Bomber offensive vs. Gemany: you are in charge

[mhuxt]

Are the spreadsheets available on-line?

Pretty sure I posted them here tomo, though IIRC they were graphs (?)

Will see if I can find them on photobucket again.

I see the site supports posts in zip format, might be able to stick the whole things up as zip, disguising the .xls files inside.

 

[mhuxt]

I think they might have been these:

 

[stona]

Sure the loss of 8/19 is unsustainable, but it was a special mission so a higher loss rate is to be expected.

Why so? Other specialised raids did not suffer such huge losses, the Lancasters involved in attacking the Tirpitz ("Catechism") did not. Even the Mosquitos attacking Amiens ("Jericho") lost only 2 of the 13 who actually got their. At Copenhagen ("Carthage") things didn't go so well overall,particularly if you were a Danish schoolchild,but they still only lost 4 of 18(?) Escort losses not included.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

Thank you very much, mhuxt
Good idea to put all the xls into a folder and then to zip them, so they could be posted here..

 

[pbfoot]

Did theyhave the wherewithall to actually do anything about it when they were being constructed?

From page 413 "the Right of the Line RAF in the European Air War 1939-45"
"Work had begun as early as January 1941on the building of massive bomb proof Uboat shelters at Brest, Lorient,St Nazaire and L Pallice excavations for these were carried out between Jan and April and more excavations for further groups of pens in July and August > all thgis had been duly observed and its progress monitored month by month by Photo Reconnaissance . It was the sight of these massive preparations which alarmed Coastal Command and prompted Jouberts requests They had this further point
""The foundation work done behind caissions which kept the sea water out was highly vunerable to blast bombing and the subsequent erection was susceptible to grave delays by air attack until the massive roof was in place after which bombing became useless . At this stage (july41) few roofs were in position and much foundation work was still in at the vunerable stage . By January 42 the pens at Brest and Lorient and the majority of those at St Nazaire and La Pallice had passed the stage at which interference from bombing was likeley""
To surmise what is written prior and after this article is that Bomber Command thought the U boat menace was overblown and that the bombers would be better used in hitting the facilities where the materials of war were being made
I repeat by previous statement that Harris was the second coming of Haig

 

[Hop]

In 1941 the head of Bomber Command was Richard Peirse. Harris didn't take over until February 1942.

Even Peirse did not have the power to decide targeting priorities. That was decided at the highest levels, between the air staff and the war cabinet. From March to July 1941 the number 1 priority for Bomber Command was to aid in the battle against U boats and Luftwaffe maritime aircraft.

From The Bomber Command War Diaries:

The Prime Minister issued a simple instruction. For the next four months, Bomber Command's main operational effort was to be directed against those targets which housed the sources of the threats to British shipping.

The Air Ministry passed on these orders to Bomber Command in a directive dated 9 March 1941. The initial emphasis was on the U-Boat and long-range aircraft threats. The directive repeated Churchill's own words: 'We must take the offensive against the U-boat and the Focke-Wulf wherever we can and whenever we can. The U-boat at sea must be hunted, the U boat in the building yard or in dock must be bombed. The Focke-Wulf, and other bombers employed against our shipping, must be attacked in the air and in their nests. There was a list of targets: Kiel, with three U boat shipbuilding yards. Hamburg, with two yards, Bremen and Vegesack, each with one yard; the cities of Mannheim and Augsburg with their marine diesel engine factories (Augsbrug was soon removed from the list because of its extreme range for the approaching shorter nights,): Dessau and Bremen again with aircraft factories,; Lorient, St Nazaire and Bordeaux with their U boat bases,; the Focke Wulf Kondor airfields at Stavanger in Norway and Merignax near Bordeaux. The Air Ministry did secure one concession; Sir Richard Peirse was allowed to devote a proportion of the operational effort on the old oil targets.

Sir Richard Peirse was not happy to be taken off the strategic bombing of Germany just when he felt that his force was on the verge of potential success in the improving weather of spring

Harris was Pierse's successor as head of Bomber Command. The head of Bomber Command did not make policy. That was decided by politicians with input from the heads of the forces, ie it was decided several levels above the head of Bomber Command. And Harris was not even head of BC when these decisions were taken.

Of course from July 1941 the priority changed again. The biggest threat was now that the Germans would defeat the Soviets, the priority was for BC to disrupt transport within Germany.

