British bomber development in regards to long range fighters.

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I certainly agree that Curtiss was not involved in the design of the P-51. The question is are the similarities in the radiator design an example of convergent evolution or do the designs share the same roots (ie NACA).

The evolution in research papers were 1.) Meredith, 2.) Capon and 3.) Gothert (as translated by NACA). The major collaboration between NACA and NAA was developing wind tunnel test conditions too model non-operational configurations to investigate flow properties on the 1/4 scale model - using various size baffle plates to simulate the radiator internally - then much more when the full scale XP-51B was sent to Ames to investigate 'the Rumble' March/April 1943.

The key differentiator was the plenum design, the intake scoop and the variable geometry exit gate to accommodate high speed jet effect (closed-low drag) while also serving low speed/climb cooling (open-high drag).

Curtiss never figured out the upper lip/gutter effect to strip low energy BL from the intake plenum and radiator, nor did they figure out that the exhaust plenum needed length and variable geometry exit (Ditto Spit, all Bf 109 through E, Hurricane, etc.). It also took NAA two years to finally design an enduring cooling system that made major strides in reducing high speed cooling drag
 
To be fair to Ludlow-Hewitt

I have read that as a result of his continuous criticisms of the state of BC, most justified in terms of the weaknesses exposed within the first year of the war, he was regarded by many as too much of a pessimist, but what he argued for was what BC needed, better navigation, better gunnery etc. He was realistic, and it would take the war and successive changes of policy and C-in-Cs before what he complained about would change.
 
"At least he was a realist. Whilst he eventually got his wish for a central gunnery school, and the RAF under Harris began to improve accuracy with the addition of advanced navigation and bombing aids - another of Ludlow-Hewitt's bugbears about the contemporary pre-war BC, he then added the following, which was, promptly ignored:

"Experience in China and Spain seems clearly to indicate that with the aircraft in use in these theatres of war at present , Fighter Escorts are considered absolutely essential for the protection of bomber aircraft. So far as I am aware this policy runs counter to the view long held by the Air Staff."
And he was, basically correct. Even when the RAF operated at night, there were cases where they employed night fighters to protect bombers in the following ways
  • Stalk the airfields where night-fighters operated: They would generally blow away an aircraft some point after takeoff.
  • Intrude into enemy airspace and attack night-fighters
  • Find the bomber stream and take out anything that gets too close to the bombers for comfort
The last item on the list is an escort mission, the second to last isn't an escort mission but it would require the range to penetrate into enemy territory
Wing Commander Goddard, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee on Spain, which was reprinted and circulated again in 1939. He had been invited on a fact fighting mission to Spain by the Republican War Minister. Goddard reported, "The escort of bomber formations proceeding to and from their objective by double, or more than double, their number of fighters, has been found by both sides to be a necessity, notwithstanding the ability of the bomber to shoot down fighters." Goddard did qualify this bold statement pointing out that bombers could defend themselves with speed and their forward and rearward gun defences, "Bomber crews were confident in their ability to bring down fighters and many successes by bombers were claimed."
Most British observers in Spain argues that the short ranges of the missions meant that such 'lessons' from Spain did not apply.
And that statement was dead-wrong. While fighters would have to fly far to escort the bomber, the interceptors would not have to fly far at all. They're operating within 100-200 miles from home and can respond just as aggressively if you attacked from 100-200 miles or longer. The extra range simply means you will not be in the enemy's fire until the last 100-200 miles, and that's where the fighters will earn their pay.
The reason that the British conception of an escort tended towards a heavily armed bomber rather than a fighter was because, in on going discussions through the 1930s, they could not see any way an escort fighter could be made fast enough, manoeuvrable enough or sufficiently long ranged to accompany bombers on deep penetration raids into Germany.
Also, there's different schools of thought...
  1. The average fighter pilot and dyed in the wool fighter-general would see this issue in a simple way: It should perform as any other fighter, just one that can fly really far.
    • Low hanging fruit such as drop-tanks should be exploited to the maximum extent possible. Every pound of internal fuel that can be kept from takeoff to the start of combat stretches our legs further!
    • Altitude performance should be set to that of the bombers: If the bombers have a critical altitude of 15000-25000 feet, that's what our fighters need to be able to do at least.
    • No rear-gunners: Every time we tried that before, the gunner was useless, either getting pinned or outright knocked out. As long as we're nimble enough, so too will be our guns (USAAC)
  2. The bomber-baron would see this issue as...
    • The plane needs to be able to fly large distances, so as to be able to provide an effective escort
    • Drop tanks are undesirable because fighter pilots would just punch them off and dump with it all the extra range the tanks would have provided
    • The aircraft should have a rear-gun at minimum so it can act like a flying-gunboat to help protect the bombers, while maintaining the speed and agility of a day-fighter; or be a flying gunship, and if possible -- still be more maneuverable and faster than the bomber
    • The altitude capabilities have to be tied to the bombers: There's no point of producing a fighter that tops out at 15000 feet when our bombers are topping out at 25000.
There would also be people in between these views.
 
I suspect the fighter and bomber communities in the USAAC had an even worse split: the USAAC seemed to be of the belief that fighters were superfluous, and bombers could defend themselves without any fighter escort.

When tried, this did not work.

Then, the USAAF tried abominations like the YB-40, which were supposed to be all the escort needed. They found, pretty quickly, that didn't work.
 
He believed in destroying the enemy air force first, before starting on terror bombing.
That's true, but if he couldn't take them out on the ground, he was for escorts to take them out while they were in the air.
 
Why was this so? The RAF had fanatical views as well...
Ever read Eric Hogger's book, "The True Believer"? It's old and musty, but it captures the psychology of the ideologue and his unwillingness to let facts get in the way of his beliefs. Such indiduals as Napoleon, Lenin, Hitler, and our current fuehrer have always been well aware of the workings of this phenomenon.
Cheers,
Wes
 
Ever read Eric Hogger's book, "The True Believer"? It's old and musty, but it captures the psychology of the ideologue and his unwillingness to let facts get in the way of his beliefs.
In a way, almost all of the air-power types were fanatical.

Trenchard, Douhet, Mitchell, Portal, Harris, LeMay, and so on: Part of me suspects that we didn't really have to fend off the US from threats like the Europeans did might have affected our fighter attitude.
 

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