Bomber offensive vs. Gemany: you are in charge

[Tante Ju]

I've said it before and I'll say it again. We should be asking what all those graphs and histograms representing German production might have looked like had there been no bombing.

The point is valid and IIRC USSBS shows that plans were not nearly met during the heaviest bombing. This probably had other reasons as well (lack of material or cease of alloys from import, lack of workers, optimistic planning etc.).

The bottomline however is that German did not have a lack of weapons, they in fact had a large surplus in the midst of heaviest bombing towards end of the war. There bottlenecks were manpower to man it (this was shared by many others, esp. UK and surprisingly - USSR), and fuel to drive it.

If production would be less hard hit the Germans would likely produce more - but again in all likelyhood, it would just end up storage.

 

[Glider]

The point is valid and IIRC USSBS shows that plans were not nearly met during the heaviest bombing. This probably had other reasons as well (lack of material or cease of alloys from import, lack of workers, optimistic planning etc.).

The bottomline however is that German did not have a lack of weapons, they in fact had a large surplus in the midst of heaviest bombing towards end of the war. There bottlenecks were manpower to man it (this was shared by many others, esp. UK and surprisingly - USSR), and fuel to drive it.

If production would be less hard hit the Germans would likely produce more - but again in all likelyhood, it would just end up storage.

There is no doubt that Germany had more aircraft than it fuel to power and pilots to fly them but there was a serious shortage of equiment for the Army. To few tanks, guns, small arms you name it.

 

[Tante Ju]

To few tanks, guns, small arms you name it.

That is not correct. Tanks actually was surplus.

Take a look at Sepp Dietrich SS Panzer units. Rebuilt completely after Normandy, rebuilt completely after Ardennes, Rebuilt after Spring 1945 offensive for example. 3 times in less than a year. The losses were extremely heavy but like the Luftwaffe, the Heer kept increasing in numbers despite those losses (and bombings). The Germans were quick to plug in the gaps in the equipment and this would be impossible without the production quotas achieved in 1944.

Fuel, manpower and to a lesser extent, transportation were the bottlenecks.

 

[Glider]

SS Panzer units had I believe an absolute priority on equipment. The regular army units paying the price for this priority. Had they had surplus the army units would have been maintained at full strength

 

[parsifal]

One only has to look at the shortages experienced by Guderian as he struggled to rebuild the panzer Units to know that the Heer was chronically short of equipment. The authorized strength of of a Panzer Div in 1944 was intended to be 180 tanks, but because of shortages went to war considered as full strength 9even though even by German standards it was not) with an average of just over 100 tanks. The Germans time and again for their line units were forced to accept a depressing array second rate foreign castoffs. For example a number of the Infantry formations garrisoning Holland were issued venerable Swharscloze MG dating back to 1889. Many Divisions on the Eastern Front were forced to accept as their artillery parks non-standard ordinance mostly of the captured variety. A few even had nothing more than a few 120mm mortars as their "artillery regiment" Truck allocations for the Infantry fell through the floor in 1943-4, from an average of around 880 for a standard Infantry Div in 1941 down to less than 200 in 1943-4. By comparison a british Infantry Div had well over 3000 MT attached. Every category of weapon faced shortages. Some of the glaringly obvious ones were MT, Tanks, artillery and small arms. Less obvious were the shortages of rolling stock and prime movers for the State railways. At the end threre were shortages that limited ammunition supply as well.

the germans were ineed short of manpower, thats true, but saying they had plenty of weapons is just palpably incorrect. Their armed forces were chronically and acutely short of equipment.

 

[parsifal]

According to CD Winchester "Advancing Backwards: The Demodernization of the German Army in World War 2", makes the following observations with regard to weapons and transport availability for the german armed forces.

"It looked very different from the other side of the front-line. ....successive TOEs (Tables of Organization and Equipment) reveal, a high proportion of the German army relied on horse-drawn vehicles throughout the war. German tanks were of excellent quality, but their numbers dwindled. In September 1939 the authorized strength of a panzer division included 328 tanks, reduced to 165 by 1943 and to just 54 in 1945. The war ended before this could be effected, some formations fighting on at about 1944 establishment, many others reduced to fighting on foot. Many elite panzer and panzer-grenadier formations spent considerable periods as infantry formations due to losses and shoirtages of supply. a process of 'demodernization' that had profound consequences. The turnover in personnel was equally fearsome, many of the better German formations suffering annual losses equal to their entire strength in enlisted men and 150% of their officers.

