Just to clarify, my point about the P-39 was not to suggest that it could have made an escort fighter, even with auxiliary tanks (which were to be external, not sure if they were to be disposable without double checking), but that the American leadership constantly dropped the ball on the concept of auxiliary fuel tanks.
While it's true that by and large the Americans accepted the British position, that no single engine aircraft could be developed to provide an escort fighter, it was something that was discussed time and time again through the 1930s. The lack of clarity in thinking to which I referred was the inevitable fall back position, essentially that the bombers were capable of defending themselves, despite mounting evidence that this was not so.
It took until 1943 for the USAAF to finally accept this harsh reality and it very nearly derailed the American contribution to the combined bomber offensive at a time when it was not exactly going well for the British either. It took even longer for the first US fighters in Europe to be fitted operationally with drop tanks in meaningful numbers. The first was a matter of the obstinacy that Slessor had noted in Washington, the second is far less excusable as there were opportunities to develop such systems long before the US even entered the war.
Cheers
Steve
While it's true that by and large the Americans accepted the British position, that no single engine aircraft could be developed to provide an escort fighter, it was something that was discussed time and time again through the 1930s. The lack of clarity in thinking to which I referred was the inevitable fall back position, essentially that the bombers were capable of defending themselves, despite mounting evidence that this was not so.
It took until 1943 for the USAAF to finally accept this harsh reality and it very nearly derailed the American contribution to the combined bomber offensive at a time when it was not exactly going well for the British either. It took even longer for the first US fighters in Europe to be fitted operationally with drop tanks in meaningful numbers. The first was a matter of the obstinacy that Slessor had noted in Washington, the second is far less excusable as there were opportunities to develop such systems long before the US even entered the war.
Cheers
Steve