Jabberwocky
Staff Sergeant
This was a long post, but I'll cut it down to the highlights.
For the RAF:
1. Better crew training, with emphasis on night flying, more flying hours and navigation. Increased specialisation within the RAF for crew members
2. Two thirds reduction in daylight bombing raids and one third reduction in night raids in 1941, in favour of more aircraft and sending experienced pilots/navigators/gunners to training OTUs
3. OTU training increased to a minimum of 12 weeks
4. More resources to weather forecasting, particularly on prevailing winds
5. Earlier adoption of navigation aids – GEE and Oboe could be put into service at least 6-8 months prior to historical introduction, allowing their use from mid to late 1941
6. Earlier formation of dedicated pathfinding force – initially with Hampdens then with Mosquitos
7. Better reconnaissance and post-strike assessment by the RAF – more FC assets diverted to recon, systematic bomb damage assessment done with target cameras and post strike recon
8. Development of MC (40-50% charge to weight) and HC (70-80% c-t-w) bombs earlier in the war
9. Development of better target marking bombs – larger (500-2000 lbs) illumination and parachute flares and target marking devices with more predictable drop characteristics
10. Improved target selection – greater concentration on oil, electricity and transportation hubs and the aircraft industry, at the expense of dehousing and 'morale' targets
11. Increased mining operations
12. Earlier establishment of dedicated radio and radar countermeasures teams
13. Earlier adoption of night fighter intruder operations
14. Earlier development of drop tanks for the Spitfire V
Generally, I foresee a much less operationally active BC during 1941. Raids would be cut be about 50%, in favour of BC building up its reserves of trained manpower and newer aircraft and introducing new technologies and bombing techniques. The OTUs would be expanded by at least 40-50%, allowing active squadrons to concentrate on actual bombing instead of training.
The daylight campaign is limited to strikes against small targets in France and the Low Countries that would be too difficult or small to strike at night. This would include German naval and submarine bases, French transport hubs and Luftwaffe air bases.
When BC does bomb daylight targets, it does so with concentrations of greater significance. Circus raids are not limited to 6-20 bombers, but larger formations of at least 40-50 aircraft, escorted by appropriately large numbers of fighters. Raid results are properly assessed and targets, particularly day/night fighter airfields, are bomb repeatedly.
For the RAF:
1. Better crew training, with emphasis on night flying, more flying hours and navigation. Increased specialisation within the RAF for crew members
2. Two thirds reduction in daylight bombing raids and one third reduction in night raids in 1941, in favour of more aircraft and sending experienced pilots/navigators/gunners to training OTUs
3. OTU training increased to a minimum of 12 weeks
4. More resources to weather forecasting, particularly on prevailing winds
5. Earlier adoption of navigation aids – GEE and Oboe could be put into service at least 6-8 months prior to historical introduction, allowing their use from mid to late 1941
6. Earlier formation of dedicated pathfinding force – initially with Hampdens then with Mosquitos
7. Better reconnaissance and post-strike assessment by the RAF – more FC assets diverted to recon, systematic bomb damage assessment done with target cameras and post strike recon
8. Development of MC (40-50% charge to weight) and HC (70-80% c-t-w) bombs earlier in the war
9. Development of better target marking bombs – larger (500-2000 lbs) illumination and parachute flares and target marking devices with more predictable drop characteristics
10. Improved target selection – greater concentration on oil, electricity and transportation hubs and the aircraft industry, at the expense of dehousing and 'morale' targets
11. Increased mining operations
12. Earlier establishment of dedicated radio and radar countermeasures teams
13. Earlier adoption of night fighter intruder operations
14. Earlier development of drop tanks for the Spitfire V
Generally, I foresee a much less operationally active BC during 1941. Raids would be cut be about 50%, in favour of BC building up its reserves of trained manpower and newer aircraft and introducing new technologies and bombing techniques. The OTUs would be expanded by at least 40-50%, allowing active squadrons to concentrate on actual bombing instead of training.
The daylight campaign is limited to strikes against small targets in France and the Low Countries that would be too difficult or small to strike at night. This would include German naval and submarine bases, French transport hubs and Luftwaffe air bases.
When BC does bomb daylight targets, it does so with concentrations of greater significance. Circus raids are not limited to 6-20 bombers, but larger formations of at least 40-50 aircraft, escorted by appropriately large numbers of fighters. Raid results are properly assessed and targets, particularly day/night fighter airfields, are bomb repeatedly.