Hitler effectively had two armies in 1939: a modern core of panzer divisions and infantry formations with motor transport columns and vehicle-drawn heavy weapons, plus an unmechanized mass of infantry divisions. Even that degree of modernization was achieved by pressing captured Czech tanks into service in 1940. More were added after the fall of France. The number of panzer divisions was doubled, but only by the expedient of reducing them to one tank regiment each.

Attrition in Russia


The German army found itself increasingly outnumbered on all fronts. Although production totals for tanks and aircraft did increase rapidly after 1942, Allied production soared. Despite controlling most of Europe's manufacturing resources — including the USSR's industrial heartland in the Donbas— Germany failed to reap much benefit and production targets from domestic sources fell well short of targets in part due to bombing. Domestic supply was insufficient to meet the equipment needs of the armed forces. For instance, the French aviation industry was brought under German control to manufacture, among other types, Fieseler Fi-156 Storch spotter/liaison aircraft and parts for the Junkers Ju-52. But its production rate never exceeded ten per cent of pre-war totals.

Air support deteriorated as the Luftwaffe became entangled in an increasingly costly defensive fight against British and American bomber raids. German bomber production tailed off during 1943 as resources were concentrated on fighters — and the much vaunted 'V' weapons. The German army had come to rely on air support to compensate for its numerical inferiority on the Russian front, so the absence of the Luftwaffe was keenly felt. However, the devotion of the Luftwaffe to immediate tactical crises had helped prevent the emergence of a strategic air arm. Even when key economic targets were within the limited range of Germany's twin-engine bombers, little attention was given to attacking them. Russian industry was largely untroubled by the Luftwaffe while the Ruhr was subjected to increasingly devastating raids by RAF Bomber Command and the US 8th Air Force. In early fall 1942 Russia's oil fields lay within reach of the Luftwaffe, but until the very eve of the Russian winter offensive, Hitler still clung to the idea he could capture them. Baku was not blitzed.

Military professionalism, economic amateurism

In reality the German wartime economy was a mess of competing and overlapping bureaucracies that did not respond well to the challenges of the strategic attacks made against it. Nazi officials jockeyed for position. A sharp pair of elbows was required in what Hitler viewed as a Darwinian struggle for survival; but the fittest did not survive, just the corrupt and self-serving. Albert Speer imposed some much needed central direction from his appointment in 1942, but the Russians had been granted breathing space to relocate their industry.

Perversely, the German army's close involvement in the procurement process contributed to the shortages. Whereas the Allies involved civilians at the earliest stages of the war, the development of radar and signals intelligence being good examples of civilian contribution, in Germany the army was able to dictate to the factories. Some very high quality equipment emerged, the Tiger, the Panther, the MG42 machine gun, but there was a terrible downside: many items were over-engineered, produced in small production runs and subject to endless minor modifications which meant they were no longer interchangeable. For great successes like the MG42 there were expensive failures like the Me-210 twin-engine fighter or the He-177 bomber.

Take one minor, but important item: the humble track fitted to the American M3 and German Sdkfz 251 'Hanomag' half-track vehicles. The American track consists of two steel cables with reinforcing crossbars molded into a single unit by vulcanised rubber. It wears out after 1,500 miles but is quickly and easily replaced. Its German equivalent is far better engineered, like comparing a BMW part to something off a tractor. It comprises individual steel crossbars rendered into a continuous link by a series of pins. Each pin is held in position by needle bearings. The German track is stronger and longer lasting, but requires considerably more man-hours to build. And if you drive over a mine, neither type will survive.

Even the magnificent Tiger had feet of clay. Gas-thirsty, its massive Maybach powerplant was superbly made but the strain of driving such an enormous vehicle, especially if one Tiger had to tow another, could damage them beyond local repair. But few spare engines were made, just one per ten complete new tanks. Many of Germany's best tanks spent a large part of their service life in transit from the front-line to workshops in Germany. The situation worsened as logistic services broke down in the face of Allied air superiority. A US tank commander recalled, 'Almost half the Tiger tanks we ran into during our division's advance across Europe were abandoned either due to mechanical problems or lack of fuel'.

