80 Whitley's (MK I & II) were in training units at the outbreak of the war.

Some "historians" (NOT Jabberwocky) seem to indulge in selective time travel in addition to selective/creative interpretation of their facts.

 

[ThomasP]

re

. . . the B-17E was already seeing combat service. This variant was capable of handling an 8,000 lb internal bombload - either 8 x 1,000 lbs GP bombs or 4 x 2000 lbs GP bombs - albeit at some cost in range.

Hey Jabberwocky,

I believe the B-17E/F/G could only carry 6x 1000 lb HE internally, as there was no room for more. The other 2x 1000 lb HE had to be carried under the wings.

Also, I believe the same arrangement was necessary for the 4x 2000 lb HE bomb load - ie 2x in the bomb bay and 2x under the wings.

The chart below is from a manual for the early-production B-17E, and shows the bomb rack arrangement for the B-17C/D and early E. It allows a maximum internal bomb load of only about 4800 lb.

The chart below is from an early B-17F manual, and gives an idea of the internal space limitations based on the diameter of the bombs. It has the 1600 lb AP bomb rack locations, which obviously could have carried the 1000 lb AP bomb also. Note however, that the 6x inner rack stations for the 1600 lb AP bombs are different than for the later 'standard' bomb rack arrangement (I have no idea why). Although the B-17F as it entered service was capable of carrying bombs on under-wing racks, they are not shown for the purposes of this diagram.

The chart below is the 'standard' bomb rack arrangement for vast majority of the the B-17F/G, and includes the underwing racks.

The 1000 lb AP and 1600 lb AP bombs were not in service when the B-17E entered service (though maybe the bomb racks were changed on later production airframes, or retrofitted to match the early F model?) and I do not think the external bomb racks were fitted.

I have never been able to find B-17F/G bomb rack charts that show either 8x 1000 lb HE internally or 4x 2000 lb bombs internally.

Have you or anyone else found such diagrams showing a different arrangement that allowed either the 8x 1000 lb HE or 4x 2000 lb to be carried internally? I would be very interested.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Notes on the thesis BRITAIN 1939-1945: THE ECONOMIC COST OF STRATEGIC BOMBING by John T Fahey at Britain 1939-1945: The economic cost of strategic bombing A number of URL references it contains do not work any more. The thesis findings on page 3 are that the strategic air offensive cost Britain £2.78 billion, in fact it is the thesis calculated price to build, maintain and use RAF Bomber Command during World War II, which is not the same thing, as countries like Canada and the United States helped pay costs and Bomber Command did more than strategic bombing.

"John Fahey's doctoral thesis, as are all such tertiary level theses at Sydney University, was marked by three examiners, two internationals and someone within Australia, all of whom were experts in the field and on whose judgements the university relied."

The attached spreadsheet is a working one, the notes sheet in particular meant as data points, not a coherent story and includes points discarded from the message sent about the thesis, a copy of which is in the email page. And some of the sheets contain different data to the what the sheet title says.

As with every work there are a number of obvious minor factual errors or typos. The major problems are as follows,
1) If an aircraft type served in Bomber Command then all production of that type are charged to Bomber Command.
2) All wartime constructed factory space was abandoned post war and no cost allowance for factories that produced more than bombers
3) Fuel weight is listed as heavier than water, over 10 pounds per imperial gallon, not the around 7.2 pounds it did weigh.
4) Fuel lost at sea calculation is a wartime average, but most tankers lost early, most fuel used late, as well all British tankers are considered lost loaded, inbound to UK. Fuel consumption figures in the UK include USAAF but the thesis does not seem to know that.
5) The thesis has entries for spare parts and wages then charges 100% of average aircraft cost for repairs as a separate item.
6) Aluminium, thesis £11.2 pounds per ton, US WWII Aluminium prices fixed at $0.15 per pound, $336/£82 per long ton. And does not explain how Bomber Command alone absorbed 80% of all UK production and imports.
7) The very different title to the work compared with what it actually reports.

On page 456 the thesis "Bomber Command resulted in the deaths of a considerable proportion of the 410,000 German and 60,000 Italian civilians killed by Allied bombing raids" Officially Bomber Command dropped 9,089 long tons of bombs on Italian targets, considerable proportion would mean anything from 3 to 6 deaths per ton of bombs. The USAAF in the Mediterranean report dropping 276,312 short tons, or 246,700 long tons on Italy, around 27 times as much, with the thesis having none of their aviators killed, since the deaths ratio only counts the 8th Air Force, not the 12th or 15th Air Forces. The Bomber Command War Diaries, used by the thesis, tries to give civilian casualties by raid, no attempt seems to have been made to report the diary casualty figures for Italy. There had been 259 tons of bombs dropped to end February 1942 then another 31 nights of raids to total.

It is widely understood Bomber Command killed more people in Germany than the USAAF mostly due to the firestorm raids, all up 657,674 long tons of bombs to the USAAF 572,500 long tons. Arthur Harris published a table of around 70 German towns attacked giving their total area of 102,745 acres of which 50,327 claimed destroyed, so a cost per acre figure can be calculated. The pre war populations of the towns was around 22,800,000

The good work in the thesis on costs is badly undermined by other sections, incorrect figures and flawed logic, which the education system failed to detect and has left for the world to see.

 

[33k in the air]

I have never been able to find B-17F/G bomb rack charts that show either 8x 1000 lb HE internally or 4x 2000 lb bombs internally.

6 x 1,000 lb GP bombs or 8 x 1,000 lb SAP bombs. SAP bombs had a narrower diameter hence why two more could be fitted onto the rack stations.