Again from The Bomber Command War Diaries:

During the moon period of each month, the bombers were to be sent to a ring of targets around the Ruhr - Hamm, Osnabruck, Soest, Schwerte, Cologne, Duisburg and Dusseldorf - the destruction of whose railway installations should isolate the Ruhr and prevent war materials being moved from that large industrial area to Germany's fighting fronts. Inland waterway targets were also listed. On nights with no moon the bombers were directed to attack the general city areas of Cologne, Dusseldorf and Duisburg which, all being situated on the distinctive Rhine, should be the easiest targets to find on dark nights.

and

The only minor diversion from raids on Germany was the requirement to pay occasional visits to U Boat bases in France and to the German warships in Brest Harbour

It's easy to make an argument for attacking this or that target. The problem at the time is there were so many valuable targets and so few bombers to attack them. There was also very little experience about what worked and what didn't, and how much bombing was required to have a decisive effect.

 

[Shortround6]

Will you please stop insulting Haig!

 

[wuzak]

And what aircraft were available at the time?

Certainly there were no Lancasters available in 1941.

 

[tomo pauk]

Dunno how/if the web site (World War 2 Bombers ) is a relaible source, but here it goes:

In July 1941 Bomber Command had 732 operational bombers. There were 253 Wellington, 40 Halifax, and 24 Stirling bombers, but the other 415 bombers were of types which were phased out by 1943

The 'other 415 bombers' should be Whitleys and Hampden, at least most of them?

 

[Vincenzo]

just try to check for squadron
455th Hampden
408th Hampden
405th Wellington
311th Wellington
305th Wellington
304th Wellington
301st Wellington
300th Wellington
226th Blenheim
218th Wellington
214th Wellington
207th Hampden
150th Wellington
149th Wellington
144th Hampden
142nd Wellington
139th Blenheim
115th Wellington
114th Blenheim
110th Blenheim
107th Blenheim
106th Hampden
105th Blenheim
104th Wellington
103rd Wellington
102nd Whitley
101st Wellington

99th Wellington
97th Hampden
90th Fortress
88th Boston
83rd Hampden
82nd Blenheim
78th Whitley
77th Whitley
76th Halifax
75th Wellington
61st Manchester
58th Whitley
57th Wellington
51st Whitley
50th Hampden
49th Hampden
44th Hampden
40th Wellington
35th Halifax
21st Blenheim
18th Blenheim
15th Blenheim
12th Wellington
10th Whitley
9th Wellington
7th Sterling


from rafcommands

 

[pbfoot]

It's easy to make an argument for attacking this or that target. The problem at the time is there were so many valuable targets and so few bombers to attack them. There was also very little experience about what worked and what didn't, and how much bombing was required to have a decisive effect.

You gotta start some where and what they were attacking was a poor choice. Remember the UK was hungry and needed supplies of all sorts so its seems to me it would be a priority to safeguard your lines of communications .
"in a letter to the CAS dated 4 july among proposals for coooperation between 3 RAF Commands in the sea war (Joubert)put forward the suggestion that Bomber Command should take each U-Boat operating base in turn and reduce it to the condition of Plymouth had been left in after the recent 5 days raids by the LW. Sir Philip prviously sant a draft of this letter to the AOC -in_Bomber Command who had replied that he was firmly convinced that a better employment of his limited force was on objectives in Germany and. though he realised that his bombing effort must be deflected from their primary role in order to attck the major naval units in Brest he could not agree to include the U boat Biscay bases > These views were accepted by the CAS"
Muddlers and if you think that I'm pointing at the Brits for muddlers we had the best muddler of all in WW1 Sam Hughes the man that put himself in for 2 VCs in the Boer War

 

[Gixxerman]

You gotta start some where and what they were attacking was a poor choice.

Perhaps but we have to remember that hindsight is a wonderful thing.

Back then many if not most still believed (even on the British side when you might have thought the recent BoB experience would have educated the powers that be otherwise) that you could destroy a populations will to fight erode the popular support of the Gov in charge.
All it took was just enough concentrated effort......and when that didn't do it it became a matter of enough occasions of concentrated effort ought to do it and so on and so forth.
The 1930's 'bomber will always get through' (and attendant ideas about the total collapse of of society etc etc) were deeply engrained.

IIRC Speer (or was it Goring?) is quoted as saying that they wouldn't have been able to take many more Hamburg type raids.
It turned out to be untrue but it does illustrate the hold that sort of thinking had on all sides, at least in the western European theatre.

 

[pbfoot]

Perhaps but we have to remember that hindsight is a wonderful thing.

Back then many if not most still believed (even on the British side when you might have thought the recent BoB experience would have educated the powers that be otherwise) that you could destroy a populations will to fight erode the popular support of the Gov in charge.
.