German ingenuity produced an endless succession of field expedients to compensate for the lack of armor. Most types of captured French tank were used as the basis for self-propelled anti-tank guns or artillery pieces; obsolete German tank chassis served in the same roles. Of these, one proved to be perhaps the most effective tank destroyer of the war: based on the Pz. 38(t), the Hetzer was small, easily concealed and mounted a 75mm gun. Better yet, it was mass produced with some 2,500 leaving the Skoda works by 1945. However, many others were clumsy, unreliable and only a few hundred of each were built. Spare parts were a nightmare.


Impact at the front
It was easier to supply the army in defence of static positions or during an orderly retreat, but the absence of transport exacerbated the consequences of defeat. At Stalingrad, a phased withdrawal towards von Manstein would have been terribly difficult, even had Hitler permitted it......"

 

[tomo pauk]

Thanks for posting the excerpts, parsifal.

 

[Tante Ju]

Inventories of the four main types of German tanks - as of 1st January 1944 / 1st January 1945.

Pz IV: 1668 / 1684
Panther: 1177 / 2151
Tiger I : 409 / 276
Tiger II: 0 / 195

Total: 3254 / 4306

Figures speak for themselves.

 

[tomo pauk]

Many thanks for posting the graphs.

Panther + Pz-IV are produced, monthly in 1944, to some 650 copies (T-34: almost 1170). The Tiger I + II: some 100 pcs monthly until Sept 1944, under 50 pcs after that. IS-2: almost 190 monthly in 1944. Soviets also built 200 pcs of ISU-122/152, monthly in 1944, the German JagdPanther JagdTiger production combined was some 500 pcs for the 1944-45.

Now I know that amount of produced tanks AFV does not mean that Soviets were able to muster 2:1 numerical advantage in battlefield, but a comfortable 2:1 production advantage is not something that should be take lightly. Especially if one fights 2 another major powers, having far less artillery, without air superiority enough fuel.

 

[Jenisch]

The Germans practically no had tanks in the EF by 1944.

 

[Vincenzo]

The Germans practically no had tanks in the EF by 1944.

31st may '44 panzer units strenght in EF: 603 Pz IV, 313 Pz V, 298 Pz VI
it's true that all the units were in low strenght, only the Wiking had a little more of 100 tanks

 

[stona]

31st may '44 panzer units strenght in EF: 603 Pz IV, 313 Pz V, 298 Pz VI
it's true that all the units were in low strenght, only the Wiking had a little more of 100 tanks

What were these strengths it in September after the collapse in Normandy and the carnage of the "Falaise pocket"?
Production started declining from the summer of 1944 onwards and continued to fall until the end of the war.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Tante Ju]

What were these strengths it in September after the collapse in Normandy and the carnage of the "Falaise pocket"?
Production started declining from the summer of 1944 onwards and continued to fall until the end of the war.
Cheers
Steve

On the Eastern Front...? Inventory is on the Graphs, not including Pz IIIs and StuG/StuH/JPz...

German army armored strenght as of 15 January 1945.

Panzer III (5 and 7,5 cm) 534
Panzer IV (7,5 cm) 1 684
Panther (7,5 cm) 2 151[189]
Tiger E (8,8 cm) 276
Tiger B (8,8 cm) 195
Assault Guns and Assault Howitzers: 1 213
Total: 6 053

Yeah right, six thousend tanks and assault guns being a 'shortage'...


Anyone who thinks units were ever fully filled up with armor materiel on the Eastern Front, on either sides simply kids himself. Units were experienced severe combat and losses, and were usually down to a few dozen tanks even if previously they had 200 a few weeks before.. But let's look at Soviet side from available documents for comparison.

Soviet armored strenghts for 1st Guards mech. corps, 23rd tank corps, 18 tank corps as of 1st February 1945 (combined for the three corps)

T-34s: 13
M4A2: 50
IS-2: 26
SU 85: 22
SU 100: 17
ISU 122 6
ISU 152: 8

Or 142 in total.