I agree but it quickly became apparent during thr BoB that it didn't work unless you are of a mind that the Germans didn't have the same fortuitude as the Brits

 

[Gixxerman]

Absolutely not pbfoot.
I am merely saying that wheneach side had very recent good reason experience to drop those ideas neither were able to do so.
The old certainties can take a very long time to fall away.
Hence my comment about hindsight.
These were not pig-headed stupid people, just people of their time (proved by the fact that it applies to both sides).

 

[tomo pauk]

Sure enough, we here can use the hindsight.
What about the planners of the ww2 era? The British knew that the only way the Germans threatened them in WWI was via the submarines. That is despite the fact the subs had to travel far greater distances to position themselves west of Ireland. What should be expected now, with French coast providing the Germans with better locations for their subs?
The Brits also have had the 1st hand experience that even a major bomber offensive is not likely to bring a strong defender to sue for peace. When take a look into geography, the LW was far closer to it's intended targets, than it was the case for air forces operating from UK vs. German-held Europe. So the campaign aimed against those bases doesn't seem to me as one based on hindsight from 21st century.
BTW, the sub bases pens in construction would've been far better targets than those deep inland, both during the day (esp. after April 1941, when LW shifts most of their assets East MTO), and during the night (easier to navigate, plus some flares dropping FAA-style). Being on the French shore line makes the bombers far less within the envelope of Flak fighters.
It would also forces LW to make some 'interesting' choices - if they want to defend the bases better, some of the fighters need to be recalled from East MTO, while the Flak forces need some re-shuffling. If the Germans decide to abandon the bases/pens there, that's a major blow for their operations.

 

[Gixxerman]

I'm not so sure it was so cut dried as that tomo pauk.

I just don't see how the RAF could do it with the tools available in '41.
In daylight they would be cut to pieces and at night they cannot hope to have the accuracy the then (medium) bomber force would require.
They are a long way off of the 1000 bomber type raid that could saturate the (fairly small) area with bombs.

 

[tomo pauk]

I've quoted the source giving the number of 732 bombers for the RAF in mid 1941. Seem to me as a force quite able to saturate the target.
The navigation is far easier than what was needed to find something in Germany proper, with the coastline aiding the attacker.
As for daylight attack, historically RAF was mounting the daylight attacks with strong fighter forces, but small bomber forces, managing to achieve the upper hand in Channel around, within the range of it's fighters of course. Germans aided there by relocating the bulk of their forces into East MTO by Spring/Summer of 1941. So the 200 LW fighters would be defending against the, say, 600 bombers plus 500-600 fighters? Tough luck, Luftwaffe, this time you need to attack the bombers, not to pick when to fight and when not.

 

[Shortround6]

What was lacking was the doctrine to allow the "integration" of the forces. The distance from Plymouth to Brest is about the same as from Ipswich to Rotterdam. It wouldn't have taken much of a drop tank or auxiliary Tank for Spitfires to escort bombers in daylight to Brest. I believe the British were fooling around with Auxiliary tanks on the MK II Spitfire.
Brest is also rather isolated being either as far west as Plymouth if not a shade further. It is further from Brest to Amiens than it is from Plymouth to Norwich.

The "tools" in the form of technology existed. The opportunity existed. What did not exist was the doctrine, planning and training to allow for such combined operations. Rhubarbs and such not withstanding. Using 4-6 bombers as "bait" to try to lure the Germans Up for a fighter battle is not the same as using large numbers of bombers and fighters with different cruise speeds and altitudes to actual try to bomb a target to destruction with the fighters acting as a true escort rather than the primary force with a few attached bombers damaging whatever they happened to hit.

 

[Gixxerman]

I've quoted the source giving the number of 732 bombers for the RAF in mid 1941. Seem to me as a force quite able to saturate the target.

Fair point......but how many of those 732 would be servicable at any one time?

I agree a coastal target should be a help in navigation but even so given the errors lack of accuracy I have my doubts that sufficient damage could be achieved in the short window of opportunity.
I could also imagine several LW units being pulled back (especially given the apparant easy victories at the start of the Russian campaign) for the necessary 6mths or so needed to get the U-boat pens to a state of construction where the bombing became ineffective.

On a side note, I remember being told some time ago that the Germans used a special type of conrete mix for those pens and that the concrete actually became stronger over time, does anyone know if this is just myth or true?

Shortround6 makes a good point too, the RAF bomber force was far from trained for this sort of massed raid we're imagining.

 

[tyrodtom]

On a side note, I remember being told some time ago that the Germans used a special type of conrete mix for those pens and that the concrete actually became stronger over time, does anyone know if this is just myth or true.

That's true with all concrete. I gets about 90% of it's full strenght in about 30 days, when properly cured, and gets stronger the older it gets , if properly cared for.