These units were hammered heavily in previous fightings and their losses were severe. Now in contrast to this reality, a Soviet mech. corps TOE authorized 3 x 21 SU 76/85/122 and 183 medium tanks (246 in toal(, and a single tank corps was supposed to have the same 3 x 21 SU 76/85/122 plus 207 medium tanks (270 in total).

Now it follows that these two Soviet tanks corps and the mech. corps was supposed to have no less than 597 medium tanks (instead of thirteen T34s and fifty Shermans..) and no less than 189 SUs (instead of 31). The 1st and 5th Guards cav. corps did not even have any tanks anymore.

Units down on strenght were hardly only a German headache on the EF... just to put it into reality world vs. thoughts of armchair historians who believe units actually were anywhere near their TOE. Yeah, those who did not fight. AFAIK even those US armored formations were very badly down on armor by the time ardennes offenzive, and they had only a bit of fighting for couple of months, not 3+ years of savage bloodletting on the Eastern Front. So all this wording of the 'carnage of Falaise...' by who's standards? Everyday rearguard action by Eastern Front standards... the Red Army lost about a hundred tanks on avarage daily during the siege of Berlin...

 

[Vincenzo]

What were these strengths it in September after the collapse in Normandy and the carnage of the "Falaise pocket"?
Production started declining from the summer of 1944 onwards and continued to fall until the end of the war.
Cheers
Steve

that the tank production was declining, probably is best tell from the fall '44, is obvious the germans were loss ground the bombing gain intensify.
However this are the numbers, this are for tanks in the EF not the same of previous ( (total) of strenght of panzer units)
31/5/44: 307 Tigers, 292 Panthers, 771 Pz IV; (include tanks need repair)
30/9/44: 267 Tigers, 721 Panthers, 579 Pz IV; (the % of need repair is higher)
30/12/44: 261 Tigers, 726 Panthers, 768 Pz IV (the % need trpair is around the same of september)

 

[parsifal]

Many of the socalled "available" in the German army were also laughably not ready for combat. I recall somwhere a report of a Panther listed as ready for combat.....it had no tracks, no engine and the turret was not functioning.

During the advance on Moscow, in 1941, the Germans still had over 3000 tanks in their frontline inventories, yet Guderian was complaining that his formation, 2Pz was down to about 30 tanks as true runners. Even then there were shortages that were affecting true German tank strengths. A shortage of reconditioned engines, gearboxesand the like. There were tanks strewn allover Russia, still listed as operational, but in reality not functioning. In the case of the 1941-2 period, it took a lull in the fighting which allowed a partial recovery. In the finish about 60-70% of the (in reality) non-operational tanks were returned to service, but fully 30-40% were not. History shows what the the Germans were forced to do. The norther mobile units were stripped out of MT manpower and tanks, to reinfoce 4 Panzer Army, which led the 1942 southern offensive.

In 1944-5 there was no such respite. Many of the so-called runners were in fact non-operational. Moreover there was no longer the MT neded to keep the fortmations supplied properly. Spare parts, particulalry engines were in acute short supply. Fuel also, of course was very scare. Bombing accounted, or was responsible for many of these shortages.

There are lies, damn lies, statistics, and there is German propaganda prepared mostly for Hitlers consumption.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

There are lies, damn lies, statistics, and there is German propaganda prepared mostly for Hitlers consumption.

I was thinking the same thing. The wrong report to Hitler could be bad for your health.

 

[Milosh]

What is the source for your numbers Tante Ju?

 

[Vincenzo]

My source is Panzertruppen of Jentz, from this book came also the tables posted from Tante Ju. Also the situation 15th jan '45 there is on that book but is stated as 1st january

 

[Tante Ju]

There are lies, damn lies, statistics, and there is German propaganda prepared mostly for Hitlers consumption.

And also people with opinion measured against the figures supplied by one of the most authoritive figure on German armor, Thomas Jentz... (may he rest in piece for all the good research he made during his labourous life )

 

[stona]

Still asking the wrong question.
How many tanks,armoured vehicles and motor transports would have been available to the Wermacht,with the fuel to run them and spares to keep them going had there been no bombing?
Cheers
Steve